discussed standard in Ohio

2005In Davis, 77 Ohio St.3d at 416 -417 , the court discussed the requirement of a "change in circumstances" and emphasized that a trial court's finding of whether a change in circumstances has occurred must not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.

2001In Davis , 77 Ohio St.3d at 416—417, 674 N.E.2d at 1161 , the court discussed the requirement of a “change in circumstances” and emphasized that a trial court’s finding of whether a change in circumstances has occurred must not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.

2002In Albain v. Flower Hospital (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 251 , 553 N.E.2d 1038 , paragraph two of the syllabus, the court discussed the claim of negligent credentialing as follows: {¶ 30} “ ‘[A] hospital has a direct duty to grant and to continue such privileges only to competent physicians.

2002In Albain v. Flower Hospital (1990), 50 Ohio St.3d 251 , 553 N.E.2d 1038 , paragraph two of the syllabus, the court discussed the claim of negligent credentialing as follows: {¶ 30} “ ‘[A] hospital has a direct duty to grant and to continue such privileges only to competent physicians.

2000Auth. (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 202 , 206 , 207 , 12 O.O. 3d 198, 201, 202, 389 N.E.2d 1013 , 116-117 , this court discussed the standard of review which the common pleas court should employ in reviewing an agency's order stating that the common pleas court must weigh the evidence in the record and may consider new or additional evidence.

1998Auth. (1979), 58 Ohio St.2d 202, 206-207 , 12 O.O.3d 198, 201-202 , 389 N.E.2d 1113, 1116-1117 , this court discussed the standard of review which the common pleas court should employ in reviewing an agency’s order, stating that the common pleas court must weigh the evidence in the record and may consider new or additional evidence.

2024Cuyahoga No. 88867, 2007-Ohio-5072, ¶ 19 , when it summarized the Ohio Supreme Court decision of Vahila v. Hall, 77 Ohio St.3d 421 , 674 N.E.2d 1164 (1997), stating: “[T]he Ohio Supreme Court defined the elements that must be established to make a case for legal malpractice.

2024Cuyahoga No. 88867, 2007-Ohio-5072, ¶ 19 , when it summarized the Ohio Supreme Court decision of Vahila v. Hall, 77 Ohio St.3d 421 , 674 N.E.2d 1164 (1997), stating: “[T]he Ohio Supreme Court defined the elements that must be established to make a case for legal malpractice.

2006O'Brien v. Angley (1980), 63 Ohio St.2d 159 , 163." {¶ 12} The admission and exclusion of evidence at trial is left to the discretion of the trial court.

2000O'Brien v. Angley (1980), 63 Ohio St.2d 159 , 163 , 407 N.E.2d 490 . * * *.

2003In State v. Jones (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 335 , 339-40 , 744 N.E.2d 1163 , the court discussed the requirement of a jury composed of a cross-section of the community as follows: "`[T]he selection of a petit jury from a representative cross section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.' Taylor v. Louisiana (1975), 419 U.S. 522 , 528 , 95 S.Ct. 692 , 697 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 , 697 .

2003In State v. Jones (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 335 , 339-40 , 744 N.E.2d 1163 , the court discussed the requirement of a jury composed of a cross-section of the community as follows: "`[T]he selection of a petit jury from a representative cross section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.' Taylor v. Louisiana (1975), 419 U.S. 522 , 528 , 95 S.Ct. 692 , 697 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 , 697 .

2003In State v. Jones (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 335 , 339-40 , 744 N.E.2d 1163 , the court discussed the requirement of a jury composed of a cross-section of the community as follows: "`[T]he selection of a petit jury from a representative cross section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.' Taylor v. Louisiana (1975), 419 U.S. 522 , 528 , 95 S.Ct. 692 , 697 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 , 697 .

2003In State v. Jones (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 335 , 339-40 , 744 N.E.2d 1163 , the court discussed the requirement of a jury composed of a cross-section of the community as follows: "`[T]he selection of a petit jury from a representative cross section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.' Taylor v. Louisiana (1975), 419 U.S. 522 , 528 , 95 S.Ct. 692 , 697 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 , 697 .

2024Cuyahoga No. 88867, 2007-Ohio-5072, ¶ 19 , when it summarized the Ohio Supreme Court decision of Vahila v. Hall, 77 Ohio St.3d 421 , 674 N.E.2d 1164 (1997), stating: “[T]he Ohio Supreme Court defined the elements that must be established to make a case for legal malpractice.

2021Stark No. 2004-Ohio-1570 at ¶ 23-24: Pursuant to the law of the case doctrine, “[a]fter a reviewing court has reversed and remanded a cause for further action in the trial court, and the unsuccessful party does not prosecute review to the Supreme Court, the pronouncement of the law by the intermediate court becomes the law of the case, and must be followed by the lower court in subsequent proceedings in that case.” Pavlides v. Niles Gun Show, Inc., (1996), 112 Ohio App.3d 609, 615 , 679 N.E.2d 728 .

2021Stark No. 2004-Ohio-1570 at ¶ 23-24: Pursuant to the law of the case doctrine, “[a]fter a reviewing court has reversed and remanded a cause for further action in the trial court, and the unsuccessful party does not prosecute review to the Supreme Court, the pronouncement of the law by the intermediate court becomes the law of the case, and must be followed by the lower court in subsequent proceedings in that case.” Pavlides v. Niles Gun Show, Inc., (1996), 112 Ohio App.3d 609, 615 , 679 N.E.2d 728 .

2021Stark No. 2004-Ohio-1570 at ¶ 23-24: Pursuant to the law of the case doctrine, “[a]fter a reviewing court has reversed and remanded a cause for further action in the trial court, and the unsuccessful party does not prosecute review to the Supreme Court, the pronouncement of the law by the intermediate court becomes the law of the case, and must be followed by the lower court in subsequent proceedings in that case.” Pavlides v. Niles Gun Show, Inc., (1996), 112 Ohio App.3d 609, 615 , 679 N.E.2d 728 .

2019No. 05AP-242, 2006-Ohio-946, ¶ 16 , quoting Fiocca v. Fiocca, 10th Dist.

2017State v. Mabry, supra; State v. Ward, 2017-Ohio-1391 , __N.E.3d__ (2d Dist.) (Donovan, J., dissenting.) {¶ 47} In State v. Ward, for example, we stated, in a situation where the trial court did not make specific findings regarding the discussed factors, “there is no reason here to remand, as the record indicates there were no coercive police procedures nor was Ward placed in handcuffs or in custody in any way.

2017State v. Mabry, supra; State v. Ward, 2017-Ohio-1391 , __N.E.3d__ (2d Dist.) (Donovan, J., dissenting.) {¶ 47} In State v. Ward, for example, we stated, in a situation where the trial court did not make specific findings regarding the discussed factors, “there is no reason here to remand, as the record indicates there were no coercive police procedures nor was Ward placed in handcuffs or in custody in any way.

2016Still, that line cannot be said to be bright or sharply defined.” State v. Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 519 , 849 N.E.2d 985 , 2006-Ohio-3255 , ¶ 22. {¶ 15} In Farris, the court discussed factors to consider in making the decision whether an intermediate Miranda warning can be sufficient, including “the completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the first round of interrogation, the overlapping content of the two statements, the timing and setting of the first and the second, the continuity of police personnel, and the degree to which the interrogator's questions treated the second roun

2016Still, that line cannot be said to be bright or sharply defined.” State v. Farris, 109 Ohio St.3d 519 , 849 N.E.2d 985 , 2006-Ohio-3255 , ¶ 22. {¶ 15} In Farris, the court discussed factors to consider in making the decision whether an intermediate Miranda warning can be sufficient, including “the completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the first round of interrogation, the overlapping content of the two statements, the timing and setting of the first and the second, the continuity of police personnel, and the degree to which the interrogator's questions treated the second roun

2016In Zan, supra, the determinative factor for finding that the defendant’s post-Miranda statements were voluntarily given was the consensual nature of the first interrogation.

2014No. 13AP-167, 2014-Ohio-666, ¶ 16-17 , this court discussed the standard of review applicable to felony sentencing decisions: This court reviews a trial court's sentence to determine if it is clearly and convincingly contrary to law.

2011State v. Ross (1999), 135 Ohio App.3d 262 , 733 N.E.2d 659 .

2011State v. Ross (1999), 135 Ohio App.3d 262 , 733 N.E.2d 659 .

2009Penney , supra. We stated: {¶ 71} "The court correctly cited the seminal case of Yeager v. Local Union 20 (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 369 .

2009Penney , supra. We stated: {¶ 71} "The court correctly cited the seminal case of Yeager v. Local Union 20 (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 369 .

2007Vol. III, at 572.) The court then polled each member of the jury individually, and each juror gave a positive response to the court's inquiry. *Page 17 {¶ 47} In Cleveland v. Gonzalez , Cuyahoga App. No. 85070, 2005-Ohio-4413 , at ¶ 44 , the court discussed the standard of review for an appellate court following a trial court's ruling on a motion for mistrial, stating in relevant part: The standard of review for evaluating a trial judge's decision to grant or deny a mistrial is abuse of discretion.

2007Chambers v. Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. *Page 7 (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 123 * * * The doctrine is designed to prevent a plaintiff from using a liberal venue statute to vex, oppress or harass a defendant by bringing a suit in a forum unrelated to the parties or cause of action.

2007State v. Sage (1987), 31 Ohio St.3d 173 , 182 * * * Mistrials need to be declared only when the ends of justice so require and a fair trial is no longer possible.

2007Hartt v. Munobe (1993), 67 Ohio St.3d 3 , 5-6 .

2007Accordingly, we review the trial court's decision under normal forum non conveniens analysis. {¶ 17} In Lee v. Burnett , Franklin App. No. 07AP-40, 2007-Ohio-3742 , at ¶ 8-9 , this court discussed the doctrine of forum non conveniens, including the relevant factors to be considered in determining whether to dismiss an action, stating as follows: * * * The doctrine of forum non conveniens permits a court to dismiss an action in order to further the ends of justice and to promote the convenience of the parties, even though jurisdiction and venue are proper in the court chosen by the plaintiff.

2006No. C-030897, 2004-Ohio-5726 , at ¶ 9, the court discussed the requirement of "deep lung" air as follows: {¶ 38} "As the Ohio Supreme Court noted in State v. Steele [(1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 187 , 190 ], the reason for waiting twenty minutes before testing a suspect is to eliminate the possibility that the test result is a product of anything other than the suspect's deep lung breath.

2006No. C-030897, 2004-Ohio-5726 , at ¶ 9, the court discussed the requirement of "deep lung" air as follows: {¶ 38} "As the Ohio Supreme Court noted in State v. Steele [(1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 187 , 190 ], the reason for waiting twenty minutes before testing a suspect is to eliminate the possibility that the test result is a product of anything other than the suspect's deep lung breath.

2006In Miller v. Lindsay-Green, Inc., Franklin App. No. 04AP-848, 2005-Ohio-6366, at ¶ 52 , this court discussed that standard as follows: * * * Pursuant to Civ.R. 50(A), "a motion for directed verdict is granted if, after construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion is directed, `reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion upon the evidence submitted and that conclusion is adverse to such party.' " Goodyear Tire Rubber Co. v. Aetna Cas.

2006Therefore, I find that the defendant is a sexual predator." {¶ 29} It is quite apparent that the trial court did little more than adopt Dr. Dyer's testimony as to those factors that in her judgment increased the risk of recidivism, and further observed that McKenzie had fulfilled the "likelihood" component of the sexual predator definition by actually committing another sexually oriented offense after having recently pleaded guilty to two such offenses. {¶ 30} Bearing in mind that the discussion requirement imposed upon trial courts by Eppinger is to "aid appellate courts in reviewing the evid