plain language analysis in New Jersey

2026We begin with the plain language of the rule, and "ascribe to the [words of the rule] their ordinary meaning and significance . . . and read them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the [court rules] as a whole." Wiese v. Dedhia, 188 N.J. 587, 592 (2006) (alterations in original) (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)). [DiFiore v. Pezic, 254 N.J. 212 , 228 (2023).] Having considered the record and the applicable law, we affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by the judge during the July 7, 2025 hearing.

2026"When interpreting court rules, we ordinarily apply cannons of statutory construction [and] . . . , as with a statute, the analysis must A-2265-23 14 begin with the plain language of the rule." Wiese v. Dedhia, 188 N.J. 587, 592 (2006).

2026We begin with the plain language of the rule, and "ascribe to the [words of the rule] their ordinary meaning and significance . . . and read them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the [court rules] as a whole." Wiese v. Dedhia, 188 N.J. 587, 592 (2006) (alterations in original) (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)). [DiFiore v. Pezic, 254 N.J. 212 , 228 (2023).] Having considered the record and the applicable law, we affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by the judge during the July 7, 2025 hearing.

2023We begin with the plain language of the rule, and “ascribe to the [words of the rule] their ordinary meaning and significance . . . and read them in context with related provisions so as to give sense to the [court rules] as a whole.” Wiese v. Dedhia, 188 N.J. 587, 592 (2006) (alterations in original) (quoting DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492 (2005)).

2025"Should the plain language analysis yield more than one plausible interpretation of the regulation, a reviewing court may consider extrinsic sources, including 'the long-standing meaning ascribed to the language by the agency charged with its enforcement.'" In re Eastwick, 225 N.J. at 542 (quoting Bedford v. Riello, 195 N.J. 210, 222 (2008)).

2016Should the plain language analysis yield more than one plausible interpretation of the regulation, a reviewing court may consider extrinsic sources, including “the long-standing meaning ascribed to the language by the agency charged with its enforcement.” Bedford, supra, 195 N.J. at 222, 948 A.2d 1272 (citing Malone v. Fender, 80 N.J. 129, 137-38 , 402 A.2d 240 (1979)).

2025In State v. Drury, 190 N.J. 197, 211 (2007), our Supreme Court held that carjacking is not simply a variety of robbery under a plain language analysis of the two statutes.

2020Finally, Mr. Mitchell testified that the carjacker who dragged him out of the truck was wearing something gray and, indeed, [Abdul-Matin] was wearing a gray hooded sweatshirt on the night of the incident. [(citations omitted).] A-0849-18T1 13 The judge also rejected Abdul-Matin's specific claim that trial counsel was ineffective by not moving "to dismiss the robbery count[s]" on the ground that "there was no evidence that defendants attempted to steal anything other than the Silverado." The judge reasoned that because "carjacking and robbery are separate [and] distinct charges[,]" trial counse

2019See DiProspero v. Penn , 183 N.J. 477 , 492, 874 A.2d 1039 (2005) ("A court should not 'resort to extrinsic interpretative aids' when 'the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, and susceptible to only one interpretation.' " (quoting Lozano v. Frank DeLuca Const. , 178 N.J. 513 , 522, 842 A.2d 156 (2004) ) ).

2019See DiProspero v. Penn , 183 N.J. 477 , 492, 874 A.2d 1039 (2005) ("A court should not 'resort to extrinsic interpretative aids' when 'the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, and susceptible to only one interpretation.' " (quoting Lozano v. Frank DeLuca Const. , 178 N.J. 513 , 522, 842 A.2d 156 (2004) ) ).

2025See also State v. Garretson, 313 N.J.

2024Rule 1:21-1(c) states that, unless otherwise permitted by other court rules, "an entity, however formed and for whatever purpose, other than a sole proprietorship shall neither appear nor file any paper in any action in any court of this State except through an attorney authorized to practice in this State." Thus, "Rule 1:21-1(c), with certain exceptions not applicable here, provides that a business entity, other than a sole proprietorship, is required to appear in court through an attorney authorized to practice law in the State." Gobe Media Grp., LLC v. Cisneros, 403 N.J.

2020When both a plain language analysis and the use of extrinsic evidence do not resolve an ambiguity in a penal statute, "the ambiguity [must] be resolved in favor of the defendant." Rodriguez, 238 N.J. at 114 (quoting State v. Regis, 208 N.J. 439, 451 (2011)).

2019In the oft-cited federal case of International Business Machines Corp. v. Edelstein, 526 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir. 1975) ("IBM"), in which the parties anticipated there would be hundreds of witnesses, a dispute arose regarding access to witnesses for interviews.

2019The Court based its holding in Tier on the plain language of the rule, as well as "the confidentiality concerns raised by disclosure of work product." The Court stressed "one of the underlying principles on which our criminal justice system is based," namely that "a defendant 'has an absolute, unqualified right to 45 A-3479-18T4 compel the State to investigate its own case, find its own witnesses, prove its own facts, and convince the jury through its own resources.'" Id. at 563 (quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 112 (1970) (Black, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part)).

2019Office of Att'y Ethics, 224 N.J. 470, 484 (2016) (applying "familiar canons of statutory construction to interpret the court rules[,] . . . look[ing] first to the plain language of the rule[] and giv[ing] the words their ordinary meaning") (citations omitted).

2017Therefore, under the plain language of the rule, appellant was not unavailable." Davis v. Texas, 961 S.W.2d 156, 156-57 (Tex. Crim.

2017App. 1998) (applying similar language from the previous version of the rule); see also Castro v. Texas, 914 S.W.2d 159, 163 (Tex. App. 1995) (holding that the defendant's testimony from a prior trial was inadmissible hearsay when 8 A-0545-16T4 offered by the defendant who invoked his right not to testify at the trial; a court is not required to permit a defendant "to offer self-serving evidence to the jury without facing cross- examination by the State.").

2016Should the plain language analysis yield more than one plausible interpretation of the regulation, a reviewing court may consider extrinsic sources, including “the long-standing meaning ascribed to the language by the agency charged with its enforcement.” Bedford, supra, 195 N.J. at 222, 948 A.2d 1272 (citing Malone v. Fender, 80 N.J. 129, 137-38 , 402 A.2d 240 (1979)).

2016If, however, the regulation’s “language is clear, then the interpretative process will end without resort to extrinsic sources.” Ibid.; see also U.S. Bank, N.A., supra, 210 N.J. at 199 , 42 A.3d 870 (quoting Bedford, supra, 195 N.J. at 222, 948 A.2d 1272 ); In re Election Law Enft, supra, 201 N.J. at 263 , 989 A.2d 1254 (citing DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492-93 , 874 A.2d 1039 (2005)); Lozano v. Frank DeLuca Constr., 178 N.J. 513, 522 , 842 A.2d 156 *543 (2004).

2016If, however, the regulation’s “language is clear, then the interpretative process will end without resort to extrinsic sources.” Ibid.; see also U.S. Bank, N.A., supra, 210 N.J. at 199 , 42 A.3d 870 (quoting Bedford, supra, 195 N.J. at 222, 948 A.2d 1272 ); In re Election Law Enft, supra, 201 N.J. at 263 , 989 A.2d 1254 (citing DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492-93 , 874 A.2d 1039 (2005)); Lozano v. Frank DeLuca Constr., 178 N.J. 513, 522 , 842 A.2d 156 *543 (2004).

2016If, however, the regulation’s “language is clear, then the interpretative process will end without resort to extrinsic sources.” Ibid.; see also U.S. Bank, N.A., supra, 210 N.J. at 199 , 42 A.3d 870 (quoting Bedford, supra, 195 N.J. at 222, 948 A.2d 1272 ); In re Election Law Enft, supra, 201 N.J. at 263 , 989 A.2d 1254 (citing DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492-93 , 874 A.2d 1039 (2005)); Lozano v. Frank DeLuca Constr., 178 N.J. 513, 522 , 842 A.2d 156 *543 (2004).

2004Guaranty Ass'n, 383 So.2d 974, 975 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980) (finding that the plain language of an immunity provision like New Jersey's unambiguously immunized the association from claim that association's alleged refusal to settle claim within policy limits made it liable for jury award exceeding coverage limits); Veillon v. Louisiana Ins.

2004Guaranty Ass'n, 608 So. 2d 670, 672 (La.Ct.App.1992) (holding that Louisiana's analog to New Jersey's section 17 immunized state's guaranty's association from liability from "its own independent negligence or breach of fiduciary duty under the policy to settle within the policy limits"); PIE Mut.