plain language rule in Colorado

2014We are mindful that “our interpretation should give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all parts of [the] statute.” Apodaca, 255 P.3d at 1102-03 (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 32 But, “[i]f a statute appears ambiguous,” then we “must proceed beyond a plain language analysis and consider legislative history, prior law, the goal intended to be achieved by the statute, and the consequences of a given construction of the statute in order to ascertain its meaning.” People v. Norton, 63 P.3d 339, 345 (Colo.2003); see also Frank M.

2011Legislative Goal and Consequences Where a statute is ambiguous, “a court must proceed beyond a plain language analysis and consider ... the goal intended to be achieved by the statute, and the consequences pf a given construction of the statute in order to ascertain its meaning.” People v. Norton, 63 P.3d 339, 345 (Colo.2003); see also § 2-4-203, C.R.S.2011.

2026See People v. Washam, 2018 CO 19 , ¶ 17, 413 P.3d 1261, 1265 . 9 Washam does not apply to cases, such as this, in which the court permitted amendment of the information before trial. ¶ 24 The plain language of the rule does not require the court to find good cause or lack of prejudice to the defendant before granting a motion to amend before trial.

2026See People v. Washam, 2018 CO 19 , ¶ 17, 413 P.3d 1261, 1265 . 9 Washam does not apply to cases, such as this, in which the court permitted amendment of the information before trial. ¶ 24 The plain language of the rule does not require the court to find good cause or lack of prejudice to the defendant before granting a motion to amend before trial.

2025See People v. Subjack, 2021 CO 10, ¶ 14 ; see also People v. Arellano-Avila, 20 P.3d 1191, 1192 (Colo. 2001) (In interpreting a rule of criminal procedure, “we look to its plain meaning in pari materia with the other rules.”). ¶ 21 Here, Pellouchoud’s postconviction counsel filed a thorough postconviction motion and never moved to withdraw.

2025See People v. Subjack, 2021 CO 10, ¶ 14 ; see also People v. Arellano-Avila, 20 P.3d 1191, 1192 (Colo. 2001) (In interpreting a rule of criminal procedure, “we look to its plain meaning in pari materia with the other rules.”). ¶ 21 Here, Pellouchoud’s postconviction counsel filed a thorough postconviction motion and never moved to withdraw.

2022See Armstrong, 831 P.2d at 503 (a source of income under the child support guidelines is not determined by other definitions that may be used for federal or state income tax purposes). ¶ 30 In determining the meaning of the statutes, we engage in a plain language analysis and give effect to the statutory terms according to their commonly understood and accepted usage.

2022See 14 People in Interest of J.R.T., 55 P.3d 217, 219 (Colo. App. 2002), aff’d sub nom.

2021Waste 6 Mgmt. of Colo., Inc. v. City of Commerce City, 250 P.3d 722, 725 (Colo. App. 2010).

2020See § 19-1-108(1), C.R.S. (2020) (“The juvenile court may appoint one or more magistrates to hear any case or matter under the court’s jurisdiction, except where a jury trial has been requested pursuant to section 19-2-107 . . . .”); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 310 (2004) (“[A] defendant who stands trial may consent to judicial factfinding as to sentence enhancements . . . .”).

2020So our holding that, “for the purposes of the jury trial requirement,” a sentence enhancer sometimes functions as an element for Sixth Amendment purposes, Lopez v. People, 113 P.3d 713, 722 (Colo. 2005), does not dictate the interaction between Colorado’s complicity and at-risk victim statutes.3 3 In the interest of not conflating related issues, we set forth the foregoing plain language analysis without reference to the lines of cases discussing sentence enhancers and elements in other contexts; namely, the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial (Apprendi and O’Brien) and double jeopardy/merge

2019H:11 (2018). ¶ 44 Galvan argues that “if the jury concluded that Mr. Galvan did not act in self-defense with respect to S.M. because he allegedly provoked her, it could have applied that finding to the second degree assault offense against C.M.” To the extent we understand his argument, we reject it. ¶ 45 The provocation instruction stated that Galvan did not act in self-defense if “with intent to cause bodily injury or death to another person, [he] provoke[d] the use of unlawful physical force by that other person.” (Emphasis added.) The plain language of the instruction itself made clear tha

2018I therefore think that Rule 12(b)(2) “says what it means and means what it says,” so “[g]reat 43 weight must be given to the plain language of the rule . . . .” United States v. Walker, 665 F.3d 212, 218 (1st Cir. 2011)(discussing the waiver language in Fed.

2018See Mockelmann v. Mockelmann, 121 P.3d 337, 340 (Colo. App. 2005) (noting that allowing divorced parties “to perpetuate disputes long after the entry of permanent orders” is “counter to the strong public policy favoring the finality of judgments” in family law actions).

2014Hall & Co. v. Newsom, 125 P.3d 444, 448 (Colo.2005)(“[T]he historical development of ... a [comprehensive statutory] scheme can often shed light on the purposes behind specific amendments.”); Lang v. Colo. Mental Health Inst., 44 P.3d 262, 264 (Colo. App.2001)(Where “the statutory provisions do not speak to the matter at issue, we interpret the statute to comport with what we conclude are the General Assembly’s objectives.”). ¶ 33 If a “statute establishes a general rule, subject to [an] exception[ ], we .must construe the exception[] narrowly to preserve the primary operation of the general r

2014Hall & Co. v. Newsom, 125 P.3d 444, 448 (Colo.2005)(“[T]he historical development of ... a [comprehensive statutory] scheme can often shed light on the purposes behind specific amendments.”); Lang v. Colo. Mental Health Inst., 44 P.3d 262, 264 (Colo. App.2001)(Where “the statutory provisions do not speak to the matter at issue, we interpret the statute to comport with what we conclude are the General Assembly’s objectives.”). ¶ 33 If a “statute establishes a general rule, subject to [an] exception[ ], we .must construe the exception[] narrowly to preserve the primary operation of the general r

2014Hall & Co. v. Newsom, 125 P.3d 444, 448 (Colo.2005)(“[T]he historical development of ... a [comprehensive statutory] scheme can often shed light on the purposes behind specific amendments.”); Lang v. Colo. Mental Health Inst., 44 P.3d 262, 264 (Colo. App.2001)(Where “the statutory provisions do not speak to the matter at issue, we interpret the statute to comport with what we conclude are the General Assembly’s objectives.”). ¶ 33 If a “statute establishes a general rule, subject to [an] exception[ ], we .must construe the exception[] narrowly to preserve the primary operation of the general r

2014We are mindful that “our interpretation should give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all parts of [the] statute.” Apodaca, 255 P.3d at 1102-03 (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶ 32 But, “[i]f a statute appears ambiguous,” then we “must proceed beyond a plain language analysis and consider legislative history, prior law, the goal intended to be achieved by the statute, and the consequences of a given construction of the statute in order to ascertain its meaning.” People v. Norton, 63 P.3d 339, 345 (Colo.2003); see also Frank M.

2014Hall & Co. v. Newsom, 125 P.3d 444, 448 (Colo.2005)(“[T]he historical development of ... a [comprehensive statutory] scheme can often shed light on the purposes behind specific amendments.”); Lang v. Colo. Mental Health Inst., 44 P.3d 262, 264 (Colo. App.2001)(Where “the statutory provisions do not speak to the matter at issue, we interpret the statute to comport with what we conclude are the General Assembly’s objectives.”). ¶ 33 If a “statute establishes a general rule, subject to [an] exception[ ], we .must construe the exception[] narrowly to preserve the primary operation of the general r

2013Thus, based upon the plain language of the rule, we must conclude that "entry of judgment" is different from a "verdict or finding of guilt." Cf. Carlson v. Ferris, 85 P.3d 504 , 509 (Colo.2003) ( "[T]he use of different terms signals an intent on the part of the General Assembly to afford those terms different meanings."); City of Aurora v. Powell, 153 Colo. 4 , 7-8, 383 P.2d 798 , 800 (1963) ("The verdict is not a judicial determination, but rather a finding of fact which the trial court may accept or reject and utilize in formulating a judgment."); cf. Fed.R.Crim.P. 33(b)(1)-(2) (stating th

2013Thus, based upon the plain language of the rule, we must conclude that "entry of judgment" is different from a "verdict or finding of guilt." Cf. Carlson v. Ferris, 85 P.3d 504 , 509 (Colo.2003) ( "[T]he use of different terms signals an intent on the part of the General Assembly to afford those terms different meanings."); City of Aurora v. Powell, 153 Colo. 4 , 7-8, 383 P.2d 798 , 800 (1963) ("The verdict is not a judicial determination, but rather a finding of fact which the trial court may accept or reject and utilize in formulating a judgment."); cf. Fed.R.Crim.P. 33(b)(1)-(2) (stating th