plain language rule in Utah

2025If, as occurred here, state officers instead obtain records lawfully possessed by federal agencies, EIDPA’s exclusionary rule would not apply under the State’s reading. 48 Similarly, under that reading, if a state officer __________________________________________________________ 43 See UTAH CODE § 77-23c-105 (2019). 44 Id. 45 See Marion Energy, Inc., 2011 UT 50, ¶ 15 (explaining that “statutory language is ambiguous” when “its terms remain susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations after we have conducted a plain language analysis”). 46 See Of, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-

2025That is, “when statutory language is ambiguous—in that its terms remain susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations after we have conducted a plain language analysis—,” Marion Energy, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 15 , we “seek guidance from legislative history and relevant policy considerations,” Zilleruelo v. Commodity Transporters, Inc., 2022 UT 1, ¶ 31 , 506 P.3d 509 (cleaned up). ¶20 Armenta first contends that the district court based its interpretation on a flawed definition of “emergency medical assistance.” UFA disagrees, maintaining instead that the “district court undertook its plain-lang

2019“We interpret court rules, like statutes and administrative rules, according to their plain language.” Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14, ¶ 19 , 133 P.3d 370 . 20190726-CA 3 2019 UT App 175 NPEC v. Miller Furthermore, we will read the plain language of the rule as a whole, see Board of Educ. v. Sandy City Corp., 2004 UT 37, ¶ 9 , 94 P.3d 234 , and “seek to give effect to the intent of the body that promulgated the rule.” Burns, 2006 UT 14, ¶ 19 .

2019“We interpret court rules, like statutes and administrative rules, according to their plain language.” Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14, ¶ 19 , 133 P.3d 370 . 20190726-CA 3 2019 UT App 175 NPEC v. Miller Furthermore, we will read the plain language of the rule as a whole, see Board of Educ. v. Sandy City Corp., 2004 UT 37, ¶ 9 , 94 P.3d 234 , and “seek to give effect to the intent of the body that promulgated the rule.” Burns, 2006 UT 14, ¶ 19 .

2023However, our supreme court has recently “repeatedly eschewed extra-textual or contra-textual judicial glosses on the Utah Rules of Evidence.” State v. Biel, 2021 UT 8, ¶ 25 , 484 P.3d 1172 ; see, e.g., State v. Lowther, 2017 UT 34 , ¶ 30 n.40, 398 P.3d 1032 (pointing “to the plain language of rule 404(b) for the standard for the admissibility of evidence” and repudiating a prior characterization of rule 404(b) as “inclusionary”).

2023However, our supreme court has recently “repeatedly eschewed extra-textual or contra-textual judicial glosses on the Utah Rules of Evidence.” State v. Biel, 2021 UT 8, ¶ 25 , 484 P.3d 1172 ; see, e.g., State v. Lowther, 2017 UT 34 , ¶ 30 n.40, 398 P.3d 1032 (pointing “to the plain language of rule 404(b) for the standard for the admissibility of evidence” and repudiating a prior characterization of rule 404(b) as “inclusionary”).

2023Compare id. at 259 (“When faced with a question of statutory construction, we look first to the plain language of the statute.” (quotation simplified)), with Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, ¶ 44 , 201 P.3d 966 (“Under basic rules of contract interpretation, (continued…) 20210258-CA 11 2023 UT App 36 Vierig v. Therriault ¶25 In addition, Therriault points out that the key phrase from this provision isn’t just “costs of collection”; rather, it’s “costs and expenses of collection.” (Emphasis added.) It’s of course true that the term “costs” sometimes carries a particular legal mean

2023Compare id. at 259 (“When faced with a question of statutory construction, we look first to the plain language of the statute.” (quotation simplified)), with Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, ¶ 44 , 201 P.3d 966 (“Under basic rules of contract interpretation, (continued…) 20210258-CA 11 2023 UT App 36 Vierig v. Therriault ¶25 In addition, Therriault points out that the key phrase from this provision isn’t just “costs of collection”; rather, it’s “costs and expenses of collection.” (Emphasis added.) It’s of course true that the term “costs” sometimes carries a particular legal mean

2024Thus, the plain language of the rule “does not provide for an appeal-like review of a commissioner’s decision, but instead requires independent findings of fact and conclusions of law based on the evidence.” Day, 2018 UT App 143, ¶ 16 (quotation simplified). 20220090-CA 14 2024 UT App 6 Holt v. Holt ¶30 In the case at hand, after the commissioner made his recommendation, Christopher filed an objection wherein he explained that while the commissioner “correctly found” that the reasonable-time rule applied to section 9(B) of the decree, he erred because the recommendation was not based on eviden

2022See Day v. Barnes, 2018 UT App 143, ¶ 15 , 427 P.3d 1272 (“We interpret court rules, like statutes and administrative rules, according to their plain language.

2023Compare id. at 259 (“When faced with a question of statutory construction, we look first to the plain language of the statute.” (quotation simplified)), with Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, ¶ 44 , 201 P.3d 966 (“Under basic rules of contract interpretation, (continued…) 20210258-CA 11 2023 UT App 36 Vierig v. Therriault ¶25 In addition, Therriault points out that the key phrase from this provision isn’t just “costs of collection”; rather, it’s “costs and expenses of collection.” (Emphasis added.) It’s of course true that the term “costs” sometimes carries a particular legal mean

2023Compare id. at 259 (“When faced with a question of statutory construction, we look first to the plain language of the statute.” (quotation simplified)), with Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2, ¶ 44 , 201 P.3d 966 (“Under basic rules of contract interpretation, courts first look to the writing alone to determine its meaning and the intent of the contracting parties.”).

2016See Forshee, 611 P.2d at 1225 .

2016The note later states: “Subparagraph (d)(1) sets forth the test to be applied by the court in determining whether to allow the privilege or to require the government to elect to disclose the identity of the informer or to dismiss, in a criminal case.” Id.

2010See Navajo Nation v. Superior Court, 47 F.Supp.2d 1233, 1237-38 (E.D.Wash.1999) (citing Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 , 112 S.Ct. 1146 , 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) (conducting a plain-language analysis of ICWA). 32 . 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (emphasis added). 33 .

2010C.D., 2008 UT App 477 , ¶ 14, 200 P.3d 194 . [30] Hughes, 2007 UT 30, ¶ 25 , 156 P.3d 820 (internal quotation marks omitted). [31] See Navajo Nation v. Superior Court, 47 F.Supp.2d 1233, 1237-38 (E.D.Wash. 1999) (citing Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 , 112 S.Ct. 1146 , 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992)) (conducting a plain-language analysis of ICWA). [32] 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (emphasis added). [33] Id. [34] Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-1109(1). [35] Id. § 78A-6-1109(2); see also Utah R.App.

2008Admin. 4-506 (1997) (repealed 2003); Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694, 700 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (stating that the plain language of rule 4-506 "offer[s] no room for ... discretion to excuse compliance").

1999“A trial court’s interpretation of a rule in the Utah Code of Judicial Administration presents a question of law reviewed for correctness.” Hartford Leasing Corp. v. State, 888 P.2d 694, 697 (Utah Ct.App.1994).

2007However, the rationale underlying the marital communication privilege is to " 'encourage marital confidences, which in turn promote marital harmony." State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1228-29 (Utah 1997) (quoting Utah R.

2007However, the rationale underlying the marital communication privilege is to "'encourage marital confidences, which in turn promote marital harmony.'" State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1228-29 (Utah 1997) (quoting Utah R.

2019In our view, Fox has the better of the arguments. ¶13 "We review administrative rules in the same manner as statutes, focusing first on the plain language of the rule." Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Air Quality Board , 2009 UT 76 , ¶ 13, 226 P.3d 719 .

2019In our view, Fox has the better of the arguments. ¶13 "We review administrative rules in the same manner as statutes, focusing first on the plain language of the rule." Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Air Quality Board , 2009 UT 76 , ¶ 13, 226 P.3d 719 .

2016A statute is ambiguous only when ―its terms remain susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations after we have conducted a plain language analysis.‖ Id. (citation omitted).

2016A statute is ambiguous only when ―its terms remain susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations after we have conducted a plain language analysis.‖ Id. (citation omitted).

2025See Wilkerson, 2020 UT App 160, ¶ 11 (“A statute is considered ambiguous if its terms remain susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations after we have conducted a plain language analysis.” (cleaned up)). ¶27 In this situation, where the relevant statutory language is ambiguous, we must “resort to other modes of statutory construction and seek guidance from legislative history and other accepted sources.” Id. ¶ 10 (cleaned up).

2025“A statute is considered ambiguous if its terms remain susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations after we have conducted a plain language analysis.” State v. Wilkerson, 2020 UT App 160, ¶ 11 , 478 P.3d 1048 (cleaned up).

2001Accordingly, because the language making payment of filing fees a jurisdictional requirement had been removed, this court, in State v. Johnson, held that "[u]nder Rule 3, the timely payment of fees on an appeal from the district court to this Court is no longer jurisdictional." 700 P.2d 1125 , 1129 n. 1 (Utah 1985) (emphasis added). ¶ 13 Consistent with the above cases, in determining whether the payment of filing fees is a jurisdictional requirement for commencement of an action at the trial level, we must look to the plain language of rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

2000The plain language of rule 3(a) makes it clear that "the timely payment of fees on an appeal from the district court to this Court is no longer jurisdictional." State v. Johnson, 700 P.2d 1125 , 1129 n. 1 (Utah 1985). ¶ 20 The clerk accepted the faxed copy of the notice of appeal as a timely filed notice of appeal.

2025Indeed, as we recently explained in State v. Francis, 2025 UT App 104, ¶ 71 , -- P.3d --, it would have been impermissible for Defense Expert to have offered such testimony anyway. 20230525-CA 22 2025 UT App 120 State v. McDaniel A. Qualifications ¶57 Under rule 702(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, “a witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in

2025Indeed, as we recently explained in State v. Francis, 2025 UT App 104, ¶ 71 , -- P.3d --, it would have been impermissible for Defense Expert to have offered such testimony anyway. 20230525-CA 22 2025 UT App 120 State v. McDaniel A. Qualifications ¶57 Under rule 702(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, “a witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in

2024Our supreme court has pulled back from previous extra-textual additions to rule 403, holding that “the governing legal standard for evaluating whether evidence satisfies rule 403 is the plain language of the rule, nothing more and nothing less.” State v. Cuttler, 2015 UT 95, ¶ 2 , 367 P.3d 981 .

2024Our supreme court has pulled back from previous extra-textual additions to rule 403, holding that “the governing legal standard for evaluating whether evidence satisfies rule 403 is the plain language of the rule, nothing more and nothing less.” State v. Cuttler, 2015 UT 95, ¶ 2 , 367 P.3d 981 .

2021Id.

2017Arbogast Family Tr. v. River Crossings, LLC , 2010 UT 40 , ¶ 16, 238 P.3d 1035 ("[W]e look to the express language of that procedural rule and to the cases interpreting it." (citation omitted)); Rowley v. Milford City , 10 Utah 2d 299 , 352 P.2d 225 , 226 (1960) ("[P]ermitting supplementary pleadings is largely discretionary with the trial court.").

2013And because the district court in this case did not "explicitly direct that no additional order [was] necessary ... rule 7(f)(2) require[d] the prepara *624 tion and entry of a separate order in conformity with the court's decision." Id. 182 (internal quotation marks omitted). 124 "The plain language of the rule requires an explicit direction if an order is not required by the court; it does not contemplate that the parties must engage in a guessing game to divine the court's intentions." Code, 2007 UT 48, 15 , 162 P.3d 1097 {(emphasis added).

2013And because the district court in this case did not “explicitly direct that no additional order [was] necessary . . . rule 7(f)(2) require[d] the preparation and entry of a separate order in conformity with the court’s decision.” Id. ¶ 32 (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶24 “The plain language of the rule requires an explicit direction if an order is not required by the court; it does not contemplate that the parties must engage in a guessing game to divine the court’s intentions.” Code, 2007 UT 43, ¶ 5 (emphasis added).

2010See Navajo Nation v. Superior Court, 47 F.Supp.2d 1233, 1237-38 (E.D.Wash.1999) (citing Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 , 112 S.Ct. 1146 , 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) (conducting a plain-language analysis of ICWA). 32 . 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (emphasis added). 33 .

2010See Navajo Nation v. Superior Court, 47 F.Supp.2d 1233, 1237-38 (E.D.Wash.1999) (citing Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 , 112 S.Ct. 1146 , 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992) (conducting a plain-language analysis of ICWA). 32 . 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (emphasis added). 33 .