plain language rule in Iowa

2015See Brisson, 955 P.2d at 891 .

2015See Brisson, 955 P.2d at 891 .

2017See Storm, 898 N.W.2d at 163, 165 (Hecht, J., dissenting) (outlining nonexhaustive list of exceptions to 31 plain-language rule).

2017See Storm, 898 N.W.2d at 163, 165 (Hecht, J., dissenting) (outlining nonexhaustive list of exceptions to plain-language rule).

2009“When the language of a statute is plain and its meaning clear, the rules of statutory construction do not permit us to search for meaning beyond the statute’s express terms.” Rock v. Warhank, 757 N.W.2d 670, 673 (Iowa 2008).

2009“When the language of a statute is plain and its meaning clear, the rules of statutory construction do not permit us to search for meaning beyond the statute’s express terms.” Rock v. Warhank, 757 N.W.2d 670, 673 (Iowa 2008).

1990By the plain language of rule 236 good cause must be based on (1) mistake, (2) inadvertence, (3) surprise, (4) excusable neglect, or (5) unavoidable casualty." In re Marriage of Huston, 263 N.W.2d 697, 698 (Iowa 1978), quoting Paige v. City of Chariton, 252 N.W.2d 433, 437 (Iowa 1977).

1990By the plain language of rule 236 good cause must be based on (1) mistake, (2) inadvertence, (3) surprise, (4) excusable neglect, or (5) unavoidable casualty.” In re Marriage of Huston, 263 N.W.2d 697, 698 (Iowa 1978), quoting Paige v. City of Chariton, 252 N.W.2d 433, 437 (Iowa 1977).

2026Embassy Tower Care, Inc. v. Tweedy, 516 N.W.2d 831, 834 (Iowa 1994) (holding that the plain language of the rule “makes clear . . . that it applies only when a trial has previously been held”). 2 Under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.1013(1), [a] petition for relief under rule 1.1012 requires payment of the filing fee set forth in Iowa Code section 602.8105(1)(a), or if made in small claims, the filing fee set forth in section 631.6(1)(a), and must be filed and served in the original action within one year after the entry of the judgment or order involved.

2026But as the State asserts “justification is an affirmative defense rather than an element.” See State v. Delay, 320 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Iowa 1982) (emphasis added); see also White v. Harkrider, 990 N.W.2d 647 , 656 (Iowa 2023) (listing cases describing justification as an affirmative defense).

2025To determine whether the requirements of rule 2.8(2)(d) were met, “[w]e employ a substantial compliance standard.” Fisher, 877 N.W.2d at 681 (citation omitted).

2024Indeed, we have said a “foundational element[]” of the rule is that the proffered evidence must be a “business record.” State v. Reynolds, 746 N.W.2d 837, 841 (Iowa 2008); see also Beachel v. Long, 420 N.W.2d 482, 484 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998).

2024Indeed, we have said a “foundational element[]” of the rule is that the proffered evidence must be a “business record.” State v. Reynolds, 746 N.W.2d 837, 841 (Iowa 2008); see also Beachel v. Long, 420 N.W.2d 482, 484 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998).

2015State v. Harrington, 800 N.W.2d 46, 50 (Iowa 2011) (“The plain language of rule 5.609(a)(2), however, leaves the district court no similar discretion.

1997See Saadiq v. State, 387 N.W.2d 315, 319 (Iowa 1986) (when meaning of statute is clear, appellate court may not search for a meaning beyond the clear language).

1997See State v. Beeks, 428 N.W.2d 307, 309 (Iowa App.1988) (speedy indictment rule commenced upon the arrest for the offense charged in the existent proceedings.) The broad construction suggested by Edwards is beyond the plain language of the rule.

1995See State v. Swanson, 452 N.W.2d 466, 468 (Iowa App.1989).

1992State v. Hunziker, 311 N.W.2d 692, 693 (Iowa App.1981).

1990By the plain language of rule 236 good cause must be based on (1) mistake, (2) inadvertence, (3) surprise, (4) excusable neglect, or (5) unavoidable casualty." In re Marriage of Huston, 263 N.W.2d 697, 698 (Iowa 1978), quoting Paige v. City of Chariton, 252 N.W.2d 433, 437 (Iowa 1977).

1990By the plain language of rule 236 good cause must be based on (1) mistake, (2) inadvertence, (3) surprise, (4) excusable neglect, or (5) unavoidable casualty.” In re Marriage of Huston, 263 N.W.2d 697, 698 (Iowa 1978), quoting Paige v. City of Chariton, 252 N.W.2d 433, 437 (Iowa 1977).

1989The clear implication of the argument is that a class action plaintiff, like the customary defendant, must have “ ‘certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and sub *876 stantial justice.’ ” Smalley v. Dewberry, 379 N.W.2d 922, 924 (Iowa 1986) (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 , 66 S.Ct. 154, 158 , 90 L.Ed. 95, 102 (1945)).

1989The clear implication of the argument is that a class action plaintiff, like the customary defendant, must have “ ‘certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and sub *876 stantial justice.’ ” Smalley v. Dewberry, 379 N.W.2d 922, 924 (Iowa 1986) (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 , 66 S.Ct. 154, 158 , 90 L.Ed. 95, 102 (1945)).

1989The clear implication of the argument is that a class action plaintiff, like the customary defendant, must have “ ‘certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and sub *876 stantial justice.’ ” Smalley v. Dewberry, 379 N.W.2d 922, 924 (Iowa 1986) (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 , 66 S.Ct. 154, 158 , 90 L.Ed. 95, 102 (1945)).

1981State v. Schmitt, 290 N.W.2d 24, 26-28 (Iowa 1980) (apprehension of escapee constituted arrest, commencing forty-five-day period of rule 27(2)(a)).