14 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
BV/B1, LLC v. InvestorsBankgreen2 sentences2019See Johnson Controls, Inc. v. London Mkt. , 2010 WI 52 , ¶ 59, 325 Wis. 2d 176 , 784 N.W.2d 579 ("Wisconsin case law instructs that the language of the policy should be our initial focus."); see also BV/B1, LLC v. InvestorsBank , 2010 WI App 152 , ¶ 25, 330 Wis. 2d 462 , 792 N.W.2d 622 ("When interpreting a contract clause, we begin with the plain language of the clause."). 2019See Johnson Controls, Inc. v. London Mkt. , 2010 WI 52 , ¶ 59, 325 Wis. 2d 176 , 784 N.W.2d 579 ("Wisconsin case law instructs that the language of the policy should be our initial focus."); see also BV/B1, LLC v. InvestorsBank , 2010 WI App 152 , ¶ 25, 330 Wis. 2d 462 , 792 N.W.2d 622 ("When interpreting a contract clause, we begin with the plain language of the clause."). | 3 | 3 |
Johnson Controls, Inc. v. London Marketgreen2 sentences2019See Johnson Controls, Inc. v. London Mkt. , 2010 WI 52 , ¶ 59, 325 Wis. 2d 176 , 784 N.W.2d 579 ("Wisconsin case law instructs that the language of the policy should be our initial focus."); see also BV/B1, LLC v. InvestorsBank , 2010 WI App 152 , ¶ 25, 330 Wis. 2d 462 , 792 N.W.2d 622 ("When interpreting a contract clause, we begin with the plain language of the clause."). 2019See Johnson Controls, Inc. v. London Mkt. , 2010 WI 52 , ¶ 59, 325 Wis. 2d 176 , 784 N.W.2d 579 ("Wisconsin case law instructs that the language of the policy should be our initial focus."); see also BV/B1, LLC v. InvestorsBank , 2010 WI App 152 , ¶ 25, 330 Wis. 2d 462 , 792 N.W.2d 622 ("When interpreting a contract clause, we begin with the plain language of the clause."). | 3 | 3 |
State v. JEREMIAH C.green2 sentences2025See State v. Jeremiah C., 2003 WI App 40, ¶17 , 260 Wis. 2d 359 , 659 N.W.2d 193 (“It is our duty to construe statutes on the same subject matter in a manner that harmonizes them in order to give each full force and effect.”). ¶24 First, a plain language analysis reveals that there is no conflict between our interpretation of WIS. 2025See State v. Jeremiah C., 2003 WI App 40, ¶17 , 260 Wis. 2d 359 , 659 N.W.2d 193 (“It is our duty to construe statutes on the same subject matter in a manner that harmonizes them in order to give each full force and effect.”). ¶24 First, a plain language analysis reveals that there is no conflict between our interpretation of WIS. | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Countygreen1 sentence2012Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶ 46 (reminding that statutory context shapes a plain language analysis). | 1 | 1 |
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings Against Younggreen2 sentences2010See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Young, 2006 WI 109, ¶¶ 21-22 , 296 Wis.2d 36 , 718 N.W.2d 717 ." [6] The referee made no reference to "extraordinary circumstances." *681 ¶ 54 The court, including the dissenters, must follow the plain language of the rule adopted. 2010See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Young, 2006 WI 109, ¶¶ 21-22 , 296 Wis.2d 36 , 718 N.W.2d 717 ." [6] The referee made no reference to "extraordinary circumstances." *681 ¶ 54 The court, including the dissenters, must follow the plain language of the rule adopted. | 1 | 1 |
City of Madison v. Town of Fitchburggreen2 sentences2006In this case, the majority opinion uses the plain language rule to shield its eyes from the legislative intent to exclude motor vehicle offenses from consideration both as a predicate offense and a present offense under the habitual offender statute."); State v. Sample, 215 Wis. 2d 487, 510 , 573 N.W.2d 187 (1998) (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (advocating a holistic approach to statutory interpretation and observing that "[b]y using this approach to statutory interpretation, judges can acknowledge and deal with interpretive problems that arise from the inherent ambiguity of language as well a 2006In this case, the majority opinion uses the plain language rule to shield its eyes from the legislative intent to exclude motor vehicle offenses from consideration both as a predicate offense and a present offense under the habitual offender statute."); State v. Sample, 215 Wis. 2d 487, 510 , 573 N.W.2d 187 (1998) (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (advocating a holistic approach to statutory interpretation and observing that "[b]y using this approach to statutory interpretation, judges can acknowledge and deal with interpretive problems that arise from the inherent ambiguity of language as well a | 1 | 1 |
Trott v. Wisconsin Department of Health & Family Servicesgreen2 sentences2002See *933 Trott v. DHFS, 2001WI App 68, ¶ 15, 242 Wis. 2d 397 , 626 N.W.2d 48 (rejecting an interpretation of a rule as "not plausible in light of the regulation's plain language and framework"); Maxey v. Racine Redevelopment Auth., 120 Wis. 2d 13, 20 , 353 N.W.2d 812 (Ct. App. 1984) (noting that when construing statutes, courts will avoid "unrealistic and unreasonable" interpretations). ¶ 11. 2002See *933 Trott v. DHFS, 2001WI App 68, ¶ 15, 242 Wis. 2d 397 , 626 N.W.2d 48 (rejecting an interpretation of a rule as "not plausible in light of the regulation's plain language and framework"); Maxey v. Racine Redevelopment Auth., 120 Wis. 2d 13, 20 , 353 N.W.2d 812 (Ct. App. 1984) (noting that when construing statutes, courts will avoid "unrealistic and unreasonable" interpretations). ¶ 11. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Yellow Freight System, Inc.green2 sentences2001See State v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 101 Wis. 2d 142, 153 , 303 N.W.2d 834 (1981) (the plain language of the statute should not be construed in a manner that results in absurd or unreasonable conse *218 quences). 2001See State v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 101 Wis. 2d 142, 153 , 303 N.W.2d 834 (1981) (the plain language of the statute should not be construed in a manner that results in absurd or unreasonable conse *218 quences). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2000Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc., 201 Wis. 2d 320, 327 , 548 N.W.2d 519 (1996); see also State v. Williams, 198 Wis. 2d 516, 525 , 544 N.W.2d 406 (1996). 2000Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc., 201 Wis. 2d 320, 327 , 548 N.W.2d 519 (1996); see also State v. Williams, 198 Wis. 2d 516, 525 , 544 N.W.2d 406 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dippel v. Sciano
green
2 sentences2022At the same 13"Strict liability in tort for the sale of a defective product unreasonably dangerous to an intended user or consumer now arises in this state by virtue of a decision of this court [as opposed to by statute]." Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 462 , 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). 14"From a reading of the plain language of the rule, the plaintiff must prove (1) that the product was in defective condition when it left the possession or control of the seller, (2) that it was unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer, (3) that the defect was a cause (a substantial factor) of the plaintiff 2022At the same 13"Strict liability in tort for the sale of a defective product unreasonably dangerous to an intended user or consumer now arises in this state by virtue of a decision of this court [as opposed to by statute]." Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 462 , 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). 14"From a reading of the plain language of the rule, the plaintiff must prove (1) that the product was in defective condition when it left the possession or control of the seller, (2) that it was unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer, (3) that the defect was a cause (a substantial factor) of the plaintiff | 3 | 1979–2022 |
Jadair Inc. v. United States Fire Insurance
green
2 sentences2006Id., ¶ 9, 562 N.W.2d 401 . ¶ 40 We focus on the meaning of "defense." As noted above, the Legislature's position is that the issues they wish to raise are "defenses" within the meaning of the statute. 2000Jadair, 209 Wis. 2d at 195 . | 2 | 2000–2006 |
State v. Sample
green
2 sentences2006In this case, the majority opinion uses the plain language rule to shield its eyes from the legislative intent to exclude motor vehicle offenses from consideration both as a predicate offense and a present offense under the habitual offender statute."); State v. Sample, 215 Wis. 2d 487, 510 , 573 N.W.2d 187 (1998) (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (advocating a holistic approach to statutory interpretation and observing that "[b]y using this approach to statutory interpretation, judges can acknowledge and deal with interpretive problems that arise from the inherent ambiguity of language as well a 2006In this case, the majority opinion uses the plain language rule to shield its eyes from the legislative intent to exclude motor vehicle offenses from consideration both as a predicate offense and a present offense under the habitual offender statute."); State v. Sample, 215 Wis. 2d 487, 510 , 573 N.W.2d 187 (1998) (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (advocating a holistic approach to statutory interpretation and observing that "[b]y using this approach to statutory interpretation, judges can acknowledge and deal with interpretive problems that arise from the inherent ambiguity of language as well a | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Maxey v. Redevelopment Authority of Racine
green
2 sentences2002See *933 Trott v. DHFS, 2001WI App 68, ¶ 15, 242 Wis. 2d 397 , 626 N.W.2d 48 (rejecting an interpretation of a rule as "not plausible in light of the regulation's plain language and framework"); Maxey v. Racine Redevelopment Auth., 120 Wis. 2d 13, 20 , 353 N.W.2d 812 (Ct. App. 1984) (noting that when construing statutes, courts will avoid "unrealistic and unreasonable" interpretations). ¶ 11. 2002See *933 Trott v. DHFS, 2001WI App 68, ¶ 15, 242 Wis. 2d 397 , 626 N.W.2d 48 (rejecting an interpretation of a rule as "not plausible in light of the regulation's plain language and framework"); Maxey v. Racine Redevelopment Auth., 120 Wis. 2d 13, 20 , 353 N.W.2d 812 (Ct. App. 1984) (noting that when construing statutes, courts will avoid "unrealistic and unreasonable" interpretations). ¶ 11. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc.
green
2 sentences2000Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc., 201 Wis. 2d 320, 327 , 548 N.W.2d 519 (1996); see also State v. Williams, 198 Wis. 2d 516, 525 , 544 N.W.2d 406 (1996). 2000Jungbluth v. Hometown, Inc., 201 Wis. 2d 320, 327 , 548 N.W.2d 519 (1996); see also State v. Williams, 198 Wis. 2d 516, 525 , 544 N.W.2d 406 (1996). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.