plain language rule in Alabama

2017"Whether an arbitration provision encompasses a party's claims 'is a matter of contract interpretation, which interpretation is guided by the intent of the parties, and which intent, absent ambiguity in the clause, is evidenced by the plain language of the clause.' " Vintson , 753 So.2d at 505 (quoting Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson , 684 So.2d 102 , 110 (Ala. 1995) ).

2015Co. of Columbus v. Parker, 92 So.3d 58, 66 (Ala.2012) (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Kilgore, 751 So.2d 8, 11 (Ala.1999)). “ ‘Whether an arbitration provision encompasses a party’s claim “is a matter of contract interpretation, which interpretation is guided by the intent of the parties, and which intent, absent ambiguity in the clause, is evidenced by the plain language of the clause.” Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 684 So.2d 102, 110 (Ala.1995).’ ” Parker, 92 So.3d at 67 (quoting Green Tree Fin.

2008Ex parte Anderson, 644 So.2d 961 (Ala.l994)(interpreting Rule 27, Ala. R.

2003Ex parte Anderson , 644 So.2d 961 (Ala. 1994) (interpreting Rule 27, Ala.R.Civ.P.).

2017"Whether an arbitration provision encompasses a party's claims 'is a matter of contract interpretation, which interpretation is guided by the intent of the parties, and which intent, absent ambiguity in the clause, is evidenced by the plain language of the clause.' " Vintson , 753 So.2d at 505 (quoting Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson , 684 So.2d 102 , 110 (Ala. 1995) ).

2013In Green Tree, supra, our supreme court stated: “Whether an arbitration provision encompasses a party’s claims ‘is a matter of contract interpretation, which interpretation is guided by the intent of the parties, and which intent, absent ambiguity in the clause, is evidenced by the plain language of the clause.’ Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 684 So.2d 102, 110 (Ala.1995).” 753 So.2d at 505 .

2008Ex parte Haynes Downard Andra & Jones, LLP, 924 So.2d 687, 692 (Ala. 2005) ("`"We start with the basic premise that words used in court rules must be given their plain meaning."'" (quoting Southeastern Meats of Pelham, Inc. v. City of Birmingham, 895 So.2d 909, 913 (Ala.2004), quoting in turn Nieto v. State, 842 So.2d 748, 749 (Ala.Crim.App.2002))).

2008Ex parte Haynes Downard Andra & Jones, LLP, 924 So.2d 687, 692 (Ala. 2005) (“ ‘ “We start with the basic premise that words used in court rules must be given their plain meaning.” ’ ” (quoting Southeastern Meats of Pelham, Inc. v. City of Birmingham, 895 So.2d 909, 913 (Ala.2004), quoting in turn Nieto v. State, 842 So.2d 748, 749 (Ala.Crim.App.2002))).

2008Ex parte Haynes Downard Andra & Jones, LLP, 924 So.2d 687, 692 (Ala. 2005) ("`"We start with the basic premise that words used in court rules must be given their plain meaning."'" (quoting Southeastern Meats of Pelham, Inc. v. City of Birmingham, 895 So.2d 909, 913 (Ala.2004), quoting in turn Nieto v. State, 842 So.2d 748, 749 (Ala.Crim.App.2002))).

2008Ex parte Haynes Downard Andra & Jones, LLP, 924 So.2d 687, 692 (Ala. 2005) (“ ‘ “We start with the basic premise that words used in court rules must be given their plain meaning.” ’ ” (quoting Southeastern Meats of Pelham, Inc. v. City of Birmingham, 895 So.2d 909, 913 (Ala.2004), quoting in turn Nieto v. State, 842 So.2d 748, 749 (Ala.Crim.App.2002))).

2008Ex parte Haynes Downard Andra & Jones, LLP, 924 So.2d 687, 692 (Ala. 2005) ("`"We start with the basic premise that words used in court rules must be given their plain meaning."'" (quoting Southeastern Meats of Pelham, Inc. v. City of Birmingham, 895 So.2d 909, 913 (Ala.2004), quoting in turn Nieto v. State, 842 So.2d 748, 749 (Ala.Crim.App.2002))).

2008Ex parte Haynes Downard Andra & Jones, LLP, 924 So.2d 687, 692 (Ala. 2005) (“ ‘ “We start with the basic premise that words used in court rules must be given their plain meaning.” ’ ” (quoting Southeastern Meats of Pelham, Inc. v. City of Birmingham, 895 So.2d 909, 913 (Ala.2004), quoting in turn Nieto v. State, 842 So.2d 748, 749 (Ala.Crim.App.2002))).

1999“The question whether an arbitration clause applies to a claim is a matter of state-law contract interpretation, which ‘is guided by the intent of the parties, and which intent, absent ambiguity in the clause, is evidenced by the plain language of the clause.’ ” Coastal Ford, Inc. v. Kidder, 694 So.2d 1285, 1288 (Ala.1997).

1999"The question whether an arbitration clause applies to a claim is a matter of state-law contract interpretation, which `is guided by the intent of the parties, and which intent, absent ambiguity in the clause, is evidenced by the plain language of the clause.'" Coastal Ford, Inc. v. Kidder , 694 So.2d 1285 , 1288 (Ala. 1997).

2017The plain language of this rule assumes that notice is prima facie required and is intended to allow the trial court a studied opportunity to weigh the effect of an absence of notice in deciding to grant or refuse such extraordinary relief.... [T]he validity of the later injunction is not to be governed by the existence of the temporary restraining order which, had the motion been insisted upon, would have been subject to dissolution for the deficiencies identified.' " Id. (emphasis added); see also Jacobs Broad.

2016The plain language of this rule assumes that notice is prima facie required and is intended to allow the trial court a studied opportunity to weigh the effect of an absence of notice in deciding to grant or refuse such extraordinary relief.... [T]he validity of the later .injunction is not to be governed by the existence of the temporary restraining order which, had the motion been insisted upon, would have been subject to dissolution for the deficiencies identified.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Jacobs Broad.

2016Scrushy Charitable Found., Inc. , 93 So.3d 83 , 87 (Ala.2012) ("By the plain language of the rule, compliance with the notice provision in Rule 56(c) may be excused with the consent of the parties.").

2015Scrushy Charitable Found., Inc., 93 So.3d 83, 87 (Ala.2012)(“By the plain language of the rule, compliance with the notice provision in Rule 56(c) may be excused with the consent of the parties.”).

2011Under the plain language of the rule and the comments to the rule, a trial court may not grant a motion to dismiss without a hearing, although, in some circumstances, it may deny such a motion.” Burgoon v. Alabama State Dep’t of Human Res., 835 So.2d 131, 133 (Ala.2002). .

2008Under the plain language of the rule and the comments to the rule, a trial court may not grant a motion to dismiss without a hearing, although, in some circumstances, it may deny such a motion." Burgoon v. Alabama State Dep't of Human Res. , 835 So.2d 131 , 133 (Ala. 2002).

2015Co. of Columbus v. Parker, 92 So.3d 58, 66 (Ala.2012) (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Kilgore, 751 So.2d 8, 11 (Ala.1999)). “ ‘Whether an arbitration provision encompasses a party’s claim “is a matter of contract interpretation, which interpretation is guided by the intent of the parties, and which intent, absent ambiguity in the clause, is evidenced by the plain language of the clause.” Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 684 So.2d 102, 110 (Ala.1995).’ ” Parker, 92 So.3d at 67 (quoting Green Tree Fin.

2015Co. of Columbus v. Parker, 92 So.3d 58, 66 (Ala.2012) (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Kilgore, 751 So.2d 8, 11 (Ala.1999)). “ ‘Whether an arbitration provision encompasses a party’s claim “is a matter of contract interpretation, which interpretation is guided by the intent of the parties, and which intent, absent ambiguity in the clause, is evidenced by the plain language of the clause.” Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 684 So.2d 102, 110 (Ala.1995).’ ” Parker, 92 So.3d at 67 (quoting Green Tree Fin.

2015Co. of Columbus v. Parker, 92 So.3d 58, 66 (Ala.2012) (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Kilgore, 751 So.2d 8, 11 (Ala.1999)). “ ‘Whether an arbitration provision encompasses a party’s claim “is a matter of contract interpretation, which interpretation is guided by the intent of the parties, and which intent, absent ambiguity in the clause, is evidenced by the plain language of the clause.” Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 684 So.2d 102, 110 (Ala.1995).’ ” Parker, 92 So.3d at 67 (quoting Green Tree Fin.

2014P., by failing to provide the reasons for the issuance of the injunction ...."); Butler v. Roome, 907 So. 2d 8 Because Rule 65 is a rule of this Court, I do not believe that separation-of-powers concerns require us to apply the plain-language rule of statutory construction. 9 See also Rule 65(d)(1), which provides that the acts to be restrained by a restraining order shall be "describe[d] in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document ...." 18 1130609 432, 435 (Ala. 2005) ("[T]he trial court's order in this case does not contain the reasons for its issuance ...."

2014See also Rule 65(d)(1), which provides that the acts to be restrained by a restraining order shall be "describe[d] in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document....” .As to this point, the decision in Marathon Construction & Demolition, LLC v. King Metal Recycling & Processing Corp., 129 So.3d 272 (Ala.2013), cited in the main opinion, was joined by only four Justices: As to "that part of the discussion that addresses the lack of compliance with Rule 65(d)(2), Ala. R.

2007See FDIC v. Lacentra Trucking, Inc. , 157 F.3d 1292 , 1302 (11th Cir.1998), cert. dismissed , [526] U.S. [1083], 119 S.Ct. 1493 , 143 L.Ed.2d 575 (1999).

2007See FDIC v. Lacentra Trucking, Inc. , 157 F.3d 1292 , 1302 (11th Cir.1998), cert. dismissed , [526] U.S. [1083], 119 S.Ct. 1493 , 143 L.Ed.2d 575 (1999).

2007See FDIC v. Lacentra Trucking, Inc. , 157 F.3d 1292 , 1302 (11th Cir.1998), cert. dismissed , [526] U.S. [1083], 119 S.Ct. 1493 , 143 L.Ed.2d 575 (1999).

2003Rule 45, Ala.R.App.P., provides, in part: "No judgment may be reversed or set aside, nor new trial granted in any civil or criminal case on the ground of misdirection of the jury ... unless in the opinion of the court to which the appeal is taken or application is made, after an examination of the entire cause, it should appear that the error complained of has probably injuriously affected substantial rights of the parties." *666 "The United States Supreme Court has recognized that most errors do not automatically render a trial unfair and, thus, can be harmless." Whitehead v. State, 777 So.2d

2002Cf. Van Knight v. Smoker, 778 So.2d 801, 805 (Ala. 2000) (except in "certain limited circumstances," Rule 56(c), Ala. R.

1999See Op. Att'y Gen., No. 84-00262 (1984) (expressing the opinion that a contract securing *861 professional services was exempted from the Competitive Bid Law even though it included the purchase of equipment that was "incidental to and inextricably integrated with the service"); see also Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 694 So.2d 1344, 1346 (Ala.1997) ("While an opinion of the attorney general is not binding, it can constitute persuasive authority.").