plain language rule in Illinois

2022July 1, 2017) (“Points not argued are waived and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing.”); see also Vancura v. Katris, 238 Ill. 2d 352, 369 (2010) (“Consistent with the plain language of the rule, this court has repeatedly held that the failure to argue a point in the appellant’s opening brief results in forfeiture of the issue.”).

2022July 1, 2017) (“Points not argued are waived and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing.”); see also Vancura v. Katris, 238 Ill. 2d 352, 369 (2010) (“Consistent with the plain language of the rule, this court has repeatedly held that the failure to argue a point in the appellant’s opening brief results in forfeiture of the issue.”).

2011When the plain language of an immunity provision in the Tort Immunity Act contains no exception for willful and wanton misconduct, we have reasoned that the legislature `"intended to immunize liability for both negligence and willful and wanton misconduct."' Village of Bloomingdale, 196 Ill.2d at 491 [ 256 Ill.Dec. 848 , 752 N.E.2d 1090 ], quoting Barnett, 171 Ill.2d at 391-92 [ 216 Ill.Dec. 550 , 665 N.E.2d 808 ].

2011The supreme court reasoned that “[w]hen the plain language of an immunity provision in the Tort Immunity Act contains no exception for willful and wanton conduct, we have reasoned that the legislature 1 “intended to immunize liability for both negligence and willful and wanton misconduct.” ’ ” Id. at 514 (quoting Village of Bloomingdale v. CDG Enterprises, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 484, 491 (2001), quoting Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 391-92 (2006)).

2018See DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 514 (2006) (when the plain language of an immunity provision in the Act contains no exception for willful and wanton conduct, it means that the legislature intended to immunize both negligence and willful and wanton conduct).

2017See DeSmet v. County of Rock Island , 219 Ill. 2d 497 , 514, 302 Ill.Dec. 466 , 848 N.E.2d 1030 (2006) (when the plain language of an immunity provision in the Act contains no exception for willful and wanton conduct, it means that the legislature intended to immunize both negligence and willful and wanton conduct).

2026Further, “we do not depart from the plain language of the rule by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the expressed intent.” People v. Dominguez, 2012 IL 111336, ¶ 16 .

2013“We interpret the rule so that no part of it is rendered meaningless or superfluous and we do not depart from the plain language of the rule by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the expressed intent.” Id. ¶ 25 We find the plain language of Rule 604(d) to be clear and unambiguous.

2013The supreme court held that the defendants were immune under section 4-102 of the Tort Immunity Act (id. at 505) and that the plaintiffs could not avoid this immunity by pleading willful and wanton misconduct: “When the plain language of an immunity provision in the Tort Immunity Act contains no exception for willful and wanton misconduct, we have reasoned that the legislature ‘ “intended to immunize liability for both negligence and willful and wanton misconduct.” ’ Village of Bloomingdale [v. CDG Enterprises, Inc.], 196 Ill. 2d [484,] 491 [(2001)], quoting Barnett, 171 Ill. 2d at 391-92 . **

2011The supreme court reasoned that “[w]hen the plain language of an immunity provision in the Tort Immunity Act contains no exception for willful and wanton conduct, we have reasoned that the legislature 1 “intended to immunize liability for both negligence and willful and wanton misconduct.” ’ ” Id. at 514 (quoting Village of Bloomingdale v. CDG Enterprises, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 484, 491 (2001), quoting Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 391-92 (2006)).

2017App. 3d 853, 856-57 (1994); see also Ries v. City of Chicago, 242 Ill. 2d 205, 224 (2011) (noting that, when the plain language of an immunity provision in the Tort Immunity Act contains no exception for willful and wanton conduct, it is -4- presumed that the legislature intended to immunize liability for both negligence and willful and wanton conduct).

2017App. 3d 853, 856-57 (1994); see also Ries v. City of Chicago, 242 Ill. 2d 205, 224 (2011) (noting that, when the plain language of an immunity provision in the Tort Immunity Act contains no exception for willful and wanton conduct, it is presumed that the legislature intended to immunize liability for both negligence and willful and wanton conduct).

2024See Smith, 2022 IL 126940, ¶ 32 (construing the plain language of the rule and concluding that it “imposes no timeframe in terms of how soon before the hearing on the State’s motion to dismiss the certificate must be filed”); People v. Turner, 187 Ill. 2d 406, 411 (1999) (construing the plain - 13 - No. 1-21-0688 language of the rule and concluding that it did not require an appointed attorney to consult with a petitioner a certain number of times). ¶ 35 Defendant cites no authority in which a postconviction attorney’s performance was found to be unreasonable solely due to the length of time i

2022See Smith, 2022 IL 126940, ¶ 32 (construing the plain language of the rule and concluding that it “imposes no timeframe in terms of how soon before the hearing on the State’s motion to dismiss the certificate must be filed”); People v. Turner, 187 Ill. 2d 406, 411 (1999) (construing the plain language of the rule and concluding that it did not require an appointed attorney to consult with a petitioner a certain number of times). ¶ 80 Defendant cites no authority in which a postconviction attorney’s performance was found to be unreasonable solely due to the length of time it took counsel to ame

2009Rather, the court found that “the plain language of the rule states that the party to whom the requests to admit are directed must serve upon the requesting party either ‘the sworn statement’ denying the matters of which admission is requested or written objections which need not be sworn.” Vision Point, 226 Ill. 2d at 355 .

2009Rather, the court found that "the plain language of the rule states that the party to whom the requests to admit are directed must serve upon the requesting party either `the sworn statement' denying the matters of which admission is requested or *429 written objections which need not be sworn." Vision Point, 226 Ill.2d at 355 , 314 Ill.Dec. 778 , 875 N.E.2d 1065 .

2024See Smith, 2022 IL 126940, ¶ 32 (construing the plain language of the rule and concluding that it “imposes no timeframe in terms of how soon before the hearing on the State’s motion to dismiss the certificate must be filed”); People v. Turner, 187 Ill. 2d 406, 411 (1999) (construing the plain - 13 - No. 1-21-0688 language of the rule and concluding that it did not require an appointed attorney to consult with a petitioner a certain number of times). ¶ 35 Defendant cites no authority in which a postconviction attorney’s performance was found to be unreasonable solely due to the length of time i

2022See Smith, 2022 IL 126940, ¶ 32 (construing the plain language of the rule and concluding that it “imposes no timeframe in terms of how soon before the hearing on the State’s motion to dismiss the certificate must be filed”); People v. Turner, 187 Ill. 2d 406, 411 (1999) (construing the plain language of the rule and concluding that it did not require an appointed attorney to consult with a petitioner a certain number of times). ¶ 80 Defendant cites no authority in which a postconviction attorney’s performance was found to be unreasonable solely due to the length of time it took counsel to ame

2021See generally Campbell v. Wagner, 303 Ill.

2021See generally Campbell v. Wagner, 303 Ill.

2020The majority also states that the “concern articulated in Hamer and My Pillow on deterring abusive fee generation by lawyers who initiate litigation is not present.” Supra ¶ 29; see Hamer v. Lentz, 132 Ill. 2d 49 (1989); My Pillow, 2018 IL 122487 .

2019App. 3d 74 (1981), the reasoning is unpersuasive, particularly in light of this court’s later decisions in Hamer v. Lentz, 132 Ill. 2d 49 (1989), and My Pillow, 2018 IL 122487 . 5 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “attorney’s fee” as “[t]he charge to a client for services performed for the client, such as an hourly fee, a flat fee, or a contingent fee.” Black’s Law Dictionary 154 (10th ed. 2014). - 16 - incurred, 6 the drafters most likely would have made such an understanding explicit, either in the plain language of the rule or in a committee comment. ¶ 48 Second, the majority dismisses the app

2017As we indicated above, “where the language of the immunity is clear and unambiguous, we may not read into it exceptions, limitations or conditions not expressly described by the plain language of the immunity.” Pouk v. Village of Romeoville, 405 Ill.

2017As we indicated above, “where the language of the immunity is clear and unambiguous, we may not read into it exceptions, limitations or conditions not expressly described by the plain language of the immunity.” Pouk v. Village of Romeoville, 405 Ill.

2014American Country Insurance Co. v. Cline, 309 Ill.

2014American Country Insurance Co. v. Cline, 309 Ill.

2011Whitledge v. Klein, 348 Ill.

2011Whitledge v. Klein, 348 Ill.

2025Ferris, Thompson & Zweig, Ltd. v. Esposito, 2017 IL 121297, ¶ 22 (when interpreting an Illinois Supreme Court rule, courts will not depart from the plain language of the rule by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that conflict with the expressed intent).

2025Esposito, 2017 IL 121297, ¶ 22 ). “[W]e will not depart from the plain language of the rule by reading into it exceptions, limitation, or conditions.” Id.

2025To the contrary, the supreme court recently reiterated that “the plain language of the rule *** does not require the court to explain the principles to the jurors in any particular fashion.” People v. Birge, 2021 IL 125644, ¶ 34 .

2022Under the plain language of the rule, “a court complies with Rule 431(b) if it (1) instructs the prospective jurors on the four principles, (2) asks if the prospective jurors understand those principles, and (3) asks if the prospective jurors accept those principles.” Birge, 2021 IL 125644, ¶ 34 .

2006People v. Roberts, 214 Ill.2d 106, 116 , 291 Ill.Dec. 674 , 824 N.E.2d 250 (2005).

2006People v. Roberts, 214 Ill. 2d 106, 116 (2005).

2020Instead, we concluded, as we do again, the plain language of the rule does not require “ ‘the trial court to ask jurors individually about each principle’ or ‘receive their answers one by one.’ ” Kinnerson, 2020 IL App (4th) 170650 ¶ 64 (quoting Willhite, 399 Ill.

2020The plain language of the rule does not require “the trial court to ask jurors individually about each principle or receive their answers one by one.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kinnerson, 2020 IL App (4th) 170650, ¶ 64 . ¶ 38 As a result, there was no error, clear or otherwise; and without error, there is no need to proceed further with a plain error analysis.

2018Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. , 167 Minn. 146 , 208 N.W. 816 (1926), a case in which the Minnesota Supreme Court positively quoted language from an Eighth Circuit case concluding that " 'the effect of the [standard] mortgage clause, when attached to a policy of insurance running to the mortgagor , is to make a new and separate contract between the mortgagee and the insurance company.' " (Emphasis added.) Id. at 818 (quoting Syndicate Insurance Co. v. Bohn , 65 F. 165 , 178 (8th Cir. 1894) ). ¶ 45 In response, Seterus argues that the plain language of the standard mortgage clause in this cas

2018Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 208 N.W. 816 (Minn. 1926), a case in which the Minnesota Supreme Court positively quoted language from an Eighth Circuit case concluding that “ ‘the effect of the [standard] mortgage clause, when attached to a policy of insurance running to the mortgagor, is to make a new and separate contract between the mortgagee and the insurance company.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 818 (quoting Syndicate Insurance Co. v. Bohn, 65 F. 165, 178 (8th Cir. 1894)). ¶ 45 In response, Seterus argues that the plain language of the standard mortgage clause in this case “does not imp