12 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1991–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Adlerred1 sentence2019Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-402 (b)(1) (emphasis added). 6 Although this Court has recognized the State’s statutory authority to appeal certain sentencing decisions, the defendant cites to previous Tennessee Supreme Court opinions claiming that our “more recent decisions have consistently recognized Rule 3 as the exclusive source of the right to appeal in criminal cases.” See, e.g., Meeks, 262 S.W.3d at 718 -19 and n.7 (“Tennessee’s [early] statutes governing the State’s right to appeal in criminal cases were replaced by the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, which became effective on July 1, | 1 | 1 |
State v. Schiefelbeingreen1 sentence2018This court has concluded that “‘[a]s a general rule, a trial court will require disclosure of the underlying data of the expert’s opinion when the court believes that the party opponent will be unable to cross-examine effectively and the reason for such inability is other than the prejudicial nature of such facts or data.’” State v. Schiefelbein, 230 S.W.3d 88, 148 (Tenn. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Shelinegreen1 sentence2018“The plain language of the rule speaks of ‘specific instances’ of sexual conduct with ‘persons’ other than the defendant.” State v. Sheline, 955 S.W.2d 42, 46 (Tenn. 1997). | 1 | 1 |
Calvin Gray Mills, Jr. v. Fulmarque, Inc.green1 sentence2016See generally Mills v. Fulmarque, 360 S.W.3d 362, 368 (Tenn. 2012). | 1 | 1 |
Seiber v. Reeves Logginggreen2 sentences2015App., Jackson, Dec. 23, 2014), that the plain language of the rule does not allow for this interpretation, see Seiber v. Reeves Logging, 284 S.W.3d 294, 301 (Tenn. 2009) (“[S]tatutes whose terms are plain and unambiguous require no construction and should be enforced according to their plain terms.”). 2015The rule states that a motion may be filed “at any time.” Id. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Marshallgreen1 sentence2015State v. Marshall, 319 S.W.3d 558, 561 (Tenn. 2010). | 1 | 1 |
Barger v. Brockgreen1 sentence2013The plain language of this rule establishes that Nancy Jones5 in her official capacity as Disciplinary Counsel to the Board, the members of the Board of Professional Responsibility, and the practice monitors and law firm appointed to provide practice monitors as agents of the Board are all shielded from civil liability for the actions taken in the disciplinary proceedings and thereafter, which were part of their official duties. 3 To the extent that Mr. Moncier makes any challenge to the validity or constitutionality of Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, we note that our Supreme Court held in Bar | 1 | 1 |
Lee Medical, Inc. v. Paula Beechergreen2 sentences2013Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 526 (Tenn.2010). 2013Lee Med., Inc., 312 S.W.3d at 527 . | 1 | 1 |
Hoechst Diafoil Company v. Nan Ya Plastics Corporationgreen1 sentence2000The plain language of the rule establishes that the purpose of requiring a bond as a condition precedent to the issuance of a restraining order or preliminary injunction is “to provide a mechanism for reimbursing an enjoined party for harm it suffers as a result of an improvidently issued injunction or restraining order.” Hoechst Diafoil Co. v. Nan Ya Plastics Corp., 174 F.3d 411, 421 (4th Cir.1999). | 1 | 1 |
Patricia Thomas v. Capital Security Services, Inc.green1 sentence1991Services, Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 874-75 (5th Cir.1988). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Shofner v. Shofner
green
1 sentence2022“The plain language of the rule demonstrates that it applies to all cases in which a successor trial judge replaces a trial judge who is unable to proceed.” Id. (emphasis added). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Meeks
green
1 sentence2019Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-402 (b)(1) (emphasis added). 6 Although this Court has recognized the State’s statutory authority to appeal certain sentencing decisions, the defendant cites to previous Tennessee Supreme Court opinions claiming that our “more recent decisions have consistently recognized Rule 3 as the exclusive source of the right to appeal in criminal cases.” See, e.g., Meeks, 262 S.W.3d at 718 -19 and n.7 (“Tennessee’s [early] statutes governing the State’s right to appeal in criminal cases were replaced by the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, which became effective on July 1, | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Crosby v. United States
green
2 sentences2001Justice Blackman, writing for the unanimous Court, held that the plain language of rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (which substantially mirrors rule 43 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure) “prohibits the trial in absentia of a defendant who is not present at the beginning of trial.” Id. at 262 , 113 S.Ct. 748 . 2001Justice Blackman, writing for the unanimous Court, held that the plain language of rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (which substantially mirrors rule 43 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure) “prohibits the trial in absentia of a defendant who is not present at the beginning of trial.” Id. at 262 , 113 S.Ct. 748 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.