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19 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Richardson v. Stategreen2 sentences2014In fact, the plain language of the test refers not just to convictions: “[A] defendant must demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts used by the fact-finder to establish the essential elements of one offense may also have been used to establish the essential elements of a second challenged offense.” Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 53 (emphasis added). 2014In fact, the plain language of the test refers not just to convictions: "[A] defendant must demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts used by the fact-finder to establish the essential elements of one offense may also have been used to establish the essential elements of a see-ond challenged offense" Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 58 (emphasis added). | 3 | 3 |
Dreyer & Reinbold, Inc. v. AutoXchange. Com., Inc.green2 sentences2015Dreyer & Reinbold, Inc. v. AutoXchange.com, Inc., 771 N.E.2d 764, 767 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. 2015Dreyer & Reinbold, Inc. v. AutoXchange.com, Inc., 771 N.E.2d 764, 767 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. | 2 | 3 |
Matter of Adoption of MASgreen2 sentences2008See Matter of Adoption of M.A.S., 695 N.E.2d 1037, 1040 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (reversing adoption petition on grounds that notice to putative father which did not comply with requirements of applicable trial rule governing service of process was defective). 2. 2008See Matter of Adoption of M.A.S., 695 N.E.2d 1037, 1040 (Ind.Ct.App.1998) (reversing adoption petition on grounds that notice to putative father which did not comply with requirements of applicable trial rule governing service of process was defective). 2. | 2 | 2 |
Andy Mohr West d/b/a Andy Mohr Toyota, Butler Motors, Inc. d/b/a Butler Toyota, and TW Toy, Inc. d/b/a Tom Wood Toyota v. Office of the Ind. Secretary of State, Auto Dealer Services Div.green1 sentence2024See West v. Off. of Ind. Sec. of State, 54 N.E.3d 349, 353 (Ind. 2016). [19] First, Hoagland contends the right to amendment after a dismissal under Rule 12(B)(8) is the same as under Rule 12(B)(6) (failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted). | 1 | 1 |
Browning v. Waltersgreen1 sentence2015See also Rumfelt v. Himes, 438 N.E.2d 980, 983-84 (Ind. 1982) (finding that trial court erred by dismissing complaint without ordering a hearing because “Trial Rule 41(E) clearly requires a hearing on a motion to dismiss”); Browning v. Walters, 620 N.E.2d 28, 32 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (“Trial Rule 41(E) requires the court to order a hearing for the purpose of dismissing the case before it can dismiss the action with prejudice”). [6] When reviewing a dismissal for failure to prosecute, we must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. | 1 | 1 |
Rumfelt v. Himesgreen1 sentence2015See also Rumfelt v. Himes, 438 N.E.2d 980, 983-84 (Ind. 1982) (finding that trial court erred by dismissing complaint without ordering a hearing because “Trial Rule 41(E) clearly requires a hearing on a motion to dismiss”); Browning v. Walters, 620 N.E.2d 28, 32 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (“Trial Rule 41(E) requires the court to order a hearing for the purpose of dismissing the case before it can dismiss the action with prejudice”). [6] When reviewing a dismissal for failure to prosecute, we must determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. | 1 | 1 |
Liew v. Breengreen1 sentence2008See Batson v. Neal Spelce Assocs., Inc., 765 F.2d 511, 516 (5th Cir.1985) (reversing district court’s award of attorney’s fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 16 where the district court awarded fees not related to the defendant’s failure to comply with the district court’s discovery order); Liew v. Breen, 640 F.2d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir.1981) (reversing award of attorney’s fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 where part of the award was for attorney time not incurred on account of the other party’s failure to obey a court order); cf. Best v. Best, 470 N.E.2d 84, 88 (Ind.Ct.App. | 1 | 1 |
Rose v. Batson v. Neal Spelce Associates, Inc.green1 sentence2008See Batson v. Neal Spelce Assocs., Inc., 765 F.2d 511, 516 (5th Cir.1985) (reversing district court’s award of attorney’s fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 16 where the district court awarded fees not related to the defendant’s failure to comply with the district court’s discovery order); Liew v. Breen, 640 F.2d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir.1981) (reversing award of attorney’s fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 where part of the award was for attorney time not incurred on account of the other party’s failure to obey a court order); cf. Best v. Best, 470 N.E.2d 84, 88 (Ind.Ct.App. | 1 | 1 |
Best v. Bestgreen1 sentence2008See Batson v. Neal Spelce Assocs., Inc., 765 F.2d 511, 516 (5th Cir.1985) (reversing district court’s award of attorney’s fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 16 where the district court awarded fees not related to the defendant’s failure to comply with the district court’s discovery order); Liew v. Breen, 640 F.2d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir.1981) (reversing award of attorney’s fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 where part of the award was for attorney time not incurred on account of the other party’s failure to obey a court order); cf. Best v. Best, 470 N.E.2d 84, 88 (Ind.Ct.App. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kuespertgreen1 sentence2008See Batson v. Neal Spelce Assocs., Inc., 765 F.2d 511, 516 (5th Cir.1985) (reversing district court’s award of attorney’s fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 16 where the district court awarded fees not related to the defendant’s failure to comply with the district court’s discovery order); Liew v. Breen, 640 F.2d 1046, 1051 (9th Cir.1981) (reversing award of attorney’s fees under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 where part of the award was for attorney time not incurred on account of the other party’s failure to obey a court order); cf. Best v. Best, 470 N.E.2d 84, 88 (Ind.Ct.App. | 1 | 1 |
Indiana Department of Environmental Management v. Schnippel Construction, Inc.green1 sentence2004Ind.Code § 1-1-4-1(1); Schnippel Constr., 778 N.E.2d at 415 (stating that we first look to the plain language of the rule and, if unambiguous, givé effect to that plain meaning). | 1 | 1 |
Rosi v. Business Furniture Corp.green1 sentence2000Cf. Hess v. Bob Phillips West Side Ford, Inc., 159 Ind.App. 46, 50 , 304 N.E.2d 814, 816 (1973) (using “literal and commonsense reading of the rule” to interpret the meaning of Indiana Trial Rule 50). 5 This Court determined that the revisions to Indiana Trial Rule 56 in 1991 were intended “[t]o promote the expeditious resolution of lawsuits and conserve judicial resources.” Rosi v. Business Furniture Corp., 615 N.E.2d 431, 434 (Ind.1993). | 1 | 1 |
Hess v. Bob Phillips West Side Ford, Inc.green2 sentences2000Cf. Hess v. Bob Phillips West Side Ford, Inc., 159 Ind.App. 46, 50 , 304 N.E.2d 814, 816 (1973) (using “literal and commonsense reading of the rule” to interpret the meaning of Indiana Trial Rule 50). 5 This Court determined that the revisions to Indiana Trial Rule 56 in 1991 were intended “[t]o promote the expeditious resolution of lawsuits and conserve judicial resources.” Rosi v. Business Furniture Corp., 615 N.E.2d 431, 434 (Ind.1993). 2000Cf. Hess v. Bob Phillips West Side Ford, Inc., 159 Ind.App. 46, 50 , 304 N.E.2d 814, 816 (1973) (using “literal and commonsense reading of the rule” to interpret the meaning of Indiana Trial Rule 50). 5 This Court determined that the revisions to Indiana Trial Rule 56 in 1991 were intended “[t]o promote the expeditious resolution of lawsuits and conserve judicial resources.” Rosi v. Business Furniture Corp., 615 N.E.2d 431, 434 (Ind.1993). | 1 | 1 |
Utley v. Healygreen1 sentence1999Id.; see also Utley v. Healy, 663 N.E.2d 229, 238 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Tapia v. State
green
2 sentences2019“Outside of the plain language of the rule, two additional Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-PC-2833 | July 23, 2019 Page 11 of 13 arguments support an abuse of discretion review.” Id. 2019“First, employing an abuse of discretion standard gives the post-conviction court the ability to curtail attempts by petitioners, including those in capital cases, to delay final judgment on their petitions.” Id. | 2 | 2016–2019 |
Juan M. Garrett v. State of Indiana
green
2 sentences2014Garrett v, 992 N.E.2d at 721 . 2014Garrett v, 992 N.E.2d at 721 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Indianapolis Historic Partners v. State Board of Tax Commissioners
green
1 sentence2002Id. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.
green
2 sentences1980In Eisen IV, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (1974), 417 U.S. 156 , 94 S.Ct. 2140 , 40 L.Ed.2d 732 , the Supreme Court determined that the plain language of the rule, the Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 23 (which our study commission commended), and the due process principles of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (1950), 339 U.S. 306 , 70 S.Ct. 652 , 94 L.Ed. 865 require that individual notice must be provided to all members of the class who are identifiable through reasonable effort. 417 U.S. 176 , 94 S.Ct. 2151 . 1980In Eisen IV, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (1974), 417 U.S. 156 , 94 S.Ct. 2140 , 40 L.Ed.2d 732 , the Supreme Court determined that the plain language of the rule, the Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 23 (which our study commission commended), and the due process principles of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (1950), 339 U.S. 306 , 70 S.Ct. 652 , 94 L.Ed. 865 require that individual notice must be provided to all members of the class who are identifiable through reasonable effort. 417 U.S. 176 , 94 S.Ct. 2151 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin
green
2 sentences1980In Eisen IV, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (1974), 417 U.S. 156 , 94 S.Ct. 2140 , 40 L.Ed.2d 732 , the Supreme Court determined that the plain language of the rule, the Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 23 (which our study commission commended), and the due process principles of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (1950), 339 U.S. 306 , 70 S.Ct. 652 , 94 L.Ed. 865 require that individual notice must be provided to all members of the class who are identifiable through reasonable effort. 417 U.S. 176 , 94 S.Ct. 2151 . 1980In Eisen IV, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin (1974), 417 U.S. 156 , 94 S.Ct. 2140 , 40 L.Ed.2d 732 , the Supreme Court determined that the plain language of the rule, the Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 23 (which our study commission commended), and the due process principles of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (1950), 339 U.S. 306 , 70 S.Ct. 652 , 94 L.Ed. 865 require that individual notice must be provided to all members of the class who are identifiable through reasonable effort. 417 U.S. 176 , 94 S.Ct. 2151 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Baker v. Mason
green
2 sentences1979Defendant claims that there was no evidence to support the giving of a transferred intent instruction and, therefore, it was improper under Baker v. Mason, (1968) 253 Ind. 348 , 242 N.E.2d 513 . 1979Defendant claims that there was no evidence to support the giving of a transferred intent instruction and, therefore, it was improper under Baker v. Mason, (1968) 253 Ind. 348 , 242 N.E.2d 513 . | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.