9 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1982–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Perry v. Seragreen1 sentence2010Thoubboron, 749 A.2d at 748 ; see also Paramedics Electromedicina, 369 F.3d at 656-57 (similar); Meehan, 312 F.3d at 911 (similar); United States v. Carelock, 459 F.3d 437, 442-43 (3d Cir.2006) (similar); cf. Perry, 623 A.2d at 1215 (holding that appellant complied with Rule 3(a)’s requirement to designate the judgment or order appealed where it was “clear from the face of the Notice of Appeal” which judgment appellant sought to appeal). | 1 | 1 |
Meehan v. United Consumers Club Franchising Corp.green1 sentence2010Thoubboron, 749 A.2d at 748 ; see also Paramedics Electromedicina, 369 F.3d at 656-57 (similar); Meehan, 312 F.3d at 911 (similar); United States v. Carelock, 459 F.3d 437, 442-43 (3d Cir.2006) (similar); cf. Perry, 623 A.2d at 1215 (holding that appellant complied with Rule 3(a)’s requirement to designate the judgment or order appealed where it was “clear from the face of the Notice of Appeal” which judgment appellant sought to appeal). | 1 | 1 |
Paramedics Electromedicina Comercial, Ltda. v. Ge Medical Systems Information Technologies, Inc.green1 sentence2010Thoubboron, 749 A.2d at 748 ; see also Paramedics Electromedicina, 369 F.3d at 656-57 (similar); Meehan, 312 F.3d at 911 (similar); United States v. Carelock, 459 F.3d 437, 442-43 (3d Cir.2006) (similar); cf. Perry, 623 A.2d at 1215 (holding that appellant complied with Rule 3(a)’s requirement to designate the judgment or order appealed where it was “clear from the face of the Notice of Appeal” which judgment appellant sought to appeal). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Olanda L. Carelockgreen1 sentence2010Thoubboron, 749 A.2d at 748 ; see also Paramedics Electromedicina, 369 F.3d at 656-57 (similar); Meehan, 312 F.3d at 911 (similar); United States v. Carelock, 459 F.3d 437, 442-43 (3d Cir.2006) (similar); cf. Perry, 623 A.2d at 1215 (holding that appellant complied with Rule 3(a)’s requirement to designate the judgment or order appealed where it was “clear from the face of the Notice of Appeal” which judgment appellant sought to appeal). | 1 | 1 |
Hines v. John B. Sharkey Co.green1 sentence2008Cf. Hines, 449 A.2d at 1093 (<cWe decline to imply a time limitation on a tenant’s counterclaim [thereby confining the claim to the time period alleged in the landlord’s complaint] when it would be contrary, to the plain language of the rule.”). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Piersongreen2 sentences2007But the plain language of the rule does not establish any such broad prohibition, nothing in our decisions suggests such a broad prohibition, and it appears from our decision in In re Pierson, 690 A.2d 941 (D.C.1997), that the Bar community does not understand the Rule 1.8(a) to impose such a prohibition. 2007See id. at 944 (referring to a hearing committee finding that “the facts ... did not establish a violation of Rule 1.8(a) ... [because] not every transaction with a client requires separate counsel or the client’s written consent”). | 1 | 1 |
Goldberg. Marchesano. Kohlman. Inc. v. Old Republic Surety Co.green1 sentence2006Co., 727 A.2d 858, 863 (D.C.1999) (“The plain language of the rule indicates that this notice and opportunity prior to filing is mandatory.”). | 1 | 1 |
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. P 95,745 Dean Woods, and All Other Persons Similarly Situated v. Covington County Bank, Edward Hoglund v. Covington County Bankgreen2 sentences1984See Woods, 537 F.2d at 813 ("An overly broad application of Canon 9 ... would ultimately be self-defeating.”). . 1984See Woods, 537 F.2d at 813 ("An overly broad application of Canon 9 . . . would ultimately be self-defeating."). [14] When two matters are so unrelated that a review of their factual contexts reveals no reasonable likelihood that a government attorney with substantial responsibility in the first had access to information that would be useful in the second (about the parties, the facts, or the peculiarities of the law developed), it is difficult to imagine how the first matter could serve as an intended vehicle for developing the second. | 1 | 1 |
Samuel Reiter Painting Co. v. Bill Miedler Homes, Inc.green2 sentences1982Williams v. State, 378 So.2d 902, 903 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980); Samuel Reiter Painting Co. v. Bill Miedler Homes, Inc., 87 Mich.App. 75, 78 , 273 N.W.2d 592, 594 (1978) (per curiam); J. 1982Williams v. State, 378 So.2d 902, 903 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980); Samuel Reiter Painting Co. v. Bill Miedler Homes, Inc., 87 Mich.App. 75, 78 , 273 N.W.2d 592, 594 (1978) (per curiam); J. | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Stategreen1 sentence1982Williams v. State, 378 So.2d 902, 903 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1980); Samuel Reiter Painting Co. v. Bill Miedler Homes, Inc., 87 Mich.App. 75, 78 , 273 N.W.2d 592, 594 (1978) (per curiam); J. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cullen v. United States
green
1 sentence2019Where there is a clear and unambiguous interpretation of the statutory language that does not render any parts of the statute superfluous, the rule of lenity does not apply. "[T]he rule of lenity is a secondary canon of construction, and is to be invoked only where the statutory language, structure, purpose and history leave the intent of the legislature in genuine doubt." Cullen v. United States , 886 A.2d 870 , 874 (D.C. 2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Thoubboron v. Ford Motor Co.
green
1 sentence2010Thoubboron, 749 A.2d at 748 ; see also Paramedics Electromedicina, 369 F.3d at 656-57 (similar); Meehan, 312 F.3d at 911 (similar); United States v. Carelock, 459 F.3d 437, 442-43 (3d Cir.2006) (similar); cf. Perry, 623 A.2d at 1215 (holding that appellant complied with Rule 3(a)’s requirement to designate the judgment or order appealed where it was “clear from the face of the Notice of Appeal” which judgment appellant sought to appeal). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Elliott v. Tilton
green
1 sentence1999“The plain language of the rule indicates that this notice and opportunity prior to filing is mandatory.” Id. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Askin v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Commission
green
2 sentences1988At the same time, the holding ignores the plain language of our rule and is totally out of character with the rationale of our prior decisions favoring "formal notice," ( see Jackson v. Employees' Compensation Appeals Board, 537 A.2d 576 (D.C. 1988); Askin v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Commission, 521 A.2d 669 (D.C.1987); Glenwood Cemetery v. District of Columbia Zoning Commission, 448 A.2d 241 (D.C.1982)), [1] as well as the precept that it is important that ambiguity be removed from the notice context. 1988At the same time, the holding ignores the plain language of our rule and is totally out of character with the rationale of our prior decisions favoring “formal notice,” (see Jackson v. Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board, 537 A.2d 576 (D.C.1988); Askin v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Commission, 521 A.2d 669 (D.C.1987); Glenwood Cemetery v. District of Columbia Zoning Commission, 448 A.2d 241 (D.C.1982)), 1 as well as the precept that it is important that ambiguity be removed from the notice context. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Jackson v. District of Columbia Employees' Compensation Appeals Board
green
2 sentences1988At the same time, the holding ignores the plain language of our rule and is totally out of character with the rationale of our prior decisions favoring "formal notice," ( see Jackson v. Employees' Compensation Appeals Board, 537 A.2d 576 (D.C. 1988); Askin v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Commission, 521 A.2d 669 (D.C.1987); Glenwood Cemetery v. District of Columbia Zoning Commission, 448 A.2d 241 (D.C.1982)), [1] as well as the precept that it is important that ambiguity be removed from the notice context. 1988At the same time, the holding ignores the plain language of our rule and is totally out of character with the rationale of our prior decisions favoring “formal notice,” (see Jackson v. Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board, 537 A.2d 576 (D.C.1988); Askin v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Commission, 521 A.2d 669 (D.C.1987); Glenwood Cemetery v. District of Columbia Zoning Commission, 448 A.2d 241 (D.C.1982)), 1 as well as the precept that it is important that ambiguity be removed from the notice context. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Glenwood Cemetery v. District of Columbia Zoning Commission
green
2 sentences1988At the same time, the holding ignores the plain language of our rule and is totally out of character with the rationale of our prior decisions favoring "formal notice," ( see Jackson v. Employees' Compensation Appeals Board, 537 A.2d 576 (D.C. 1988); Askin v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Commission, 521 A.2d 669 (D.C.1987); Glenwood Cemetery v. District of Columbia Zoning Commission, 448 A.2d 241 (D.C.1982)), [1] as well as the precept that it is important that ambiguity be removed from the notice context. 1988At the same time, the holding ignores the plain language of our rule and is totally out of character with the rationale of our prior decisions favoring “formal notice,” (see Jackson v. Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board, 537 A.2d 576 (D.C.1988); Askin v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Commission, 521 A.2d 669 (D.C.1987); Glenwood Cemetery v. District of Columbia Zoning Commission, 448 A.2d 241 (D.C.1982)), 1 as well as the precept that it is important that ambiguity be removed from the notice context. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.