plain language rule in Florida

2015The district court also noted: The Florida Supreme Court stated in Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc. that “[a] strict construction of the plain language of rule 1.442(c)(3) requires that offers of judgment made by multiple offerors must apportion the amounts attributable to each offeror.” 849 So. 2d 276, 278-79 (Fla. 2003).

2015The district court also noted: The Florida Supreme Court stated in Willis Shaw Express, Inc. v. Hilyer Sod, Inc. that “[a] strict construction of the plain language of rule 1.442(c)(3) requires that offers of judgment made by multiple offerors must apportion the amounts attributable to each offeror.” 849 So.2d 276, 278-79 (Fla.2003).

2019See Simmons v. State, 271 So. 3d 997, 999 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (remarking that the State correctly conceded that the trial court's failure to hold a competency hearing and enter a written order was fundamental error); see also Dougherty v. State, 149 So. 3d 672, 677 (Fla. 2014) ("Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.210–3.212 were enacted to set forth the required competency hearing procedures for determining whether a defendant is competent to proceed or has been restored to competency."); Williams v. State, 169 So. 3d 221, 223 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) ("Under the plain language of rule 3.210(b), t

2019See Simmons v. State, 271 So. 3d 997, 999 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (remarking that the State correctly conceded that the trial court's failure to hold a competency hearing and enter a written order was fundamental error); see also Dougherty v. State, 149 So. 3d 672, 677 (Fla. 2014) ("Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.210–3.212 were enacted to set forth the required competency hearing procedures for determining whether a defendant is competent to proceed or has been restored to competency."); Williams v. State, 169 So. 3d 221, 223 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) ("Under the plain language of rule 3.210(b), t

2010In Clements, 982 So.2d at 732 , the First District properly relied upon the plain language of rule 1.442 to determine that Fund's settlement offer satisfied the rule: In the instant case, Appellant's settlement offer apportioned the amount each Appellee was responsible to pay, as required by rule 1.442(c)(3) and explained in Lamb, 906 So.2d at 1042 ("[T]he plain language of rule 1.442(c)(3) mandates that a joint proposal for settlement differentiate between the parties.").

2007See Papouras v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 940 So.2d 479, 480 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)(holding that “[t]he question of whether a proposal for settlement complies with section 768.79, Florida Statutes (2005), and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442 is reviewed de novo In Lamb, the Florida Supreme Court held that “the plain language of rule 1.442(c)(3) mandates that a joint proposal for settlement differentiate between the parties, even when one party’s alleged liability is purely vicarious.” Lamb, 906 So.2d at 1042 (emphasis added).

2024See Brown v. State, 715 So. 2d 241, 243 (Fla. 1998) (“Our courts have long recognized that the rules of construction applicable to statutes also apply to the construction of rules.

2016See Brown v. State, 715 So. 2d 241 , 243 - 17 - determine whether Mr. Al-Hakim was indigent and therefore entitled to the appointment of counsel in this direct criminal contempt proceeding in which Mr. Al-Hakim, a member of the public, was taken into custody." Id. at 1174.

2019See Peer v. State , 983 So.2d 34 , 35 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).

2019See Peer v. State , 983 So.2d 34 , 35 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).

2019See Simmons v. State, 271 So. 3d 997, 999 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (remarking that the State correctly conceded that the trial court's failure to hold a competency hearing and enter a written order was fundamental error); see also Dougherty v. State, 149 So. 3d 672, 677 (Fla. 2014) ("Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.210–3.212 were enacted to set forth the required competency hearing procedures for determining whether a defendant is competent to proceed or has been restored to competency."); Williams v. State, 169 So. 3d 221, 223 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) ("Under the plain language of rule 3.210(b), t

2017The mandatory language of the rule obligates courts to observe these specific competency hearing requirements to “safeguard a defendant’s due process right to a fair trial- and. to provide the reviewing court with an adequate record on appeal.” Bylock v. State, 196 So.3d 513, 514 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) (quoting Dougherty v. State, 149 So.3d 672, 676 (Fla. 2014)); see also Williams v. State, 169 So.3d 221, 223 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (“Under the plain language of rule 3.210(b), the terms ‘shall’ and ‘immediately’ reflect that a hearing is mandatory.”).

2016See License Acquisitions, LLC v. Debary Real Estate Holdings, LLC, 155 So. 3d 1137, 1144 (Fla. 2014); see also L.B. v. State, 700 So. 2d 370, 372 (Fla. 1997). - 11 - In this case, the dictionary definition of “replica” does not assist a plain language analysis because, as the First District explained, a dictionary definition of “replica” does not favor one conclusion over another as to what constitutes a permissible replica of an antique firearm: Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary (Deluxe Second Edition) defines replica as “any very close reproduction or copy.” For some, a firearm w

2016See License Acquisitions, LLC v. Debary Real Estate Holdings, LLC, 155 So. 3d 1137, 1144 (Fla. 2014); see also L.B. v. State, 700 So. 2d 370, 372 (Fla. 1997). - 11 - In this case, the dictionary definition of “replica” does not assist a plain language analysis because, as the First District explained, a dictionary definition of “replica” does not favor one conclusion over another as to what constitutes a permissible replica of an antique firearm: Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary (Deluxe Second Edition) defines replica as “any very close reproduction or copy.” For some, a firearm w

2016See License Acquisitions, LLC v. Debary Real Estate Holdings, LLC, 155 So. 3d 1137, 1144 (Fla. 2014); see also L.B. v. State, 700 So. 2d 370, 372 (Fla. 1997). - 11 - In this case, the dictionary definition of “replica” does not assist a plain language analysis because, as the First District explained, a dictionary definition of “replica” does not favor one conclusion over another as to what constitutes a permissible replica of an antique firearm: Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary (Deluxe Second Edition) defines replica as “any very close reproduction or copy.” For some, a firearm w

2016See License Acquisitions, LLC v. Debary Real Estate Holdings, LLC, 155 So. 3d 1137, 1144 (Fla. 2014); see also L.B. v. State, 700 So. 2d 370, 372 (Fla. 1997). - 11 - In this case, the dictionary definition of “replica” does not assist a plain language analysis because, as the First District explained, a dictionary definition of “replica” does not favor one conclusion over another as to what constitutes a permissible replica of an antique firearm: Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary (Deluxe Second Edition) defines replica as “any very close reproduction or copy.” For some, a firearm w

1992See Owca v. Zemzicki, App. 1962, 137 So.2d 876 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962); Cook v. Licht h b lau, App. 1965, 176 So.2d 523 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965); and Bondy v. West, App. 1969, 219 So.2d 117 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969).

1972See Owca v. Zemzicki, Fla.App., 137 So.2d 876 ; Cook v. Lichtblau, Fla.App., 176 So.2d 523 , and Bondy v. West, Fla.App., 219 So.2d 117 .

2025See also Kipp v. State, 128 So. 3d 879, 881 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (“It is not enough to list such witnesses as Category A witnesses; the state is also required to indicate that the witness will testify as an expert.”); Henry v. State, 42 So. 3d 328, 329 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (“Merely listing the witness as a category A witness did not satisfy the plain language of the rule.

2011Id.

2025Failure to include the expert designation in pretrial discovery constituted a discovery violation . . . .”) (internal citation omitted); Luis v. State, 851 So. 2d 773, 776 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).

2010Id.

2006The plain language of the rule was drafted "to create predictability and consistency in post judgment requests for attorney's fees." Lyn v. Lyn, 884 So.2d 181, 183 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).

2006This court also rejected that argument, noting that the plain language of rule 1.525 requires that the motion be served within thirty days " after filing of the judgment." Id. at 184 .

1994Justice Shaw succinctly set forth the analysis supporting the court's decision in Ashley : Because habitual offender maximums clearly constitute the "maximum possible penalty provided by law" — exceeding both the guidelines and standard statutory maximums — and because habitual offender sentences are imposed in a significant number of cases, our ruling in Williams [ v. State, 316 So.2d 267 (Fla. 1975)] and the plain language of rule 3.172 require that before a court may accept a guilty or nolo plea from an eligible defendant it must ascertain that the defendant is aware of the possibility and

1994While we acknowledge that Levens v. State, 598 So.2d 120 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), and Simmons v. State, 611 So.2d 1250 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), hold that there must be misadvice by counsel rather than mere nonadvice before a plea may be withdrawn on this basis, we believe that the supreme court in Ashley v. State, 614 So.2d 486 (Fla. 1993), has applied the reasoning of Setzer : [O]ur ruling in Williams [ v. State, 316 So.2d 267, 271 (Fla. 1975)] and the plain language of rule 3.172 require that before a court may accept a guilty or nolo plea from an eligible defendant it must ascertain that the defenda

2026See Gonzalez v. State, 829 So. 2d 277, 279 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).

2025See also Kipp v. State, 128 So. 3d 879, 881 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (“It is not enough to list such witnesses as Category A witnesses; the state is also required to indicate that the witness will testify as an expert.”); Henry v. State, 42 So. 3d 328, 329 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (“Merely listing the witness as a category A witness did not satisfy the plain language of the rule.

2024Either one constitutes record activity under the bright-line test required by the plain language of the rule.”); NRG Inv. 3 Partners, LLC v. MDC 6, LLC, 266 So. 3d 236, 238 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (“NRG filed a notice of hearing on its pending motion within sixty days of the notice of lack of prosecution; such notice of hearing constituted record activity preventing dismissal under rule 1.420(e).”); Robinson v. Marek, 255 So. 3d 420, 422 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (“Robinson filed a notice of hearing of his pending motion for attorney’s fees.

2024Thus, the plain language of rule 3.800(b)(2) “contemplates an end point after which time the trial court no longer has concurrent jurisdiction to correct sentencing errors during the pendency of an appeal.” See Collando-Pena v. State, 141 So. 3d 229, 231 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).