plain language rule in Arizona

2020Our aim is to "determine and give effect to our supreme court's intent in promulgating the rule . . . keeping in mind that the best reflection of that intent is the plain language of the rule." Id. (citing Osterkamp v. Browning, 226 Ariz. 485, 489, ¶ 14 (App. 2011)). ¶11 Arizona's "Dictionary Act" defines "person" as "a corporation, company, partnership, firm, association or society, as well as a natural person." A.R.S. § 1-215(28); see also Person, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining "person" as "a human being").

2013Our purpose is to “ ‘give effect to our supreme court’s intent in promulgating the rule ... keeping in mind that the best reflection of that intent is the plain language of the rule.’” Id., quoting Osterkamp v. Browning, 226 Ariz. 485, ¶ 14 , 250 P.3d 551, 555 (App.2011).

2009The plain language of a rule is the “best indicator” of the supreme court’s intent in promulgating it; consequently, “[i]f the language is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to that language and do not employ other methods of ... construction.” Fragoso, 210 Ariz. 427, ¶ 7 , 111 P.3d at 1030 .

2009The plain language of a rule is the “best indicator” of the supreme court’s intent in promulgating it; consequently, “[i]f the language is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to that language and do not employ other methods of ... construction.” Fragoso, 210 Ariz. 427, ¶ 7 , 111 P.3d at 1030 .

2025We look first to the plain language of the rule because that is "the best and most reliable index of [the rule's] meaning." State v. Hansen, 215 Ariz. 287, 289, ¶ 7 (2007) (quoting Deer Valley Unified Sch.

2012We look first to the plain language of a rule because that is ‘the best and most reliable index of [the rule’s] meaning.’ ” Newell, 221 Ariz. 112, ¶ 7 , 210 P.3d at 1285 , quoting State v. Hansen, 215 Ariz. 287, ¶ 7 , 160 P.3d 166, 168 (2007) (alteration in Newell; citations omitted).

2012We therefore must determine and give effect to the intent of the supreme court in promulgating the rule, “keeping in mind that the best reflection of that intent is the plain language of the rule.” Id., quoting Potter, 225 Ariz. 495, ¶ 8 , 240 P.3d at 1260 .

2012We therefore must determine and give effect to the intent of the supreme court in promulgating the rule, “keeping in mind that the best reflection of that intent is the plain language of the rule.” Id., quoting Potter, 225 Ariz. 495, ¶ 8 , 240 P.3d at 1260 .

2015If the law is ambiguous, “[w]e consider secondary principles of statutory interpretation, such as ‘the context of the statute, the language used, the subject matter, its historical background, its effects and consequences, and its spirit and purpose.’ ” Brain, 234 Ariz. 322, ¶ 11 , 322 P.3d at 142 , quoting Wyatt v. Wehmueller, 167 Ariz. 281, 284 , 806 P.2d 870, 873 (1991). ¶ 40 The plain language of the immunity provisions within the AMMA resolves the question of whether the odor of marijuana gives probable cause to suspect someone of a crime.

2015If the law is ambiguous, “[w]e consider secondary principles of statutory interpretation, such as ‘the context of the statute, the language used, the subject matter, its historical background, its effects and consequences, and its spirit and purpose.’ ” Brain, 234 Ariz. 322, ¶ 11 , 322 P.3d at 142 , quoting Wyatt v. Wehmueller, 167 Ariz. 281, 284 , 806 P.2d 870, 873 (1991). ¶ 40 The plain language of the immunity provisions within the AMMA resolves the question of whether the odor of marijuana gives probable cause to suspect someone of a crime.

2011“As with statutes, court rules ‘should be harmonized wherever possible and read in conjunction with each other.’ ” Haroutunian v. Valueoptions, Inc., 218 Ariz. 541, ¶ 25 , 189 P.3d 1114, 1123 (App.2008), quoting State v. Hansen, 215 Ariz. 287, ¶ 7 , 160 P.3d 166, 168 (2007). *133 ¶ 7 In Osterkamp , we considered whether, pursuant to Rule 32.4(c)(2), a pleading defendant was entitled to appointment of counsel in a timely filed, second post-conviction proceeding, in order to “investigate and possibly assert a claim that counsel in [his] first, of-right’ post-conviction proceeding had rendered in

2011“As with statutes, court rules ‘should be harmonized wherever possible and read in conjunction with each other.’ ” Haroutunian v. Valueoptions, Inc., 218 Ariz. 541, ¶ 25 , 189 P.3d 1114, 1123 (App.2008), quoting State v. Hansen, 215 Ariz. 287, ¶ 7 , 160 P.3d 166, 168 (2007). *133 ¶ 7 In Osterkamp , we considered whether, pursuant to Rule 32.4(c)(2), a pleading defendant was entitled to appointment of counsel in a timely filed, second post-conviction proceeding, in order to “investigate and possibly assert a claim that counsel in [his] first, of-right’ post-conviction proceeding had rendered in

2010Lopez v. Kearney, 222 Ariz. 133, ¶ 12 , 213 P.3d 282, 285 (App. 2009).

2010Lopez v. Kearney, 222 Ariz. 133, ¶ 12 , 213 P.3d 282, 285 (App. 2009).

2009But when the language is “ ‘inconclusive or ambiguous, we then consider other factors such as [its] context, subject matter, effects, consequences, spirit, and purpose.’ ” Bergeron, 205 Ariz. 640, ¶ 16 , 74 P.3d at 958 , quoting Vega, 199 Ariz. 504, ¶ 8 , 19 P.3d at 648 (alteration in Bergeron). ¶ 12 Rule 410, Ariz. R.

2009But when the language is “ ‘inconclusive or ambiguous, we then consider other factors such as [its] context, subject matter, effects, consequences, spirit, and purpose.’ ” Bergeron, 205 Ariz. 640, ¶ 16 , 74 P.3d at 958 , quoting Vega, 199 Ariz. 504, ¶ 8 , 19 P.3d at 648 (alteration in Bergeron). ¶ 12 Rule 410, Ariz. R.

2006See Schritter, 201 Ariz. 391, ¶ 5 , 36 P.3d at 740 . ¶ 6 Rules are interpreted in accord with the drafters’ intent, the best evidence of which is the plain language of the rule.

2006See Schritter, 201 Ariz. 391, ¶ 5 , 36 P.3d at 740 . ¶ 6 Rules are interpreted in accord with the drafters’ intent, the best evidence of which is the plain language of the rule.

2021State v. Silva, 222 Ariz. 457, 460, ¶ 13 (App. 2009). ¶11 When a parent enters a no-contest plea, the juvenile court does not automatically terminate their parental rights.

2018Sec., 215 Ariz. 96, 99, ¶ 9 (App. 2007) (“The plain language of this rule [Rule 64(C)] undeniably suggests parental rights may be terminated by default at any of the four types of hearings named in the rule, including status conferences.”).

2017See Simpson v. Simpson, 224 Ariz. 224, 225, ¶ 6 , 229 P.3d 236 (App. 2010) (“The best indicator of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute.”).

2017See Simpson v. Simpson, 224 Ariz. 224, 225, ¶ 6 , 229 P.3d 236 (App. 2010) (“The best indicator of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute.”).

2015The fifteen-day deadline imposed by the rule is meant to “preserve the finality of judgments.” See Green v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 606 F.3d 1296, 1300 (11th Cir.2010).

2015See State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, ¶¶ 23-24 , 166 P.3d 945, 952-53 (App.2007); see also State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, ¶ 4 , 39 P.3d 525, 526 (2002) (“Our basic rule is that where ineffective assistance of counsel claims are raised, or could have been raised, in a Rule 32 post-conviction relief proceeding, subsequent claims of ineffective assistance will be deemed waived and precluded.”). ¶ 15 Neither the plain language of the rule nor case law interpreting it prior to Diaz supports Goldin’s suggestion that because of his attorneys’ ineffectiveness, his newly discovered IAC claim should be e

2015See State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, ¶¶ 23-24 , 166 P.3d 945, 952-53 (App.2007); see also State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, ¶ 4 , 39 P.3d 525, 526 (2002) (“Our basic rule is that where ineffective assistance of counsel claims are raised, or could have been raised, in a Rule 32 post-conviction relief proceeding, subsequent claims of ineffective assistance will be deemed waived and precluded.”). ¶ 15 Neither the plain language of the rule nor case law interpreting it prior to Diaz supports Goldin’s suggestion that because of his attorneys’ ineffectiveness, his newly discovered IAC claim should be e

2015See State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, ¶¶ 23-24 , 166 P.3d 945, 952-53 (App.2007); see also State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, ¶ 4 , 39 P.3d 525, 526 (2002) (“Our basic rule is that where ineffective assistance of counsel claims are raised, or could have been raised, in a Rule 32 post-conviction relief proceeding, subsequent claims of ineffective assistance will be deemed waived and precluded.”). ¶ 15 Neither the plain language of the rule nor case law interpreting it prior to Diaz supports Goldin’s suggestion that because of his attorneys’ ineffectiveness, his newly discovered IAC claim should be e

2015See State v. Swoopes, 216 Ariz. 390, ¶¶ 23-24 , 166 P.3d 945, 952-53 (App.2007); see also State v. Spreitz, 202 Ariz. 1, ¶ 4 , 39 P.3d 525, 526 (2002) (“Our basic rule is that where ineffective assistance of counsel claims are raised, or could have been raised, in a Rule 32 post-conviction relief proceeding, subsequent claims of ineffective assistance will be deemed waived and precluded.”). ¶ 15 Neither the plain language of the rule nor case law interpreting it prior to Diaz supports Goldin’s suggestion that because of his attorneys’ ineffectiveness, his newly discovered IAC claim should be e

2013Blair v. Burgener, 226 Ariz. 213, 217, ¶ 12 , 245 P.3d 898, 902 (App.2010).

2013Blair v. Burgener, 226 Ariz. 213, 217, ¶ 12 , 245 P.3d 898, 902 (App.2010).

2012“If, however, the constitutional language is ambiguous, or a construction is urged which would result in an absurdity, a court may look behind the bare words of the provision to determine the conditions which gave rise to it and the effect which it was intended to have.” McElhaney Cattle Co. v. Smith, 132 Ariz. 286, 290 , 645 P.2d 801, 805 (1982).

2012“If, however, the constitutional language is ambiguous, or a construction is urged which would result in an absurdity, a court may look behind the bare words of the provision to determine the conditions which gave rise to it and the effect which it was intended to have.” McElhaney Cattle Co. v. Smith, 132 Ariz. 286, 290 , 645 P.2d 801, 805 (1982).

2012Janson v. Christensen, 167 Ariz. 470, 471 , 808 P.2d 1222, 1223 (1991) (stating that we rely on the plain language of the rule or statute if it is unambiguous).

2012Janson v. Christensen, 167 Ariz. 470, 471 , 808 P.2d 1222, 1223 (1991) (stating that we rely on the plain language of the rule or statute if it is unambiguous).

2012“We therefore must determine and give effect to the intent of the supreme court in promulgating the rule, ‘keeping in mind that the best reflection of that intent is the plain language of the rule.’ ” Southwest Gas Corp. v. Irwin, 229 Ariz. 198, ¶ 9 , 273 P.3d 650, 654 (App.2012), quoting Osterkamp v. Browning, 226 Ariz. 485, ¶ 14 , 250 P.3d 551, 555 (App.2011).

2012“We therefore must determine and give effect to the intent of the supreme court in promulgating the rule, ‘keeping in mind that the best reflection of that intent is the plain language of the rule.’ ” Southwest Gas Corp. v. Irwin, 229 Ariz. 198, ¶ 9 , 273 P.3d 650, 654 (App.2012), quoting Osterkamp v. Browning, 226 Ariz. 485, ¶ 14 , 250 P.3d 551, 555 (App.2011).