plain language rule in Kentucky

2024Lewis v. Charolais Corp., 19 S.W.3d 671, 677 (Ky. App. 1999).

2024Lewis v. Charolais Corp., 19 S.W.3d 671, 677 (Ky. App. 1999).

2022Moreover, CR 60.03 “is intended as an equitable form of relief when no other avenue exists.” Meece v. Commonwealth, 529 S.W.3d 281, 295 (Ky. 2017).

2022In fact, we have previously held that “[i]t was not necessary for the trial judge to sua sponte order separate trials.” Humphrey v. Commonwealth, 836 S.W.2d 865, 868 (Ky. 1992).

2021Compare with Morrow v. Stivers, 836 S.W.2d 424, 430 (Ky.App. 1992).

2020“Pursuant to the plain language of the rule, in the absence of controversy, the feasibility exception of KRE 407 simply does not apply.” Davis v. Fischer Single Family Homes, Ltd., 231 S.W.3d 767, 775 (Ky. App. 2007). -9- Curtis’s second argument for getting around KRE 407’s prohibition of evidence of subsequent remedial measures was to impeach Gary Price’s testimony “that it could not be known where [Curtis] fell, that his own photographs did not show the hazard on which she fell, and that his own photographs were inaccurate and not reliable.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 7).

2017The mandate of CR 39.01 is unmistakable in its clarity.”); Parrish v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 675, 677 (Ky. 2009) (“[W]e must accept the plain meaning of the language of the rule [RCr 11.42].”); Lanham v. Commonwealth, 171 S.W.3d 14, 21 (Ky. 2005) (“More impor tantly, however, we cannot ignore the plain language of the rule [KRE 103(d) ].”).

2017The mandate of CR 39.01 is unmistakable in its clarity.”); Parrish v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 675, 677 (Ky. 2009) (“[W]e must accept the plain meaning of the language of the rule [RCr 11.42].”); Lanham v. Commonwealth, 171 S.W.3d 14, 21 (Ky. 2005) (“More impor tantly, however, we cannot ignore the plain language of the rule [KRE 103(d) ].”).

2009Notably, however, the rule provides that cases shall be dismissed “without prejudice.” Manning v. Wilkinson, 264 S.W.3d 620, 622-28 (Ky.App.2007) (citation omitted).

2007See Bohannon v. Rutland, 616 S.W.2d 46, 46 (Ky.1981).

2005Subdivision (d) (1992). [8] KRE 1104; see also Commonwealth v. Maricle, 10 S.W.3d 117, 120 (Ky.1999) (recognizing that rules commentary, while not having the force of law, "provide . . . a guide to interpretation of the rules as set forth"). [9] Cf. LaFleur v. Shoney's, Inc., 83 S.W.3d 474, 478 (Ky.2002) (discounting the appellant's argument about a civil rule because "it ignores the plain language of the rule"); McDonald v. Ethics Committee of the Kentucky Judiciary, 3 S.W.3d 740, 743 (Ky.1999) (overruling a Judicial Ethics Opinion in part because it "ignores the plain language of the rule").

2005Subdivision (d) (1992). [8] KRE 1104; see also Commonwealth v. Maricle, 10 S.W.3d 117, 120 (Ky.1999) (recognizing that rules commentary, while not having the force of law, "provide . . . a guide to interpretation of the rules as set forth"). [9] Cf. LaFleur v. Shoney's, Inc., 83 S.W.3d 474, 478 (Ky.2002) (discounting the appellant's argument about a civil rule because "it ignores the plain language of the rule"); McDonald v. Ethics Committee of the Kentucky Judiciary, 3 S.W.3d 740, 743 (Ky.1999) (overruling a Judicial Ethics Opinion in part because it "ignores the plain language of the rule").

2005Subdivision (d) (1992). [8] KRE 1104; see also Commonwealth v. Maricle, 10 S.W.3d 117, 120 (Ky.1999) (recognizing that rules commentary, while not having the force of law, "provide . . . a guide to interpretation of the rules as set forth"). [9] Cf. LaFleur v. Shoney's, Inc., 83 S.W.3d 474, 478 (Ky.2002) (discounting the appellant's argument about a civil rule because "it ignores the plain language of the rule"); McDonald v. Ethics Committee of the Kentucky Judiciary, 3 S.W.3d 740, 743 (Ky.1999) (overruling a Judicial Ethics Opinion in part because it "ignores the plain language of the rule").

2005Cf. LaFleur v. Shoney’s, Inc., 83 S.W.3d 474, 478 (Ky.2002) (discounting the appellant's argument about a civil rule because "it ignores the plain language of the rule”); McDonald v. Ethics Committee of the Kentucky Judiciary, 3 S.W.3d 740, 743 (Ky.1999) (overruling a Judicial Ethics Opinion in part because it "ignores the plain language of the rule”). .

2005Subdivision (d) (1992). [8] KRE 1104; see also Commonwealth v. Maricle, 10 S.W.3d 117, 120 (Ky.1999) (recognizing that rules commentary, while not having the force of law, "provide . . . a guide to interpretation of the rules as set forth"). [9] Cf. LaFleur v. Shoney's, Inc., 83 S.W.3d 474, 478 (Ky.2002) (discounting the appellant's argument about a civil rule because "it ignores the plain language of the rule"); McDonald v. Ethics Committee of the Kentucky Judiciary, 3 S.W.3d 740, 743 (Ky.1999) (overruling a Judicial Ethics Opinion in part because it "ignores the plain language of the rule").

2005Cf. LaFleur v. Shoney’s, Inc., 83 S.W.3d 474, 478 (Ky.2002) (discounting the appellant's argument about a civil rule because "it ignores the plain language of the rule”); McDonald v. Ethics Committee of the Kentucky Judiciary, 3 S.W.3d 740, 743 (Ky.1999) (overruling a Judicial Ethics Opinion in part because it "ignores the plain language of the rule”). .

2005Subdivision (d) (1992). [8] KRE 1104; see also Commonwealth v. Maricle, 10 S.W.3d 117, 120 (Ky.1999) (recognizing that rules commentary, while not having the force of law, "provide . . . a guide to interpretation of the rules as set forth"). [9] Cf. LaFleur v. Shoney's, Inc., 83 S.W.3d 474, 478 (Ky.2002) (discounting the appellant's argument about a civil rule because "it ignores the plain language of the rule"); McDonald v. Ethics Committee of the Kentucky Judiciary, 3 S.W.3d 740, 743 (Ky.1999) (overruling a Judicial Ethics Opinion in part because it "ignores the plain language of the rule").

2005Tucker v. Commonwealth, 916 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Ky.1996). . 147 S.W.3d 709 (Ky.2004). .

2005Subdivision (d) (1992). [8] KRE 1104; see also Commonwealth v. Maricle, 10 S.W.3d 117, 120 (Ky.1999) (recognizing that rules commentary, while not having the force of law, "provide . . . a guide to interpretation of the rules as set forth"). [9] Cf. LaFleur v. Shoney's, Inc., 83 S.W.3d 474, 478 (Ky.2002) (discounting the appellant's argument about a civil rule because "it ignores the plain language of the rule"); McDonald v. Ethics Committee of the Kentucky Judiciary, 3 S.W.3d 740, 743 (Ky.1999) (overruling a Judicial Ethics Opinion in part because it "ignores the plain language of the rule").

2004Accordingly, until the case is submitted to the jury for its deliberations, "sequestration of the jury is discretionary." Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 734 S.W.2d 437, 445 (1987).

2004Accordingly, until the case is submitted to the jury for its deliberations, “sequestration of the jury is discretionary.” Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 734 S.W.2d 437, 445 (1987).

2004The plain language of this rule provides that "[s]equestration is required only after a felony case has been submitted to a jury for its verdict." Bowling v. Commonwealth, Ky., 873 S.W.2d 175, 182 (1993) (emphasis added).

2004The plain language of this rule provides that “[sequestration is required only after a felony case has been submitted to a jury for its verdict.” Bowling v. Commonwealth, Ky., 873 S.W.2d 175, 182 (1993) (emphasis added).