plain language rule in Minnesota

2024State v. Myhre, 875 N.W.2d 799, 803 (Minn. 2016). “[W]hen interpreting a rule, we look first to the plain language of the rule and its purpose.” State v. Gray, 987 N.W.2d 563 , 566 (Minn. 2023) (quoting Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Minn. 2014)).

2018See Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A. , 851 N.W.2d 598 , 601 (Minn. 2014) ("When interpreting a rule, we look first to the plain language of the rule and its purpose.").

2017“When construing procedural rules, we look to the plain language of the rule and its purpose.” Id. ‘Words and phrases are construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage.” State v. Dahlin, 753 N.W.2d 300, 306 (Minn. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

2011See State v. Dahlin, 753 N.W.2d 300, 305-06 (Minn.2008) (stating that procedural rules are first construed according to the plain language of the rule, and if that language is unambiguous, “that plain language must be followed” (emphasis added)).

2023“When construing procedural rules, we look to the plain language of the rule and its purpose.” In re Welfare of S.M.E., 725 N.W.2d 740, 742 (Minn. 2007).

2023S.M.E., 725 N.W.2d at 742 (“When construing procedural rules, we look to the plain language of the rule and its purpose.”).

2019When interpreting a rule of civil procedure, "we first look to the plain language of the rule and its purpose." Rubey v. Vannett , 714 N.W.2d 417 , 421 (Minn. 2006).

2012P. 4.02 is applicable to service of a mechanic’s lien statement “we first look to the plain language of the rule and its purpose.” Rubey v. Vannett, 714 N.W.2d 417, 421 (Minn.2006); see also House v. Hanson, 245 Minn. 466, 473 , 72 N.W.2d 874, 878 (1955) (“The words of a court rule, like those of a statute, must be taken and construed in the sense in which they were understood and intended at the time the rule was promulgated.”).

2011“When interpreting the Minnesota Rules of Evidence, we first look to the plain language of the rule.” State v. Stone, 784 N.W.2d 367, 370 (Minn.2010).

2011“When interpreting the Minnesota Rules of Evidence, we first look to the plain language of the rule.” State v. Stone, 784 N.W.2d 367, 370 (Minn.2010).

2025To answer this question, we turn to “the plain language of the rule and its purpose.” R.K., 901 N.W.2d at 160 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2023When interpreting rules of procedure, “we look first to the plain language of the rule and its purpose.” R.K., 901 N.W.2d at 160 (quotation omitted).

2016See State v. Borg, 834 N.W.2d 194, 198 (Minn.2013).

2016See State v. Borg, 834 N.W.2d 194, 197 (Minn.2013) (“When construing the procedural rules, we look to the plain language of the rule and its purpose.”).

2018See, e.g. , Red Wing Motel Inv'rs v. Red Wing Fire Dep't , 552 N.W.2d 295 , 297 (Minn. App. 1996) (citing Cape Henry , 331 S.E.2d at 480 ), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 1996); see also Integrity Floorcovering, Inc. v. Broan-Nutone, LLC , 521 F.3d 914 , 919-21 (8th Cir. 2008).

2017McMillan also urges this court to consider Integrity Flooring, a decision from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in which the court held that a bathroom ventilation fan was an ordinary building material subject to the statute of repose. 521 F.3d at 921 .

2017Id.

2017But the criminal procedural rales must be “read as a whole and each section ... interpreted in light of the surrounding sections to avoid conflicting interpretations.” State v. Dahlin, 753 N.W.2d 300, 306 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted); see Olson, 884 N.W.2d at 398 (holding that the plain language of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure must be read in context, as a whole).

2015Id. 4 A. Rule 54.02 provides that the district court “may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims . . . only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.” Minn. R.

2015Id.

2007Id. at 171 .

2006See id. at 171 .

2025See Nat’l Tea Co., 339 N.W.2d at 61 . 15 First, the updated affidavit does not address whether the spreadsheets or the data therein were “kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity.” Cf. id.

2025See Nat’l Tea Co., 339 N.W.2d at 61 . 15 First, the updated affidavit does not address whether the spreadsheets or the data therein were “kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity.” Cf. id.

2024State v. Myhre, 875 N.W.2d 799, 803 (Minn. 2016). “[W]hen interpreting a rule, we look first to the plain language of the rule and its purpose.” State v. Gray, 987 N.W.2d 563 , 566 (Minn. 2023) (quoting Walsh v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 851 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Minn. 2014)).

2024Granted, these concerns represent a possible purpose for the statute at issue, but considering the Legislature’s purpose behind a statute goes well beyond a plain language analysis and is inappropriate in the absence of ambiguity. 5 Sterry v. Minn. Dep’t of Corr., 8 N.W.3d 224, 235 (Minn. 2024) (stating that we only consider a statute’s purpose 5 Though we need not analyze the purpose of the statute at issue, it is not clear how considering the Legislature’s concerns regarding public safety and recidivism favors only Balsley’s proposed interpretation. 9 if the statutory text is unclear).

2023Graphic Commc’ns Local 1B Health & Welfare Fund A v. CVS Caremark Corp., 850 N.W.2d 682, 689 (Minn. 2014) (explaining that “we read the statute as a whole and give effect to all of its provisions”); see also United Sav.

2023Graphic Commc’ns Local 1B Health & Welfare Fund A v. CVS Caremark Corp., 850 N.W.2d 682, 689 (Minn. 2014) (explaining that “we read the statute as a whole and give effect to all of its provisions”); see also United Sav.

2023Rules are read as a whole, and each section is interpreted “in light of the surrounding sections.” State v. Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d 677, 682 (Minn. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Am.

2018See McConaughy , 119 N.W. at 417 ("Many questions arise which are clearly political, and not of judicial cognizance.").

2018See, e.g. , Red Wing Motel Inv'rs v. Red Wing Fire Dep't , 552 N.W.2d 295 , 297 (Minn. App. 1996) (citing Cape Henry , 331 S.E.2d at 480 ), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 1996); see also Integrity Floorcovering, Inc. v. Broan-Nutone, LLC , 521 F.3d 914 , 919-21 (8th Cir. 2008).

2018See, e.g. , Red Wing Motel Inv'rs v. Red Wing Fire Dep't , 552 N.W.2d 295 , 297 (Minn. App. 1996) (citing Cape Henry , 331 S.E.2d at 480 ), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 20, 1996); see also Integrity Floorcovering, Inc. v. Broan-Nutone, LLC , 521 F.3d 914 , 919-21 (8th Cir. 2008).

2017Based on the plain language of this rule, we “may not impose identical discipline if to do so would ... result in discipliné substantially different from that warranted in Minnesota.” In re Meaden, 628 N.W.2d 129, 133 (Minn. 2001) (citing Rule 12(d), RLPR); see also In re Pennington, 706 N.W.2d 482, 482 (Minn. 2005) (order) (imposing different discipline in a reciprocal discipline case because the discipline imposed by the other jurisdiction was substantially different from the discipline warranted in Minnesota).

2017Based on the plain language of this rule, we “may not impose identical discipline if to do so would ... result in discipliné substantially different from that warranted in Minnesota.” In re Meaden, 628 N.W.2d 129, 133 (Minn. 2001) (citing Rule 12(d), RLPR); see also In re Pennington, 706 N.W.2d 482, 482 (Minn. 2005) (order) (imposing different discipline in a reciprocal discipline case because the discipline imposed by the other jurisdiction was substantially different from the discipline warranted in Minnesota).

2017No. 12 v. Minn. Dep’t of Educ., 788 N.W.2d 907, 912 (Minn. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re Cities of Annandale & Maple Lake, 731 N.W.2d 502, 513-14 (Minn. 2007) (stating that we rely on a plain-language analysis when a federal regulation’s language is “clear and capable of understanding”).

2017Cf. Slaughter, 691 N.W.2d at 76 (considering, at the close of the State’s case, defendant’s motion for acquittal and ordering inclusion of an uncharged lesser-included offense).