third-party claim in Georgia

1983The trial court granted this motion in full, holding that there existed no duty of B & W which would provide a basis for the architect’s claims for contribution and indemnity, that is, that any liability of B & W runs only to the Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta or other intermediary contractors or others in the contractual chain and the third party claim of the architectural firm is not appropriate, citing Smith, Kline & French Laboratories v. Just, 126 Ga. App. 643, 649 ( 191 SE2d 632 ), and the architectural firm could not tender a substitute defendant, citing Brabham v. Brown, 147

1983The trial court granted this motion in full, holding that there existed no duty of B & W which would provide a basis for the architect’s claims for contribution and indemnity, that is, that any liability of B & W runs only to the Housing Authority of the City of Atlanta or other intermediary contractors or others in the contractual chain and the third party claim of the architectural firm is not appropriate, citing Smith, Kline & French Laboratories v. Just, 126 Ga. App. 643, 649 ( 191 SE2d 632 ), and the architectural firm could not tender a substitute defendant, citing Brabham v. Brown, 147

2021Co., 484 NW2d 811, 813 (Minn. App. 1992) (“[C]ourts in other jurisdictions have generally held that an action against a liability insurer for failure to settle a claim does not accrue . . . until the judgment against the insured is final.” (citations omitted)); Allstate Ins.

2021Co., 484 NW2d 811, 813 (Minn. App. 1992) (“[C]ourts in other jurisdictions have generally held that an action against a liability insurer for failure to settle a claim does not accrue . . . until the judgment against the insured is final.”); Allstate Ins.

2013We affirmed the denial of summary judgment on the main claim, 306 Ga. App. at 212-213 (1), but we reversed the trial court’s denial of summary judgment to the NCHA on Kennedy’s third-party claim, holding that the indemnity provision was void and unenforceable under OCGA § 13-8-2 (b) and that the trial court “erred in denying the NCHA’s motion for summary judgment on Kennedy’s third-party complaint.” Id. at 217 (2) (b).

2013We affirmed the denial of summary judgment on the main claim, 306 Ga. App. at 212-213 (1), but we reversed the trial court’s denial of summary judgment to the NCHA on Kennedy’s third-party claim, holding that the indemnity provision was void and unenforceable under OCGA § 13-8-2 (b) and that the trial court “erred in denying the NCHA’s motion for summary judgment on Kennedy’s third-party complaint.” Id. at 217 (2) (b).

1995See Cohran v. Jones, 160 Ga. App. 761, 762 (1) ( 288 SE2d 80 ) (1981).

1995See Cohran v. Jones, 160 Ga. App. 761, 762 (1) ( 288 SE2d 80 ) (1981).

2021See Davis, 564 U. S. at 241 (III); Reed v. State, 307 Ga. 527, 535 (2) (b) (837 SE2d 272) (2019); Registe, 292 Ga. at 156-157; Smarr v. State, 317 Ga. App. 584, 593 (3) (c) (732 SE2d 110) (2012); see also United States v. Zodhiates, 901 F3d 137, 143 (I) (2d Cir. 2018) (holding exclusionary rule did not apply to historical CSLI obtained in objectively reasonable good faith reliance on appellate precedent establishing the third-party doctrine before the Carpenter Court held that a warrant is required for at least seven days of historical CSLI despite the fact that the information is held by a th

2021See Davis, 564 U. S. at 241 (III); Reed v. State, 307 Ga. 527, 535 (2) (b) ( 837 SE2d 272 ) (2019); Registe, 292 Ga. at 156-157 ; Smarr v. State, 317 Ga. App. 584, 593 (3) (c) ( 732 SE2d 110 ) (2012); see also United States v. Zodhiates, 901 F3d 137, 143 (I) (2d Cir. 2018) (holding exclusionary rule did not apply to historical CSLI obtained in objectively reasonable good faith reliance on appellate precedent establishing the third-party doctrine before the Carpenter Court held that a warrant is required for at least seven days of historical CSLI despite the fact that the information is held by

2021See Davis, 564 U. S. at 241 (III); Reed v. State, 307 Ga. 527, 535 (2) (b) (837 SE2d 272) (2019); Registe, 292 Ga. at 156-157; Smarr v. State, 317 Ga. App. 584, 593 (3) (c) (732 SE2d 110) (2012); see also United States v. Zodhiates, 901 F3d 137, 143 (I) (2d Cir. 2018) (holding exclusionary rule did not apply to historical CSLI obtained in objectively reasonable good faith reliance on appellate precedent establishing the third-party doctrine before the Carpenter Court held that a warrant is required for at least seven days of historical CSLI despite the fact that the information is held by a th

2021See Davis, 564 U. S. at 241 (III); Reed v. State, 307 Ga. 527, 535 (2) (b) ( 837 SE2d 272 ) (2019); Registe, 292 Ga. at 156-157 ; Smarr v. State, 317 Ga. App. 584, 593 (3) (c) ( 732 SE2d 110 ) (2012); see also United States v. Zodhiates, 901 F3d 137, 143 (I) (2d Cir. 2018) (holding exclusionary rule did not apply to historical CSLI obtained in objectively reasonable good faith reliance on appellate precedent establishing the third-party doctrine before the Carpenter Court held that a warrant is required for at least seven days of historical CSLI despite the fact that the information is held by

2021See Davis, 564 U. S. at 241 (III); Reed v. State, 307 Ga. 527, 535 (2) (b) (837 SE2d 272) (2019); Registe, 292 Ga. at 156-157; Smarr v. State, 317 Ga. App. 584, 593 (3) (c) (732 SE2d 110) (2012); see also United States v. Zodhiates, 901 F3d 137, 143 (I) (2d Cir. 2018) (holding exclusionary rule did not apply to historical CSLI obtained in objectively reasonable good faith reliance on appellate precedent establishing the third-party doctrine before the Carpenter Court held that a warrant is required for at least seven days of historical CSLI despite the fact that the information is held by a th

2021See Davis, 564 U. S. at 241 (III); Reed v. State, 307 Ga. 527, 535 (2) (b) ( 837 SE2d 272 ) (2019); Registe, 292 Ga. at 156-157 ; Smarr v. State, 317 Ga. App. 584, 593 (3) (c) ( 732 SE2d 110 ) (2012); see also United States v. Zodhiates, 901 F3d 137, 143 (I) (2d Cir. 2018) (holding exclusionary rule did not apply to historical CSLI obtained in objectively reasonable good faith reliance on appellate precedent establishing the third-party doctrine before the Carpenter Court held that a warrant is required for at least seven days of historical CSLI despite the fact that the information is held by

2021See Davis, 564 U. S. at 241 (III); Reed v. State, 307 Ga. 527, 535 (2) (b) (837 SE2d 272) (2019); Registe, 292 Ga. at 156-157; Smarr v. State, 317 Ga. App. 584, 593 (3) (c) (732 SE2d 110) (2012); see also United States v. Zodhiates, 901 F3d 137, 143 (I) (2d Cir. 2018) (holding exclusionary rule did not apply to historical CSLI obtained in objectively reasonable good faith reliance on appellate precedent establishing the third-party doctrine before the Carpenter Court held that a warrant is required for at least seven days of historical CSLI despite the fact that the information is held by a th

2021See Davis, 564 U. S. at 241 (III); Reed v. State, 307 Ga. 527, 535 (2) (b) (837 SE2d 272) (2019); Registe, 292 Ga. at 156-157; Smarr v. State, 317 Ga. App. 584, 593 (3) (c) (732 SE2d 110) (2012); see also United States v. Zodhiates, 901 F3d 137, 143 (I) (2d Cir. 2018) (holding exclusionary rule did not apply to historical CSLI obtained in objectively reasonable good faith reliance on appellate precedent establishing the third-party doctrine before the Carpenter Court held that a warrant is required for at least seven days of historical CSLI despite the fact that the information is held by a th

2021See Davis, 564 U. S. at 241 (III); Reed v. State, 307 Ga. 527, 535 (2) (b) (837 SE2d 272) (2019); Registe, 292 Ga. at 156-157; Smarr v. State, 317 Ga. App. 584, 593 (3) (c) (732 SE2d 110) (2012); see also United States v. Zodhiates, 901 F3d 137, 143 (I) (2d Cir. 2018) (holding exclusionary rule did not apply to historical CSLI obtained in objectively reasonable good faith reliance on appellate precedent establishing the third-party doctrine before the Carpenter Court held that a warrant is required for at least seven days of historical CSLI despite the fact that the information is held by a th

2021See Davis, 564 U. S. at 241 (III); Reed v. State, 307 Ga. 527, 535 (2) (b) ( 837 SE2d 272 ) (2019); Registe, 292 Ga. at 156-157 ; Smarr v. State, 317 Ga. App. 584, 593 (3) (c) ( 732 SE2d 110 ) (2012); see also United States v. Zodhiates, 901 F3d 137, 143 (I) (2d Cir. 2018) (holding exclusionary rule did not apply to historical CSLI obtained in objectively reasonable good faith reliance on appellate precedent establishing the third-party doctrine before the Carpenter Court held that a warrant is required for at least seven days of historical CSLI despite the fact that the information is held by

2021We therefore disapprove the Court of Appeals’ decision in Brown v. State, 330 Ga. App. 488, 492-493 & n.6 30 Because, at the time of Lofton’s trial, a federal statute, 18 USC § 2702 (c) (4), and binding appellate precedent, Registe, 292 Ga. at 157, authorized the investigatory conduct at issue, reversing the trial court’s decision in this case would have little, if any, additional benefit in deterring future violations of the privacy interests recognized in Carpenter.

2021We therefore disapprove the Court of Appeals’ decision in Brown v. State, 330 Ga. App. 488, 492-493 (2) & 30 Because, at the time of Lofton’s trial, a federal statute, 18 USC § 2702 (c) (4), and binding appellate precedent, Registe, 292 Ga. at 157 , authorized the investigatory conduct at issue, reversing the trial court’s decision in this case would have little, if any, additional benefit in deterring future violations of the privacy interests recognized in Carpenter.

2017See Cheeley Investments , 332 Ga. App. at 120-121 (3), 770 S.E.2d 350 . 3 OCGA § 13-6-11 provides: "The expenses of litigation generally shall not be allowed as a part of the damages; but where the plaintiff has specially pleaded and has made prayer therefor and where the defendant has acted in bad faith, has been stubbornly litigious, or has caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense, the jury may allow them." 4 Thus, the facts of this case involve two attorney fee awards: the fees assessed against JRD in the Gwinnett action and the fees assessed against Zambetti in the Forsyth acti

2017See Cheeley Investments , 332 Ga. App. at 120-121 (3), 770 S.E.2d 350 . 3 OCGA § 13-6-11 provides: "The expenses of litigation generally shall not be allowed as a part of the damages; but where the plaintiff has specially pleaded and has made prayer therefor and where the defendant has acted in bad faith, has been stubbornly litigious, or has caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense, the jury may allow them." 4 Thus, the facts of this case involve two attorney fee awards: the fees assessed against JRD in the Gwinnett action and the fees assessed against Zambetti in the Forsyth acti

2017See Cheeley Investments , 332 Ga. App. at 120-121 (3), 770 S.E.2d 350 . 3 OCGA § 13-6-11 provides: "The expenses of litigation generally shall not be allowed as a part of the damages; but where the plaintiff has specially pleaded and has made prayer therefor and where the defendant has acted in bad faith, has been stubbornly litigious, or has caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense, the jury may allow them." 4 Thus, the facts of this case involve two attorney fee awards: the fees assessed against JRD in the Gwinnett action and the fees assessed against Zambetti in the Forsyth acti

2017See Cheeley Investments , 332 Ga. App. at 120-121 (3), 770 S.E.2d 350 . 3 OCGA § 13-6-11 provides: "The expenses of litigation generally shall not be allowed as a part of the damages; but where the plaintiff has specially pleaded and has made prayer therefor and where the defendant has acted in bad faith, has been stubbornly litigious, or has caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense, the jury may allow them." 4 Thus, the facts of this case involve two attorney fee awards: the fees assessed against JRD in the Gwinnett action and the fees assessed against Zambetti in the Forsyth acti

2011Cleaveland v. Gannon, 284 Ga. 376, 381 (2) ( 667 SE2d 366 ) (2008). 4 At this point, because we must construe the record evidence in the light most favorable to Saiia, and because there is some evidence in the record of a complete written contract between Saiia and Terracon, we accept that the contractual claim in this case is based upon a complete written contract for professional services.

2011Cleaveland v. Gannon, 284 Ga. 376, 381 (2) ( 667 SE2d 366 ) (2008). 4 At this point, because we must construe the record evidence in the light most favorable to Saiia, and because there is some evidence in the record of a complete written contract between Saiia and Terracon, we accept that the contractual claim in this case is based upon a complete written contract for professional services.

2008See Dickens v. State, 280 Ga. 320 (2) ( 627 SE2d 587 ) (2006).

2008See Dickens v. State, 280 Ga. 320 (2) ( 627 SE2d 587 ) (2006).

2000Opatut v. Guest Pond Club, 188 Ga.App. 478, 480 (2), 373 S.E.2d 372 (1988).

2000Opatut v. Guest Pond Club, 188 Ga.App. 478, 480 (2), 373 S.E.2d 372 (1988).

1991See, e.g., United States v. Nicholas, 28 F.R.D. 8 (D.Minn. 1961).

1989Co., 121 Ga. App. 573, 575 (3) ( 174 SE2d 447 ) (1970).

1989Co., 121 Ga. App. 573, 575 (3) ( 174 SE2d 447 ) (1970).

1989See Duensing v. Tripp, 596 F.Supp. 389 (S.D.

1988“Where, as here, a third-party claim can be severed, OCGA § 9-11-42 (b), the trial court may grant additional strikes to the defendants in the exercise of a legal discretion. [Cits.] A legal discretion ‘ “means a sound discretion, that is to say, a discretion exercised not arbitrarily or wilfully, but with regard to what is right and equitable under the circumstances and the law, and directed by the reason and conscience of the judge to a just result.” [Cits.]’ [Cit.]” Keller Indus. v. Summers Roofing Co., 179 Ga. App. 288, 290 (1) ( 346 SE2d 99 ) (1986).

1988“Where, as here, a third-party claim can be severed, OCGA § 9-11-42 (b), the trial court may grant additional strikes to the defendants in the exercise of a legal discretion. [Cits.] A legal discretion ‘ “means a sound discretion, that is to say, a discretion exercised not arbitrarily or wilfully, but with regard to what is right and equitable under the circumstances and the law, and directed by the reason and conscience of the judge to a just result.” [Cits.]’ [Cit.]” Keller Indus. v. Summers Roofing Co., 179 Ga. App. 288, 290 (1) ( 346 SE2d 99 ) (1986).

1986Sheffield v. Lewis, 246 Ga. 19, 20 ( 268 SE2d 615 ); State Hwy.

1986Sheffield v. Lewis, 246 Ga. 19, 20 ( 268 SE2d 615 ); State Hwy.

1978First, although this court has indicated, without holding, that ". . .the judge who has discretion to sever a third-party claim would also have the discretion to grant a third-party defendant six additional strikes” (Mercer v. Braswell, 140 Ga. App. 624, 626 ( 231 SE2d 431 )), appellants have made absolutely no showing that a severance was sought or denied or that additional jury strikes were required, requested, or refused.

1978First, although this court has indicated, without holding, that ". . .the judge who has discretion to sever a third-party claim would also have the discretion to grant a third-party defendant six additional strikes” (Mercer v. Braswell, 140 Ga. App. 624, 626 ( 231 SE2d 431 )), appellants have made absolutely no showing that a severance was sought or denied or that additional jury strikes were required, requested, or refused.