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27 Iowa opinions name it 2 courts 1961–2024 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Iowa courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Carpenter v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2021Meanwhile, Justice Gorsuch sought to go further than the majority in its limitations on the third-party doctrine in his dissent, arguing the third-party doctrine was altogether “horribly wrong.” Id. at ___, 138 S. Ct. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) 81 (quoting Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 Mich. L. 2021Meanwhile, Justice Gorsuch sought to go further than the majority in its limitations on the third-party doctrine in his dissent, arguing the third-party doctrine was altogether “horribly wrong.” Id. at ___, 138 S. Ct. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) 81 (quoting Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 Mich. L. | 3 | 3 |
United States v. Millerred2 sentences2021Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44, 99 S. Ct. at 2582; United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 , 96 S. Ct. 1619, 1624 (1976). 2021Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44, 99 S. Ct. at 2582; United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 , 96 S. Ct. 1619, 1624 (1976). | 3 | 3 |
Smith v. Marylandred2 sentences2021Carpenter, 585 U.S. at ___ , 138 S. Ct. at 2216 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 , 743–44, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 2582 (1979)). 2021Carpenter, 585 U.S. at ___ , 138 S. Ct. at 2216 (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 , 743–44, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 2582 (1979)). | 3 | 3 |
Brody v. Rubygreen2 sentences2014See Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902, 906 (Iowa 1978); accord Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 51(3), at 357 (2000) [hereinafter Restatement Governing Lawyers]; see also Estate of Leonard v. Swift, 656 N.W.2d 132, 145 (Iowa 2003) (indicating a third-party claim exists when “the third party is a direct and intended beneficiary of the lawyer’s services” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 2014See Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902, 906 (Iowa 1978); accord Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 51(3), at 357 (2000) [hereinafter Restatement Governing Lawyers]; see also Estate of Leonard v. Swift, 656 N.W.2d 132, 145 (Iowa *841 2003) (indicating a third-party claim exists when “the third party is a direct and intended beneficiary of the lawyer’s services” (internal quotation marks omitted)). | 2 | 3 |
State, Department of Human Services Ex Rel. Palmer v. Unisys Corp.green2 sentences2024Id. at 147, 149 . 2024Id. at 147, 149 . | 2 | 2 |
Estate of Leonard, Ex Rel., Palmer v. Swiftgreen2 sentences2014See Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902, 906 (Iowa 1978); accord Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 51(3), at 357 (2000) [hereinafter Restatement Governing Lawyers]; see also Estate of Leonard v. Swift, 656 N.W.2d 132, 145 (Iowa 2003) (indicating a third-party claim exists when “the third party is a direct and intended beneficiary of the lawyer’s services” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 2014See Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902, 906 (Iowa 1978); accord Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 51(3), at 357 (2000) [hereinafter Restatement Governing Lawyers]; see also Estate of Leonard v. Swift, 656 N.W.2d 132, 145 (Iowa *841 2003) (indicating a third-party claim exists when “the third party is a direct and intended beneficiary of the lawyer’s services” (internal quotation marks omitted)). | 2 | 2 |
Kooyman Ex Rel. Kooyman v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.green2 sentences1984Kooyman v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 315 N.W.2d 30, 33 (Iowa 1982). 1984Kooyman v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 315 N.W.2d 30, 33 (Iowa 1982). | 2 | 2 |
Ashmead v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2004Id. at 200-01 (citations omitted). 1995Id. | 1 | 2 |
Venard v. Wintergreen2 sentences2018Nevertheless, “a successful party need not cross-appeal to preserve error on a ground urged but ignored or rejected by the district court.” Venard v. Winter, 524 N.W.2d 163, 165 (Iowa 1994). 2018Nevertheless, "a successful party need not cross-appeal to preserve error on a ground urged but ignored or rejected by the district court." Venard v. Winter , 524 N.W.2d 163 , 165 (Iowa 1994). | 1 | 1 |
Summy v. City of Des Moinesgreen1 sentence2015See Summy v. City of Des Moines, 708 N.W.2d 333, 340 (Iowa 2006), but see Tamco 5 Third-party defendant Fieldstone did not join in the settlement; following a bench trial, Westlake’s litigation with Fieldstone resulted in a judgment in Westlake’s favor for $253,000. 7 Pork II, LLC v. Heartland Co-op, No. 14-0412, 2015 WL 4481571, at *2-5 (Iowa Ct. App. July 22, 2015) (“There is a lurking inconsistency in our law regarding the scrutiny applied to the district court’s refusal to give a requested jury instruction.”). | 1 | 1 |
Tamco Pork II, LLC and Farm Bureau Insurance Company, as Subrogee of Tamco Pork II, LLC v. Heartland Co-Op and Pro Build, LLCgreen1 sentence2015See Summy v. City of Des Moines, 708 N.W.2d 333, 340 (Iowa 2006), but see Tamco 5 Third-party defendant Fieldstone did not join in the settlement; following a bench trial, Westlake’s litigation with Fieldstone resulted in a judgment in Westlake’s favor for $253,000. 7 Pork II, LLC v. Heartland Co-op, No. 14-0412, 2015 WL 4481571, at *2-5 (Iowa Ct. App. July 22, 2015) (“There is a lurking inconsistency in our law regarding the scrutiny applied to the district court’s refusal to give a requested jury instruction.”). | 1 | 1 |
Holsapple v. McGrathgreen1 sentence2003Similarly, we have recognized a third-party claim by the intended beneficiary of a nontestamentary instrument where the third party can prove (1) he or she “was specifically identified, by the donor, as an object of the grantor’s intent; and (2) the expectancy was lost or diminished as a result of professional negligence.” Holsapple v. McGrath, 575 N.W.2d 518, 520 (Iowa 1998) (citing Holsapple I, 521 N.W.2d at 714 ). | 1 | 1 |
State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, Cross-Appellant v. George Balmer and Margaret Balmer, Cross-Appelleesgreen1 sentence1995Co., 471 N.W.2d 824, 828 (Iowa 1991) (in a first-party bad-faith claim, “the insurer has no clearly defined duty of investigation [as in a third-party claim] and may require the insured to present adequate proof of loss before paying the claim.”) (citation omitted); see also State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Balmer, 891 F.2d 874, 877-78 (11th Cir.1990) (under Alabama law once insurer finds arguable reason to deny claim it has no affirmative duty to investigate further) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
North Iowa State Bank v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co.green1 sentence1995Co., 471 N.W.2d 824, 828 (Iowa 1991) (in a first-party bad-faith claim, “the insurer has no clearly defined duty of investigation [as in a third-party claim] and may require the insured to present adequate proof of loss before paying the claim.”) (citation omitted); see also State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Balmer, 891 F.2d 874, 877-78 (11th Cir.1990) (under Alabama law once insurer finds arguable reason to deny claim it has no affirmative duty to investigate further) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Flintkote Company v. Brewer Co. of Florida, Inc.green1 sentence1988See, e.g., Flintkote Co. v. Brewer Co., 221 So.2d 784 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1969); County of Giles v. First U.S. Corp., 445 S.W.2d 157 (Tenn. 1969); Comment, Contracts. | 1 | 1 |
Dockendorf v. Lakiegreen2 sentences1986Allocation of the separate amounts could be done in the settlement documents, as in this case. 2 In the case of trial it could be done by special interrogatories, Westendorf 330 N.W.2d at 702; Dockendorf v. Lakie, 240 Minn. 441, 448 , 61 N.W.2d 752, 756-57 (1953), or by separate findings by the court in a nonjury case. 1986Allocation of the separate amounts could be done in the settlement documents, as in this case. 2 In the case of trial it could be done by special interrogatories, Westendorf 330 N.W.2d at 702; Dockendorf v. Lakie, 240 Minn. 441, 448 , 61 N.W.2d 752, 756-57 (1953), or by separate findings by the court in a nonjury case. | 1 | 1 |
Anderson v. Continental Insurancegreen2 sentences1984He cites Anderson v. Continental Insurance Co., 85 Wis.2d 675, 687 , 271 N.W.2d 368, 374-75 (1978) as supporting the analogy between the two types of insurance claims. 1984He cites Anderson v. Continental Insurance Co., 85 Wis.2d 675, 687 , 271 N.W.2d 368, 374-75 (1978) as supporting the analogy between the two types of insurance claims. | 1 | 1 |
Evans v. Howard R. Green Co.green2 sentences1984Green Co., 231 N.W.2d 907, 916 (Iowa 1975). 1984Green Co., 231 N.W.2d 907, 916 (Iowa 1975). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Iowa. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Knotts
green
2 sentences2021The Court remarked this sophisticated level of surveillance deserved unique protections compared to past types of surveillance that have been upheld as constitutional under the third-party doctrine, such as the placing of a beeper in a container to augment visual surveillance in tracking a vehicle through traffic, United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 , 103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983). 2021The Court remarked this sophisticated level of surveillance deserved unique protections compared to past types of surveillance that have been upheld as constitutional under the third-party doctrine, such as the placing of a beeper in a container to augment visual surveillance in tracking a vehicle through traffic, United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 , 103 S. Ct. 1081 (1983). | 3 | 2021–2021 |
California v. Greenwood
green
2 sentences2021The Supreme Court’s holding in Greenwood was not simply based on the third-party doctrine, as the Court also focused on the fact that the respondent had discarded his garbage, thereby abandoning any privacy expectation in its contents. 486 U.S. at 43–44, 108 S. Ct. at 1630–31. 2021The Supreme Court’s holding in Greenwood was not simply based on the third-party doctrine, as the Court also focused on the fact that the respondent had discarded his garbage, thereby abandoning any privacy expectation in its contents. 486 U.S. at 43–44, 108 S. Ct. at 1630–31. | 3 | 2021–2021 |
Ruden v. Jenk
green
2 sentences2003Notwithstanding these concerns, this court has recognized that a third-party claim may be allowed “under severely limited circumstances.” Ruden, 543 N.W.2d at 610 . 2003In the Ruden case, which is more analogous to the matter before us, this court considered the extent of the duty owed to nonclients by the attorney for the administrator of an estate. 543 N.W.2d at 610-11 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Holsapple v. McGrath
green
1 sentence2003Similarly, we have recognized a third-party claim by the intended beneficiary of a nontestamentary instrument where the third party can prove (1) he or she “was specifically identified, by the donor, as an object of the grantor’s intent; and (2) the expectancy was lost or diminished as a result of professional negligence.” Holsapple v. McGrath, 575 N.W.2d 518, 520 (Iowa 1998) (citing Holsapple I, 521 N.W.2d at 714 ). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Pirkl v. Northwestern Mutual Insurance Ass'n
green
1 sentence1991In a first-party action, the “insurer has no clearly defined duty of investigation [as in a third-party claim] and may require the insured to present adequate proof of loss before paying the claim.” Id. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Ludwig v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence1990Id. at 146 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Khabbaz v. Swartz
green
1 sentence1988In this appeal, both parties focus their arguments on the Restatement language discussed in Khabbaz v. Swartz, 319 N.W. 2d 279 (Iowa 1982). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
County of Giles v. FIRST US CORPORATION
green
1 sentence1988See, e.g., Flintkote Co. v. Brewer Co., 221 So.2d 784 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1969); County of Giles v. First U.S. Corp., 445 S.W.2d 157 (Tenn. 1969); Comment, Contracts. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District
green
2 sentences1986We agree with the New York Court of Appeals’ observation that although it may assume too much to conclude that proximate causation could never be established, that “this element might indeed be difficult, if not impossible to prove.” Donohue, 47 N.Y.2d at 443 , 418 N.Y.S.2d at 377 , 391 N.E.2d at 1353-54 . 1986We agree with the New York Court of Appeals’ observation that although it may assume too much to conclude that proximate causation could never be established, that “this element might indeed be difficult, if not impossible to prove.” Donohue, 47 N.Y.2d at 443 , 418 N.Y.S.2d at 377 , 391 N.E.2d at 1353-54 . | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Koppie v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence1982Kooyman v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 315 N.W.2d 30, 33-34 (Iowa 1982); Koppie v. Allied Mutual Insurance Co., 210 N.W.2d 844 , 846 — 48 (Iowa 1973). 3 The second is the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, which may arise from an insurer’s conduct in handling the claim of an insured. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Brett v. Brett
neutral
1 sentence1979Although there have been instances where this court has considered the merits of a third party challenge to a divorce decree, Brett v. Brett, 191 Iowa 262 , 182 N.W. 241 (1921), when directly confronted with the issue of third party standing regarding divorces, we have not allowed such an attack. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Albert v. Dietz
green
2 sentences1973A similar declaration appears in Albert v. Dietz (D.C., Haw.1968), 283 F.Supp. 854, 857 , where a defendant sought to im-plead a county to obtain contribution for alleged negligence but failed to do so within the six-month statutory limit under a statute which provided that “the persons so injured * * * or someone in his behalf, shall, within six months after such injuries are received, give the chairman of the board of supervisors notice in writing of such injuries * * * ”. 1973A similar declaration appears in Albert v. Dietz (D.C., Haw.1968), 283 F.Supp. 854, 857 , where a defendant sought to implead a county to obtain contribution for alleged negligence but failed to do so within the six-month statutory limit under a statute which provided that "the persons so injured * * * or someone in his behalf, shall, within six months after such injuries are received, give the chairman of the board of supervisors notice in writing of such injuries * * *". | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Minneapolis, St. Paul and Sault Ste. Marie Railroad Company, and Third-Party v. City of Fond Du Lac, Third-Party green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Bedell v. Reagan green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Allied Mutual Casualty Company v. Long green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Burnett v. Agent neutral | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Dart Transit Co., Inc. v. Wiggins green | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.