third-party claim in Michigan

2025Even if the assignments are rescinded, Wallace cannot pursue this litigation as the real party in interest against defendants, nonparties that were wholly uninvolved with the assignment contracts. third-party rule did not survive this Court’s decision in Titan Ins Co. Id. at 397-398 .

2025Even if the assignments are rescinded, Wallace cannot pursue this litigation as the real party in interest against defendants, nonparties that were wholly uninvolved with the assignment contracts. third-party rule did not survive this Court’s decision in Titan Ins Co. Id. at 397-398 .

2022“A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of 1 Third-party defendant Wayne County is not a party to this appeal. -2- reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183 ; 665 NW2d 468 (2003).

2022“A genuine issue of material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of 1 Third-party defendant Wayne County is not a party to this appeal. -2- reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” West v Gen Motors Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183 ; 665 NW2d 468 (2003).

2017See, e.g., Grange Ins Co of Mich v Lawrence, 494 Mich 475 ; 835 NW2d 363 (2013) (“household” insurer that paid medical bills commenced an action to recoup payments from the insurer of the vehicle); Rambin v Allstate Ins Co, 297 Mich App 679 , 682 n 2; 825 NW2d 95 (2012), aff’d in part & rev’d in part 495 Mich 316 ; 852 NW2d 34 (2014) (“Third-party defendant AAA of Michigan, the insurer of a relative with whom plaintiff resided, was added to the case by defendant Allstate, as a potential higher-priority insurer”).

2017See, e.g., Grange Ins Co of Mich v Lawrence, 494 Mich 475 ; 835 NW2d 363 (2013) (“household” insurer that paid medical bills commenced an action to recoup payments from the insurer of the vehicle); Rambin v Allstate Ins Co, 297 Mich App 679 , 682 n 2; 825 NW2d 95 (2012), aff’d in part & rev’d in part 495 Mich 316 ; 852 NW2d 34 (2014) (“Third-party defendant AAA of Michigan, the insurer of a relative with whom plaintiff resided, was added to the case by defendant Allstate, as a potential higher-priority insurer”).

2015Id. at 78-79 .

2015Id. at 78-79 .

1975When a claim or counterclaim is asserted against a plaintiff, he may cause a third party to be brought in under circumstances which under this rule would entitle a defendant to do so.” In applying GCR 1963, 204 to the case at bar, the trial judge relied on Moyses v Spartan Asphalt Paving Co, 383 Mich 314 ; 174 NW2d 797 (1970), to arrive at his decision to grant the motions to dismiss.

1975When a claim or counterclaim is asserted against a plaintiff, he may cause a third party to be brought in under circumstances which under this rule would entitle a defendant to do so.” In applying GCR 1963, 204 to the case at bar, the trial judge relied on Moyses v Spartan Asphalt Paving Co, 383 Mich 314 ; 174 NW2d 797 (1970), to arrive at his decision to grant the motions to dismiss.

2025Id. at 718 .

2024That is, while we acknowledge that, for example, a creditor may assign its right to receive a debt to a third party, see, e.g., Velocity Investments, LLC v Cocina, 77 AD3d 1306, 1306 ; 909 NYS2d 853 (NY App Div 4th, 2010) (transfer of right to collect credit-card debt to a third party under a claim of account stated), plaintiff has not clearly articulated a theory as to why its claims for open account and account stated may be pursued against defendant, who volunteered for the obligation to pay the debt incurred by the original debtor, Freddie’s, through the Separation Agreement.

2024That is, while we acknowledge that, for example, a creditor may assign its right to receive a debt to a third party, see, e.g., Velocity Investments, LLC v Cocina, 77 AD3d 1306, 1306 ; 909 NYS2d 853 (NY App Div 4th, 2010) (transfer of right to collect credit-card debt to a third party under a claim of account stated), plaintiff has not clearly articulated a theory as to why its claims for open account and account stated may be pursued against defendant, who volunteered for the obligation to pay the debt incurred by the original debtor, Freddie’s, through the Separation Agreement.

2023MCL 500.3135(5); McCormick v Carrier, 487 Mich 180, 190 ; 795 NW2d 517 (2010).

2023MCL 500.3135(5); McCormick v Carrier, 487 Mich 180, 190 ; 795 NW2d 517 (2010).

2023Rather, it is only those injuries that are caused by the insured’s use of a motor vehicle.” Id. -6- Plaintiff also alleged a third-party claim for noneconomic damages under MCL 500.3135(1) which provides for such tort liability “only if the injured person has suffered death, serious impairment of body function, or permanent serious disfigurement.” A serious impairment of body function is an objectively manifested impairment of an important body function that affects the person’s general ability to lead his normal life.

2022Under Thompson a plaintiff would not necessarily have to provide aid or encouragement to the one exercising the right in order to bring a third-party claim. 11 To the extent South Haven references pre-existing common law, we note that “[a]t common law, there was no right to be free from being fired for reporting an employer’s violation of the law.” Dudewicz v Norris-Schmid, Inc, 443 Mich 68, 78 ; 503 NW2d 645 (1993), citing Covell v Spengler, 141 Mich App 76, 83 ; 366 NW2d 76 (1985).

2022Under Thompson a plaintiff would not necessarily have to provide aid or encouragement to the one exercising the right in order to bring a third-party claim. 11 To the extent South Haven references pre-existing common law, we note that “[a]t common law, there was no right to be free from being fired for reporting an employer’s violation of the law.” Dudewicz v Norris-Schmid, Inc, 443 Mich 68, 78 ; 503 NW2d 645 (1993), citing Covell v Spengler, 141 Mich App 76, 83 ; 366 NW2d 76 (1985).

2022Under Thompson a plaintiff would not necessarily have to provide aid or encouragement to the one exercising the right in order to bring a third-party claim. 11 To the extent South Haven references pre-existing common law, we note that “[a]t common law, there was no right to be free from being fired for reporting an employer’s violation of the law.” Dudewicz v Norris-Schmid, Inc, 443 Mich 68, 78 ; 503 NW2d 645 (1993), citing Covell v Spengler, 141 Mich App 76, 83 ; 366 NW2d 76 (1985).

2022Under Thompson a plaintiff would not necessarily have to provide aid or encouragement to the one exercising the right in order to bring a third-party claim. 11 To the extent South Haven references pre-existing common law, we note that “[a]t common law, there was no right to be free from being fired for reporting an employer’s violation of the law.” Dudewicz v Norris-Schmid, Inc, 443 Mich 68, 78 ; 503 NW2d 645 (1993), citing Covell v Spengler, 141 Mich App 76, 83 ; 366 NW2d 76 (1985).

2020Id.

2018Defendant is incorrect because while the wages paid to a direct attendant care worker are relevant to the issue of the reasonableness of the incurred charges, Hardrick v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 294 Mich App 651, 675 ; 819 NW2d 28 (2011), it is not germane to the issue of whether the insured actually has incurred the charges from a medical provider, which requires that an insured have a legal responsibility to pay the charges and can be proven by testimony at trial, Douglas v Allstate Ins Co, 492 Mich 241, 270 ; 821 NW2d 472 (2012).

2018Defendant is incorrect because while the wages paid to a direct attendant care worker are relevant to the issue of the reasonableness of the incurred charges, Hardrick v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 294 Mich App 651, 675 ; 819 NW2d 28 (2011), it is not germane to the issue of whether the insured actually has incurred the charges from a medical provider, which requires that an insured have a legal responsibility to pay the charges and can be proven by testimony at trial, Douglas v Allstate Ins Co, 492 Mich 241, 270 ; 821 NW2d 472 (2012).

2018Defendant is incorrect because while the wages paid to a direct attendant care worker are relevant to the issue of the reasonableness of the incurred charges, Hardrick v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 294 Mich App 651, 675 ; 819 NW2d 28 (2011), it is not germane to the issue of whether the insured actually has incurred the charges from a medical provider, which requires that an insured have a legal responsibility to pay the charges and can be proven by testimony at trial, Douglas v Allstate Ins Co, 492 Mich 241, 270 ; 821 NW2d 472 (2012).

2018In Monat v State Farm Ins Co, 469 Mich 679 , 680- 681, 695; 677 NW2d 843 (2004), our Supreme Court held that collateral estoppel barred a plaintiff’s first-party claim after a no-cause-of-action jury verdict was reached on the third-party claim.

2018In Monat v State Farm Ins Co, 469 Mich 679 , 680- 681, 695; 677 NW2d 843 (2004), our Supreme Court held that collateral estoppel barred a plaintiff’s first-party claim after a no-cause-of-action jury verdict was reached on the third-party claim.

2017Although neither party challenged the trial court’s jurisdiction over the third-party claim, this Court found “that question so basic as to be dispositive.” Id. at 605 .

2017The Supreme Court granted State Farm’s application for leave to appeal. 499 Mich 941 (2016).

2016Instead, Hendon asserted only a claim for uninsured motorist benefits, which ‘“permits an injured motorist to obtain coverage from his or her own insurance company to the extent that a third- party claim would be permitted against the . . . at-fault driver.”’ Nickola v MIC Gen Ins Co, 312 Mich App 374, 387 ; 878 NW2d 480 (2015), quoting Rory v Continental Ins Co, 473 Mich 457, 465 ; 703 NW2d 23 (2005).

2016Instead, Hendon asserted only a claim for uninsured motorist benefits, which ‘“permits an injured motorist to obtain coverage from his or her own insurance company to the extent that a third- party claim would be permitted against the . . . at-fault driver.”’ Nickola v MIC Gen Ins Co, 312 Mich App 374, 387 ; 878 NW2d 480 (2015), quoting Rory v Continental Ins Co, 473 Mich 457, 465 ; 703 NW2d 23 (2005).

2005MCL 500.3135(1); Kreiner v. Fischer, 471 Mich. 109 , 683 N.W.2d 611 (2004); Auto Club Ins.

2005MCL 500.3135(1); Kreiner v. Fischer, 471 Mich. 109 , 683 N.W.2d 611 (2004); Auto Club Ins.

2001In re Calcutt, supra at 754 .

2001In re Calcutt, supra at 760 .

1999McAuley v General Motors Corp, 457 Mich 513, 518 ; 578 NW2d 282 (1998).

1999McAuley v General Motors Corp, 457 Mich 513, 518 ; 578 NW2d 282 (1998).