third-party claim in Connecticut

2026The United States Supreme Court has explained that the third-party doctrine promulgated in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 , 99 S. Ct. 2577 , 61 L.

2026The United States Supreme Court has explained that the third-party doctrine promulgated in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 , 99 S. Ct. 2577 , 61 L.

2025Ed. 2d 30 (1988) (‘‘the police cannot reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal activity that could have been observed by any member of the public’’) (emphasis added)); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 , 88 S. Ct. 507 , 19 L.

2025Ed. 2d 30 (1988) (‘‘the police cannot reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal activity that could have been observed by any member of the public’’) (emphasis added)); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 , 88 S. Ct. 507 , 19 L.

2025The only difference is that the third-party doctrine involves expo- sure to an outside party, while the abandonment doc- trine involves exposure to the general public.’’); cf. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 , 108 S. Ct. 1625 , 100 L.

2025The only difference is that the third-party doctrine involves expo- sure to an outside party, while the abandonment doc- trine involves exposure to the general public.’’); cf. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 , 108 S. Ct. 1625 , 100 L.

2025Ed. 2d 132 (2023); State v. Westrom, 6 N.W.3d 145, 153–54 (Minn.), cert. denied, U.S. , 145 S. Ct. 418 , 220 L.

2012On appeal, the defendants first claim that the board erred in affirming the commissioner’s finding that the commission lacked jurisdiction “to review the amount of a spouse’s recovery from a third party claim for loss of consortium when determining the appropriate moratorium due [the defendants].” The defendants contend that, pursuant to this court’s holding in Schiano v. Bliss Exterminating Co., 57 Conn. App. 406 , 750 A.2d 1098 (2000), the commissioner has not only the authority but also the obligation to review the subject settlement allocation between the plaintiff and his wife “to determi

2012On appeal, the defendants first claim that the board erred in affirming the commissioner’s finding that the commission lacked jurisdiction “to review the amount of a spouse’s recovery from a third party claim for loss of consortium when determining the appropriate moratorium due [the defendants].” The defendants contend that, pursuant to this court’s holding in Schiano v. Bliss Exterminating Co., 57 Conn. App. 406 , 750 A.2d 1098 (2000), the commissioner has not only the authority but also the obligation to review the subject settlement allocation between the plaintiff and his wife “to determi

2003Under this approach, pioneered by the District of Columbia Circuit in the well-known case of Keene Corporation v. Insurance Company of North America, [ 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C.

2001See Melrose floor Co., Inc. v. Lechner , 435 N.W.2d 90 (Minn.App. 1989); Holland v. Thacher , 199 Cal.App.3d 924 , 245 Cal.Rptr. 247 (1988); Waldman v. Levine , 544 A.2d 683 (D.C.App. 1988); Hughes v. Housley , 599 P.2d 1250 (Utah CT Page 14963 1979); see also Olds v. Donnelly , 150 N.J. 424 , 696 A.2d 633 (1997) (holding that the trial court properly dismissed the third party complaint because the successor attorney did not owe the predecessor attorney a duty of care).

2001See Melrose floor Co., Inc. v. Lechner , 435 N.W.2d 90 (Minn.App. 1989); Holland v. Thacher , 199 Cal.App.3d 924 , 245 Cal.Rptr. 247 (1988); Waldman v. Levine , 544 A.2d 683 (D.C.App. 1988); Hughes v. Housley , 599 P.2d 1250 (Utah CT Page 14963 1979); see also Olds v. Donnelly , 150 N.J. 424 , 696 A.2d 633 (1997) (holding that the trial court properly dismissed the third party complaint because the successor attorney did not owe the predecessor attorney a duty of care).

2001See Melrose floor Co., Inc. v. Lechner , 435 N.W.2d 90 (Minn.App. 1989); Holland v. Thacher , 199 Cal.App.3d 924 , 245 Cal.Rptr. 247 (1988); Waldman v. Levine , 544 A.2d 683 (D.C.App. 1988); Hughes v. Housley , 599 P.2d 1250 (Utah CT Page 14963 1979); see also Olds v. Donnelly , 150 N.J. 424 , 696 A.2d 633 (1997) (holding that the trial court properly dismissed the third party complaint because the successor attorney did not owe the predecessor attorney a duty of care).

2001See Melrose floor Co., Inc. v. Lechner , 435 N.W.2d 90 (Minn.App. 1989); Holland v. Thacher , 199 Cal.App.3d 924 , 245 Cal.Rptr. 247 (1988); Waldman v. Levine , 544 A.2d 683 (D.C.App. 1988); Hughes v. Housley , 599 P.2d 1250 (Utah CT Page 14963 1979); see also Olds v. Donnelly , 150 N.J. 424 , 696 A.2d 633 (1997) (holding that the trial court properly dismissed the third party complaint because the successor attorney did not owe the predecessor attorney a duty of care).

2000Practice Book § 10-39 provides in pertinent part: "Whenever any party wishes to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of any answer to any complaint, counterclaim or cross complaint, or any part of that answer including any special defense contained therein, that party may do so by filing a motion to strike the contested pleading or part thereof" "[A] plaintiff can [move to strike] a special defense. . ." Nowak v. Nowak, 175 Conn. 112 , 116 , see GMAC Mortgage Corp. v. Nieves, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. 164925 (January 29, 1999, Tobin, J. ) ("[a

1999American Fidelity Casualty Co. v. Greyhound Corp. , 232 F.2d 89 , 92 (5 th Cir.) 1956.

1998The Supreme Court, in Worsham v. Greifenberger , 242 Conn. 432 , 444 , 698 A.2d 867 (1997), imposed a due process requirement that the notice include language that the right to intervene and any further right to bring a claim against the party will expire in thirty days. 4 The statute contemplates the situation in which the employer may also be the defendant in a third party claim brought by the employee.

1998The Supreme Court, in Worsham v. Greifenberger , 242 Conn. 432 , 444 , 698 A.2d 867 (1997), imposed a due process requirement that the notice include language that the right to intervene and any further right to bring a claim against the party will expire in thirty days. 4 The statute contemplates the situation in which the employer may also be the defendant in a third party claim brought by the employee.

1998The defendant also cites Jackson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 196 Cal.Rptr. 474 (1983) which did not involve a bad faith claim against the plaintiff's own insurer but a third party claim by an injured party against the tortfeasor's insurer.

1997See Squeglia v. Squeglia, 234 Conn. 259 , 661 A.2d 1007 (1995); Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518 , 522-28 , 542 A.2d 711 (1988).

1997See Squeglia v. Squeglia, 234 Conn. 259 , 661 A.2d 1007 (1995); Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518 , 522-28 , 542 A.2d 711 (1988).

1997Likewise, Ankiewicz v. Kinder, 408 Mass. 792 , 563 N.E.2d 684 (1990), in which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court allowed a third-party claim for contribution against the minor plaintiff's mother premised on parental negligence in a lead paint action, over the vigorous dissent of Chief Justice Liacos, provides little support in light of that jurisdiction's abrogation of the parental immunity doctrine. 5 Connecticut, however, continues to affirm its adherence to the doctrine of parental immunity.

1997Likewise, Ankiewicz v. Kinder, 408 Mass. 792 , 563 N.E.2d 684 (1990), in which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court allowed a third-party claim for contribution against the minor plaintiff's mother premised on parental negligence in a lead paint action, over the vigorous dissent of Chief Justice Liacos, provides little support in light of that jurisdiction's abrogation of the parental immunity doctrine. 5 Connecticut, however, continues to affirm its adherence to the doctrine of parental immunity.

1996Nationwide files this motion to strike all three counts claiming such actions are barred by the exclusivity provisions of sec. 31-284 (a) of the workers compensation act The third party plaintiff argues on the basis of Ferryman v Groton , 212 Conn. 138 (1989) that a third party claim could exist against an employer despite the exclusivity clause of sec 31-284 (a) provided the claim was based on an independent duty owed by the employer to the third party regardless of the fact that the benefits of such claim would indirectly accrue to the injured employee.

1996First, following the analysis utilized in Lagosz v. Whitaker, supra, 9 CSCR 94 , a third-party claim for costs incurred in the pursuit of indemnification is not contingent on a finding that the third-party plaintiff is liable to the original plaintiff.

1994Additionally, the legal sufficiency of Kapetan's indemnification claim based on active/passive negligence was already determined in the memorandum of decision addressing STO Industries' previous motion for summary judgment, wherein this court, Sylvester, J., found that "[i]n viewing the third party claim in a broad manner and in favor of Kapetan, an independent legal relationship has been alleged sufficient to state a claim for indemnification." See Kapetan v. STO Industries, 8 CSCR 54 (December 2, 1992, Sylvester, J.).

1993The certified question was: “Is a volunteer fire fighter eligible for benefits under General Statutes § 7-314a also eligible for concurrent employment benefits pursuant to General Statutes § 31-310?” Wislocki v. Prospect, 223 Conn. 911 , 612 A.2d 58 (1992).

1993The certified question was: “Is a volunteer fire fighter eligible for benefits under General Statutes § 7-314a also eligible for concurrent employment benefits pursuant to General Statutes § 31-310?” Wislocki v. Prospect, 223 Conn. 911 , 612 A.2d 58 (1992).

1992In Russell v. Dean Whitter Reynolds, Inc., 200 Conn. 172 the court held that the sale of securities does not fall within the ambit of CUTPA citing the statutory scheme of the Connecticut Uniform Securities Act (CUSA) (Conn. Gen.

1992Liljedahl Bros., Inc. v. Grigsby, 215 Conn. 345 , 348 (1990).

1991Third-party defendant claims that third-party plaintiffs' indemnification claim is legally insufficient for failure to plead exclusive control of the situation as required by Kaplan v. Merberg Wrecking Corporation, 152 Conn. 405 , 416 , 207 A.2d 732 (1965).

1991Third-party defendant claims that third-party plaintiffs' indemnification claim is legally insufficient for failure to plead exclusive control of the situation as required by Kaplan v. Merberg Wrecking Corporation, 152 Conn. 405 , 416 , 207 A.2d 732 (1965).

1990The answer is found in Krawczyk v. Stingle, 208 Conn. 239 (1988), wherein our supreme court addressed the matter of expansion of the third party rule beyond potential liability to will beneficiaries.