5 Idaho opinions name it 1 courts 1936–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Idaho courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Doty v. Bisharagreen2 sentences1995E.g., Doty v. Bishara, 123 Idaho 329, 332 , 848 P.2d 387, 390 (1992) (“A party is entitled to have its theory of the case included in the instructions given to the jury if that theory is supported by any reasonable view of the evidence.”); Garrett Freightlines v. Bannock Paving Co., 112 Idaho 722, 730-31 , 735 P.2d 1033, 1041-42 (1987) (“Litigants have a right to have the jury instructed on every reasonable theory presenting a basis of a claim or relief, or defense thereto, where such theory finds support in the pleadings and evidence.”) In support of this argument SRCC states that a “legally 1995E.g., Doty v. Bishara, 123 Idaho 329, 332 , 848 P.2d 387, 390 (1992) (“A party is entitled to have its theory of the case included in the instructions given to the jury if that theory is supported by any reasonable view of the evidence.”); Garrett Freightlines v. Bannock Paving Co., 112 Idaho 722, 730-31 , 735 P.2d 1033, 1041-42 (1987) (“Litigants have a right to have the jury instructed on every reasonable theory presenting a basis of a claim or relief, or defense thereto, where such theory finds support in the pleadings and evidence.”) In support of this argument SRCC states that a “legally | 1 | 1 |
Garrett Freightlines, Inc. v. Bannock Paving Co.green2 sentences1995E.g., Doty v. Bishara, 123 Idaho 329, 332 , 848 P.2d 387, 390 (1992) (“A party is entitled to have its theory of the case included in the instructions given to the jury if that theory is supported by any reasonable view of the evidence.”); Garrett Freightlines v. Bannock Paving Co., 112 Idaho 722, 730-31 , 735 P.2d 1033, 1041-42 (1987) (“Litigants have a right to have the jury instructed on every reasonable theory presenting a basis of a claim or relief, or defense thereto, where such theory finds support in the pleadings and evidence.”) In support of this argument SRCC states that a “legally 1995E.g., Doty v. Bishara, 123 Idaho 329, 332 , 848 P.2d 387, 390 (1992) (“A party is entitled to have its theory of the case included in the instructions given to the jury if that theory is supported by any reasonable view of the evidence.”); Garrett Freightlines v. Bannock Paving Co., 112 Idaho 722, 730-31 , 735 P.2d 1033, 1041-42 (1987) (“Litigants have a right to have the jury instructed on every reasonable theory presenting a basis of a claim or relief, or defense thereto, where such theory finds support in the pleadings and evidence.”) In support of this argument SRCC states that a “legally | 1 | 1 |
Bean v. Allstate Insurancegreen2 sentences1990The court in Bean refused to allow a third-party claim against an insurer "in the absence of explicit authorization to that effect." Id. at 796. 1990The court in Bean refused to allow a third-party claim against an insurer “in the absence of explicit authorization to that effect.” Id. at 796. | 1 | 1 |
Sterling v. Bloomred2 sentences1986A majority of this court held that liability for such "negligent supervision" did not exist under the laws of this state and dismissed the third party claim which had urged such a "negligent supervision" claim. [15] In this connection it is interesting to note that a reasonable inference raised by allegation (j) is that Bloom never should have been on probation in the first place, which clearly implicates a judicial function. [16] Indeed, the assertion in the special concurrence that the probation officer "could have overseen Bloom's conduct to prevent these violations," ante at 238, 723 P.2d 1986A majority of this court held that liability for such "negligent supervision" did not exist under the laws of this state and dismissed the third party claim which had urged such a "negligent supervision" claim. [15] In this connection it is interesting to note that a reasonable inference raised by allegation (j) is that Bloom never should have been on probation in the first place, which clearly implicates a judicial function. [16] Indeed, the assertion in the special concurrence that the probation officer "could have overseen Bloom's conduct to prevent these violations," ante at 238, 723 P.2d | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Idaho. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Griggs v. Nash
green
1 sentence2015Id. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Rawlings v. Apodaca
green
2 sentences1990The Hettwers argue that Rawlings v. Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 149 , 726 P.2d 565 (1986), cited by this Court in White , supports the extension of White to the facts here. 1990The Hettwers argue that Rawlings v. Apodaca, 151 Ariz. 149 , 726 P.2d 565 (1986), cited by this Court in White , supports the extension of White to the facts here. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Mendini v. Milner
green
2 sentences1936In Mendini v. Milner, 47 Ida. 439 , 276 Pac. 313 , the court said: “The statute of limitations is general, is to be liberally construed and must be applied in all cases where an exception is not specifically made. 1936In Mendini v. Milner, 47 Ida. 439 , 276 Pac. 313 , the court said: “The statute of limitations is general, is to be liberally construed and must be applied in all cases where an exception is not specifically made. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
McDonald v. Stephens
neutral
2 sentences1936Co. v. Bank of America, 109 Cal. App. 415 , 294 Pac. 45 ); McDonald v. Stephens, 204 Ala. 359 , 85 So. 746 ); nor does it conform to the requirements of pleadings as set out in I. 1936Co. v. Bank of America, 109 Cal. App. 415 , 294 Pac. 45 ); McDonald v. Stephens, 204 Ala. 359 , 85 So. 746 ); nor does it conform to the requirements of pleadings as set out in I. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
McCaffey C. Co., Inc. v. Bank of America
green
2 sentences1936Co. v. Bank of America, 109 Cal. App. 415 , 294 Pac. 45 ); McDonald v. Stephens, 204 Ala. 359 , 85 So. 746 ); nor does it conform to the requirements of pleadings as set out in I. 1936Co. v. Bank of America, 109 Cal. App. 415 , 294 Pac. 45 ); McDonald v. Stephens, 204 Ala. 359 , 85 So. 746 ); nor does it conform to the requirements of pleadings as set out in I. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.