third-party claim in New York

2022The court correctly denied Sabey defendants' motion for summary judgment on the third-party claim for common-law indemnification against Select Safety, in view of the issues of fact as to Sabey defendants' negligence ( see Spielmann v 170 Broadway NYC LP , 187 AD3d 492, 494 [1st Dept 2020]).

2022The court correctly denied Sabey defendants' motion for summary judgment on the third-party claim for common-law indemnification against Select Safety, in view of the issues of fact as to Sabey defendants' negligence ( see Spielmann v 170 Broadway NYC LP , 187 AD3d 492, 494 [1st Dept 2020]).

2016Third-party defendant failed to meet her initial burden of establishing as a matter of law that the sole proximate cause of the accident was Austin’s negligence (see Burghardt v Cmaylo, 40 AD3d 568, 569 [2007]; see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]).

2016Third-party defendant failed to meet her initial burden of establishing as a matter of law that the sole proximate cause of the accident was Austin’s negligence (see Burghardt v Cmaylo, 40 AD3d 568, 569 [2007]; see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]).

2026Auth. , 293 AD2d 371, 372 [1st Dept 2002]).

2025Auth. , 293 AD2d 371, 372 [1st Dept 2002]).

2012CPLR 1007 provides that “a defendant may proceed against a person not a party who is or may be liable to that defendant for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against that defendant.” The Court of Appeals has recognized that “[t]he language of CPLR 1007 serves only to identify the persons against whom a third-party claim may be brought” (George Cohen Agency v Donald S. Perlman Agency, 51 NY2d 358, 365 [1980]).

2012CPLR 1007 provides that “a defendant may proceed against a person not a party who is or may be liable to that defendant for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against that defendant.” The Court of Appeals has recognized that “[t]he language of CPLR 1007 serves only to identify the persons against whom a third-party claim may be brought” (George Cohen Agency v Donald S. Perlman Agency, 51 NY2d 358, 365 [1980]).

2025"Where the record indicates that a third-party plaintiff knowingly and deliberately delayed in commencing the third-party action, the Supreme Court acts within its discretion to dismiss the third-party complaint" ( Soto v CBS Corp. , 157 AD3d at 741; see Skolnick v Max Connor, LLC , 89 AD3d 443, 444 ).

2025"Where the record indicates that a third-party plaintiff knowingly and deliberately delayed in commencing the third-party action, the Supreme Court acts within its discretion to dismiss the third-party complaint" ( Soto v CBS Corp. , 157 AD3d at 741; see Skolnick v Max Connor, LLC , 89 AD3d 443, 444 ).

2023The parties' contract relieves Freeman of its duty to indemnify TIA "for occurrences or accidents caused by any other party not under Freeman's direct control." While the record demonstrates that Freeman exerted a substantial amount of control over the exhibitors who are alleged to have caused plaintiff's accident, issues of fact remain as to whether that control amounts to "direct control" for purposes of the contractual indemnification clause in Freeman's contract with TIA ( see Sommer [*2]v Federal Signal Corp. , 79 NY2d 540, 555 [1992]).

2023The parties' contract relieves Freeman of its duty to indemnify TIA "for occurrences or accidents caused by any other party not under Freeman's direct control." While the record demonstrates that Freeman exerted a substantial amount of control over the exhibitors who are alleged to have caused plaintiff's accident, issues of fact remain as to whether that control amounts to "direct control" for purposes of the contractual indemnification clause in Freeman's contract with TIA ( see Sommer [*2]v Federal Signal Corp. , 79 NY2d 540, 555 [1992]).

2022Third-party defendant subcontractor Electric, which provided temporary electrical power on all floors above the 11th for use by other contractors, established prima facie that it was not negligent in connection with plaintiff's accident and therefore is not liable to defendants for common-law indemnification and contribution (see Naughton v City of New York , 94 AD3d 1, 10 [1st Dept 2012]; Trustees of Columbia Univ. v Mitchell/Giurgola Assoc. , 109 AD2d 449, 454 [1st Dept 1985]).

2009The court properly dismissed the construction manager’s third-party claim for common-law indemnification since plaintiffs claims and the owner’s cross claims allege breach of contract by the construction manager, not vicarious liability attributed solely to the fault of the architect (see Trustees of Columbia Univ. v Mitchell/Giurgola Assoc., 109 AD2d 449, 453 [1985] [“(s)ince the predicate of common-law indemnity is vicarious liability without actual fault on the part of the proposed indemnitee, it follows that a party who has itself actually participated to some degree in the wrongdoing cann

2022As the record establishes that plaintiff's accident was not "caused by the negligence . . . or other improper conduct" of ADCO, the court also properly granted ADCO summary judgment dismissing the third-party claim for contractual indemnification and denied Sabey defendants' motion for summary judgment on the same ( see Harris v City of New York , 202 AD3d 624, 625 [1st Dept 2022]).

2022As the record establishes that plaintiff's accident was not "caused by the negligence . . . or other improper conduct" of ADCO, the court also properly granted ADCO summary judgment dismissing the third-party claim for contractual indemnification and denied Sabey defendants' motion for summary judgment on the same ( see Harris v City of New York , 202 AD3d 624, 625 [1st Dept 2022]).

2021The contractual indemnification agreements in the lease between SMHS and Lobster required Lobster to indemnify SMHS for claims arising out of Lobster's acts, omissions, or negligence; they are not triggered by "the routine performance of plaintiff's duties on the job" as a Lobster employee, "or his mere presence [*3]on the site" ( Gentile v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. , 9 Misc 3d 111, 112 [App Term, 1st Dept 2005]).

2021The contractual indemnification agreements in the lease between SMHS and Lobster required Lobster to indemnify SMHS for claims arising out of Lobster's acts, omissions, or negligence; they are not triggered by "the routine performance of plaintiff's duties on the job" as a Lobster employee, "or his mere presence [*3]on the site" ( Gentile v Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. , 9 Misc 3d 111, 112 [App Term, 1st Dept 2005]).

2018"CPLR 1010 provides a safety valve for cases in which the third-party claim will unduly delay the determination of the main action or prejudice the substantial rights of any party'" ( Annanquartey v Passeser, 260 AD2d 517, 517 , quoting CPLR 1010 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Gomez v City of New York, 78 AD3d 482, 483-484 ; Cipollina v Kent, 52 AD2d 632, 632 ).

2011The record supports the court’s finding that the defendants “knowingly and deliberately delayed the commencement of the third-party action.” Third-party defendant was also prejudiced by the filing of the third-party complaint months after third-party defendant had dissolved its business and thus, as stated by counsel, no longer had access to employees or records (see Gomez v City of New York, 78 AD3d 482, 483 [2010]).

2016Third-party defendant failed to meet her initial burden of establishing as a matter of law that the sole proximate cause of the accident was Austin’s negligence (see Burghardt v Cmaylo, 40 AD3d 568, 569 [2007]; see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]).

2016Third-party defendant failed to meet her initial burden of establishing as a matter of law that the sole proximate cause of the accident was Austin’s negligence (see Burghardt v Cmaylo, 40 AD3d 568, 569 [2007]; see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]).

2016“An attorney sued for malpractice is entitled to commence a third-party claim for contribution [or indemnification] against a subsequent attorney whose negligence has contributed to or aggravated the plaintiff’s damages” (Hansen v Brognano, 137 AD2d 880, 881 [1988] [citation omitted]; see CPLR 1401; Schauer v Joyce, 54 NY2d 1, 5 [1981]; M & R Ginsburg, LLC v Segel, Goldman, Mazzotta & Siegel, P.C., 121 AD3d 1354, 1354-1355 [2014]; Soussis v Lazer, Aptheker, Rosetta & Yedid, P.C., 66 AD3d 993, 995 [2009]).

1996Although "[a]n attorney sued for malpractice is entitled to commence a third-party claim for contribution against a subsequent attorney whose negligence has contributed to or aggravated the plaintiffs damages” (Hansen v Brognano, 137 AD2d 880, 881 ; Schauer v Joyce, 54 NY2d 1, 5 ), the record establishes that an attorney other than the third-party defendant was substituted as the plaintiffs counsel in the bankruptcy proceeding at issue in this action.

2025"CPLR 1010 provides a safety valve for cases in which the third-party claim will unduly delay the determination of the main action or prejudice the substantial rights of any party" ( Annanquartey v Passeser , 260 AD2d 517, 517 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPLR 1010).

2025"CPLR 1010 provides a safety valve for cases in which the third-party claim will unduly delay the determination of the main action or prejudice the substantial rights of any party" ( Soto v CBS Corp. , 157 AD3d 740 , 741 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPLR 1010; Annanquartey v Passeser , 260 AD2d 517, 517 ).

2018Council, 84 NY2d 13, 19 ; Lobban v Brown, 125 AD3d 612, 613 ; Matter of Jackson v City of New York, 70 AD3d 694, 695 ).

2015Council, 84 NY2d 13, 19 [1994]; Zamfino v Furman, 1 AD3d 591, 592 [2003]).

2016“An attorney sued for malpractice is entitled to commence a third-party claim for contribution [or indemnification] against a subsequent attorney whose negligence has contributed to or aggravated the plaintiff’s damages” (Hansen v Brognano, 137 AD2d 880, 881 [1988] [citation omitted]; see CPLR 1401; Schauer v Joyce, 54 NY2d 1, 5 [1981]; M & R Ginsburg, LLC v Segel, Goldman, Mazzotta & Siegel, P.C., 121 AD3d 1354, 1354-1355 [2014]; Soussis v Lazer, Aptheker, Rosetta & Yedid, P.C., 66 AD3d 993, 995 [2009]).

1996Although "[a]n attorney sued for malpractice is entitled to commence a third-party claim for contribution against a subsequent attorney whose negligence has contributed to or aggravated the plaintiffs damages” (Hansen v Brognano, 137 AD2d 880, 881 ; Schauer v Joyce, 54 NY2d 1, 5 ), the record establishes that an attorney other than the third-party defendant was substituted as the plaintiffs counsel in the bankruptcy proceeding at issue in this action.

2009While two or more entities that “are subject to liability for damages for the same personal injury, injury to property or wrongful death, may claim contribution” from the other (CPLR 1401), a purely economic loss resulting from a breach of contract does not constitute an “injury to property” within the meaning of CPLR 1401 (see Board of Educ. of Hudson City School Dist. v Sargent, Webster, Crenshaw & Folley, 71 NY2d 21, 26 [1987]).

1996Third-party defendants moved to dismiss the third- party complaint on the ground that no claim for contribution lies in these circumstances (see, e.g., Board of Educ. v Sargent, Webster, Crenshaw & Folley, 71 NY2d 21 ).

2018Pursuant to Workers' Compensation Law § 29(5), an employee who is the recipient of workers' compensation benefits may settle a third-party claim arising out of the same accident without prejudice to the continued payment of benefits upon "obtaining either the written consent [*2]of the compensation carrier before the [settlement], or judicial approval of the [settlement] within three months after it" ( Furtado v Mario's Bakery, 17 AD3d 527, 528 ; see Matter of Johnson v Buffalo & Erie County Private Indus.

2015“Pursuant to Workers’ Compensation Law § 29 (5), an employee who is the recipient of workers’ compensation benefits may compromise a third-party claim arising out of the same accident without prejudice to the continued payment of benefits upon obtaining either the written consent of the compensation carrier before the compromise, or judicial approval of the compromise within three months after it” (Furtado v Mario’s Bakery, 17 AD3d 527, 527-528 [2005]; see Matter of Johnson v Buffalo & Erie County Private Indus.