20 North Carolina opinions name it 3 courts 1977–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Shore v. Browngreen2 sentences2008In Shore v. Brown, our Supreme Court held that the third-party claim was abated because "[w]hen the third-party complaint was filed . . . that identical issue was already pending in a prior action between the same parties[.]" 324 N.C. 427, 429 , 378 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1989). 2008In Shore v. Brown, our Supreme Court held that the third-party claim was abated because "[w]hen the third-party complaint was filed . . . that identical issue was already pending in a prior action between the same parties[.]" 324 N.C. 427, 429 , 378 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1989). | 1 | 2 |
McCollum v. McCollumgreen1 sentence2024See, e.g., McCollum v. McCollum, 102 N.C. | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Wilsongreen1 sentence2018App. at 667 , 468 S.E.2d at 498 ("[A]llowing a third-party claim against the insurer of an adverse party for violating [N.C. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Suggsgreen2 sentences2015See State v. Suggs, 117 N.C.App. 654 , 659-60, 453 S.E.2d 211 , 214-215 (1995) (holding "the defendant's constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure is not implicated" where telephone records were obtained from third-party telephone company); State v. Melvin, 86 N.C.App. 291 , 295-96, 357 S.E.2d 379 , 382-83 (1987) (holding SBI obtaining defendant's bank records from the bank "could not constitute a governmental 'search' for Fourth Amendment purposes" because defendant had no Fourth Amendment privacy interest in records maintained by third party); State v. Overton, 60 N.C 2015See State v. Suggs, 117 N.C.App. 654 , 659-60, 453 S.E.2d 211 , 214-215 (1995) (holding "the defendant's constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure is not implicated" where telephone records were obtained from third-party telephone company); State v. Melvin, 86 N.C.App. 291 , 295-96, 357 S.E.2d 379 , 382-83 (1987) (holding SBI obtaining defendant's bank records from the bank "could not constitute a governmental 'search' for Fourth Amendment purposes" because defendant had no Fourth Amendment privacy interest in records maintained by third party); State v. Overton, 60 N.C | 1 | 1 |
National Bank of Canada v. Artex Industries, Inc.green1 sentence2006See, e.g., Nat’l Bank of Canada v. Artex Indus., 627 F. Supp. 610, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (dismissing a third-party complaint without prejudice filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a) because, although the alleged third-party claim arose from the same transaction or set of facts as the original claim, its outcome was not contingent on the outcome of the main claim). {22} In this case, the Defendants’ Third-Party Complaint asserts that two other entities affiliated with the Plaintiff made the Haynes Payments, with the intent to influence Mr. Haynes’ actions in selecting [5] vendors | 1 | 1 |
North River Insurance v. Philadelphia Reinsurance Corp.green2 sentences2005Co., 161 F.R.D. 293, 297 (E.D.Pa.1995) ("Because [the insurer] has agreed to defend this action, [the insureds] have no reasonable expectation of privilege."); North River Ins. v. Philadelphia Reinsurance, 797 F.Supp. 363, 366 (D.N.J. 1992) ("The common interest doctrine has been recognized in the insured/insurer context when counsel has been retained or paid for by the insurer, and allows either party to obtain attorney-client communications related to the underlying facts giving rise to the claim, because the interests of the insured and insurer in defeating the third-party claim against the 2005See, e.g., Northwood Nursing Home v. Continental Ins., 161 F.R.D. 293, 297 (E.D.Pa.1995) ("Because [the insurer] has agreed to defend this action, [the insureds] have no reasonable expectation of privilege."); North River Ins. v. Philadelphia Reinsurance, 797 F.Supp. 363, 366 (D.N.J. 1992) ("The common interest doctrine has been recognized in the insured/insurer context when counsel has been retained or paid for by the insurer, and allows either party to obtain attorney-client communications related to the underlying facts giving rise to the claim, because the interests of the insured and insu | 1 | 1 |
Pittston Co. v. Allianz Insurancegreen2 sentences2005Co., 143 F.R.D. 66, 69 (D.N.J.1992) ("It seems clear that use of the [common interest] doctrine is warranted when there is a dispute between [an] insurer and [an] insured regarding underlying litigation in which the insured was represented by an attorney appointed by the insurer."); Waste Management, Inc. v. International Surplus Lines Ins. 2005Co., 143 F.R.D. 66, 69 (D.N.J.1992) ("It seems clear that use of the ["common interest"] doctrine is warranted when there is a dispute between insurer and insured regarding underlying litigation in which the insured was represented by an attorney appointed by the insurer." (citations omitted)), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 124 F.3d 508 (3d Cir.N.J.1997); Waste Management v. Intern. | 1 | 1 |
Northwood Nursing & Convalescent Home, Inc. v. Continental Insurancegreen2 sentences2005Co., 161 F.R.D. 293, 297 (E.D.Pa.1995) ("Because [the insurer] has agreed to defend this action, [the insureds] have no reasonable expectation of privilege."); North River Ins. v. Philadelphia Reinsurance, 797 F.Supp. 363, 366 (D.N.J. 1992) ("The common interest doctrine has been recognized in the insured/insurer context when counsel has been retained or paid for by the insurer, and allows either party to obtain attorney-client communications related to the underlying facts giving rise to the claim, because the interests of the insured and insurer in defeating the third-party claim against the 2005See, e.g., Northwood Nursing Home v. Continental Ins., 161 F.R.D. 293, 297 (E.D.Pa.1995) ("Because [the insurer] has agreed to defend this action, [the insureds] have no reasonable expectation of privilege."); North River Ins. v. Philadelphia Reinsurance, 797 F.Supp. 363, 366 (D.N.J. 1992) ("The common interest doctrine has been recognized in the insured/insurer context when counsel has been retained or paid for by the insurer, and allows either party to obtain attorney-client communications related to the underlying facts giving rise to the claim, because the interests of the insured and insu | 1 | 1 |
Sutton v. Dukegreen2 sentences1992However, we conclude that defendant’s motion to dismiss was properly granted since plaintiff’s complaint “discloses an unconditional affirmative defense which defeats the claim asserted [and] pleads facts which deny the right to any relief on the alleged claim.” Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 102 , 176 S.E.2d 161, 166 (1970). 1992However, we conclude that defendant’s motion to dismiss was properly granted since plaintiff’s complaint “discloses an unconditional affirmative defense which defeats the claim asserted [and] pleads facts which deny the right to any relief on the alleged claim.” Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 102 , 176 S.E.2d 161, 166 (1970). | 1 | 1 |
Clark v. Inn Westgreen2 sentences1992See Clark v. Inn West, 324 N.C. 415 , 379 S.E.2d 23 (1989) (N.C.G.S. *648 § 18B-121 creates a cause of action for damages for injuries to an “aggrieved person”); Hart v. Ivey, 332 N.C. 299 , 420 S.E.2d 174 (1992) (complaint against a social host who served alcohol to a person who drove while intoxicated and injured a third party stated a claim for negligence at common law). 1992See Clark v. Inn West, 324 N.C. 415 , 379 S.E.2d 23 (1989) (N.C.G.S. *648 § 18B-121 creates a cause of action for damages for injuries to an “aggrieved person”); Hart v. Ivey, 332 N.C. 299 , 420 S.E.2d 174 (1992) (complaint against a social host who served alcohol to a person who drove while intoxicated and injured a third party stated a claim for negligence at common law). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hallgreen2 sentences1989An assault on a third party in defense of a family member is privileged only if the “defendant had a well-grounded belief that an assault was about to be committed by another on the family member . . . .” State v. Hall, 89 N.C. 1989App. 491, 494 , 366 S.E.2d 527, 529 (1988). | 1 | 1 |
Oestreicher v. American National Stores, Inc.green2 sentences1987See Oestreicher v. Stores, 290 N.C. 118 , 225 S.E. 2d 797 (1976). 1987See Oestreicher v. Stores, 290 N.C. 118 , 225 S.E. 2d 797 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
Mims v. Mimsgreen2 sentences1983See Mims v. Mims, 305 N.C. 41 , 286 S.E. 2d 779 (1982). 1983See Mims v. Mims, 305 N.C. 41 , 286 S.E. 2d 779 (1982). | 1 | 1 |
Nationwide Mut. I. Co. v. Weeks-Allen Motor Co., Inc.green2 sentences1979See generally, 3 Moore’s Federal Practice, supra, ¶ 14.08.” Third-party defendant relies on Insurance Co. v. Motor Co., 18 N.C. 1979App. 689 , 198 S.E. 2d 88 (1973). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ingle v. Allen
green
2 sentences1986Ingle v. Allen, 71 N.C. 1986Ingle v. Allen, 71 N.C. | 2 | 1986–1986 |
Quail Hollow East Condominium Association v. Donald J. Scholz Co.
green
2 sentences1986Condominium Assoc. v. Scholz Co., 47 N.C.App. 518 , 268 S.E.2d 12 , disc. rev. denied, 301 N.C. 527 , 273 S.E.2d 454 (1980); Industries Inc. v. Construction Co., 42 N.C.App. 259 , 257 S.E.2d 50 , disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 296 , 259 S.E.2d 301 -02 (1979). 1986Condominium Assoc. v. Scholz Co., 47 N.C.App. 518 , 268 S.E.2d 12 , disc. rev. denied, 301 N.C. 527 , 273 S.E.2d 454 (1980); Industries Inc. v. Construction Co., 42 N.C.App. 259 , 257 S.E.2d 50 , disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 296 , 259 S.E.2d 301 -02 (1979). | 2 | 1986–1986 |
McKoy v. McKoy
green
1 sentence2022Dismissal of a third-party claim is allowed under Rule 41(b) for “failure to prosecute the claim, failure to comply with the rules of civil procedure, or failure to comply with a court order.” 3 Krawiec, 2018 NCBC LEXIS 86 , at *7 (quoting McKoy v. McKoy, 214 N.C. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Kirkhart
green
1 sentence2016DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Kirkhart, 148 N.C. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Melvin
green
2 sentences2015See State v. Suggs, 117 N.C.App. 654 , 659-60, 453 S.E.2d 211 , 214-215 (1995) (holding "the defendant's constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure is not implicated" where telephone records were obtained from third-party telephone company); State v. Melvin, 86 N.C.App. 291 , 295-96, 357 S.E.2d 379 , 382-83 (1987) (holding SBI obtaining defendant's bank records from the bank "could not constitute a governmental 'search' for Fourth Amendment purposes" because defendant had no Fourth Amendment privacy interest in records maintained by third party); State v. Overton, 60 N.C 2015See State v. Suggs, 117 N.C.App. 654 , 659-60, 453 S.E.2d 211 , 214-215 (1995) (holding "the defendant's constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure is not implicated" where telephone records were obtained from third-party telephone company); State v. Melvin, 86 N.C.App. 291 , 295-96, 357 S.E.2d 379 , 382-83 (1987) (holding SBI obtaining defendant's bank records from the bank "could not constitute a governmental 'search' for Fourth Amendment purposes" because defendant had no Fourth Amendment privacy interest in records maintained by third party); State v. Overton, 60 N.C | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Overton
green
2 sentences2015See State v. Suggs, 117 N.C.App. 654 , 659-60, 453 S.E.2d 211 , 214-215 (1995) (holding "the defendant's constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure is not implicated" where telephone records were obtained from third-party telephone company); State v. Melvin, 86 N.C.App. 291 , 295-96, 357 S.E.2d 379 , 382-83 (1987) (holding SBI obtaining defendant's bank records from the bank "could not constitute a governmental 'search' for Fourth Amendment purposes" because defendant had no Fourth Amendment privacy interest in records maintained by third party); State v. Overton, 60 N.C 2015See State v. Suggs, 117 N.C.App. 654 , 659-60, 453 S.E.2d 211 , 214-215 (1995) (holding "the defendant's constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure is not implicated" where telephone records were obtained from third-party telephone company); State v. Melvin, 86 N.C.App. 291 , 295-96, 357 S.E.2d 379 , 382-83 (1987) (holding SBI obtaining defendant's bank records from the bank "could not constitute a governmental 'search' for Fourth Amendment purposes" because defendant had no Fourth Amendment privacy interest in records maintained by third party); State v. Overton, 60 N.C | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Smith v. Maryland
red
2 sentences2015Smith, 442 U.S. at 743 -44 , 99 S.Ct. at 2581 -82 , 61 L.Ed.2d at 229 . 2015Smith, 442 U.S. at 743 -44 , 99 S.Ct. at 2581 -82 , 61 L.Ed.2d at 229 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Reed v. Elmore
green
2 sentences2011This is the unavoidable result of the rule established by Reed v. Elmore, 246 N.C. 221 , 98 S.E.2d 360 (1957) which has been criticized by courts and commentators alike, but our courts are bound by it as precedent. 2011This is the unavoidable result of the rule established by Reed v. Elmore, 246 N.C. 221 , 98 S.E.2d 360 (1957) which has been criticized by courts and commentators alike, but our courts are bound by it as precedent. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
North River Insurance Company v. Cigna Reinsurance Company
green
2 sentences2005See, e.g., Northwood Nursing Home v. Continental Ins., 161 F.R.D. 293, 297 (E.D.Pa.1995) ("Because [the insurer] has agreed to defend this action, [the insureds] have no reasonable expectation of privilege."); North River Ins. v. Philadelphia Reinsurance, 797 F.Supp. 363, 366 (D.N.J. 1992) ("The common interest doctrine has been recognized in the insured/insurer context when counsel has been retained or paid for by the insurer, and allows either party to obtain attorney-client communications related to the underlying facts giving rise to the claim, because the interests of the insured and insu 2005Pa., 1995) (“Because [the insurer] has agreed to defend this action, [the insureds] have no reasonable expectation of privilege.”); North River Ins. v. Philadelphia Reinsurance, 797 F. Supp. 363, 366 (D.N.J. 1992) (“The common interest doctrine has been recognized in the insured/insurer context when counsel has been retained or paid for by the insurer, and allows either party to obtain attorney-client communications related to the underlying facts giving rise to the claim, because the interests of the insured and insurer in defeating the third-party claim against the insured are so close that | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Pittston Company v. Allianz Insurance Company
green
2 sentences2005Co., 143 F.R.D. 66, 69 (D.N.J.1992) ("It seems clear that use of the ["common interest"] doctrine is warranted when there is a dispute between insurer and insured regarding underlying litigation in which the insured was represented by an attorney appointed by the insurer." (citations omitted)), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 124 F.3d 508 (3d Cir.N.J.1997); Waste Management v. Intern. 2005Co., 143 F.R.D. 66, 69 (D.N.J. 1992) (“It seems clear that use of the [“common interest”] doctrine is warranted when there is a dispute between insurer and insured regarding underlying litigation in which the insured was represented by an attorney appointed by the insurer.” (citations omitted)), rev’d and remanded on other grounds, 124 F.3d 508 (3d Cir. N.J. 1997); Waste Management v. Intern. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
O'Mara Enterprises, Inc. v. Mellon Bank, N.A.
green
1 sentence2000Gray Wilson, North Carolina Civil Procedure § 14-4, at 280 (2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter Wilson on Civil Procedure] (citing O’Mara Enter. v. Mellon Bank, 101 F.R.D. 668 (W.D. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Conquest
green
1 sentence1996Co. v. Conquest, 658 So.2d 928 (Fl. 1995) (recognizing that allowing a third-party claim against the insurer of an adverse party may be unwise, but allowing the claim due to an explicit statutory provision); State Farm Mutual Auto. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Hart v. Ivey
green
2 sentences1992See Clark v. Inn West, 324 N.C. 415 , 379 S.E.2d 23 (1989) (N.C.G.S. *648 § 18B-121 creates a cause of action for damages for injuries to an “aggrieved person”); Hart v. Ivey, 332 N.C. 299 , 420 S.E.2d 174 (1992) (complaint against a social host who served alcohol to a person who drove while intoxicated and injured a third party stated a claim for negligence at common law). 1992See Clark v. Inn West, 324 N.C. 415 , 379 S.E.2d 23 (1989) (N.C.G.S. *648 § 18B-121 creates a cause of action for damages for injuries to an “aggrieved person”); Hart v. Ivey, 332 N.C. 299 , 420 S.E.2d 174 (1992) (complaint against a social host who served alcohol to a person who drove while intoxicated and injured a third party stated a claim for negligence at common law). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Quail Hollow East Condominium Association v. Donald J. Scholz Company
green
2 sentences1986Condominium Assoc. v. Scholz Co., 47 N.C.App. 518 , 268 S.E.2d 12 , disc. rev. denied, 301 N.C. 527 , 273 S.E.2d 454 (1980); Industries Inc. v. Construction Co., 42 N.C.App. 259 , 257 S.E.2d 50 , disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 296 , 259 S.E.2d 301 -02 (1979). 1986Condominium Assoc. v. Scholz Co., 47 N.C.App. 518 , 268 S.E.2d 12 , disc. rev. denied, 301 N.C. 527 , 273 S.E.2d 454 (1980); Industries Inc. v. Construction Co., 42 N.C.App. 259 , 257 S.E.2d 50 , disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 296 , 259 S.E.2d 301 -02 (1979). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
SHOFFNER INDUSTRIES INC. v. WB Lloyd Construction Co.
green
2 sentences1986Condominium Assoc. v. Scholz Co., 47 N.C.App. 518 , 268 S.E.2d 12 , disc. rev. denied, 301 N.C. 527 , 273 S.E.2d 454 (1980); Industries Inc. v. Construction Co., 42 N.C.App. 259 , 257 S.E.2d 50 , disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 296 , 259 S.E.2d 301 -02 (1979). 1986Condominium Assoc. v. Scholz Co., 47 N.C.App. 518 , 268 S.E.2d 12 , disc. rev. denied, 301 N.C. 527 , 273 S.E.2d 454 (1980); Industries Inc. v. Construction Co., 42 N.C.App. 259 , 257 S.E.2d 50 , disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 296 , 259 S.E.2d 301 -02 (1979). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Shoffner Industries, Inc. v. W. B. Lloyd Construction Co.
green
2 sentences1986Condominium Assoc. v. Scholz Co., 47 N.C.App. 518 , 268 S.E.2d 12 , disc. rev. denied, 301 N.C. 527 , 273 S.E.2d 454 (1980); Industries Inc. v. Construction Co., 42 N.C.App. 259 , 257 S.E.2d 50 , disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 296 , 259 S.E.2d 301 -02 (1979). 1986Condominium Assoc. v. Scholz Co., 47 N.C.App. 518 , 268 S.E.2d 12 , disc. rev. denied, 301 N.C. 527 , 273 S.E.2d 454 (1980); Industries Inc. v. Construction Co., 42 N.C.App. 259 , 257 S.E.2d 50 , disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 296 , 259 S.E.2d 301 -02 (1979). | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| State Highway Commission v. LA REYNOLDS COMPANY green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Millsaps v. WILKES CONTRACTING COMPANY green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.