third-party claim in Colorado

2025Hinson provided direct care while working at Insight.” Holding that it made “no sense that WS[i] should have a duty to defend where it had absolutely no control or responsibility 23 for” Hinson’s direct care of the decedent, the district court dismissed Insight’s claim regarding WSi’s duty to defend. ¶ 43 With respect to the third-party claim regarding WSi’s duty to indemnify Insight, the court cited Brochner v. Western Insurance Co., 724 P.2d 1293 (Colo. 1986), and section 13-50.5-102, C.R.S. 2025, and concluded that the contractual provision was “void against public policy because it would r

2025While a third-party claim under section 13-80-104(1)(b)(II)(A) doesn’t arise until a case is settled or 23 judgment is entered, “such claims may be brought in either (1) the construction defect litigation before a settlement or entry of judgment or (2) a separate lawsuit after a settlement or entry of judgment.” Goodman v. Heritage Builders, Inc., 2017 CO 13, ¶ 9 . ¶ 41 Further, as relevant here, under CDARA section 13-20- 803.5(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024, if a plaintiff is filing suit against a construction professional, they must deliver written notice of the claim to the professional no later than

2020Id. ¶ 13 However, when attorney fees are “damages” awarded “as part of the substance of a lawsuit” — as opposed to “costs” awarded to a prevailing party under a fee shifting provision — a trial court’s order is not final until the court has determined the amount of the attorney fees award.

2012Silva explicitly contrasted the third-party claim at issue in that case with discovery in a first-party claim and acknowledged that "[the scope of discovery of insurance information should be broader in a first-party claim between an insured party and his insurer than in a third-party personal injury claim." Id. at 1192 . 135 To that end, in Tayler v. Travelers Ins.

2007In Bailey, the court of appeals also stated that there is a "relationship of confidence and trust which exists between the insurer and insured." 844 P.2d at 1339 .

2002Id.

1997To the extent that the status order may be construed as certified pursuant to C.R.C.P. 54(b), see Chambliss/Jenkins Associates v. Forster, 650 P.2d 1315 (Colo.App.1982), the certification is erroneous.

1991They argue that the trial court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether attorney fees should be awarded pursuant to statute, as required by the supreme court’s decisions in Pedlow v. Stamp, 776 P.2d 382 (Colo.1989), and Board of County Commissioners v. Auslaender, 745 P.2d 999 (Colo.1987).

1991They argue that the trial court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether attorney fees should be awarded pursuant to statute, as required by the supreme court’s decisions in Pedlow v. Stamp, 776 P.2d 382 (Colo.1989), and Board of County Commissioners v. Auslaender, 745 P.2d 999 (Colo.1987).

1990Therefore, the event which operates as a matter of law to assignment the third-party claim to the carrier is the “payment of compensation.” See Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Industrial Commission, 145 Colo. 369 , 359 P.2d 4 (1961) (interpreting former statute); Central Electric Supply Co. v. Industrial Commission, 698 P.2d 830 (Colo.App.1984).

1990Therefore, the event which operates as a matter of law to assignment the third-party claim to the carrier is the “payment of compensation.” See Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Industrial Commission, 145 Colo. 369 , 359 P.2d 4 (1961) (interpreting former statute); Central Electric Supply Co. v. Industrial Commission, 698 P.2d 830 (Colo.App.1984).

1990Therefore, the event which operates as a matter of law to assignment the third-party claim to the carrier is the “payment of compensation.” See Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Industrial Commission, 145 Colo. 369 , 359 P.2d 4 (1961) (interpreting former statute); Central Electric Supply Co. v. Industrial Commission, 698 P.2d 830 (Colo.App.1984).

1989Thus, “if the defendant has no liability to the plaintiff, then the third party defendant has no liability to the defendant-third party plaintiff.” Faser v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 674 F.2d 856 (11th Cir.1982).

1989The purpose of C.R.C.P. 14(a) is to “substitute a third party for the claim being brought by the plaintiff.” Packaging Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 173 Colo. 212 , 477 P.2d 367 (1970).

1989The purpose of C.R.C.P. 14(a) is to “substitute a third party for the claim being brought by the plaintiff.” Packaging Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 173 Colo. 212 , 477 P.2d 367 (1970).

1988In construing these provisions, the supreme court in Marquez v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 620 P.2d 29 (Colo.1980), concluded that a subro-gation provision in a PIP policy “cannot be permitted to reduce the funds to which the insured is entitled in order to obtain full compensation for his injuries.” Thus, since the parties in Marquez stipulated that the victim’s total damages equalled $30,000, and since the total proceeds received by him, both from his PIP carrier and as a result of his assertion of a third party claim, was less than that amount, the insurer was not entitle

1985See Craft v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 572 F.2d 565 (7th Cir.1978); Vincent v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc., 373 So.2d 1054, 1064 (Ala.1979) (Jones, J., specially concurring); Duncan v. Andrew County Mutual Insurance Co., 665 S.W.2d 13 (Mo.App.1983) (while court recognized a tort action in third-party insurance contracts, it declined to extend the cause of action to first-party contracts); Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Insurance Co., 118 N.H. 607 , 392 A.2d 576 (1978) (same); Santilli v. State Farm Life Insurance Co., 278 Or. 53 , 562 P.2d 965 (1977); MFA Mutual Insurance Co. v.

1985See Craft v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 572 F.2d 565 (7th Cir.1978); Vincent v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc., 373 So.2d 1054, 1064 (Ala.1979) (Jones, J., specially concurring); Duncan v. Andrew County Mutual Insurance Co., 665 S.W.2d 13 (Mo.App.1983) (while court recognized a tort action in third-party insurance contracts, it declined to extend the cause of action to first-party contracts); Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Insurance Co., 118 N.H. 607 , 392 A.2d 576 (1978) (same); Santilli v. State Farm Life Insurance Co., 278 Or. 53 , 562 P.2d 965 (1977); MFA Mutual Insurance Co. v.

1985See Craft v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 572 F.2d 565 (7th Cir.1978); Vincent v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc., 373 So.2d 1054, 1064 (Ala.1979) (Jones, J., specially concurring); Duncan v. Andrew County Mutual Insurance Co., 665 S.W.2d 13 (Mo.App.1983) (while court recognized a tort action in third-party insurance contracts, it declined to extend the cause of action to first-party contracts); Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Insurance Co., 118 N.H. 607 , 392 A.2d 576 (1978) (same); Santilli v. State Farm Life Insurance Co., 278 Or. 53 , 562 P.2d 965 (1977); MFA Mutual Insurance Co. v.

1985See Craft v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 572 F.2d 565 (7th Cir.1978); Vincent v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc., 373 So.2d 1054, 1064 (Ala.1979) (Jones, J., specially concurring); Duncan v. Andrew County Mutual Insurance Co., 665 S.W.2d 13 (Mo.App.1983) (while court recognized a tort action in third-party insurance contracts, it declined to extend the cause of action to first-party contracts); Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Insurance Co., 118 N.H. 607 , 392 A.2d 576 (1978) (same); Santilli v. State Farm Life Insurance Co., 278 Or. 53 , 562 P.2d 965 (1977); MFA Mutual Insurance Co. v.

1985See Craft v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 572 F.2d 565 (7th Cir.1978); Vincent v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc., 373 So.2d 1054, 1064 (Ala.1979) (Jones, J., specially concurring); Duncan v. Andrew County Mutual Insurance Co., 665 S.W.2d 13 (Mo.App.1983) (while court recognized a tort action in third-party insurance contracts, it declined to extend the cause of action to first-party contracts); Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Insurance Co., 118 N.H. 607 , 392 A.2d 576 (1978) (same); Santilli v. State Farm Life Insurance Co., 278 Or. 53 , 562 P.2d 965 (1977); MFA Mutual Insurance Co. v.

1985See Craft v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 572 F.2d 565 (7th Cir.1978); Vincent v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc., 373 So.2d 1054, 1064 (Ala.1979) (Jones, J., specially concurring); Duncan v. Andrew County Mutual Insurance Co., 665 S.W.2d 13 (Mo.App.1983) (while court recognized a tort action in third-party insurance contracts, it declined to extend the cause of action to first-party contracts); Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Insurance Co., 118 N.H. 607 , 392 A.2d 576 (1978) (same); Santilli v. State Farm Life Insurance Co., 278 Or. 53 , 562 P.2d 965 (1977); MFA Mutual Insurance Co. v.

1985See Craft v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 572 F.2d 565 (7th Cir.1978); Vincent v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc., 373 So.2d 1054, 1064 (Ala.1979) (Jones, J., specially concurring); Duncan v. Andrew County Mutual Insurance Co., 665 S.W.2d 13 (Mo.App.1983) (while court recognized a tort action in third-party insurance contracts, it declined to extend the cause of action to first-party contracts); Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Insurance Co., 118 N.H. 607 , 392 A.2d 576 (1978) (same); Santilli v. State Farm Life Insurance Co., 278 Or. 53 , 562 P.2d 965 (1977); MFA Mutual Insurance Co. v.

1985See Craft v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 572 F.2d 565 (7th Cir.1978); Vincent v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Alabama, Inc., 373 So.2d 1054, 1064 (Ala.1979) (Jones, J., specially concurring); Duncan v. Andrew County Mutual Insurance Co., 665 S.W.2d 13 (Mo.App.1983) (while court recognized a tort action in third-party insurance contracts, it declined to extend the cause of action to first-party contracts); Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Insurance Co., 118 N.H. 607 , 392 A.2d 576 (1978) (same); Santilli v. State Farm Life Insurance Co., 278 Or. 53 , 562 P.2d 965 (1977); MFA Mutual Insurance Co. v.

1980Considering these facts and relying upon Denver v. Lee, 168 Colo. 208 , 450 P.2d 352 (1969), the trial court entered summary judgment for third-party defendants on the basis that the Colorado Workmen's Compensation Act, § 8-40-101 et seq., C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Cum.Supp.) (the Act) bars the third-party claim.

1980Considering these facts and relying upon Denver v. Lee, 168 Colo. 208 , 450 P.2d 352 (1969), the trial court entered summary judgment for third-party defendants on the basis that the Colorado Workmen's Compensation Act, § 8-40-101 et seq., C.R.S. 1973 (1979 Cum.Supp.) (the Act) bars the third-party claim.

1973In asserting this third-party claim, Bendix relies primarily on Jacobson v. Dahlberg, 171 Colo. 42 , 464 P.2d 298 .

1973In asserting this third-party claim, Bendix relies primarily on Jacobson v. Dahlberg, 171 Colo. 42 , 464 P.2d 298 .