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36 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1957–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Carpenter v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2021Id. ¶15 The third-party doctrine traces its roots to United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), and Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 2021Id. ¶15 The third-party doctrine traces its roots to United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), and Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). | 3 | 3 |
Shaktman v. Stategreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., State v. Walton, 324 P.3d 876, 906 (Haw. 2014); State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1991); Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 151 (Fla. 1989); State v. Thompson, 760 P.2d 1162, 1165 (Idaho 1988); People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135 , 141–42 (Colo. 1983); Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283, 1289 (Pa. 1979). 2021See, e.g., State v. Walton, 324 P.3d 876, 906 (Haw. 2014); State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1991); Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 151 (Fla. 1989); State v. Thompson, 760 P.2d 1162, 1165 (Idaho 1988); People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135 , 141–42 (Colo. 1983); Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283, 1289 (Pa. 1979). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Walton.green2 sentences2021See, e.g., State v. Walton, 324 P.3d 876, 906 (Haw. 2014); State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1991); Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 151 (Fla. 1989); State v. Thompson, 760 P.2d 1162, 1165 (Idaho 1988); People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135 , 141–42 (Colo. 1983); Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283, 1289 (Pa. 1979). 2021See, e.g., State v. Walton, 324 P.3d 876, 906 (Haw. 2014); State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1991); Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 151 (Fla. 1989); State v. Thompson, 760 P.2d 1162, 1165 (Idaho 1988); People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135 , 141–42 (Colo. 1983); Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283, 1289 (Pa. 1979). | 2 | 3 |
Grijalva v. Arizona State Compensation Fundgreen2 sentences2018Therefore, we assume, without deciding, Aitken 's continued validity and adherence to legislative intent in applying the lien provision. 1 ¶ 18 In contrast to the contested third-party action that was tried to verdict in Aitken , Grijalva involved a plaintiff/employee's "pretrial attempt to settle a third party claim without approval of the compensation carrier," followed by an "apportionment of fault apparently carried out for the sole purpose of impacting the carrier's lien rights." 185 Ariz. at 76 , 912 P.2d at 1305 . 2018Therefore, we assume, without deciding, Aitken 's continued validity and adherence to legislative intent in applying the lien provision. 1 ¶ 18 In contrast to the contested third-party action that was tried to verdict in Aitken , Grijalva involved a plaintiff/employee's "pretrial attempt to settle a third party claim without approval of the compensation carrier," followed by an "apportionment of fault apparently carried out for the sole purpose of impacting the carrier's lien rights." 185 Ariz. at 76 , 912 P.2d at 1305 . | 2 | 3 |
United States v. Sebastian Contrerasgreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., United States v. Hood, 920 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2019) (holding that IP addresses are subject to the third-party doctrine and fall outside the scope of Carpenter); United States v. Contreras, 905 F.3d 853, 857 (5th Cir. 2018) (ruling that, post- Carpenter, ISP subscriber information “falls comfortably within the scope of the third-party doctrine”); see also United States v. Wellbeloved-Stone, 777 F. App’x 605 , 607 (4th Cir. 2019) (declining to revisit Bynum’s holding that subscriber information was not protected by the Fourth Amendment in light of Carpenter); United States v. VanDy 2021See, e.g., United States v. Hood, 920 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2019) (holding that IP addresses are subject to the third-party doctrine and fall outside the scope of Carpenter); United States v. Contreras, 905 F.3d 853, 857 (5th Cir. 2018) (ruling that, post- Carpenter, ISP subscriber information “falls comfortably within the scope of the third-party doctrine”); see also United States v. Wellbeloved-Stone, 777 F. App’x 605 , 607 (4th Cir. 2019) (declining to revisit Bynum’s holding that subscriber information was not protected by the Fourth Amendment in light of Carpenter); United States v. VanDy | 2 | 2 |
State v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., State v. Walton, 324 P.3d 876, 906 (Haw. 2014); State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1991); Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 151 (Fla. 1989); State v. Thompson, 760 P.2d 1162, 1165 (Idaho 1988); People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135 , 141–42 (Colo. 1983); Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283, 1289 (Pa. 1979). 2021See, e.g., State v. Walton, 324 P.3d 876, 906 (Haw. 2014); State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1991); Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 151 (Fla. 1989); State v. Thompson, 760 P.2d 1162, 1165 (Idaho 1988); People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135 , 141–42 (Colo. 1983); Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283, 1289 (Pa. 1979). | 2 | 2 |
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Peatongreen2 sentences2021Fulton v. Woodford, 26 Ariz. App. 17, 22 (1976); Peaton, 168 Ariz. at 192 (same). 2021Fulton v. Woodford, 26 Ariz. App. 17, 22 (1976); Peaton, 168 Ariz. at 192 (same). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Gunwallgreen2 sentences2021MIXTON Opinion of the Court ¶56 Mixton places particular emphasis on Washington state court decisions, namely State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 812 (Wash. 1986), and State v. Miles, 156 P.3d 864 , 868 ¶ 14 (Wash. 2007), for the proposition that the third-party doctrine or its reasoning is inconsistent with Arizona’s Private Affairs Clause. 2021Gunwall, 720 P.2d at 812–13 (enumerating factors such as the textual language of the state constitution, significant textual differences between the state and federal constitutions, state constitutional and common law history, preexisting state law, structural variance between the state and federal constitutions, and matters of state interest or local concern). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., State v. Walton, 324 P.3d 876, 906 (Haw. 2014); State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1991); Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 151 (Fla. 1989); State v. Thompson, 760 P.2d 1162, 1165 (Idaho 1988); People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135 , 141–42 (Colo. 1983); Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283, 1289 (Pa. 1979). 2021See, e.g., State v. Walton, 324 P.3d 876, 906 (Haw. 2014); State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1991); Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 151 (Fla. 1989); State v. Thompson, 760 P.2d 1162, 1165 (Idaho 1988); People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135 , 141–42 (Colo. 1983); Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283, 1289 (Pa. 1979). | 2 | 2 |
Taylor v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurancegreen2 sentences2021Clearwater, 164 Ariz. at 258–59; Taylor, 185 Ariz. at 175–76. ¶41 In contrast, a third-party claim involves a third-party who is making a liability claim against the insured. 2021Clearwater, 164 Ariz. at 258 ; see Taylor, 185 Ariz. at 175–76 (same). ¶42 Because the insured’s liability to the claimant may exceed the policy limits, in a third-party claim there is “the added risk of subjecting the insured to liability in excess of the policy limits because of the insurer’s bad faith refusal to settle within those limits.” Clearwater, 164 Ariz. at 259 . | 2 | 2 |
Fulton v. Woodfordgreen2 sentences2021Fulton v. Woodford, 26 Ariz. App. 17, 22 (1976); Peaton, 168 Ariz. at 192 (same). 2021Fulton v. Woodford, 26 Ariz. App. 17, 22 (1976); Peaton, 168 Ariz. at 192 (same). | 2 | 2 |
Clearwater v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurancegreen2 sentences2021Clearwater, 164 Ariz. at 258–59; Taylor, 185 Ariz. at 175–76. ¶41 In contrast, a third-party claim involves a third-party who is making a liability claim against the insured. 2021Clearwater, 164 Ariz. at 258 ; see Taylor, 185 Ariz. at 175–76 (same). ¶42 Because the insured’s liability to the claimant may exceed the policy limits, in a third-party claim there is “the added risk of subjecting the insured to liability in excess of the policy limits because of the insurer’s bad faith refusal to settle within those limits.” Clearwater, 164 Ariz. at 259 . | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. DeJohngreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., State v. Walton, 324 P.3d 876, 906 (Haw. 2014); State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1991); Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 151 (Fla. 1989); State v. Thompson, 760 P.2d 1162, 1165 (Idaho 1988); People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135 , 141–42 (Colo. 1983); Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283, 1289 (Pa. 1979). 2021See, e.g., State v. Walton, 324 P.3d 876, 906 (Haw. 2014); State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1991); Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 151 (Fla. 1989); State v. Thompson, 760 P.2d 1162, 1165 (Idaho 1988); People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135 , 141–42 (Colo. 1983); Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283, 1289 (Pa. 1979). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Hoodgreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., United States v. Hood, 920 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2019) (holding that IP addresses are subject to the third-party doctrine and fall outside the scope of Carpenter); United States v. Contreras, 905 F.3d 853, 857 (5th Cir. 2018) (ruling that, post- Carpenter, ISP subscriber information “falls comfortably within the scope of the third-party doctrine”); see also United States v. Wellbeloved-Stone, 777 F. App’x 605 , 607 (4th Cir. 2019) (declining to revisit Bynum’s holding that subscriber information was not protected by the Fourth Amendment in light of Carpenter); United States v. VanDy 2021See, e.g., United States v. Hood, 920 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2019) (holding that IP addresses are subject to the third-party doctrine and fall outside the scope of Carpenter); United States v. Contreras, 905 F.3d 853, 857 (5th Cir. 2018) (ruling that, post- Carpenter, ISP subscriber information “falls comfortably within the scope of the third-party doctrine”); see also United States v. Wellbeloved-Stone, 777 F. App’x 605 , 607 (4th Cir. 2019) (declining to revisit Bynum’s holding that subscriber information was not protected by the Fourth Amendment in light of Carpenter); United States v. VanDy | 2 | 2 |
State v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2021See State v. Clark, 752 S.E.2d 907 , 921 n.13 (W. 2021See State v. Clark, 752 S.E.2d 907 , 921 n.13 (W. | 2 | 2 |
| Bonner v. Minico, Inc.green | 2 | 2 |
Katz v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2021MIXTON JUSTICE BOLICK, joined by CHIEF JUSTICE BRUTINEL and VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, Dissenting inquiry is whether the defendant possessed ‘a reasonable expectation of privacy,’” id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 ), “under the Washington Constitution the relevant inquiry for determining when a search has occurred is whether the state unreasonably intruded into the defendant’s ‘private affairs.’” Id. at 153–54. ¶116 Nonetheless, several other states have rejected the third-party doctrine in construing their own constitutions even when they parallel the Fourth Amendment. 2021MIXTON JUSTICE BOLICK, joined by CHIEF JUSTICE BRUTINEL and VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, Dissenting inquiry is whether the defendant possessed ‘a reasonable expectation of privacy,’” id. (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 ), “under the Washington Constitution the relevant inquiry for determining when a search has occurred is whether the state unreasonably intruded into the defendant’s ‘private affairs.’” Id. at 153–54. ¶116 Nonetheless, several other states have rejected the third-party doctrine in construing their own constitutions even when they parallel the Fourth Amendment. | 1 | 3 |
Hornback v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences1984The su-' preme court’s reasoning implies that carrier approval of a third party claim is a prerequisite to reopening because the carrier is entitled to protect its subrogation rights to “all rights of the employee against a third party tortfeasor,” id. at 219 , 474 P.2d 807 , including those rights which would reimburse reopening benefits. 1984The su-' preme court’s reasoning implies that carrier approval of a third party claim is a prerequisite to reopening because the carrier is entitled to protect its subrogation rights to “all rights of the employee against a third party tortfeasor,” id. at 219 , 474 P.2d 807 , including those rights which would reimburse reopening benefits. | 1 | 3 |
| Liberty Mutual Insurance v. Western Casualty & Surety Co.green | 1 | 2 |
| United States v. Perrinegreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Christiegreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Chapmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Christopher Weastgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Forrestergreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Cairagreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Andersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Valenciagreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. LaGrandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Spreitzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Jonesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Carvergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Aitken v. Industrial Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Fulminantegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sandoval v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement & Power Districtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hendry v. Industrial Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mannel v. Industrial Com'n of Arizonagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Purcell v. Zimbelmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Anderson Aviation Sales Company, Inc. v. Perezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. Maryland
red
2 sentences2021Id. ¶15 The third-party doctrine traces its roots to United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), and Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 2021Id. ¶15 The third-party doctrine traces its roots to United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), and Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). | 3 | 2019–2021 |
People v. Sporleder
green
2 sentences2021See, e.g., State v. Walton, 324 P.3d 876, 906 (Haw. 2014); State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1991); Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 151 (Fla. 1989); State v. Thompson, 760 P.2d 1162, 1165 (Idaho 1988); People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135 , 141–42 (Colo. 1983); Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283, 1289 (Pa. 1979). 2021See, e.g., State v. Walton, 324 P.3d 876, 906 (Haw. 2014); State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1991); Shaktman v. State, 553 So. 2d 148, 151 (Fla. 1989); State v. Thompson, 760 P.2d 1162, 1165 (Idaho 1988); People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135 , 141–42 (Colo. 1983); Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 403 A.2d 1283, 1289 (Pa. 1979). | 3 | 2019–2021 |
United States v. Miller
red
2 sentences2021Id. ¶15 The third-party doctrine traces its roots to United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), and Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). 2021Id. ¶15 The third-party doctrine traces its roots to United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), and Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). | 3 | 2019–2021 |
Boyd v. United States
red
2 sentences2021In Boyd v. United States, the Court invalidated, under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, federal laws pursuant to which business invoices were obtained without a warrant. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 2021In Boyd v. United States, the Court invalidated, under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, federal laws pursuant to which business invoices were obtained without a warrant. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). | 2 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Montano
green
2 sentences2021See, e.g., United States v. Hood, 920 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2019) (holding that IP addresses are subject to the third-party doctrine and fall outside the scope of Carpenter); United States v. Contreras, 905 F.3d 853, 857 (5th Cir. 2018) (ruling that, post- Carpenter, ISP subscriber information “falls comfortably within the scope of the third-party doctrine”); see also United States v. Wellbeloved-Stone, 777 F. App’x 605 , 607 (4th Cir. 2019) (declining to revisit Bynum’s holding that subscriber information was not protected by the Fourth Amendment in light of Carpenter); United States v. VanDy 2021See, e.g., United States v. Hood, 920 F.3d 87, 92 (1st Cir. 2019) (holding that IP addresses are subject to the third-party doctrine and fall outside the scope of Carpenter); United States v. Contreras, 905 F.3d 853, 857 (5th Cir. 2018) (ruling that, post- Carpenter, ISP subscriber information “falls comfortably within the scope of the third-party doctrine”); see also United States v. Wellbeloved-Stone, 777 F. App’x 605 , 607 (4th Cir. 2019) (declining to revisit Bynum’s holding that subscriber information was not protected by the Fourth Amendment in light of Carpenter); United States v. VanDy | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Simpson v. Miller ex rel. County of Maricopa
green
2 sentences2021That priority is misplaced given that in our federalist system, “state constitutions are our basic charters of state governance.” Simpson v. Miller, 241 Ariz. 341 , 345 ¶ 8 (2017); accord State v. Wein, 244 Ariz. 22 , 32 ¶ 39 (2018) (Bolick, Gould, and Lopez, JJ., dissenting); see also Jeffrey S. Sutton, 51 Imperfect Solutions: State Constitutions and the Development of American Constitutional Law 42–83 (2018) (highlighting greater state constitutional protections for the rights of criminal defendants). 2021That priority is misplaced given that in our federalist system, “state constitutions are our basic charters of state governance.” Simpson v. Miller, 241 Ariz. 341 , 345 ¶ 8 (2017); accord State v. Wein, 244 Ariz. 22 , 32 ¶ 39 (2018) (Bolick, Gould, and Lopez, JJ., dissenting); see also Jeffrey S. Sutton, 51 Imperfect Solutions: State Constitutions and the Development of American Constitutional Law 42–83 (2018) (highlighting greater state constitutional protections for the rights of criminal defendants). | 2 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Mixton
green
2 sentences2021The court of appeals claims that these states have rejected this approach under their state constitutions because they have concluded that “people . . . have a reasonable expectation of privacy in information they must furnish to companies providing banking, phone, and internet services in order to use those services.” See Mixton, 247 Ariz. at 224 ¶ 25 (collecting cases from states that have rejected the third-party doctrine on state constitutional grounds). 2021The court of appeals claims that these states have rejected this approach under their state constitutions because they have concluded that “people . . . have a reasonable expectation of privacy in information they must furnish to companies providing banking, phone, and internet services in order to use those services.” See Mixton, 247 Ariz. at 224 ¶ 25 (collecting cases from states that have rejected the third-party doctrine on state constitutional grounds). | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Rawlings v. Apodaca
green
2 sentences2021Zilisch, 196 Ariz. at 238 ¶ 21; Rawlings, 151 Ariz. at 153 ; Noble, 128 Ariz. at 190 . ¶48 Thus, for the first time in our jurisprudence, the majority applies a first-party standard for settlement offers involving a third-party claim. 2021Zilisch, 196 Ariz. at 238 ¶ 21; Rawlings, 151 Ariz. at 153 ; Noble, 128 Ariz. at 190 . ¶48 Thus, for the first time in our jurisprudence, the majority applies a first-party standard for settlement offers involving a third-party claim. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Noble v. National American Life Insurance
green
2 sentences2021Zilisch, 196 Ariz. at 238 ¶ 21; Rawlings, 151 Ariz. at 153 ; Noble, 128 Ariz. at 190 . ¶48 Thus, for the first time in our jurisprudence, the majority applies a first-party standard for settlement offers involving a third-party claim. 2021Zilisch, 196 Ariz. at 238 ¶ 21; Rawlings, 151 Ariz. at 153 ; Noble, 128 Ariz. at 190 . ¶48 Thus, for the first time in our jurisprudence, the majority applies a first-party standard for settlement offers involving a third-party claim. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Miles
green
2 sentences2021MIXTON Opinion of the Court ¶56 Mixton places particular emphasis on Washington state court decisions, namely State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 812 (Wash. 1986), and State v. Miles, 156 P.3d 864 , 868 ¶ 14 (Wash. 2007), for the proposition that the third-party doctrine or its reasoning is inconsistent with Arizona’s Private Affairs Clause. 2021MIXTON Opinion of the Court ¶56 Mixton places particular emphasis on Washington state court decisions, namely State v. Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808, 812 (Wash. 1986), and State v. Miles, 156 P.3d 864 , 868 ¶ 14 (Wash. 2007), for the proposition that the third-party doctrine or its reasoning is inconsistent with Arizona’s Private Affairs Clause. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Weatherford Ex Rel. Michael L. v. State
green
2 sentences2021Michael L. v. State, 206 Ariz. 529 , 533 ¶ 9 (2003). 2021Michael L. v. State, 206 Ariz. 529 , 533 ¶ 9 (2003). | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Zilisch v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
green
2 sentences2021Zilisch, 196 Ariz. at 238 ¶ 21; Rawlings, 151 Ariz. at 153 ; Noble, 128 Ariz. at 190 . ¶48 Thus, for the first time in our jurisprudence, the majority applies a first-party standard for settlement offers involving a third-party claim. 2021Zilisch, 196 Ariz. at 238 ¶ 21; Rawlings, 151 Ariz. at 153 ; Noble, 128 Ariz. at 190 . ¶48 Thus, for the first time in our jurisprudence, the majority applies a first-party standard for settlement offers involving a third-party claim. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Hendrickson v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N OF ARIZONA
green
2 sentences2008The fact that a claimant may suffer no financial impact from disregarding the direction of the statute does not lessen his lawyer’s obligation to follow the law as set out in section 23-1023.C. 202 Ariz. 442, ¶ 19 , 46 P.3d at 1067 . ¶59. 2008The fact that a claimant may suffer no financial impact from disregarding the direction of the statute does not lessen his lawyer’s obligation to follow the law as set out in section 23-1023.C. 202 Ariz. 442, ¶ 19 , 46 P.3d at 1067 . ¶59. | 2 | 2008–2008 |
| Morgan v. Hays green | 2 | 2006–2006 |
| Bohn v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona green | 2 | 2002–2002 |
| State of Arizona v. Darrel Peter Pandeli green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| R.S./s.E. v. Hon. thompson/teddy Vanders green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Strickland v. Washington green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State of Arizona v. Anthony Lito Hernandez green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Charnes v. DiGiacomo green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Huerta green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Marcus Zanders v. State of Indiana green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Pool v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Riley v. Cal. United States green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Harm green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. MacHado green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. Prion green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| State v. Gibson green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Bohn v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| MacAluso v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Tucson Electric Power Co. v. Apache County green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Henderson green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Hilliard v. Estelle green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Weatherspoon v. United States green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Schade Transfer & Storage Co. v. Alabam Freight Lines neutral | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Blakely Oil, Inc. v. Crowder green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Sato v. Van Denburgh green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| United States v. Acord green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Gaspord v. Emery Transportation Co. neutral | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.