third-party claim in Texas

2015Justice Chapa’ correctly analogized the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine in Riley to the Third Party Doctrine: “Similar to the way that the search-incident-to- arrest doctrine was ill suited to the digital data contained on cell phones seized during an arrest, the third-party doctrine is ‘ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.’” Ford v. State, 444 S.W.3d 171, 202 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014)(quoting U.S. v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (Sotomayor, J. concurring). 9 The ma

2015Similar to the way that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine was ill suited to the digital data contained on cell phones seized during an arrest, the third-party doctrine is "ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal [**70] of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks." Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).

2007See also Estate of Arlitt v. Paterson , 995 S.W.2d 713, 721 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied); Standard Fire Ins.

2001See also Estate of Arlitt v. Paterson, 995 S.W.2d 713, 721 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. denied); Standard Fire Ins.

2025I would require the court of appeals to reconsider whether probable cause could justify the search of six months of IP address information under 51 Carpenter, 585 U.S. at 311-15 (acknowledging the fact that people compulsively carry cell phones in support of a greater privacy concern for historical cell-site records and that cell phones are a pervasive and insistent part of daily life as a reason not to apply the third-party doctrine to such records); Riley, 573 U.S. at 395 (recognizing the pervasive character of cell phones, which “carry a cache of sensitive personal information,” as support

2024Id. at 308–10.22 The Supreme Court noted that CSLI “present[s] even greater privacy concerns than the GPS monitoring of a vehicle . . . considered in Jones,” because a cell phone is “almost a ‘feature of human anatomy’” that “tracks nearly exactly the movements of its owner.” Id. at 311 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 , 385 (2014)). “[W]hen the government tracks the location of a cell phone it achieves near perfect surveillance, as if it had attached an ankle monitor to the phone’s user.” Id. at 311-12. 22 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, adopting the reasoning in Carpenter, has

2020(A pen register captures numbers dialed on a landline telephone.) We decided to apply the third-party doctrine to CSLI because we concluded in Ford v. State, 477 S.W.3d 321 (Tex. Crim.

2020(A pen register captures numbers dialed on a landline telephone.) We decided to apply the third-party doctrine to CSLI because we concluded in Ford v. State, 477 S.W.3d 321 (Tex. Crim.

2025The court of appeals disagreed, concluding § 15.003 is “inapplicable to a defendant’s third-party claim against third-party defendants.” Id. at *2 (citing Jaster v. Comet II Constr., Inc., 438 S.W.3d 556 , 558 n.16 (Tex. 2014) (“[A] third-party plaintiff . . . is not a ‘plaintiff’ but a ‘defendant suing a non-party.’”); Harding Bars, LLC v. McCaskill, 374 S.W.3d 517, 520 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. denied) (holding that filing of a cross-claim did not transform party into a “plaintiff” because party was already part of the suit)).

2017In Jaster , the court addressed whether the certificate of merit requirement applies to “a defendant or third-party defendant who files a third-party claim or cross-claim against a licensed or registered professional.” 3 Jaster, 438 S.W.3d at 559 (plurality op.).

2024That is, Chatrie II held the third-party doctrine (under which a defendant has no protected expectation of privacy in information voluntarily turned over to a third party, see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 , 743- 44 (1979)), applied to Chatrie’s geofence-warrant-derived geo-location data to preclude any reasonable expectation of privacy.

2015Riley does not concern the third party doctrine espoused in Smith, 442 U.S. at 743-44 , and relied upon in reaching our decision.

2026A judgment is final for purposes of appeal when (1) a judgment expressly disposes of some, but not all defendants; (2) the only remaining defendants have not been served or answered; and (3) nothing in the record indicates that the plaintiff ever expected to obtain service on the unserved defendants, “such that the case ‘stands as if there had been a discontinuance’ as to the unserved defendants.” In re Sheppard, 193 S.W.3d 181, 187 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Penn, 363 S.W.2d 230, 232 (Tex. 1962)).

2011See In re Discount Rental, Inc., 216 S.W.3d 831, 832 (Tex.2007) (per curiam) (“Because the default judgment was taken without proper service, it was void.”); Lytle v. Cunningham, 261 S.W.3d 837, 840 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.) (‘When the attempted service of process is invalid, the trial court acquires no personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and the default judgment is void.”); see also In re Sheppard, 193 S.W.3d 181 , 189 & n. 8 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (recognizing trial court does not have jurisdiction until service has been achieved or defendant waives service

2007Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 20 S.W.3d 692, 702 (Tex.2000) (citing Arkwright-Boston Mfrs.

2007Co. of Pittsburgh, PA , 20 S.W.3d 692, 702 (Tex. 2000) (citing Arkwright-Boston Mfrs.

2026See Madison v. Gordon, 39 S.W.3d 604, 606 (Tex. 2001) (stating that a person is a bona fide purchaser for value when the person acquires property in good faith, for value, and without notice of constructive or actual notice of a third-party claim).

2015The statute simply doesn’t address the circumstance of a purchaser who receives notice of a third-party claim by some means other than a recorded notice 1 To qualify as a “bona fide purchaser,” “one must acquire property in good faith, for value, and without notice of any third-party claim or interest.” Madison v. Gordon, 39 S.W.3d 604, 606 (Tex. 2001). 2 See Act of May 26, 2009, 81st Leg., R.S., Ch. 297, § 2, sec. 12.0071, 2009 Tex. Gen.

2011The court held the extrinsic evidence GuideOne sought to introduce did not fit the exception because it “directly contradicts the plaintiffs allegations that the [cjhurch employed [the youth minister] during the relevant coverage period, an allegation material, at least in part, to the merits of the third-party claim.” Id. at 310 .

2011The court held the extrinsic evidence GuideOne sought to introduce did not fit the exception because it "directly contradicts the plaintiff's allegations that the [c]hurch employed [the youth minister] during the relevant coverage period, an allegation material, at least in part, to the merits of the third-party claim." Id. at 310 .

2025Compare Chatrie, 107 F.4th at 332 (applying the third party doctrine to hold that it does not constitute a search), with Smith, 110 F.4th at 836 (holding that the third party doctrine does not apply to geofence warrants and concluding that “law enforcement in this case did conduct a search when it sought Location History data from Google”); Pierre Grosdidier, Courts Are Split: A Look at the Constitutionality of Geofence Warrants, 87 TEX.

2025The Court of Criminal Appeals assumed (without deciding) that geofence warrants are a “search within the parameters of the Fourth Amendment.” See Wells, 714 S.W.3d at 620 (comparing a Fourth Circuit case holding that geofence warrants did not constitute searches after applying the third party doctrine with a Fifth Circuit case holding that doctrine did not apply to geofence warrants, and also concluding they constituted searches (citing United States v. Chatrie, 107 F.4th 319 , 332 (4th Cir. 2024), reh’g en banc granted, No. 22-4489, 2024 WL 4648102 (4th Cir. Nov. 1, 2024) and United States v.

2025The court of appeals disagreed, concluding § 15.003 is “inapplicable to a defendant’s third-party claim against third-party defendants.” Id. at *2 (citing Jaster v. Comet II Constr., Inc., 438 S.W.3d 556 , 558 n.16 (Tex. 2014) (“[A] third-party plaintiff . . . is not a ‘plaintiff’ but a ‘defendant suing a non-party.’”); Harding Bars, LLC v. McCaskill, 374 S.W.3d 517, 520 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. denied) (holding that filing of a cross-claim did not transform party into a “plaintiff” because party was already part of the suit)).

2025The court went on to hold that “[s]ection 15.062 governs venue of third-party claims, not section 15.003.” Id. (citing Hopson v. Dallas ISD, No. 05–02–01819–CV, 2003 WL 402881 , at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 24, 2003, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that joinder of third–party claims is governed by § 15.062, not 13 § 15.003)).

2021See Fletcher, 217 S.W.3d at 758 (holding that a bona fide purchaser is without notice of a third-party claim or interest to the property).

2021The evidence here, if believed by the trier of fact, would support a finding that appellees were not “without notice, constructive or actual, of any third-party claim or interest.” Fletcher, 217 S.W.3d at 758 (holding that a bona fide purchaser is without notice of a third-party claim or interest to the property).

2017We agree with the dissenting justice that “[t]he statute simply doesn’t address the circumstance of a purchaser who receives notice of a third-party claim by some means other than a recorded notice of lis pendens.” Id. at 190 (Massengale, J., dissenting).

2017We agree with the dissenting justice that “[t]he statute simply doesn’t address the circumstance of a purchaser who receives notice of a third-party claim by some means other than a recorded notice of lis pendens.” Id. at 190 (Mas-sengale, J., dissenting).

2015See Weingarten, 343 S.W.3d at 865 (recognizing a limited exception to the eight-corners rule for a “pure coverage” question where the insurer is not questioning the merits of the underlying third-party claim, and the extrinsic evidence goes “strictly to an issue of coverage without contradicting any allegation in the third-party claimant’s pleadings material to the merits of that underlying claim”).

2015See Weingarten, 343 S.W.3d at 865 (recognizing a limited exception to the eight-corners rule for a “pure coverage” question where the insurer is not questioning the merits of the underlying third-party claim, and the extrinsic evidence goes “strictly to an issue of 6 coverage without contradicting any allegation in the third-party claimant’s pleadings material to the merits of that underlying claim”).

2015Certainly the safer approach for employers in appellees' position would be to provide the information in the form of the signed, written “complaints” described in Subchapter B. 112 See City of League City v. Blevins, 821 S.W.2d 212, 215 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ) (holding “proceedings held before an independent third party hearing examiner pursuant to [the Civil Service Act] are not in the nature of an arbitration and are not subject to the provisions of the Texas General Arbitration Act”). 113 Even if not squarely raised by appellees, we have the power and duty to consider

2013See City of League City v. Blevins, 821 S.W.2d 212, 215 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ) (holding "proceedings held before an independent third party hearing examiner pursuant to [the Civil Service Act] are not in the nature of an arbitration and are not subject to the provisions of the Texas General Arbitration Act”). 113 .

2015See Warner, 245 S.W.3d at 461 .

2015See Warner, 245 S.W.3d at 461 .

2011The Court also noted that “an insured is fully protected against his insurer’s refusal to defend or mishandling of a third-party claim by his contractual and Stowers rights.” Id. at 28-29 .

2011Taylor points out that the Texas Supreme Court expressly contemplates the existence of some contractual right in the following statement: “The court overlooked the fact that an insured is fully protected against his insurer’s refusal to defend or mishandling of a third-party claim by his contractual and Stowers rights.” Head, 938 S.W.2d at 28-29 ; see also Traver, 980 S.W.2d at 629 (“We further concluded that rights granted under Stowers together with rights under the contract of insurance fully protected the insured against an insurance company’s erroneous refusal to defend a third-party liab

2022White elected to appeal to an independent third-party hearing examiner but then argued that the examiner was without jurisdiction to hear his appeal because the suspension letter did not satisfy the requirement to “notify White that an appeal to a hearing examiner would limit his ability to seek further review with a district court judge.” Id.

2022White elected to appeal to an independent third-party hearing examiner but then argued that the examiner was without jurisdiction to hear his appeal because the suspension letter did not satisfy the requirement to “notify White that an appeal to a hearing examiner would limit his ability to seek further review with a district court judge.” Id.