68 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1962–2023 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In re United Statesgreen2 sentences2017Rather, the officer need only make a showing required by the federal Stored Communications Act – that is, “specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that [the historical CSLI is] relevant and material to an ongoing investigation.” Id. at 315 (citing 18 U.S.C. §2703 (d)); see also In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell Site Information, 809 F.Supp.2d 113 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that third party doctrine does not apply to historical CSLI). 31 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has also reject 2017Rather, the officer need only make a showing required by the federal Stored Communications Act – that is, “specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that [the historical CSLI is] relevant and material to an ongoing investigation.” Id. at 315 (citing 18 U.S.C. §2703 (d)); see also In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell Site Information, 809 F.Supp.2d 113 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that third party doctrine does not apply to historical CSLI). 31 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has also reject | 3 | 3 |
United States v. Aaron Grahamgreen2 sentences2017Moreover, depending on the precision of the particular device, it may have the capability of providing detailed information about movements within a dwelling. 52 In that regard, the court also relied on the panel decision in United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 355-56 (4th Cir. 2015), which rejected the third party doctrine and held that law enforcement access to historical CSLI was a search. 2017In that regard, the court also relied on the panel decision in United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332, 355-56 (4th Cir. 2015), which rejected the third party doctrine and held that law enforcement access to historical CSLI was a search. | 3 | 3 |
Allen & Whalen, Inc. v. John C. Grimberg Co.green2 sentences1968While a demurrer is an appropriate way of raising the sufficiency of a third-party claim, Allen & Whalen, Inc. v. Grimberg Co., supra, 229 Md. at 588; Ennis v. Donovan, 222 Md. 536, 161 A. 2d 698 (1960) ; Nohowel v. Hall, 218 Md. 160 , 146-A. 2d 187 (1958), and while the allowance of a third-party claim rests with the sound discretion of the trial court, Bradyhouse v. Levinson, supra, 230 Md. at 523 ; Gorn v. Kolker,. supra, 213 Md. 551, at 554-55 , “[This] does not necessarily mean, however, that where the action of the lower court is-clearly arbitrary or has no sound basis in law or in reaso 1966In Allen & Whalen, supra, in speaking of a third party claim under Rule 315 a, which, like a cross claim under Rule 314 b, must be for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant seeking help from a codefendant, Chief Judge Brune said for the Court (pp. 587-88 of 229 Md.): “The usual basis for third-party impleader is that the third-party defendant is or may be secondarily liable for all or some part of the plaintiff’s claim against the original defendant as in the case of an indemnitor, guarantor, surety or insurer or a joint tortfeasor obligated by substantive law to make cont | 2 | 5 |
Carpenter v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2023See Riley, 573 U.S. at 386 (determining that it would be unreasonable to apply the search incident to arrest exception to permit a warrantless search of a cell phone because the rationale for the exception’s application to physical objects did not extend to the digital contents of a cell phone); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217-20 (determining that it would be unreasonable to apply the third-party doctrine to permit a warrantless search of 127 days’ worth of cell site location records because society does not expect law enforcement to secretly track an individual’s every movement without a warran 2023Additional support for our conclusion comes from the Supreme Court’s discussion in Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219 , differentiating between physical and digital information in the context of another exception to the warrant requirement, the third-party doctrine. | 2 | 2 |
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Scottgreen2 sentences2023See Riley, 573 U.S. at 386 (determining that it would be unreasonable to apply the search incident to arrest exception to permit a warrantless search of a cell phone because the rationale for the exception’s application to physical objects did not extend to the digital contents of a cell phone); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217-20 (determining that it would be unreasonable to apply the third-party doctrine to permit a warrantless search of 127 days’ worth of cell site location records because society does not expect law enforcement to secretly track an individual’s every movement without a warran 2023See Riley, 573 U.S. at 386 (determining that it would be unreasonable to apply the search incident to arrest exception to permit a warrantless search of a cell phone because the rationale for the exception’s application to physical objects did not extend to the digital contents of a cell phone); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217-20 (determining that it would be unreasonable to apply the third-party doctrine to permit a warrantless search of 127 days’ worth of cell site location records because society does not expect law enforcement to secretly track an individual’s every movement without a warran | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Augustinegreen2 sentences2017See Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230 , 4 N.E.3d 846 (2014) (holding that law enforcement access to historical CSLI for a two-week period is a search under state constitutional provision, although a warrant may not be needed for a period of shorter duration); Commonwealth v. Estabrook, 472 Mass. 852 , 38 N.E.3d 231 (2015) (confirming that law enforcement officers may obtain historical CSLI relating to a period of six hours or less without need for a search warrant). c. 2017See Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230 , 4 N.E.3d 846 (2014) (holding that law enforcement access to historical CSLI for a two-week period is a search under state constitutional provision, although a warrant may not be needed for a period of shorter duration); Commonwealth v. Estabrook, 472 Mass. 852 , 38 N.E.3d 231 (2015) (confirming that law enforcement officers may obtain historical CSLI relating to a period of six hours or less without need for a search warrant). c. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Robert Stephen Hallmarkgreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., United States v. Hallmark, 911 F.2d 399, 402 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Reed, 575 F.3d 900, 914 (9th Cir. 2009); Sun Kin Chan v. State, 78 Md. 2017See, e.g., United States v. Hallmark, 911 F.2d 399, 402 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Reed, 575 F.3d 900, 914 (9th Cir, 2009); Sun Kin Chan v. State, 78 Md.App. 287 , 552 A.2d 1351 (1989). . | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Reedgreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., United States v. Hallmark, 911 F.2d 399, 402 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Reed, 575 F.3d 900, 914 (9th Cir. 2009); Sun Kin Chan v. State, 78 Md. 2017See, e.g., United States v. Hallmark, 911 F.2d 399, 402 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Reed, 575 F.3d 900, 914 (9th Cir, 2009); Sun Kin Chan v. State, 78 Md.App. 287 , 552 A.2d 1351 (1989). . | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Damian Patrickgreen2 sentences2017Cell Site Simulator In United States v. Patrick, 842 F.3d 540, 541 (7th Cir. 2016), law enforcement officers located and arrested the defendant—-for whom they had a valid arrest warrant—in a car on a public street with the assistance of a cell site simulator. 2017The court noted that the cell site simulator was not used to generate the probable cause for the arrest of the defendant, only to find his location. 842 F.3d at 545 ("A fugitive cannot be picky about how he is run aground.”). . | 2 | 2 |
White v. Land Homes Corporationgreen2 sentences2003In White v. Land Homes, 251 Md. 603 , 248 A.2d 159 (1968), the Court, discussing the predecessor rule and finding it in pari materia to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14, explained: A third-party claim will lie in any case where it can be alleged that the third-party defendant is necessarily answerable to the original defendant should judgment be entered against him. 2003In White v. Land Homes, 251 Md. 603 , 248 A.2d 159 (1968), the Court, discussing the predecessor rule and finding it in pari materia to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14, explained: A third-party claim will lie in any case where it can be alleged that the third-party defendant is necessarily answerable to the original defendant should judgment be entered against him. | 1 | 4 |
Franch v. Ankneygreen2 sentences2020“The employer’s subrogation interest in the third-party claim acts as a ‘statutory lien’ on any recovery the employee may obtain from the third[ ]party.” Franch v. Ankney, 341 Md. 350, 358 (1996) (quoting Richard P. Gilbert & Robert L. 2003Id. at 358-60 , 670 A.2d 951 (quoting Ankney v. Franch, 103 Md.App. 83, 109 , 652 A.2d 1138 (1995)) (other citations omitted) (footnotes omitted). | 1 | 3 |
Shofer v. Stuart Hack Co.green2 sentences2003Although the issue involved in this case was not presented in Shofer v. the Stuart Hack Company, 324 Md. 92, 98 , 595 A.2d 1078 , (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1096 , 112 S.Ct. 1174 , 117 L.Ed.2d 419 (1992), it is interesting to note that the Shofer Court, explaining its decision to enter final judgment on its own initiative, stated: "The docket of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City reflects that no judgment has ever been entered disposing of the third-party claim by respondents against Grabush. 2003Although the issue involved in this case was not presented in Shofer v. the Stuart Hack Company, 324 Md. 92, 98 , 595 A.2d 1078 , (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1096 , 112 S.Ct. 1174 , 117 L.Ed.2d 419 (1992), it is interesting to note that the Shofer Court, explaining its decision to enter final judgment on its own initiative, stated: "The docket of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City reflects that no judgment has ever been entered disposing of the third-party claim by respondents against Grabush. | 1 | 2 |
Porter Hayden Co. v. Bullingergreen2 sentences2010See also Porter Hayden Co. v. Bullinger, 350 Md. 452, 471-72 , 713 A.2d 962, 971 (1998) (reasoning that a default judgment entered on an asbestos manufacturer’s third-party claim against a third-party defendant constituted a determination of liability, such that the third-party defendant should be considered a joint tort-feasor under the Act); Lerman v. Heeman, 347 Md. 439, 446 , 701 A.2d 426, 430 (1997) (determining that a jury verdict had pronounced Dr. Lerman and Dr. Heeman, defendants in a medical malpractice action, to be “joint tort-feasors,” such that Dr. Heeman could seek contribution 2010See also Porter Hayden Co. v. Bullinger, 350 Md. 452, 471-72 , 713 A.2d 962, 971 (1998) (reasoning that a default judgment entered on an asbestos manufacturer’s third-party claim against a third-party defendant constituted a determination of liability, such that the third-party defendant should be considered a joint tort-feasor under the Act); Lerman v. Heeman, 347 Md. 439, 446 , 701 A.2d 426, 430 (1997) (determining that a jury verdict had pronounced Dr. Lerman and Dr. Heeman, defendants in a medical malpractice action, to be “joint tort-feasors,” such that Dr. Heeman could seek contribution | 1 | 2 |
Haupt v. Stategreen2 sentences2007Id. at 474 , 667 A.2d 179 . 2007Id. at 474 , 667 A.2d 179 . | 1 | 2 |
Charles J. Frank, Inc. v. Associated Jewish Charities of Baltimore, Inc.green2 sentences2005Frank, Inc. v. Associated Jewish Charities of Baltimore, Inc., 294 Md. 443 , 450 A.2d 1304 (1982), this Court reversed the circuit court’s determination in a construction dispute that a contractor’s third-party claim on arbitrable issues, which contained no demand for arbitration, filed against the building’s owner, to which the owner filed a demurrer and an answer, constituted the contractor’s waiver of arbitration for all issues, i.e., those issues that were litigated as well as unrelated issues arising under the contract. 2005Frank, Inc. v. Associated Jewish Charities of Baltimore, Inc., 294 Md. 443 , 450 A.2d 1304 (1982), this Court reversed the circuit court’s determination in a construction dispute that a contractor’s third-party claim on arbitrable issues, which contained no demand for arbitration, filed against the building’s owner, to which the owner filed a demurrer and an answer, constituted the contractor’s waiver of arbitration for all issues, i.e., those issues that were litigated as well as unrelated issues arising under the contract. | 1 | 2 |
Bradyhouse v. Levinsongreen2 sentences2003Id. at 609 , 248 A.2d 159 ; see also Bradyhouse v. Levinson, 230 Md. 519, 522 , 187 A.2d 838 (1963)(stating that a third-party claim must be for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against the original defendant). 2003Id. at 609 , 248 A.2d 159 ; see also Bradyhouse v. Levinson, 230 Md. 519, 522 , 187 A.2d 838 (1963)(stating that a third-party claim must be for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against the original defendant). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Copesgreen2 sentences2023State v. Copes, 454 Md. 581, 611 (2017). 29 cause if he had missed that deadline. 2023Copes v. State, 454 Md. 581, 611 (2017) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
| Baltimore County v. Baltimore County Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 4green | 1 | 1 |
| Collier v. Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Allgood v. Muellergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Swigert v. Welkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Keene Corp. v. Levingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lerman v. Heemangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Loh v. Safeway Stores, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Garrettgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Merrimack School District v. National School Bus Service, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Atlantic Contracting & Material Co. v. Ulico Casualty Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Zissu v. Bear, Stearns & Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Otis Elevator Co. v. TODA CONSTRUCTION OF CA.green | 1 | 1 |
| Gold Coast Mall, Inc. v. Larmar Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Scarlett Harbor Associates Ltd. Partnershipgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Scarlett Harbor Associates Ltd. Partnershipgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Holland v. Thachergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Melrose Floor Co., Inc. v. Lechnergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pocock v. Gladdengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Suitland Development Corp. v. Merchants Mortgage Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In Re Applic. of US for an Order for Disclosuregreen2 sentences2017Skinner, 690 F.3d at 776-77 . 49 The court also rejected the state’s reliance on the third party doctrine, noting that “[s]imply because the cell phone user knows or should know that his cell phone gives off signals that enable the service provider to detect its location for call routing purposes ... does not mean that the user is consenting to use of that location information by third parties for any other unrelated purposes.” Tracey, 152 So.3d at 522 . 33 expectation of privacy both in his location as revealed by real-time location data [i.e., CSLI] and in his movement where his location is 2017Md. 2011) (“the subject here has a reasonable expectation of privacy both in his location as revealed by real-time location data [ie., CSLI] and in his movement where his location is subject to continuous tracking over an extended period of time, here thirty days”); but see In re Application of the United States for an Order for the Disclosure of Telecommunications Records and Authorizing the Use of a Pen Register and Trap and Trace, 405 F.Supp.2d 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding, pursuant to the third party doctrine, that the collection of certain real-time CSLI is not a Fourth Amendment search). | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Varriale v. State
green
2 sentences2023See Riley, 573 U.S. at 386 (determining that it would be unreasonable to apply the search incident to arrest exception to permit a warrantless search of a cell phone because the rationale for the exception’s application to physical objects did not extend to the digital contents of a cell phone); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217-20 (determining that it would be unreasonable to apply the third-party doctrine to permit a warrantless search of 127 days’ worth of cell site location records because society does not expect law enforcement to secretly track an individual’s every movement without a warran 2023See Riley, 573 U.S. at 386 (determining that it would be unreasonable to apply the search incident to arrest exception to permit a warrantless search of a cell phone because the rationale for the exception’s application to physical objects did not extend to the digital contents of a cell phone); Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217-20 (determining that it would be unreasonable to apply the third-party doctrine to permit a warrantless search of 127 days’ worth of cell site location records because society does not expect law enforcement to secretly track an individual’s every movement without a warran | 2 | 2023–2023 |
In Re Electronic Communication Service to Disclose
green
2 sentences2017Rather, the officer need only make a showing required by the federal Stored Communications Act – that is, “specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that [the historical CSLI is] relevant and material to an ongoing investigation.” Id. at 315 (citing 18 U.S.C. §2703 (d)); see also In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell Site Information, 809 F.Supp.2d 113 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that third party doctrine does not apply to historical CSLI). 31 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has also reject 2017Rather, the officer need only make a showing required by the federal Stored Communications Act – that is, “specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that [the historical CSLI is] relevant and material to an ongoing investigation.” Id. at 315 (citing 18 U.S.C. §2703 (d)); see also In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Release of Historical Cell Site Information, 809 F.Supp.2d 113 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that third party doctrine does not apply to historical CSLI). 31 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has also reject | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Commonwealth v. Estabrook
green
2 sentences2017See Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230 , 4 N.E.3d 846 (2014) (holding that law enforcement access to historical CSLI for a two-week period is a search under state constitutional provision, although a warrant may not be needed for a period of shorter duration); Commonwealth v. Estabrook, 472 Mass. 852 , 38 N.E.3d 231 (2015) (confirming that law enforcement officers may obtain historical CSLI relating to a period of six hours or less without need for a search warrant). c. 2017See Commonwealth v. Augustine, 467 Mass. 230 , 4 N.E.3d 846 (2014) (holding that law enforcement access to historical CSLI for a two-week period is a search under state constitutional provision, although a warrant may not be needed for a period of shorter duration); Commonwealth v. Estabrook, 472 Mass. 852 , 38 N.E.3d 231 (2015) (confirming that law enforcement officers may obtain historical CSLI relating to a period of six hours or less without need for a search warrant). c. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Sun Kin Chan v. State
green
2 sentences2017See, e.g., United States v. Hallmark, 911 F.2d 399, 402 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Reed, 575 F.3d 900, 914 (9th Cir, 2009); Sun Kin Chan v. State, 78 Md.App. 287 , 552 A.2d 1351 (1989). . 2017See, e.g., United States v. Hallmark, 911 F.2d 399, 402 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Reed, 575 F.3d 900, 914 (9th Cir, 2009); Sun Kin Chan v. State, 78 Md.App. 287 , 552 A.2d 1351 (1989). . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Andrews
green
2 sentences2017Id. at 398-99 , 134 A.3d 324 . 52 Consequently, it held that the officers’ use of a cell site simulator to locate the defendant was a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. e. Summary It is evident that, in assessing whether law enforcement use of location tracking data and devices is a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, courts have looked to a variety of factors—whether use of a device involves a physical trespass, whether the device is used for long-term or short-term track ing, whether the device tracks movements within a private dwelling or on a public street, and whether t 2017Id. at 398-99 , 134 A.3d 324 . 52 Consequently, it held that the officers’ use of a cell site simulator to locate the defendant was a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. e. Summary It is evident that, in assessing whether law enforcement use of location tracking data and devices is a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, courts have looked to a variety of factors—whether use of a device involves a physical trespass, whether the device is used for long-term or short-term track ing, whether the device tracks movements within a private dwelling or on a public street, and whether t | 2 | 2017–2017 |
United States v. Melvin Skinner
green
2 sentences2017Skinner, 690 F.3d at 776-77 . 49 The court also rejected the state’s reliance on the third party doctrine, noting that “[s]imply because the cell phone user knows or should know that his cell phone gives off signals that enable the service provider to detect its location for call routing purposes ... does not mean that the user is consenting to use of that location information by third parties for any other unrelated purposes.” Tracey, 152 So.3d at 522 . 33 expectation of privacy both in his location as revealed by real-time location data [i.e., CSLI] and in his movement where his location is 2017Skinner, 690 F.3d at 776-77 . 49 The court also rejected the state’s reliance on the third party doctrine, noting that “[s]imply because the cell phone user knows or should know that his cell phone gives off signals that enable the service provider to detect its location for call routing purposes ... does not mean that the user is consenting to use of that location information by third parties for any other unrelated purposes.” Tracey, 152 So.3d at 522 . 33 expectation of privacy both in his location as revealed by real-time location data [i.e., CSLI] and in his movement where his location is | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Shawn Alvin Tracey v. State of Florida
green
2 sentences2017Skinner, 690 F.3d at 776-77 . 49 The court also rejected the state’s reliance on the third party doctrine, noting that “[s]imply because the cell phone user knows or should know that his cell phone gives off signals that enable the service provider to detect its location for call routing purposes ... does not mean that the user is consenting to use of that location information by third parties for any other unrelated purposes.” Tracey, 152 So.3d at 522 . 33 expectation of privacy both in his location as revealed by real-time location data [i.e., CSLI] and in his movement where his location is 2017The court also rejected the state’s reliance on the third party doctrine, noting that "[sjimply because the cell phone user knows or should know that his cell phone gives off signals that enable the service provider to detect its location for call routing purposes ... does not mean that the user is consenting to use of that location information by third parties for any other unrelated purposes.” Tracey, 152 So.3d at 522 , . | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Ankney v. Franch
green
2 sentences1996Additionally, the court held that if the employer can establish that it has been prejudiced by the settlement, i.e., because the reasonable dollar value of the third-party claim might have been significantly greater than the amount of the actual unauthorized settlement and the settlement was less than the workers’ compensation benefits, then the employer is also entitled to a credit for the amount of the prejudice. 7 Ankney, 103 Md.App. at 109-10 , 652 A.2d at 1151 . 1996Additionally, the court held that if the employer can establish that it has been prejudiced by the settlement, i.e., because the reasonable dollar value of the third-party claim might have been significantly greater than the amount of the actual unauthorized settlement and the settlement was less than the workers’ compensation benefits, then the employer is also entitled to a credit for the amount of the prejudice. 7 Ankney, 103 Md.App. at 109-10 , 652 A.2d at 1151 . | 2 | 1996–2003 |
Livingston Fire Protection, Inc. v. Hubbard
neutral
2 sentences1999It held that, although the language of the statute gave the Commission jurisdiction over legal fees “rendered in connection with any claim under this article,” the Commission had no jurisdiction for “counsel fees in connection with a third party claim as the pertinent language of the section is specifically limited to legal fees ‘rendered in connection with any claim under this article.’ ” Livingston Fire Pro., 45 Md.App. at 511 , 414 A.2d at 8 (quoting then Md.Code (1957, 1964 Repl.Vol., 1977 Cum.Supp.), Art. 101, § 57 and current § 9-731). 1999It held that, although the language of the statute gave the Commission jurisdiction over legal fees “rendered in connection with any claim under this article,” the Commission had no jurisdiction for “counsel fees in connection with a third party claim as the pertinent language of the section is specifically limited to legal fees ‘rendered in connection with any claim under this article.’ ” Livingston Fire Pro., 45 Md.App. at 511 , 414 A.2d at 8 (quoting then Md.Code (1957, 1964 Repl.Vol., 1977 Cum.Supp.), Art. 101, § 57 and current § 9-731). | 2 | 1981–1999 |
Friedman v. Wilson Freight Forwarding Company
green
2 sentences1969And at page 611, it was further stated: “The federal courts have been quite liberal in holding a third-party claim sufficient if it alleges facts under which the third-party defendant ‘is or may be liable to’ the original defendant ‘for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim in order to avoid circuity of action.’ (citations omitted) In Friedman [Friedman v. Wilson Freight Forwarding Co., 181 F. Supp. 327 (D.W.D. 1968The federal courts have been quite liberal in holding a third-party claim sufficient if it alleges facts under which the third-party defendant “is or may be liable to” the original defendant “for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim in order to avoid circuity of action.” Handel-Maarschaapij, etc. v. Faradyne Electronics Corp., 37 F.R.D. 357 (D.S.D.N.Y. 1964) ; Friedman v. Wilson Freight Forwarding Co., 181 F. Supp. 327 (D.W.D.Pa. 1960) ; Fruit Growers Co-op v. California Pie & Baking Co., 2 F.R.D. 415 (D.F.D.N.Y. 1942) ; Balcoff v. Teagarden, 36 F. Supp. 225 (D.S.D.N.Y. 1940). | 2 | 1968–1969 |
Ennis v. Donovan
green
2 sentences1968While a demurrer is an appropriate way of raising the sufficiency of a third-party claim, Allen & Whalen, Inc. v. Grimberg Co., supra, 229 Md. at 588; Ennis v. Donovan, 222 Md. 536, 161 A. 2d 698 (1960) ; Nohowel v. Hall, 218 Md. 160 , 146-A. 2d 187 (1958), and while the allowance of a third-party claim rests with the sound discretion of the trial court, Bradyhouse v. Levinson, supra, 230 Md. at 523 ; Gorn v. Kolker,. supra, 213 Md. 551, at 554-55 , “[This] does not necessarily mean, however, that where the action of the lower court is-clearly arbitrary or has no sound basis in law or in reaso 1968While a demurrer is an appropriate way of raising the sufficiency of a third-party claim, Allen & Whalen, Inc. v. Grimberg Co., supra, 229 Md. at 588; Ennis v. Donovan, 222 Md. 536, 161 A. 2d 698 (1960) ; Nohowel v. Hall, 218 Md. 160 , 146-A. 2d 187 (1958), and while the allowance of a third-party claim rests with the sound discretion of the trial court, Bradyhouse v. Levinson, supra, 230 Md. at 523 ; Gorn v. Kolker,. supra, 213 Md. 551, at 554-55 , “[This] does not necessarily mean, however, that where the action of the lower court is-clearly arbitrary or has no sound basis in law or in reaso | 2 | 1962–1968 |
Nazario v. Washington Adventist Hospital, Inc.
green
1 sentence2020Nazario v. Washington Adventist Hosp., Inc., 45 Md. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Jason Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Jianas Bros. Packaging Co., Inc. green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| In Re Grand Jury Proceedings. Sam Rabin, Witness-Appellee v. United States of America, Movant-Appellant green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Noble v. Bruce green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Ehrlich v. Grove green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Parler & Wobber v. Miles & Stockbridge, P.C. green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Silbersack v. ACandS, Inc. green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Washington v. Washington Hospital Center green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| United States v. Hardy green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Seifert v. Regents of University of Minnesota green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Republic Insurance v. Pat Dinardo Auto Sales, Inc. green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Woodhaven Homes & Realty, Inc. v. Barbara Hotz and Dale Hotz v. Douglas E. Robbins and Robbins Electric, Inc. green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Johnson & Towers Baltimore, Inc. v. Vessel \Hunter\"" green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Western Maryland Railway Co. v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corp. green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Ward v. Nationwide Mutual Automobile Insurance green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| cluster 566907 green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Roebuck v. Steuart green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Clark v. Velsicol Chemical Corp. green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Stuart Hack Co. v. Shofer green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Knoche v. Cox green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Catania v. Lippman green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher v. Superior Court of L.A. Cty. green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Hansen v. Brognano green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Goldfisher v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Waldman v. Levine green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Johnson v. Federal Kemper Insurance green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Brocker Manufacturing & Supply Co. v. Mashburn green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Leppo v. State Highway Administration green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Smith v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.