third-party claim in Oregon

2024See Sloan, 364 Or at 645 (discussing a physician’s “specified duty of care” and “affirmative duty” to patients in the context of a claim brought on behalf of a patient who allegedly died as a result of medical negligence); Tomlinson v. Metropolitan Pediatrics, LLC, 245 Or App 658, 673 , 366 P3d 370 (2015), aff’d, 362 Or 431 , 412 P3d 133 (2018) (“the issue in Mead was whether the plaintiff—whose negligence claim was premised on the existence of a physician-patient relationship—had demonstrated the existence of that relationship,” and “the court had no reason to—and did not—address the cognizab

2024See Sloan, 364 Or at 645 (discussing a physician’s “specified duty of care” and “affirmative duty” to patients in the context of a claim brought on behalf of a patient who allegedly died as a result of medical negligence); Tomlinson v. Metropolitan Pediatrics, LLC, 245 Or App 658, 673 , 366 P3d 370 (2015), aff’d, 362 Or 431 , 412 P3d 133 (2018) (“the issue in Mead was whether the plaintiff—whose negligence claim was premised on the existence of a physician-patient relationship—had demonstrated the existence of that relationship,” and “the court had no reason to—and did not—address the cognizab

2023See Hawthorne, 316 Or App at 498-99 (“Under Article I, section 9, Oregon courts have held that, in some instances, a person does not have a protected privacy interest in infor- mation that the person voluntarily allows a third party to access and maintain for its own legitimate business purposes.”); see also Carpenter v. United States, 585 US ___ , ___, 138 S Ct 2206, 2219-220 , 201 L Ed 2d 507 (2018) (describing the third-party doctrine, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, as essentially recognizing that a person who voluntarily exposes information to a third party assumes the risk that the

2023See Hawthorne, 316 Or App at 498-99 (“Under Article I, section 9, Oregon courts have held that, in some instances, a person does not have a protected privacy interest in infor- mation that the person voluntarily allows a third party to access and maintain for its own legitimate business purposes.”); see also Carpenter v. United States, 585 US ___ , ___, 138 S Ct 2206, 2219-220 , 201 L Ed 2d 507 (2018) (describing the third-party doctrine, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, as essentially recognizing that a person who voluntarily exposes information to a third party assumes the risk that the

2023See Hawthorne, 316 Or App at 498-99 (“Under Article I, section 9, Oregon courts have held that, in some instances, a person does not have a protected privacy interest in infor- mation that the person voluntarily allows a third party to access and maintain for its own legitimate business purposes.”); see also Carpenter v. United States, 585 US ___ , ___, 138 S Ct 2206, 2219-220 , 201 L Ed 2d 507 (2018) (describing the third-party doctrine, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, as essentially recognizing that a person who voluntarily exposes information to a third party assumes the risk that the

2023See Hawthorne, 316 Or App at 498-99 (“Under Article I, section 9, Oregon courts have held that, in some instances, a person does not have a protected privacy interest in infor- mation that the person voluntarily allows a third party to access and maintain for its own legitimate business purposes.”); see also Carpenter v. United States, 585 US ___ , ___, 138 S Ct 2206, 2219-220 , 201 L Ed 2d 507 (2018) (describing the third-party doctrine, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, as essentially recognizing that a person who voluntarily exposes information to a third party assumes the risk that the

2006First Commerce of America, 329 Or at 202 .

2005See id.

2018ORS 31.600(2) specifically provides that the fact that a plaintiff is not a party to the third-party claim does not prevent the trier of fact from comparing the fault of the third-party defendant in the action brought by the plaintiff." 351 Or. at 21 -22 , 261 P.3d 1215 .

2018ORS 31.600(2) specifically provides that the fact that a plaintiff is not a party to the third-party claim does not prevent the trier of fact from comparing the fault of the third-party defendant in the action brought by the plaintiff." 351 Or. at 21 -22 , 261 P.3d 1215 .

2014We noted that ORCP 22 C abrogated the requirement of separate actions, explaining that ORCP 22 C was patterned after the federal impleader rule, FRCP 14(a), which was “designed to decide contingent liability as well as primary liability and the third-party claim can accelerate determination of the liability, if any, between the third-party plaintiff and the third-party defendant.” 94 Or App at 652-53 (internal quotation marks omitted).

2013Gray & Co., 94 Or App 648, 652-53 , 767 P2d 83 , rev den, 308 Or 33 (1989) (explaining that “the requirement of separate actions has been abrogated in the federal courts by FRCP 14(a), the rule after which ORCP 22 C was patterned,” and that, under the corresponding federal rule “the third-party claim can accelerate determination of the liability, if any, between the third-party plaintiff and the third-party defendant” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).

1998The third-party claim has the effect of shifting all or part of the third-party plaintiffs liability to its defendant.” Hampton Tree Farms, Inc. v. Jewett, 125 Or App 178, 193 , 865 P2d 420 (1993), aff'd 320 Or 599 , 892 P2d 683 (1995) (citations omitted); see also Fisher v. Bowman, 97 Or App 357, 360 , 776 P2d 575 , rev den 308 Or 500 (1989) (third-party liability must “ ‘in some way [be] dependent upon the outcome of the main claim’ ”) (quoting United States v. One 1977 Mercedes Benz, 708 F2d 444, 452 (9th Cir 1983), cert den 464 US 1071 (1984)).

1998The third-party claim has the effect of shifting all or part of the third-party plaintiffs liability to its defendant.” Hampton Tree Farms, Inc. v. Jewett, 125 Or App 178, 193 , 865 P2d 420 (1993), aff'd 320 Or 599 , 892 P2d 683 (1995) (citations omitted); see also Fisher v. Bowman, 97 Or App 357, 360 , 776 P2d 575 , rev den 308 Or 500 (1989) (third-party liability must “ ‘in some way [be] dependent upon the outcome of the main claim’ ”) (quoting United States v. One 1977 Mercedes Benz, 708 F2d 444, 452 (9th Cir 1983), cert den 464 US 1071 (1984)).

1998The third-party claim has the effect of shifting all or part of the third-party plaintiffs liability to its defendant.” Hampton Tree Farms, Inc. v. Jewett, 125 Or App 178, 193 , 865 P2d 420 (1993), aff'd 320 Or 599 , 892 P2d 683 (1995) (citations omitted); see also Fisher v. Bowman, 97 Or App 357, 360 , 776 P2d 575 , rev den 308 Or 500 (1989) (third-party liability must “ ‘in some way [be] dependent upon the outcome of the main claim’ ”) (quoting United States v. One 1977 Mercedes Benz, 708 F2d 444, 452 (9th Cir 1983), cert den 464 US 1071 (1984)).

1998The third-party claim has the effect of shifting all or part of the third-party plaintiffs liability to its defendant.” Hampton Tree Farms, Inc. v. Jewett, 125 Or App 178, 193 , 865 P2d 420 (1993), aff'd 320 Or 599 , 892 P2d 683 (1995) (citations omitted); see also Fisher v. Bowman, 97 Or App 357, 360 , 776 P2d 575 , rev den 308 Or 500 (1989) (third-party liability must “ ‘in some way [be] dependent upon the outcome of the main claim’ ”) (quoting United States v. One 1977 Mercedes Benz, 708 F2d 444, 452 (9th Cir 1983), cert den 464 US 1071 (1984)).

2021Cf. Masood, 360 Or at 643 (holding that, where requirements of ORS 742.061(1) were met, insured was entitled to recover attor- ney fees incurred in enforcing an oral agreement between insured and insurer predicated on an underlying policy; stating that the “determinative question” under the stat- ute was “the source of the insured’s claim”); see Traveler’s Insurance Co. v. Plummer, 278 Or 387 , 563 P2d 1218 (1977) (cited by court in Masood and reaching similar conclusion under predecessor to ORS 742.061(1) with regard to fees an insured had incurred in pursuing a third-party claim).

2021Cf. Masood, 360 Or at 643 (holding that, where requirements of ORS 742.061(1) were met, insured was entitled to recover attor- ney fees incurred in enforcing an oral agreement between insured and insurer predicated on an underlying policy; stating that the “determinative question” under the stat- ute was “the source of the insured’s claim”); see Traveler’s Insurance Co. v. Plummer, 278 Or 387 , 563 P2d 1218 (1977) (cited by court in Masood and reaching similar conclusion under predecessor to ORS 742.061(1) with regard to fees an insured had incurred in pursuing a third-party claim).

2021Cf. Masood, 360 Or at 643 (holding that, where requirements of ORS 742.061(1) were met, insured was entitled to recover attor- ney fees incurred in enforcing an oral agreement between insured and insurer predicated on an underlying policy; stating that the “determinative question” under the stat- ute was “the source of the insured’s claim”); see Traveler’s Insurance Co. v. Plummer, 278 Or 387 , 563 P2d 1218 (1977) (cited by court in Masood and reaching similar conclusion under predecessor to ORS 742.061(1) with regard to fees an insured had incurred in pursuing a third-party claim).