third-party claim in Nebraska

2016The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly said there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in personal information a defendant knowingly exposes to third parties.22 And this is true even when the information is revealed to the third party on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence in the third party will not be betrayed.23 Applying the third-party doctrine to the facts of this case, we conclude Jenkins did not have a reasonable expectation 20 Id., 442 U.S. at 744 . 21 State v. Knutson, supra note 1 . 22 State v. Wiedeman, 286 Neb. 193 , 835 N.W.2d 698 (2

2016The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly said there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in personal information a defendant knowingly exposes to third parties.22 And this is true even when the information is revealed to the third party on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence in the third party will not be betrayed.23 Applying the third-party doctrine to the facts of this case, we conclude Jenkins did not have a reasonable expectation 20 Id., 442 U.S. at 744 . 21 State v. Knutson, supra note 1 . 22 State v. Wiedeman, 286 Neb. 193 , 835 N.W.2d 698 (2

2022In Malolepszy v. State, 270 Neb. 100 , 699 N.W.2d 387 (2005), the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ petition against the defendant, but did not explicitly adjudicate the defendant’s third-party claim against a third-party defendant.

2022In Malolepszy v. State, 270 Neb. 100 , 699 N.W.2d 387 (2005), the district court dismissed the plaintiffs’ petition against the defendant, but did not explicitly adjudicate the defendant’s third-party claim against a third-party defendant.

2019The Supreme Court noted, "A duty to indemnify will always arise out of another more basic *733 obligation whether it arises on contract or tort." Id . at 184, 444 N.W.2d at 309 .

2019The Supreme Court noted, “A duty to indemnify will always arise out of another more basic obligation whether it arises on contract or tort.” Id. at 184, 444 N.W.2d at 309 .

2001Co., 195 Neb. 578 , 239 N.W.2d 499 (1976), a case again involving alleged bad faith in refusing to settle a third-party claim, this court cited with approval an instruction that the insurer had assumed a fiduciary position toward the insured.

2001Co., 195 Neb. 578 , 239 N.W.2d 499 (1976), a case again involving alleged bad faith in refusing to settle a third-party claim, this court cited with approval an instruction that the insurer had assumed a fiduciary position toward the insured.

2024A cell service customer does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the records maintained by a third-party service pro- vider of the phone numbers that text messages or calls were sent to or received from or in the times when those communi- cations took place. [43] As a matter of law, counsel is not ineffective for fail- ing to make an objection that has no merit. 87 Because there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the cell phone 82 State v. Jennings, supra note 2 . 83 Carpenter v. United States, supra note 68. 84 State v. Jennings, supra note 2 , 305 Neb. at 820, 942 N.W.2d

2024A cell service customer does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the records maintained by a third-party service pro- vider of the phone numbers that text messages or calls were sent to or received from or in the times when those communi- cations took place. [43] As a matter of law, counsel is not ineffective for fail- ing to make an objection that has no merit. 87 Because there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the cell phone 82 State v. Jennings, supra note 2 . 83 Carpenter v. United States, supra note 68. 84 State v. Jennings, supra note 2 , 305 Neb. at 820, 942 N.W.2d

2024A cell service customer does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the records maintained by a third-party service pro- vider of the phone numbers that text messages or calls were sent to or received from or in the times when those communi- cations took place. [43] As a matter of law, counsel is not ineffective for fail- ing to make an objection that has no merit. 87 Because there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the cell phone 82 State v. Jennings, supra note 2 . 83 Carpenter v. United States, supra note 68. 84 State v. Jennings, supra note 2 , 305 Neb. at 820, 942 N.W.2d

2024A cell service customer does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the records maintained by a third-party service pro- vider of the phone numbers that text messages or calls were sent to or received from or in the times when those communi- cations took place. [43] As a matter of law, counsel is not ineffective for fail- ing to make an objection that has no merit. 87 Because there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the cell phone 82 State v. Jennings, supra note 2 . 83 Carpenter v. United States, supra note 68. 84 State v. Jennings, supra note 2 , 305 Neb. at 820, 942 N.W.2d

2022J-TON CONTRACTORS Cite as 31 Neb.

2020Thus, in R & D Properties, we found we had jurisdic- tion over an appeal from an order granting a new trial on the building owner’s claims against a contractor, even though a third-party claim against a subcontractor was still pending and the court did not issue a certification under § 25-1315. 16 The order granting a new trial was final and appealable with- out a § 25-1315 certification, because the language designat- ing the order granting a new trial as “an appealable order” plainly controlled over the mandate in § 25-1315 that “any order or other form of decision, however designated, which

2020Thus, in R & D Properties, we found we had jurisdic- tion over an appeal from an order granting a new trial on the building owner’s claims against a contractor, even though a third-party claim against a subcontractor was still pending and the court did not issue a certification under § 25-1315. 16 The order granting a new trial was final and appealable with- out a § 25-1315 certification, because the language designat- ing the order granting a new trial as “an appealable order” plainly controlled over the mandate in § 25-1315 that “any order or other form of decision, however designated, which

2020Thus, in R & D Properties, we found we had jurisdic- tion over an appeal from an order granting a new trial on the building owner’s claims against a contractor, even though a third-party claim against a subcontractor was still pending and the court did not issue a certification under § 25-1315. 16 The order granting a new trial was final and appealable with- out a § 25-1315 certification, because the language designat- ing the order granting a new trial as “an appealable order” plainly controlled over the mandate in § 25-1315 that “any order or other form of decision, however designated, which

2017App. 914 , 738 N.W.2d 466 (2007). 12 See, Castellar Partners v. AMP Limited, supra note 8 ; Cerny v. Todco Barricade Co., supra note 10; Southwest Omaha Hospitality v. Werner- Robertson, supra note 11 ; Halac v. Girton, supra note 11 ; Sand Livestock Sys. v. Svoboda, supra note 11 ; Jones v. Jones, supra note 11 ; Murphy v. Brown, supra note 11 . 13 See Sand Livestock Sys. v. Svoboda, supra note 11 . - 469 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 298 Nebraska R eports RAFERT v. MEYER Cite as 298 Neb. 461 of an exceptional need for immediate appellate intervention.14 Appellants’ motion requeste

2017The circumstances here do not make this the “unusual case.” In urging us to accept jurisdiction over the appeal, Meyer argues that our resolution of the issues on appeal could 22 10 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2659 at 110 (2014). - 472 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 298 Nebraska R eports RAFERT v. MEYER Cite as 298 Neb. 461 eliminate the need for a trial of his third-party claim.

2017App. 914 , 738 N.W.2d 466 (2007). 12 See, Castellar Partners v. AMP Limited, supra note 8 ; Cerny v. Todco Barricade Co., supra note 10; Southwest Omaha Hospitality v. Werner- Robertson, supra note 11 ; Halac v. Girton, supra note 11 ; Sand Livestock Sys. v. Svoboda, supra note 11 ; Jones v. Jones, supra note 11 ; Murphy v. Brown, supra note 11 . 13 See Sand Livestock Sys. v. Svoboda, supra note 11 . - 469 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 298 Nebraska R eports RAFERT v. MEYER Cite as 298 Neb. 461 of an exceptional need for immediate appellate intervention.14 Appellants’ motion requeste

2016Ed. 2d 71 (1976); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 , 93 S. Ct. 611 , 34 L.

2016Ed. 2d 71 (1976); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 , 93 S. Ct. 611 , 34 L.

2016The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly said there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in personal information a defendant knowingly exposes to third parties.22 And this is true even when the information is revealed to the third party on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence in the third party will not be betrayed.23 Applying the third-party doctrine to the facts of this case, we conclude Jenkins did not have a reasonable expectation 20 Id., 442 U.S. at 744 . 21 State v. Knutson, supra note 1 . 22 State v. Wiedeman, 286 Neb. 193 , 835 N.W.2d 698 (2

2016The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly said there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in personal information a defendant knowingly exposes to third parties.22 And this is true even when the information is revealed to the third party on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence in the third party will not be betrayed.23 Applying the third-party doctrine to the facts of this case, we conclude Jenkins did not have a reasonable expectation 20 Id., 442 U.S. at 744 . 21 State v. Knutson, supra note 1 . 22 State v. Wiedeman, 286 Neb. 193 , 835 N.W.2d 698 (2

2016We applied the reasoning articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Smith v. Maryland.19 There, the Court applied the third-party doctrine and held that law enforcement officers do not need a warrant to have a telephone company install a pen register to record the numbers dialed from a 18 State v. Knutson, supra note 1 . 19 Smith v. Maryland, supra note 15. - 697 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 294 Nebraska R eports STATE v. JENKINS Cite as 294 Neb. 684 person’s telephone, because the activity does not amount to a search under the Fourth Amendment.

2016It is worth mentioning that, given the landline technology of telephones at the time of Smith, the records obtained by the government in that case arguably contained more precise location data than the CSLI at issue here, because landlines are associated with a physical street address.29 The fact that the business records in Smith showed exactly where the caller was (in his home) at the time the calls were placed did not preclude the Court from applying the third-party doctrine and 27 Id. 28 Id., 132 S. Ct. at 949. 29 See U.S. v. Davis, supra note 4 . - 700 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sh

2016The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly said there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in personal information a defendant knowingly exposes to third parties.22 And this is true even when the information is revealed to the third party on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence in the third party will not be betrayed.23 Applying the third-party doctrine to the facts of this case, we conclude Jenkins did not have a reasonable expectation 20 Id., 442 U.S. at 744 . 21 State v. Knutson, supra note 1 . 22 State v. Wiedeman, 286 Neb. 193 , 835 N.W.2d 698 (2

2016The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly said there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in personal information a defendant knowingly exposes to third parties.22 And this is true even when the information is revealed to the third party on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence in the third party will not be betrayed.23 Applying the third-party doctrine to the facts of this case, we conclude Jenkins did not have a reasonable expectation 20 Id., 442 U.S. at 744 . 21 State v. Knutson, supra note 1 . 22 State v. Wiedeman, 286 Neb. 193 , 835 N.W.2d 698 (2

2016It is worth mentioning that, given the landline technology of telephones at the time of Smith, the records obtained by the government in that case arguably contained more precise location data than the CSLI at issue here, because landlines are associated with a physical street address.29 The fact that the business records in Smith showed exactly where the caller was (in his home) at the time the calls were placed did not preclude the Court from applying the third-party doctrine and 27 Id. 28 Id., 132 S. Ct. at 949. 29 See U.S. v. Davis, supra note 4 . - 700 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sh

2000Dammann v. Litty, 234 Neb. 664 , 452 N.W.2d 522 (1990); Schuyler State Bank v. Cech, 228 Neb. 588 , 423 N.W.2d 464 (1988); Church of the Holy Spirit v. Bevco, Inc., supra. The basic function of third-party practice is the original defendant’s seeking to transfer to the third-party defendant the liability asserted by the original plaintiff.

2000Dammann v. Litty, 234 Neb. 664 , 452 N.W.2d 522 (1990); Schuyler State Bank v. Cech, 228 Neb. 588 , 423 N.W.2d 464 (1988); Church of the Holy Spirit v. Bevco, Inc., supra. The basic function of third-party practice is the original defendant’s seeking to transfer to the third-party defendant the liability asserted by the original plaintiff.

1999We concluded that the employer was not responsible for any of the costs which its employee incurred in unsuccessfully pursuing the third-party claim because it “was a party defendant... for the sole purpose of protecting its statutory right of subrogation and, therefore, did not join in the prosecuting of the claim.” Id. at 377 , 576 N.W.2d at 791-92 .

1999We concluded that the employer was not responsible for any of the costs which its employee incurred in unsuccessfully pursuing the third-party claim because it “was a party defendant... for the sole purpose of protecting its statutory right of subrogation and, therefore, did not join in the prosecuting of the claim.” Id. at 377 , 576 N.W.2d at 791-92 .

1999Versch v. Tichota, 192 Neb. 251 , 220 N.W.2d 8 (1974); Gillotte v. Omaha Public Power Dist., 189 Neb. 444 , 203 N.W.2d 163 (1973), disapproved on other grounds, Nekuda v. Waspi Trucking, Inc., 222 Neb. 806 , 388 N.W.2d 438 (1986).

1999Versch v. Tichota, 192 Neb. 251 , 220 N.W.2d 8 (1974); Gillotte v. Omaha Public Power Dist., 189 Neb. 444 , 203 N.W.2d 163 (1973), disapproved on other grounds, Nekuda v. Waspi Trucking, Inc., 222 Neb. 806 , 388 N.W.2d 438 (1986).

1999City of Omaha v. Morello, 257 Neb. 869 , 602 N.W.2d 1 (1999); Hagelstein v. Swift-Eckrich, 257 Neb. 312 , 597 N.W.2d 394 (1999); Janssen v. Tomahawk Oil Co., 254 Neb. 370 , 576 N.W.2d 787 (1998).

1999City of Omaha v. Morello, 257 Neb. 869 , 602 N.W.2d 1 (1999); Hagelstein v. Swift-Eckrich, 257 Neb. 312 , 597 N.W.2d 394 (1999); Janssen v. Tomahawk Oil Co., 254 Neb. 370 , 576 N.W.2d 787 (1998).

1999Versch v. Tichota, 192 Neb. 251 , 220 N.W.2d 8 (1974); Gillotte v. Omaha Public Power Dist., 189 Neb. 444 , 203 N.W.2d 163 (1973), disapproved on other grounds, Nekuda v. Waspi Trucking, Inc., 222 Neb. 806 , 388 N.W.2d 438 (1986).

1999Versch v. Tichota, 192 Neb. 251 , 220 N.W.2d 8 (1974); Gillotte v. Omaha Public Power Dist., 189 Neb. 444 , 203 N.W.2d 163 (1973), disapproved on other grounds, Nekuda v. Waspi Trucking, Inc., 222 Neb. 806 , 388 N.W.2d 438 (1986).

1999Versch v. Tichota, 192 Neb. 251 , 220 N.W.2d 8 (1974); Gillotte v. Omaha Public Power Dist., 189 Neb. 444 , 203 N.W.2d 163 (1973), disapproved on other grounds, Nekuda v. Waspi Trucking, Inc., 222 Neb. 806 , 388 N.W.2d 438 (1986).

1999Versch v. Tichota, 192 Neb. 251 , 220 N.W.2d 8 (1974); Gillotte v. Omaha Public Power Dist., 189 Neb. 444 , 203 N.W.2d 163 (1973), disapproved on other grounds, Nekuda v. Waspi Trucking, Inc., 222 Neb. 806 , 388 N.W.2d 438 (1986).

1999City of Omaha v. Morello, 257 Neb. 869 , 602 N.W.2d 1 (1999); Hagelstein v. Swift-Eckrich, 257 Neb. 312 , 597 N.W.2d 394 (1999); Janssen v. Tomahawk Oil Co., 254 Neb. 370 , 576 N.W.2d 787 (1998).

1999City of Omaha v. Morello, 257 Neb. 869 , 602 N.W.2d 1 (1999); Hagelstein v. Swift-Eckrich, 257 Neb. 312 , 597 N.W.2d 394 (1999); Janssen v. Tomahawk Oil Co., 254 Neb. 370 , 576 N.W.2d 787 (1998).

1988The express warranties alleged and evidence presented do not place Gateway in excess of the authority of the agency and, therefore, the granting of summary judgment for Gateway on Suzukis’ third cause of action [warranties] was proper. 207 Neb. at 566-67 , 299 N.W.2d at 766 .

1988The express warranties alleged and evidence presented do not place Gateway in excess of the authority of the agency and, therefore, the granting of summary judgment for Gateway on Suzukis’ third cause of action [warranties] was proper. 207 Neb. at 566-67 , 299 N.W.2d at 766 .