11 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rideout v. Riendeaugreen2 sentences2018Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57 , 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054 , 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (plurality opinion); Rideout v. Riendeau , 2000 ME 198 , ¶ 18, 761 A.2d 291 ("[T]he right to direct and control a child's upbringing is a 'fundamental' liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause."). [¶ 14] By itself, a third party's assertion of de facto parenthood rights results in a disruption of the parent-child relationship because it "forc[es] a parent to expend time and resources defending against a third-party claim to a child [and] is itself an infringement on the fundamental right to parent." Pitt 2018Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57 , 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054 , 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (plurality opinion); Rideout v. Riendeau , 2000 ME 198 , ¶ 18, 761 A.2d 291 ("[T]he right to direct and control a child's upbringing is a 'fundamental' liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause."). [¶ 14] By itself, a third party's assertion of de facto parenthood rights results in a disruption of the parent-child relationship because it "forc[es] a parent to expend time and resources defending against a third-party claim to a child [and] is itself an infringement on the fundamental right to parent." Pitt | 3 | 3 |
Troxel v. Granvillegreen2 sentences2018Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57 , 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054 , 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (plurality opinion); Rideout v. Riendeau , 2000 ME 198 , ¶ 18, 761 A.2d 291 ("[T]he right to direct and control a child's upbringing is a 'fundamental' liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause."). [¶ 14] By itself, a third party's assertion of de facto parenthood rights results in a disruption of the parent-child relationship because it "forc[es] a parent to expend time and resources defending against a third-party claim to a child [and] is itself an infringement on the fundamental right to parent." Pitt 2018Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57 , 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054 , 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (plurality opinion); Rideout v. Riendeau , 2000 ME 198 , ¶ 18, 761 A.2d 291 ("[T]he right to direct and control a child's upbringing is a 'fundamental' liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause."). [¶ 14] By itself, a third party's assertion of de facto parenthood rights results in a disruption of the parent-child relationship because it "forc[es] a parent to expend time and resources defending against a third-party claim to a child [and] is itself an infringement on the fundamental right to parent." Pitt | 1 | 2 |
Matthew W. Pitts v. Amanda M. Mooregreen2 sentences2018Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57 , 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054 , 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (plurality opinion); Rideout v. Riendeau , 2000 ME 198 , ¶ 18, 761 A.2d 291 ("[T]he right to direct and control a child's upbringing is a 'fundamental' liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause."). [¶ 14] By itself, a third party's assertion of de facto parenthood rights results in a disruption of the parent-child relationship because it "forc[es] a parent to expend time and resources defending against a third-party claim to a child [and] is itself an infringement on the fundamental right to parent." Pitt 2018Troxel v. Granville , 530 U.S. 57 , 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054 , 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (plurality opinion); Rideout v. Riendeau , 2000 ME 198 , ¶ 18, 761 A.2d 291 ("[T]he right to direct and control a child's upbringing is a 'fundamental' liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause."). [¶ 14] By itself, a third party's assertion of de facto parenthood rights results in a disruption of the parent-child relationship because it "forc[es] a parent to expend time and resources defending against a third-party claim to a child [and] is itself an infringement on the fundamental right to parent." Pitt | 1 | 2 |
Avangrid Networks, Inc. v. Secretary of Stategreen1 sentence2022See Avangrid Networks, Inc. v. Sec'y of State, 2020 ME 109 , ¶ 37 n.11, 237 A.3d 882 . 10 Theodore A. Small, Esq. (orally), Skelton, Taintor & Abbott, Lewiston, for appellant Sultan Corp. Aaron M. | 1 | 1 |
Milligan v. Stategreen1 sentence2018Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality opinion); Rideout v. Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 18 , 761 A.2d 291 (“[T]he right to direct and control a child’s upbringing is a ‘fundamental’ liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.”). [¶14] By itself, a third party’s assertion of de facto parenthood rights results in a disruption of the parent-child relationship because it “forc[es] a parent to expend time and resources defending against a third-party claim to a child [and] is itself an infringement on the fundamental right to parent.” Pitts, 2014 ME 59, ¶ 35 , 90 A.3d 1169 ; | 1 | 1 |
Koch Industries, Inc., Cross-Appellant v. Sun Company, Inc., Cross-Appellees, and Champlin Refining & Chemicals, Inc., Defendant-Cross-Appelleegreen2 sentences2009Furthermore, an owner who transfers property to a third party in violation of a right of first refusal creates “an enforceable option in the right-holder.” Koch Indus. v. Sun Co., 918 F.2d 1203, 1211 (5th Cir.1990); see also Holmes, supra, § 11.3, at 480 (“Although [the right-holder’s] Right of First Refusal was not an Option Contract, [the owner’s] wrongful act has caused it to become one.”). 2009Once a right of first refusal “ripens” into an option, “contract law applicable to option contracts applies.” Holmes, supra, § 11.3, at 471 n. 6. [¶ 21] When a transfer of property in violation of a right of first refusal gives rise to an enforceable option, the option “is not perpetual and the right-holder must choose between exercising it *1046 or acquiescing in the transfer of property.” A.G.E., Inc. v. Buford, 105 S.W.3d 667, 673 (Tex.App.2003); see also Koch, 918 F.2d at 1211 . | 1 | 1 |
A.G.E., Inc. v. Bufordgreen1 sentence2009Once a right of first refusal “ripens” into an option, “contract law applicable to option contracts applies.” Holmes, supra, § 11.3, at 471 n. 6. [¶ 21] When a transfer of property in violation of a right of first refusal gives rise to an enforceable option, the option “is not perpetual and the right-holder must choose between exercising it *1046 or acquiescing in the transfer of property.” A.G.E., Inc. v. Buford, 105 S.W.3d 667, 673 (Tex.App.2003); see also Koch, 918 F.2d at 1211 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. One Blue Corvettegreen2 sentences2003First, relying on State v. One Blue Corvette, 1999 ME 98, ¶ 7 , 732 A.2d 856, 857 , the State contends that section 1158 is ambiguous and that we should construe the third-party exception to be restricted to firearm cases in which the firearms involved were stolen from a third party. 2003First, relying on State v. One Blue Corvette, 1999 ME 98, ¶ 7 , 732 A.2d 856, 857 , the State contends that section 1158 is ambiguous and that we should construe the third-party exception to be restricted to firearm cases in which the firearms involved were stolen from a third party. | 1 | 1 |
Knight v. Penobscot Bay Medical Centergreen1 sentence1982We may review the presiding justice’s failure to give a tort instruction on the third-party claim only if it constituted “obvious error.” Knight v. Penobscot Bay Medical Center, 420 A.2d 915, 919 (Me.1980). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sultan Corporation v. Department of Environmental Protection
green
1 sentence2023Prot., 2022 ME 21 , 4 10, 272 A.3d 296 , The Board ruled that the third-party defense is not available due to the plain language of § 1367, and accordingly did not reach the merits of the defense.? | 1 | 2023–2023 |
City of Old Town v. Expera Old Town, LLC
neutral
2 sentences2022Rather, it stated that it had “considered the arguments of the parties but [found] that it did not need to decide, as a matter of law, whether the third-party defense is available to Sultan . . . because . . . even if [the defense was] available, Sultan ha[d] not met its burden to prove all the elements of the third-party defense.” [¶9] “Where the Superior Court acts as an intermediate appellate court, we review directly the Board’s decision for abuse of discretion, error of law, or findings unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.” City of Old Town v. Expera Old Town, LLC, 2021 ME 2 2022Rather, it stated that it had “considered the arguments of the parties but [found] that it did not need to decide, as a matter of law, whether the third-party defense is available to Sultan . . . because . . . even if [the defense was] available, Sultan ha[d] not met its burden to prove all the elements of the third-party defense.” [¶9] “Where the Superior Court acts as an intermediate appellate court, we review directly the Board’s decision for abuse of discretion, error of law, or findings unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.” City of Old Town v. Expera Old Town, LLC, 2021 ME 2 | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Carpenter v. United States
green
2 sentences2019Id. at 2219-20 . 2019Id. at 2219-20 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Conlogue v. Conlogue
green
2 sentences2014First, because forcing a parent to expend time and resources defending against a third-party claim to a child is itself an infringement on the fundamental right to parent, 17 Conlogue, 2006 ME 12, ¶ 13 , 890 A.2d 691 ; Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 30 , 761 A.2d 291 , a party seeking de facto parenthood status must, at the outset, establish his or her standing to initiate the litigation by making a prima facie showing of de facto parenthood according to the two-part test we have announced today, i.e., that the petitioner had a permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible role 17 This prelimina 2014First, because forcing a parent to expend time and resources defending against a third-party claim to a child is itself an infringement on the fundamental right to parent, 17 Conlogue, 2006 ME 12, ¶ 13 , 890 A.2d 691 ; Rideout, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 30 , 761 A.2d 291 , a party seeking de facto parenthood status must, at the outset, establish his or her standing to initiate the litigation by making a prima facie showing of de facto parenthood according to the two-part test we have announced today, i.e., that the petitioner had a permanent, unequivocal, committed, and responsible role 17 This prelimina | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Philbrook v. Theriault
green
2 sentences2014At this first stage, “the court must make a preliminary determination that such a relationship does in fact exist before a parent can be required to fully litigate the issue.” Philbrook, 2008 ME 152, ¶ 19 , 957 A.2d 74 . 2014At this first stage, “the court must make a preliminary determination that such a relationship does in fact exist before a parent can be required to fully litigate the issue.” Philbrook, 2008 ME 152, ¶ 19 , 957 A.2d 74 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Austin v. Austin
green
2 sentences2003Austin v. Austin, 2000 ME 61, ¶ 8 , 748 A.2d 996, 1000 . [¶ 5] In One Blue Corvette , we considered the assertion that the automobile forfeiture statute, 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2421(1) (1996), was ambiguous because it required proof that the defendant was the “sole owner-operator” of the automobile for forfeiture to apply, but also contained a third-party exception nearly identical to the exception established in section 1158. 2003Austin v. Austin, 2000 ME 61, ¶ 8 , 748 A.2d 996, 1000 . [¶ 5] In One Blue Corvette , we considered the assertion that the automobile forfeiture statute, 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2421(1) (1996), was ambiguous because it required proof that the defendant was the “sole owner-operator” of the automobile for forfeiture to apply, but also contained a third-party exception nearly identical to the exception established in section 1158. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Bedell v. Reagan
green
2 sentences1995Id. at 298 , 192 A.2d at 27 . 1995Id. at 298 , 192 A.2d at 27 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Environmental Improvement Commission
green
2 sentences1991We construed the Act to require a jury trial, not at the stage of the arbitration of the third-party claim, but in the reimbursement proceeding against the responsible party, and, as so construed, not to violate jury trial rights. 307 A.2d at 29-30 . 1991We construed the Act to require a jury trial, not at the stage of the arbitration of the third-party claim, but in the reimbursement proceeding against the responsible party, and, as so construed, not to violate jury trial rights. 307 A.2d at 29-30 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.