first part test in Oregon

2001Id.

2001Id.

2017As to the second part of the test, “a petitioner must show that his or her trial counsel’s deficiency had a tendency to affect the verdict.” Short v. Hill, 195 Or App 723, 729 , 99 P3d 311 (2004), rev den, 338 Or 374 (2005). 4 On appeal, petitioner essentially renews the arguments he made to the post-conviction court.

2010As to the second part of the test, “a petitioner must show that his or her trial counsel’s deficiency had a tendency to affect the verdict.” Short v. Hill, 195 Or App 723, 729 , 99 P3d 311 (2004), rev den, 338 Or 374 (2005).

2017As to the first part of the test, “[i]f a lawyer exercising reasonable professional skill would have recognized the existence of an issue and would have concluded under the circumstances that the benefits of raising it outweighed the risks of doing so, failing to raise the issue may constitute inadequate assistance.” Krieg v. Belleque, 221 Or App 36, 40 , 188 P3d 413 (2008).

2017As to the first part of the test, “[i]f a lawyer exercising reasonable professional skill would have recognized the existence of an issue and would have concluded under the circumstances that the benefits of raising it outweighed the risks of doing so, failing to raise the issue may constitute inadequate assistance.” Krieg v. Belleque, 221 Or App 36, 40 , 188 P3d 413 (2008).

2017As to the second part of the test, “a petitioner must show that his or her trial counsel’s deficiency had a tendency to affect the verdict.” Short v. Hill, 195 Or App 723, 729 , 99 P3d 311 (2004), rev den, 338 Or 374 (2005). 4 On appeal, petitioner essentially renews the arguments he made to the post-conviction court.

2017As to the second part of the test, “a petitioner must show that his or her trial counsel’s deficiency had a tendency to affect the verdict.” Short v. Hill, 195 Or App 723, 729 , 99 P3d 311 (2004), rev den, 338 Or 374 (2005). 4 On appeal, petitioner essentially renews the arguments he made to the post-conviction court.

2006The first part of the inquiry — whether a defendant purposefully has directed or availed itself of the privileges of conducting activities within the forum state — “ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts.” Burger King Corp., 471 US at 475 .

2003The first part of the inquiry—whether a defendant purposefully has directed or availed itself of the privileges of conducting activities within the forum state—“ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 US 462, 475 , 105 S Ct 2174 , 85 L Ed 2d 528 (1985).

2026The juvenile court found that “mother has engaged in conduct and is characterized by mental health conditions” and “the conduct is seriously detrimental Cite as 346 Or App 609 (2026) 621 to the child.” Having reviewed the record, we agree with that finding.

2025First, a court ascertains the “unit of prosecution,” that is, “the minimum amount of activity a defendant must undertake, what he must do, to commit each new and sepa- rate independent violation of a criminal statute.” Rentz, 777 F3d at 1109 .

2024Trujillo, 312 Or at 435 ; Strickland, 466 US at 689-90 .

2024Trujillo, 312 Or at 435 ; Strickland, 466 US at 689-90 .

2024“Factors relevant to the ‘nature of the work’ test have included considerations such as whether the work done is an integral part of the employer’s regular business and whether the indi- vidual, in relation to the employer’s business, is in a business or profession of his or her own.” Rubalcaba v. Nagaki Farms, Inc., 333 Or 614 , 619 n 2, 43 P3d 1106 (2002). 354 Sedgwick CMS v. Barreras “[W]e are not persuaded that the ALJ failed to consider the first part of the test.

2024“Factors relevant to the ‘nature of the work’ test have included considerations such as whether the work done is an integral part of the employer’s regular business and whether the indi- vidual, in relation to the employer’s business, is in a business or profession of his or her own.” Rubalcaba v. Nagaki Farms, Inc., 333 Or 614 , 619 n 2, 43 P3d 1106 (2002). 354 Sedgwick CMS v. Barreras “[W]e are not persuaded that the ALJ failed to consider the first part of the test.

2015FINAL DECISION TC-MD 140420N 6 religion, then such use must be primarily for the benefit of the church * * *.” Id.

2015Id. at 264 .

2015“The threshold established by OEC 401 is ‘very low’ — if evidence even slightly increases or decreases the probability of the existence of a fact of consequence, then it is relevant.” Grey, 175 Or App at 249 (quoting State v. Titus, 328 Or 475, 480-81 , 982 P2d 1133 (1999)).

2015“The threshold established by OEC 401 is ‘very low’ — if evidence even slightly increases or decreases the probability of the existence of a fact of consequence, then it is relevant.” Grey, 175 Or App at 249 (quoting State v. Titus, 328 Or 475, 480-81 , 982 P2d 1133 (1999)).

2014Id. 7 *686 The commentary to ABA Rule 1.8(a) establishes that the first part of that rule serves as a general prophylactic against lawyers entering into business transactions with clients and does so regardless of whether the lawyer knowingly acquires a pecuniary interest adverse to his or her client, see RPC 1.8(a), or whether entering into the transaction creates a significant risk of materially limiting the lawyer’s ability to represent his or her client, see RPC 1.7(a)(2).

2014See, e.g., Coulson, 243 Or App at 265 (citing cases); id. at 272-73 (the defendant could not have consented to delay when he did not have notice that an indictment had been issued against him); State v. Bigelow, 197 Or App 441, 446 , 106 P3d 162 , rev den, 339 Or 544 (2005) (accepting state’s concession that the defendant neither caused nor consented to delay where the defendant “had no knowledge of the indictment or the outstanding warrant until she was arrested”).

2014See, e.g., Coulson, 243 Or App at 265 (citing cases); id. at 272-73 (the defendant could not have consented to delay when he did not have notice that an indictment had been issued against him); State v. Bigelow, 197 Or App 441, 446 , 106 P3d 162 , rev den, 339 Or 544 (2005) (accepting state’s concession that the defendant neither caused nor consented to delay where the defendant “had no knowledge of the indictment or the outstanding warrant until she was arrested”).

1994It goes to knowledge.” (Emphasis supplied.) The admissibility of evidence of other crimes or bad acts under OEC 404(3) is governed by a three-part test set out in State v. Johnson, 313 Or 189, 195 , 832 P2d 443 (1992). 2 The first part of that test requires that the evidence must be independently relevant for a purpose other than showing criminal character. 313 Or at 195 .

1994It goes to knowledge.” (Emphasis supplied.) The admissibility of evidence of other crimes or bad acts under OEC 404(3) is governed by a three-part test set out in State v. Johnson, 313 Or 189, 195 , 832 P2d 443 (1992). 2 The first part of that test requires that the evidence must be independently relevant for a purpose other than showing criminal character. 313 Or at 195 .

1993This is a “question of logical relevancy which the trial judge must decide under OEC 104(1).” 5 State v. Pinnell, 311 Or 98 , 109 n 17, 806 P2d 110 (1991).

1993This is a “question of logical relevancy which the trial judge must decide under OEC 104(1).” 5 State v. Pinnell, 311 Or 98 , 109 n 17, 806 P2d 110 (1991).

1990Joseph Forest Products v. Pratt, supra, 278 Or at 480-81 ; Hamacher v. Tumy et al, supra, 222 Or at 347 .

1990Joseph Forest Products v. Pratt, supra, 278 Or at 480-81 ; Hamacher v. Tumy et al, supra, 222 Or at 347 .

1986In applying the first part of the test, the Court agreed that the state’s interest in “safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor” by relieving the minor of the need to testify in public is compelling. 457 US at 607 .

1981The basis of the informants’ knowledge was first-hand experience: they traded stolen coins for hashish in defendants’ home. 2 See State v. Mellinger, 52 Or *286 App 21, 627 P2d 897 (1981); State v. Henderson, 40 Or App 27 , 594 P2d 419 (1979); State v. Diaz, 29 Or App 523 , 564 P2d 1066 (1977).

1981The basis of the informants’ knowledge was first-hand experience: they traded stolen coins for hashish in defendants’ home. 2 See State v. Mellinger, 52 Or *286 App 21, 627 P2d 897 (1981); State v. Henderson, 40 Or App 27 , 594 P2d 419 (1979); State v. Diaz, 29 Or App 523 , 564 P2d 1066 (1977).

1981The basis of the informants’ knowledge was first-hand experience: they traded stolen coins for hashish in defendants’ home. 2 See State v. Mellinger, 52 Or *286 App 21, 627 P2d 897 (1981); State v. Henderson, 40 Or App 27 , 594 P2d 419 (1979); State v. Diaz, 29 Or App 523 , 564 P2d 1066 (1977).

1981The basis of the informants’ knowledge was first-hand experience: they traded stolen coins for hashish in defendants’ home. 2 See State v. Mellinger, 52 Or *286 App 21, 627 P2d 897 (1981); State v. Henderson, 40 Or App 27 , 594 P2d 419 (1979); State v. Diaz, 29 Or App 523 , 564 P2d 1066 (1977).

1981The basis of the informants’ knowledge was first-hand experience: they traded stolen coins for hashish in defendants’ home. 2 See State v. Mellinger, 52 Or *286 App 21, 627 P2d 897 (1981); State v. Henderson, 40 Or App 27 , 594 P2d 419 (1979); State v. Diaz, 29 Or App 523 , 564 P2d 1066 (1977).