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23 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1908–2025 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Brosseau v. Haugengreen2 sentences2024Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (cleaned up). 2024Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (cleaned up). | 3 | 3 |
New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruengreen1 sentence2025However, the Majority elsewhere seems to suggest that felons are not - 11 - The Bruen Court considered three questions in determining whether the first part of the test was met with respect to the conduct of the individual petitioners: (1) whether the petitioners were part of “the people” whom the Second Amendment protects; (2) whether the handguns the petitioners sought to possess are weapons “in common use” today for self-defense; and (3) whether the plain text of the Second Amendment protects the petitioners’ proposed course of conduct, i.e., carrying handguns publicly for self-defense. 597 | 1 | 1 |
Newton v. Stategreen2 sentences2025The first part of the test is known as “the performance prong[,]” and the second prong is known as “the prejudice prong[.]” See Newton v. State, 455 Md. 341, 356 , 168 A.3d 1, 9 (2017) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ). 2025The first part of the test is known as “the performance prong[,]” and the second prong is known as “the prejudice prong[.]” See Newton v. State, 455 Md. 341, 356 , 168 A.3d 1, 9 (2017) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ). | 1 | 1 |
Kenwood Gardens Condominiums, Inc. v. Whalen Properties, LLCgreen2 sentences2019As to the second part of the test to determine whether an action is quasi-judicial in nature- i.e. , whether "there is a deliberative fact-finding process with testimony and the weighing of evidence[,]" id. at 332 , 144 A.3d at 659 (citation omitted)-the process utilized in this case resulting in the adoption of Ordinance No. 876 and the incorporated written decision of the Council undeniably was a deliberative fact-finding process involving testimony and the weighing of evidence. 2019As to the second part of the test to determine whether an action is quasi-judicial in nature- i.e. , whether "there is a deliberative fact-finding process with testimony and the weighing of evidence[,]" id. at 332 , 144 A.3d at 659 (citation omitted)-the process utilized in this case resulting in the adoption of Ordinance No. 876 and the incorporated written decision of the Council undeniably was a deliberative fact-finding process involving testimony and the weighing of evidence. | 1 | 1 |
Powell v. McCormackgreen2 sentences2009Lamb v. Hammond, 308 Md. 286, 293 , 518 A.2d 1057, 1060 (1987).' The first part of the framework requires courts to evaluate “whether the claim presented and the relief sought are of the type which admit of judicial resolution.” Lamb, 308 Md. at 293 , 518 A.2d at 1060 (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 516-17 , 89 S.Ct. 1944, 1961 , 23 L.Ed.2d 491, 514 (1969)). 2009Lamb v. Hammond, 308 Md. 286, 293 , 518 A.2d 1057, 1060 (1987).' The first part of the framework requires courts to evaluate “whether the claim presented and the relief sought are of the type which admit of judicial resolution.” Lamb, 308 Md. at 293 , 518 A.2d at 1060 (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 516-17 , 89 S.Ct. 1944, 1961 , 23 L.Ed.2d 491, 514 (1969)). | 1 | 1 |
Lamb v. Hammondgreen2 sentences2009Lamb v. Hammond, 308 Md. 286, 293 , 518 A.2d 1057, 1060 (1987).' The first part of the framework requires courts to evaluate “whether the claim presented and the relief sought are of the type which admit of judicial resolution.” Lamb, 308 Md. at 293 , 518 A.2d at 1060 (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 516-17 , 89 S.Ct. 1944, 1961 , 23 L.Ed.2d 491, 514 (1969)). 2009Lamb v. Hammond, 308 Md. 286, 293 , 518 A.2d 1057, 1060 (1987).' The first part of the framework requires courts to evaluate “whether the claim presented and the relief sought are of the type which admit of judicial resolution.” Lamb, 308 Md. at 293 , 518 A.2d at 1060 (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 516-17 , 89 S.Ct. 1944, 1961 , 23 L.Ed.2d 491, 514 (1969)). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Custody of MAGgreen1 sentence2005The presumption of parental fitness, however, is not only an acknowledgment of parental rights; it has long been held to be a presumption that the best interests of the child are served by parental custody.” The Supreme Court of Mississippi recently opined in In re Custody of M.A.G., 859 So.2d 1001, 1004 (Miss.2003), that: “As far back as 1929, this Court has held that when one parent dies, the other parent has a right to the child’s custody until there has been abandonment or the living *410 parent has forfeited that right by immoral conduct. | 1 | 1 |
Mary Jane Wickman v. Northwestern National Insurance Companygreen1 sentence2002Lexis 9422, at *10; see Wickman, 908 F.2d at 1088 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Carter, Bowie, McCullough v. State
green
2 sentences2022The first part of the analysis, which applies to any term-of-years sentence, assesses the period of parole ineligibility in light of certain “benchmarks.” The benchmarks identified in Carter included: (1) the offender’s natural life expectancy; (2) the parole eligibility of an offender serving a life sentence; (3) a 50-year threshold; (4) legislative reforms in the wake of Graham; and (5) the typical retirement age. 461 Md. at 351-56 . 2022The first part of the analysis, which applies to any term-of-years sentence, assesses the period of parole ineligibility in light of certain “benchmarks.” The benchmarks identified in Carter included: (1) the offender’s natural life expectancy; (2) the parole eligibility of an offender serving a life sentence; (3) a 50-year threshold; (4) legislative reforms in the wake of Graham; and (5) the typical retirement age. 461 Md. at 351-56 . | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Webster v. Woolford
green
2 sentences1919For had the special circumstances been known, the parties might have specially provided for the breach of contract by s-pec-ial terms as to the damages in that ease, and of this advantage it would he very unjust to- deprive them.” And as said by Judge Robinson, speaking for this Court, in Webster v. Woolford, supra, 81 Md. 329 : “The first part of the rule as thus- laid down applies to cases in which the damages are the direct and natural result o-f the breach of the contract, and which the law presumes to have been in contemplation of both parties. 1919For had the special circumstances been known, the parties might have specially provided for the breach of contract by s-pec-ial terms as to the damages in that ease, and of this advantage it would he very unjust to- deprive them.” And as said by Judge Robinson, speaking for this Court, in Webster v. Woolford, supra, 81 Md. 329 : “The first part of the rule as thus- laid down applies to cases in which the damages are the direct and natural result o-f the breach of the contract, and which the law presumes to have been in contemplation of both parties. | 2 | 1908–1919 |
Besche v. Murphy
green
1 sentence2025In our view, including in the second step of the test that the decedent must represent to the claimant that the claimant is like an adoptive child would be essentially duplicative of the requirement of the first part of the test—that the claimant demonstrate the existence of some direct expression by the decedent of an intent to adopt the claimant. - 42 - permitting such action[.]” Id. at 544, 59 A.2d at 501 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2025The first part of the test is known as “the performance prong[,]” and the second prong is known as “the prejudice prong[.]” See Newton v. State, 455 Md. 341, 356 , 168 A.3d 1, 9 (2017) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ). 2025This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning [in a manner] guaranteed [] by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Ornelas v. United States
green
2 sentences2018Id. at 696-97 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 (cleaned up). 2018Id. at 696-97 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 (cleaned up). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Knight v. State
green
1 sentence2014Knight, 381 Md. at 533-34 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Chandris, Inc. v. Latsis
green
2 sentences2012SEAMAN STATUS To satisfy the first part of the test, that the worker contributes to the function of the vessel or the accomplishment of its mission, a claimant need only show that he “do[es] the ship’s work.” Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368 , 115 S.Ct. 2172 . 2012SEAMAN STATUS To satisfy the first part of the test, that the worker contributes to the function of the vessel or the accomplishment of its mission, a claimant need only show that he “do[es] the ship’s work.” Chandris, 515 U.S. at 368 , 115 S.Ct. 2172 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Sproates v. State
green
2 sentences2011In considering the first part of this test, this Court has stated that “the Fourth Amendment applies only to ‘constitutionally protected areas’ such as a person’s house or curtilage.” Sproates v. State, 58 Md.App. 547, 557 , 473 A.2d 1289 (1984). 2011In considering the first part of this test, this Court has stated that “the Fourth Amendment applies only to ‘constitutionally protected areas’ such as a person’s house or curtilage.” Sproates v. State, 58 Md.App. 547, 557 , 473 A.2d 1289 (1984). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority
green
2 sentences2006With respect to both parts of the Pike test, the Supreme Court has held that “the critical consideration is the overall effect of the statute on both local and interstate activity.” Brown-Forman Distillers, 476 U.S. at 579 , 106 S.Ct. at 2084 . 2006With respect to both parts of the Pike test, the Supreme Court has held that “the critical consideration is the overall effect of the statute on both local and interstate activity.” Brown-Forman Distillers, 476 U.S. at 579 , 106 S.Ct. at 2084 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.
green
2 sentences2006If the statute survives the first part of the test, a court must then engage in a balancing test to determine whether “the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 , 90 S. Ct at 847 . 2006If the statute survives the first part of the test, a court must then engage in a balancing test to determine whether “the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.” Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 , 90 S. Ct at 847 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Jorita Padfield v. Aig Life Insurance Company, a Corporation
green
1 sentence2002According to the Padfield Court, the first part of the inquiry pertains to whether “the insured subjectively lacked an expectation of death or injury.” 290 F.3d at 1126 , 2002 U.S.App. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Cirincione v. State
green
2 sentences2002Appellant complains that the court failed to examine the first part of the test — whether counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness — and focused only on the second prong of the test — “the prejudice arising out of counsel’s error.” Appellant further asserts that the court applied an “erroneous standard” in examining the second prong, looking to whether Hawkins’ testimony would have created a “reasonable doubt” as to appellant’s involvement in the crime rather than to whether “there was a substantial possibility that Mr. Hawkins’ testimony would have resulted 2002Appellant complains that the court failed to examine the first part of the test — whether counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness — and focused only on the second prong of the test — “the prejudice arising out of counsel’s error.” Appellant further asserts that the court applied an “erroneous standard” in examining the second prong, looking to whether Hawkins’ testimony would have created a “reasonable doubt” as to appellant’s involvement in the crime rather than to whether “there was a substantial possibility that Mr. Hawkins’ testimony would have resulted | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Bond v. Nibco, Inc.
green
1 sentence1995Bond, 96 Md.App. at 136 , 623 A.2d 721 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.
red
1 sentence1981The Court held that while the restraints met the first part of the test there utilized (the statute was a forthright statement of the clear purpose of the California legislature to permit price maintenance), the state program did not meet the second *10 part of the test because the state "simply authorizes price-setting and enforces the prices established by private parties.” Ibid. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Zittle v. Weller
green
1 sentence1923Any other construction of the deed would render the language we have just quoted meaningless, and fail to give effect to' what the parties treated as an important part of the description of the property conveyed, or ,as said by Judge Alvey in Mims v. Armstrong, 31 Md. 95 to withhold this meaning from the words we have just quoted “is to deny to them all import whatever; and that is not justified by any rule of construction.” The reasoning of the Court in Zittle v. Weller, supra, seems particularly applicable to this feature of the present case, especially in view of the suggestion that “the pr | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.