first part test in Arkansas

2018Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. 690 , 695-97, 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

2018Ornelas v. United States , 517 U.S. 690 , 695-97, 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

2009Id. at 855, citing General Motors Corp. v. Romein , 503 U.S. 181 , 112 S.Ct. 1105 , 117 L.Ed.2d 328 (1992).

2009Id. at 855, citing General Motors Corp. v. Romein , 503 U.S. 181 , 112 S.Ct. 1105 , 117 L.Ed.2d 328 (1992).

2009Equipment Manufacturers Institute, et al. v. Janklow, et al. , 300 F.3d. 842 (2002) citing Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power Light Co. , 459 U.S. 400 , 411 , 103 S.Ct. 697 , 704 , 47 L.Ed. 2d 569 (1983); Educational Employees Credit Union , 50 F.3d at 1438 .

2009Equipment Manufacturers Institute, et al. v. Janklow, et al. , 300 F.3d. 842 (2002) citing Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power Light Co. , 459 U.S. 400 , 411 , 103 S.Ct. 697 , 704 , 47 L.Ed. 2d 569 (1983); Educational Employees Credit Union , 50 F.3d at 1438 .

2009Equipment Manufacturers Institute, et al. v. Janklow, et al. , 300 F.3d. 842 (2002) citing Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power Light Co. , 459 U.S. 400 , 411 , 103 S.Ct. 697 , 704 , 47 L.Ed. 2d 569 (1983); Educational Employees Credit Union , 50 F.3d at 1438 .

1986Hill v. Lockhart, supra; McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).

1986Hill v. Lockhart, supra; McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).

1977United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965).

1942The first part of the instruction is: 44You are instructed that the only purpose for which proof of threats is admissible is to throw light on the state of mind of the defendant at the time he fired the fatal shot, and to show who was the probable aggressor; ...” A similar instruction was approved by this court in Long v. State, 76 Ark. 495 , 91 S. W. 26 .

1939This presumption merely constitutes a temporary burden on the defendant which passes out of the case upon the introduction of competent testimony explaining the facts in issue.” The substance of the first part of instruction No. 2 was to the same effect as instruction No. 1 given by the trial court .in the case of Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Beard, Admr., 198 Ark. 346 , 128 S. W. 2d 697 , the only difference being that instruction No. 2 given in the instant case was not a binding instruction whereas instruction No. 1 given in the Bear'd Case, supra, was a binding instruction.

1939This presumption merely constitutes a temporary burden on the defendant which passes out of the case upon the introduction of competent testimony explaining the facts in issue.” The substance of the first part of instruction No. 2 was to the same effect as instruction No. 1 given by the trial court .in the case of Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Beard, Admr., 198 Ark. 346 , 128 S. W. 2d 697 , the only difference being that instruction No. 2 given in the instant case was not a binding instruction whereas instruction No. 1 given in the Bear'd Case, supra, was a binding instruction.

1923In Johnson v. State, 120 Ark. 193 -203, an instruction was given containing similar language to that in the first part of the instruction under review, ' and we refused to reverse the judgment because of such ruling.