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22 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1894–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lynch v. Stategreen2 sentences1995See Lynch v. State, 571 N.E.2d at 538-39 (involuntary manslaughter was lesser included offense of murder charge where killing was obviously accomplished with a touching, i.e., defendant "battered" victim with a shooting). 1992Lynch, 571 N.E.2d at 588 . | 1 | 2 |
Morehead v. Deitrichgreen1 sentence2023See Morehead, 932 N.E.2d at 1276 . | 1 | 1 |
McCraney v. Gibsongreen1 sentence2023Because the material facts do not establish the second part of the two-part test for determining a landlord’s liability for the acts of the tenant’s dog, the Bocanegras were entitled to summary judgment.2 See McCraney, 952 N.E.2d at 289 (affirming summary judgment for the landlord where there was no evidence in 2 Because the Bocanegras only needed to prove one part of the test, we need not address the first part of the test regarding whether the Bocanegras retained control over the property. | 1 | 1 |
Bergeron v. Mansourgreen1 sentence2011See, e.g., Bergeron, 152 F.2d 27 ; Kleckley, 338 S.C. 131 , 526 S.E.2d 218 ; Foamcraft, 238 Ill.App.3d 791 , 179 Ill.Dec. 705 , 606 N.E.2d 537 ; Sumrall, 258 Cal.App.2d 565 , 65 Cal.Rptr. 755 ; Nesbitt, 204 A.2d 473 . | 1 | 1 |
Morrison v. Sadlergreen1 sentence2008See Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 31-32 (Ind.Ct.App.2005); but cf. Brizzi, 837 N.E.2d at 998 (Ind.2005) (“I conclude that Article I, Section 1[,] does indeed have substance and is designed to assure all persons in this state ‘certain inalienable rights’ which are enforceable by the courts. | 1 | 1 |
Sayre v. Stategreen2 sentences2003See also Sayre v. State, 471 N.E.2d 708, 712 (Ind.Ct.App. 1984) ("when a police officer sees contraband from an area that is not constitutionally protected, i.e., before an intrusion, ... no search in the constitutional sense has occurred") (emphasis original), reh'g denied, trans. denied (Ind.1985), cert. denied 475 U.S. 1027 , 106 S.Ct. 1226 , 89 L.Ed.2d 336 (1986). 2003See also Sayre v. State, 471 N.E.2d 708, 712 (Ind.Ct.App.1984) ("when a police officer sees contraband from an area that is not constitutionally protected, i.e., before an intrusion, .... no search in the constitutional sense has pecurred") (emphasis original), reh'g denied, trans. denied (Ind.1985), cert. denied 475 U.S. 1027 , 106 S.Ct. 1226 , 89 L.Ed.2d 336 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
VanWinkle v. Stategreen2 sentences2003Under the first part of the analysis, the Fourth Amendment permits the State, when conducting an investigation, to enter a citizen's land, approach the front door, and knock on that door without requesting a search warrant, because when engaging in those acts, police do "not stray from places that visitors to the property could be expected to go when they park[ ] in [a] driveway and approach[ ][a] residence." VanWinkle v. State, 764 N.E.2d 258, 264 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied 774 N.E.2d 516 (Ind.2002). 2003Under the first part of the analysis, the Fourth Amendment permits the State, when conducting an investigation, to enter a citizen's land, approach the front door, and knock on that door without requesting a search warrant, because when engaging in those acts, police do "not stray from places that visitors to the property could be expected to go when they park[ ] in [a] driveway and approach[ l[al residence." VanWinkle v. State, 764 N.E.2d 258, 264 (Ind.Ct.App.2002), trans. denied 774 N.E.2d 516 (Ind.2002). | 1 | 1 |
Glick v. Lockhartgreen2 sentences2003See also Sayre v. State, 471 N.E.2d 708, 712 (Ind.Ct.App. 1984) ("when a police officer sees contraband from an area that is not constitutionally protected, i.e., before an intrusion, ... no search in the constitutional sense has occurred") (emphasis original), reh'g denied, trans. denied (Ind.1985), cert. denied 475 U.S. 1027 , 106 S.Ct. 1226 , 89 L.Ed.2d 336 (1986). 2003See also Sayre v. State, 471 N.E.2d 708, 712 (Ind.Ct.App.1984) ("when a police officer sees contraband from an area that is not constitutionally protected, i.e., before an intrusion, .... no search in the constitutional sense has pecurred") (emphasis original), reh'g denied, trans. denied (Ind.1985), cert. denied 475 U.S. 1027 , 106 S.Ct. 1226 , 89 L.Ed.2d 336 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
Melvin v. Oklahomagreen2 sentences2003See also Sayre v. State, 471 N.E.2d 708, 712 (Ind.Ct.App. 1984) ("when a police officer sees contraband from an area that is not constitutionally protected, i.e., before an intrusion, ... no search in the constitutional sense has occurred") (emphasis original), reh'g denied, trans. denied (Ind.1985), cert. denied 475 U.S. 1027 , 106 S.Ct. 1226 , 89 L.Ed.2d 336 (1986). 2003See also Sayre v. State, 471 N.E.2d 708, 712 (Ind.Ct.App.1984) ("when a police officer sees contraband from an area that is not constitutionally protected, i.e., before an intrusion, .... no search in the constitutional sense has pecurred") (emphasis original), reh'g denied, trans. denied (Ind.1985), cert. denied 475 U.S. 1027 , 106 S.Ct. 1226 , 89 L.Ed.2d 336 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
Sanderson v. Ricegreen2 sentences2003See also Sayre v. State, 471 N.E.2d 708, 712 (Ind.Ct.App. 1984) ("when a police officer sees contraband from an area that is not constitutionally protected, i.e., before an intrusion, ... no search in the constitutional sense has occurred") (emphasis original), reh'g denied, trans. denied (Ind.1985), cert. denied 475 U.S. 1027 , 106 S.Ct. 1226 , 89 L.Ed.2d 336 (1986). 2003See also Sayre v. State, 471 N.E.2d 708, 712 (Ind.Ct.App.1984) ("when a police officer sees contraband from an area that is not constitutionally protected, i.e., before an intrusion, .... no search in the constitutional sense has pecurred") (emphasis original), reh'g denied, trans. denied (Ind.1985), cert. denied 475 U.S. 1027 , 106 S.Ct. 1226 , 89 L.Ed.2d 336 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
Pepka v. Branchgreen2 sentences1997See Pepka, 155 Ind.App. at 658 , 294 N.E.2d at 153 . 1997See Pepka, 155 Ind.App. at 658 , 294 N.E.2d at 153 . | 1 | 1 |
Straub v. Stategreen1 sentence1991See also Straub v. State (1991), Ind., 567 N.E.2d 87 (stating the first part of the test is disjunctive, not conjunctive). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Clinic for Women, Inc. v. Brizzigreen1 sentence2008See Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 31-32 (Ind.Ct.App.2005); but cf. Brizzi, 837 N.E.2d at 998 (Ind.2005) (“I conclude that Article I, Section 1[,] does indeed have substance and is designed to assure all persons in this state ‘certain inalienable rights’ which are enforceable by the courts. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wright v. State
green
2 sentences2012Id. at 567 . 2012Id. at 567 . | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Ohio v. Roberts
red
2 sentences1984The first part of the test requires the prosecution to "either produce or demonstrate the unavailability of the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant." 658 F.2d at 460 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 , 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2538 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). 1984The first part of the test requires the prosecution to "either produce or demonstrate the unavailability of the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant." 658 F.2d at 460 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 , 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2538 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). | 2 | 1984–1989 |
Nesbitt v. Erie Coach Co.
green
1 sentence2011See, e.g., Bergeron, 152 F.2d 27 ; Kleckley, 338 S.C. 131 , 526 S.E.2d 218 ; Foamcraft, 238 Ill.App.3d 791 , 179 Ill.Dec. 705 , 606 N.E.2d 537 ; Sumrall, 258 Cal.App.2d 565 , 65 Cal.Rptr. 755 ; Nesbitt, 204 A.2d 473 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Kleckley v. Northwestern National Casualty Co.
green
2 sentences2011See, e.g., Bergeron, 152 F.2d 27 ; Kleckley, 338 S.C. 131 , 526 S.E.2d 218 ; Foamcraft, 238 Ill.App.3d 791 , 179 Ill.Dec. 705 , 606 N.E.2d 537 ; Sumrall, 258 Cal.App.2d 565 , 65 Cal.Rptr. 755 ; Nesbitt, 204 A.2d 473 . 2011See, e.g., Bergeron, 152 F.2d 27 ; Kleckley, 338 S.C. 131 , 526 S.E.2d 218 ; Foamcraft, 238 Ill.App.3d 791 , 179 Ill.Dec. 705 , 606 N.E.2d 537 ; Sumrall, 258 Cal.App.2d 565 , 65 Cal.Rptr. 755 ; Nesbitt, 204 A.2d 473 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Foamcraft, Inc. v. First State Insurance
green
2 sentences2011See, e.g., Bergeron, 152 F.2d 27 ; Kleckley, 338 S.C. 131 , 526 S.E.2d 218 ; Foamcraft, 238 Ill.App.3d 791 , 179 Ill.Dec. 705 , 606 N.E.2d 537 ; Sumrall, 258 Cal.App.2d 565 , 65 Cal.Rptr. 755 ; Nesbitt, 204 A.2d 473 . 2011See, e.g., Bergeron, 152 F.2d 27 ; Kleckley, 338 S.C. 131 , 526 S.E.2d 218 ; Foamcraft, 238 Ill.App.3d 791 , 179 Ill.Dec. 705 , 606 N.E.2d 537 ; Sumrall, 258 Cal.App.2d 565 , 65 Cal.Rptr. 755 ; Nesbitt, 204 A.2d 473 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Sumrall v. City of Cypress
green
2 sentences2011See, e.g., Bergeron, 152 F.2d 27 ; Kleckley, 338 S.C. 131 , 526 S.E.2d 218 ; Foamcraft, 238 Ill.App.3d 791 , 179 Ill.Dec. 705 , 606 N.E.2d 537 ; Sumrall, 258 Cal.App.2d 565 , 65 Cal.Rptr. 755 ; Nesbitt, 204 A.2d 473 . 2011See, e.g., Bergeron, 152 F.2d 27 ; Kleckley, 338 S.C. 131 , 526 S.E.2d 218 ; Foamcraft, 238 Ill.App.3d 791 , 179 Ill.Dec. 705 , 606 N.E.2d 537 ; Sumrall, 258 Cal.App.2d 565 , 65 Cal.Rptr. 755 ; Nesbitt, 204 A.2d 473 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Katz v. United States
green
2 sentences2001U. S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)), reh'g denied. *970 The first part of the analysis requires a determination that Krise held an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in the area and personal item searched. 2001U. S. 347, 361, 88 S.Ct. 507 , 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)), reh'g denied. *970 The first part of the analysis requires a determination that Krise held an actual, subjective expectation of privacy in the area and personal item searched. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Connick Ex Rel. Parish of Orleans v. Myers
green
2 sentences1997“Whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.” Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48 , 103 S.Ct. at 1690 . 1997“Whether an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.” Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48 , 103 S.Ct. at 1690 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Jewell v. State
green
1 sentence1991Jewell, supra. The first part of the test is satisfied in this case because the statute defining murder and the charging instrument necessarily include involuntary manslaughter as a lesser offense of murder. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
United States of America Ex Rel. Melvin Haywood v. Dennis Wolff, Warden, Joliet Penitentiary
green
2 sentences1984The first part of the test requires the prosecution to "either produce or demonstrate the unavailability of the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant." 658 F.2d at 460 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 , 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2538 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980)). *649 The court must then determine that the statement to be used bears sufficient "indicia of reliability," usually by establishing the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness. "[T]he right to use a deposition at trial in place of the personal appearance of the deponent is usually conditioned up 1984The first part of the test requires the prosecution to "either produce or demonstrate the unavailability of the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant." 658 F.2d at 460 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 , 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2538 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Middelkamp v. Hanewich
green
1 sentence1983Middlekamp, supra, 364 N.E.2d at 1035 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Dillon v. State green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Schmidt v. State
green
2 sentences1978One line of our decisions deals with the first part of the requirement for giving Miranda warnings; the definition of “custodial.” See, e.g., Dillon v. State, (1971) 257 Ind. 312 , 275 N.E.2d 312 ; Raines v. State, (1971) 256 Ind. 404 , 269 N.E.2d 378 ; Owens v. State, (1971) 255 Ind. 693 , 266 N.E.2d 612 ; Schmidt v. State, (1970) 255 Ind. 443 , 265 N.E.2d 219 , reh. denied, (1971) 256 Ind. 218 , 267 N.E.2d 554 . 1978One line of our decisions deals with the first part of the requirement for giving Miranda warnings; the definition of “custodial.” See, e.g., Dillon v. State, (1971) 257 Ind. 312 , 275 N.E.2d 312 ; Raines v. State, (1971) 256 Ind. 404 , 269 N.E.2d 378 ; Owens v. State, (1971) 255 Ind. 693 , 266 N.E.2d 612 ; Schmidt v. State, (1970) 255 Ind. 443 , 265 N.E.2d 219 , reh. denied, (1971) 256 Ind. 218 , 267 N.E.2d 554 . | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Owens v. State
green
2 sentences1978One line of our decisions deals with the first part of the requirement for giving Miranda warnings; the definition of “custodial.” See, e.g., Dillon v. State, (1971) 257 Ind. 312 , 275 N.E.2d 312 ; Raines v. State, (1971) 256 Ind. 404 , 269 N.E.2d 378 ; Owens v. State, (1971) 255 Ind. 693 , 266 N.E.2d 612 ; Schmidt v. State, (1970) 255 Ind. 443 , 265 N.E.2d 219 , reh. denied, (1971) 256 Ind. 218 , 267 N.E.2d 554 . 1978One line of our decisions deals with the first part of the requirement for giving Miranda warnings; the definition of “custodial.” See, e.g., Dillon v. State, (1971) 257 Ind. 312 , 275 N.E.2d 312 ; Raines v. State, (1971) 256 Ind. 404 , 269 N.E.2d 378 ; Owens v. State, (1971) 255 Ind. 693 , 266 N.E.2d 612 ; Schmidt v. State, (1970) 255 Ind. 443 , 265 N.E.2d 219 , reh. denied, (1971) 256 Ind. 218 , 267 N.E.2d 554 . | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Kennedy v. State
neutral
2 sentences1978In another line of our decisions, we have found that statements of defendants were volunteered and spontaneous, and not in response to “interrogation.” Kennedy v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 322 , 370 N.E.2d 331 ; Riddle v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 587 , 348 N.E.2d 635 ; Lockridge v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 678 , 338 N.E.2d 275 ; Jennings v. State, (1973) 262 Ind. 476 , 318 N.E.2d 358 ; Hewitt v. State, (1970) 261 Ind. 71 , 300 N.E.2d 94 ; New v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 307 , 259 N.E.2d 696 . *618 *617 It is obvious that this appellant was in custody at the *618 time when she gave her oral admissions t 1978In another line of our decisions, we have found that statements of defendants were volunteered and spontaneous, and not in response to “interrogation.” Kennedy v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 322 , 370 N.E.2d 331 ; Riddle v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 587 , 348 N.E.2d 635 ; Lockridge v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 678 , 338 N.E.2d 275 ; Jennings v. State, (1973) 262 Ind. 476 , 318 N.E.2d 358 ; Hewitt v. State, (1970) 261 Ind. 71 , 300 N.E.2d 94 ; New v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 307 , 259 N.E.2d 696 . *618 *617 It is obvious that this appellant was in custody at the *618 time when she gave her oral admissions t | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Raines v. State
green
2 sentences1978One line of our decisions deals with the first part of the requirement for giving Miranda warnings; the definition of “custodial.” See, e.g., Dillon v. State, (1971) 257 Ind. 312 , 275 N.E.2d 312 ; Raines v. State, (1971) 256 Ind. 404 , 269 N.E.2d 378 ; Owens v. State, (1971) 255 Ind. 693 , 266 N.E.2d 612 ; Schmidt v. State, (1970) 255 Ind. 443 , 265 N.E.2d 219 , reh. denied, (1971) 256 Ind. 218 , 267 N.E.2d 554 . 1978One line of our decisions deals with the first part of the requirement for giving Miranda warnings; the definition of “custodial.” See, e.g., Dillon v. State, (1971) 257 Ind. 312 , 275 N.E.2d 312 ; Raines v. State, (1971) 256 Ind. 404 , 269 N.E.2d 378 ; Owens v. State, (1971) 255 Ind. 693 , 266 N.E.2d 612 ; Schmidt v. State, (1970) 255 Ind. 443 , 265 N.E.2d 219 , reh. denied, (1971) 256 Ind. 218 , 267 N.E.2d 554 . | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Hewitt v. State
neutral
2 sentences1978In another line of our decisions, we have found that statements of defendants were volunteered and spontaneous, and not in response to “interrogation.” Kennedy v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 322 , 370 N.E.2d 331 ; Riddle v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 587 , 348 N.E.2d 635 ; Lockridge v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 678 , 338 N.E.2d 275 ; Jennings v. State, (1973) 262 Ind. 476 , 318 N.E.2d 358 ; Hewitt v. State, (1970) 261 Ind. 71 , 300 N.E.2d 94 ; New v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 307 , 259 N.E.2d 696 . *618 *617 It is obvious that this appellant was in custody at the *618 time when she gave her oral admissions t 1978In another line of our decisions, we have found that statements of defendants were volunteered and spontaneous, and not in response to “interrogation.” Kennedy v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 322 , 370 N.E.2d 331 ; Riddle v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 587 , 348 N.E.2d 635 ; Lockridge v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 678 , 338 N.E.2d 275 ; Jennings v. State, (1973) 262 Ind. 476 , 318 N.E.2d 358 ; Hewitt v. State, (1970) 261 Ind. 71 , 300 N.E.2d 94 ; New v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 307 , 259 N.E.2d 696 . *618 *617 It is obvious that this appellant was in custody at the *618 time when she gave her oral admissions t | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Schmidt v. State green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Jennings v. State green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Riddle v. State green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Lockridge v. State green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
New v. State
green
2 sentences1978In another line of our decisions, we have found that statements of defendants were volunteered and spontaneous, and not in response to “interrogation.” Kennedy v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 322 , 370 N.E.2d 331 ; Riddle v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 587 , 348 N.E.2d 635 ; Lockridge v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 678 , 338 N.E.2d 275 ; Jennings v. State, (1973) 262 Ind. 476 , 318 N.E.2d 358 ; Hewitt v. State, (1970) 261 Ind. 71 , 300 N.E.2d 94 ; New v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 307 , 259 N.E.2d 696 . *618 *617 It is obvious that this appellant was in custody at the *618 time when she gave her oral admissions t 1978In another line of our decisions, we have found that statements of defendants were volunteered and spontaneous, and not in response to “interrogation.” Kennedy v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 322 , 370 N.E.2d 331 ; Riddle v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 587 , 348 N.E.2d 635 ; Lockridge v. State, (1975) 263 Ind. 678 , 338 N.E.2d 275 ; Jennings v. State, (1973) 262 Ind. 476 , 318 N.E.2d 358 ; Hewitt v. State, (1970) 261 Ind. 71 , 300 N.E.2d 94 ; New v. State, (1970) 254 Ind. 307 , 259 N.E.2d 696 . *618 *617 It is obvious that this appellant was in custody at the *618 time when she gave her oral admissions t | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Campbell v. State green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Kaiser v. Happel neutral | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| Young v. Miller green | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| North v. Jones green | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| Fuller v. Supreme Council green | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| Booher v. State green | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Wright v. State neutral | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Batten v. State green | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Parker v. State neutral | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Nelson v. Vorce green | 1 | 1894–1894 |
| Ohio & Mississippi R. W. Co. v. Collarn neutral | 1 | 1894–1894 |
| Woollen v. Whitacre green | 1 | 1894–1894 |
| Dodd v. Moore neutral | 1 | 1894–1894 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.