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39 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1900–2024 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Whitakergreen1 sentence2021State v. Whitaker, 405 S.W.3d 554, 559 (Mo.App. | 1 | 1 |
Childers v. Childersgreen2 sentences2002Childers v. Childers, 26 S.W.3d 851, 854 (Mo.App.2000). 2002Id. | 1 | 1 |
Burnett v. Burnettgreen1 sentence2002Burnett v. Burnett, 18 S.W.3d 27, 30 (Mo.App.2000). | 1 | 1 |
Barrett v. Danbury Hospitalgreen2 sentences1998See Barrett v. Danbury Hosp., 232 Conn. 242 , 654 A.2d 748 (Conn.1995)(where Supreme Court of Connecticut *926 applies its similar test for recovery for infliction of emotional distress to a fear of AIDS case). 1998See Barrett v. Danbury Hosp., 232 Conn. 242 , 654 A.2d 748 (Conn.1995)(where Supreme Court of Connecticut *926 applies its similar test for recovery for infliction of emotional distress to a fear of AIDS case). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Charlesgreen1 sentence1983State v. Charles, 612 S.W.2d 778, 780 (Mo. banc 1981). | 1 | 1 |
Seales v. Stategreen1 sentence1982The now-familiar two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel is in Seales v. State, 580 S.W.2d 733, 736 (Mo.banc 1979): [A] defendant must show that his attorney failed to exercise the customary skill and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances, and that he was prejudiced thereby. [Emphasis added.] We cannot know on this record and therefore do not intimate whether movant could satisfy the first part of the test. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Darbygreen1 sentence1980Rule 29.11(d); State v. Fingers, 564 S.W.2d 579, 584 [11-14] (Mo.App.1978); State v. Darby, 563 S.W.2d 131, 132 [2] (Mo.App.1978). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Johnsongreen1 sentence1980As to the second segment of defendant’s point, it must be remembered that the unexplained possession of recently stolen property does not raise an inference that the possessor is guilty of receiving stolen property from another [State v. Johnson, 580 S.W.2d 254, 259 (Mo. banc 1979)] and that the only state evidence as to how defendant came into possession of the property was that he stole it from the people who had first stolen it. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Fingersgreen1 sentence1980Rule 29.11(d); State v. Fingers, 564 S.W.2d 579, 584 [11-14] (Mo.App.1978); State v. Darby, 563 S.W.2d 131, 132 [2] (Mo.App.1978). | 1 | 1 |
M. F. A. Cooperative Ass'n of Mansfield v. Murraygreen1 sentence1972Cooperative Ass’n of Mansfield v. Murray, Mo.App., 365 S.W.2d 279, 289 [16-18]. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Stogsdillgreen2 sentences1960See State v. Stogsdill, 324 Mo. 105 , 23 S.W.2d 22, 26 ; State v. Drake, Mo., 298 S.W.2d 374, 377 ; Vol. 2, Raymond’s Missouri Instructions, § 3729, p. 134. 1960See State v. Stogsdill, 324 Mo. 105 , 23 S.W.2d 22, 26 ; State v. Drake, Mo., 298 S.W.2d 374, 377 ; Vol. 2, Raymond’s Missouri Instructions, § 3729, p. 134. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
White v. Director of Revenue
green
2 sentences2022White, 321 S.W.3d at 310 . 2017Id. | 3 | 2010–2022 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2017Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . 2017Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . | 2 | 1993–2017 |
In Re Estate of Robinson
green
2 sentences1960"It is competent for the Legislature to declare for the purpose of succession taxes, that the person executing the power shall be considered the source of the estate which is received by reason of the exercise of the power." In re Estate of Robinson, 192 Minn. 39, 42 , 255 N.W. 486, 487 ; State v. Brooks, 181 Minn. 262 , 232 N.W. 331 . 1960"It is competent for the Legislature to declare for the purpose of succession taxes, that the person executing the power shall be considered the source of the estate which is received by reason of the exercise of the power." In re Estate of Robinson, 192 Minn. 39, 42 , 255 N.W. 486, 487 ; State v. Brooks, 181 Minn. 262 , 232 N.W. 331 . | 2 | 1960–1960 |
State v. Brooks
neutral
2 sentences1960"It is competent for the Legislature to declare for the purpose of succession taxes, that the person executing the power shall be considered the source of the estate which is received by reason of the exercise of the power." In re Estate of Robinson, 192 Minn. 39, 42 , 255 N.W. 486, 487 ; State v. Brooks, 181 Minn. 262 , 232 N.W. 331 . 1960"It is competent for the Legislature to declare for the purpose of succession taxes, that the person executing the power shall be considered the source of the estate which is received by reason of the exercise of the power." In re Estate of Robinson, 192 Minn. 39, 42 , 255 N.W. 486, 487 ; State v. Brooks, 181 Minn. 262 , 232 N.W. 331 . | 2 | 1960–1960 |
Jackson v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co.
neutral
2 sentences1920Co., 147 N.W. 732, 733 .] The instruction was so drawn as to lead the jury to understand that the defendant was liable for whatever bad condition the stock was in whether it arose from negligent delay or from any other cause, and the words "considering the distance traveled" used in the first part of the instruction are not sufficient to explain and keep clear that distinction. 1920Co., 147 N. W. 732, 733 .] The instruction was so drawn as to lead the jury to understand that the defendant was liable for whatever bad condition the stock was in whether it arose from negligent delay or from any other cause, and the words “considering the distance traveled” used in the first part of the instruction are not sufficient to explain and keep clear that distinction. | 2 | 1920–1920 |
State v. Stewart
green
1 sentence2024Id. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg
green
1 sentence2022The first part of the inquiry is the premise that “only the defendant’s contacts with the forum are relevant, not the unilateral activity of another party or a third person.” Id. (citing Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc., 168 S.W.3d at 785 ). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Michiana Easy Livin' Country, Inc. v. Holten
green
1 sentence2022The first part of the inquiry is the premise that “only the defendant’s contacts with the forum are relevant, not the unilateral activity of another party or a third person.” Id. (citing Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc., 168 S.W.3d at 785 ). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Smith v. Doe
green
2 sentences2013The first part of the test requires the Court to “ascertain whether the legislature meant the statute to establish ‘civil’ proceedings.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 . 2013The first part of the test requires the Court to “ascertain whether the legislature meant the statute to establish ‘civil’ proceedings.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 92 , 123 S.Ct. 1140 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Ornelas v. United States
green
2 sentences2010The trial court's probable cause determination is reviewed by establishing the facts and applying the law to those facts: The first part of the analysis involves only a determination of the historical facts, but the second is a mixed question of law and fact: "[T]he historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the [relevant] statutory or [or constitutional] standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated." Id. at 696-97 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 (quoting Pullm 2010The trial court's probable cause determination is reviewed by establishing the facts and applying the law to those facts: The first part of the analysis involves only a determination of the historical facts, but the second is a mixed question of law and fact: "[T]he historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the [relevant] statutory or [or constitutional] standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated." Id. at 696-97 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 (quoting Pullm | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Pullman-Standard v. Swint
green
2 sentences2010The trial court's probable cause determination is reviewed by establishing the facts and applying the law to those facts: The first part of the analysis involves only a determination of the historical facts, but the second is a mixed question of law and fact: "[T]he historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the [relevant] statutory or [or constitutional] standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated." Id. at 696-97 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 (quoting Pullm 2010The trial court's probable cause determination is reviewed by establishing the facts and applying the law to those facts: The first part of the analysis involves only a determination of the historical facts, but the second is a mixed question of law and fact: "[T]he historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the [relevant] statutory or [or constitutional] standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated." Id. at 696-97 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 (quoting Pullm | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. White
green
1 sentence2005“The second part of the instruction, part B, gives specific instructions relating to the specific case.” Id., Note on Use 5. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
McKaskle v. Wiggins
green
2 sentences2000As the Supreme Court stated in McKaskle , “[a] defendant’s invitation to counsel to participate in the trial obliterates any claim that the participation in question deprived the defendant of control over his defense.” McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 182 , 104 S.Ct. 944 . 2000As the Supreme Court stated in McKaskle , “[a] defendant’s invitation to counsel to participate in the trial obliterates any claim that the participation in question deprived the defendant of control over his defense.” McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 182 , 104 S.Ct. 944 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Sellenriek v. Director of Revenue
green
1 sentence1999Id. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Drake
green
1 sentence1960See State v. Stogsdill, 324 Mo. 105 , 23 S.W.2d 22, 26 ; State v. Drake, Mo., 298 S.W.2d 374, 377 ; Vol. 2, Raymond’s Missouri Instructions, § 3729, p. 134. | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Le Grand v. U-Drive-It Co.
green
1 sentence1959We consider the first part of the instruction in this case to be comparable to the instruction considered in Le Grand v. U-Drive-It Co., Mo.Sup., 247 S.W.2d 706, 712 , where the court said that the instruction told the jury that “ ‘the mere fact of itself (and without more) that plaintiff was injured’ is no evidence of negligence. | 1 | 1959–1959 |
State v. Duestrow
green
1 sentence1951The first part of this instruction reads: “In this case insanity is interposed by the defendant ’s counsel as an excuse for the charge set forth in the amended information: * * Appellant contends that the above quoted part of the instruction is misleading and disparaged the defense of insanity. ’ *674 The state relies on the following cases to show that this part of the instruction is not erroneous: State v. Duestrow, 137 Mo. 44 ; State v. Holloway, 156 Mo. 222 , 56 S. W. 734 ; State v. Paulsgrove, 203 Mo. 193 , 101 S. W. 27 ; State v. Barbata, 336 Mo. 362 , 80 S. W. 2d 865 ; State v. Murphy, | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| State v. Holloway green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| State v. Waters green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
State v. Paulsgrove
neutral
2 sentences1951The first part of this instruction reads: “In this case insanity is interposed by the defendant ’s counsel as an excuse for the charge set forth in the amended information: * * Appellant contends that the above quoted part of the instruction is misleading and disparaged the defense of insanity. ’ *674 The state relies on the following cases to show that this part of the instruction is not erroneous: State v. Duestrow, 137 Mo. 44 ; State v. Holloway, 156 Mo. 222 , 56 S. W. 734 ; State v. Paulsgrove, 203 Mo. 193 , 101 S. W. 27 ; State v. Barbata, 336 Mo. 362 , 80 S. W. 2d 865 ; State v. Murphy, 1951The first part of this instruction reads: “In this case insanity is interposed by the defendant ’s counsel as an excuse for the charge set forth in the amended information: * * Appellant contends that the above quoted part of the instruction is misleading and disparaged the defense of insanity. ’ *674 The state relies on the following cases to show that this part of the instruction is not erroneous: State v. Duestrow, 137 Mo. 44 ; State v. Holloway, 156 Mo. 222 , 56 S. W. 734 ; State v. Paulsgrove, 203 Mo. 193 , 101 S. W. 27 ; State v. Barbata, 336 Mo. 362 , 80 S. W. 2d 865 ; State v. Murphy, | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| State v. Murphy green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| State v. Barbata green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
State v. Hardy
green
2 sentences1951The first part of this instruction reads: “In this case insanity is interposed by the defendant ’s counsel as an excuse for the charge set forth in the amended information: * * Appellant contends that the above quoted part of the instruction is misleading and disparaged the defense of insanity. ’ *674 The state relies on the following cases to show that this part of the instruction is not erroneous: State v. Duestrow, 137 Mo. 44 ; State v. Holloway, 156 Mo. 222 , 56 S. W. 734 ; State v. Paulsgrove, 203 Mo. 193 , 101 S. W. 27 ; State v. Barbata, 336 Mo. 362 , 80 S. W. 2d 865 ; State v. Murphy, 1951The first part of this instruction reads: “In this case insanity is interposed by the defendant ’s counsel as an excuse for the charge set forth in the amended information: * * Appellant contends that the above quoted part of the instruction is misleading and disparaged the defense of insanity. ’ *674 The state relies on the following cases to show that this part of the instruction is not erroneous: State v. Duestrow, 137 Mo. 44 ; State v. Holloway, 156 Mo. 222 , 56 S. W. 734 ; State v. Paulsgrove, 203 Mo. 193 , 101 S. W. 27 ; State v. Barbata, 336 Mo. 362 , 80 S. W. 2d 865 ; State v. Murphy, | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Stumpf v. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. green | 1 | 1950–1950 |
| Goodwin Ex Rel. Goodwin v. Eugas green | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| State v. Jones neutral | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Landau v. Cottrill neutral | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| McCloskey Ex Rel. McCloskey v. Koplar green | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Peters v. Kansas City Rys. Co. green | 1 | 1924–1924 |
| Maxey v. Metropolitan Street Railway Co. green | 1 | 1924–1924 |
| Young v. City of Webb City green | 1 | 1919–1919 |
| Torreyson v. United Railways Co. neutral | 1 | 1919–1919 |
| State v. Weisman neutral | 1 | 1918–1918 |
| State v. Sloan green | 1 | 1914–1914 |
| State v. Darling green | 1 | 1914–1914 |
| Detrich v. Metropolitan Street Railway Co. neutral | 1 | 1912–1912 |
| Hunt v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railroad neutral | 1 | 1910–1910 |
| Anderson v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. neutral | 1 | 1910–1910 |
| Wilburn v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. neutral | 1 | 1900–1900 |
| McKee v. St. Louis, Keokuk & Northwestern Railroad green | 1 | 1900–1900 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.