first part test in Virginia

2025Regarding the first part of that inquiry, the Supreme Court has held that “[t]he ‘crux of the issue’ in determining whether the evidence should be admitted is ‘whether there is a substantial relationship between the witness and a particular insurance carrier that has a financial interest in the outcome of the case.’” Graves v. Shoemaker, 299 Va. 357 , 362 (2020) (emphasis added) (quoting Lombard, 262 Va. at 496 ).9 Here, State Farm is the only insurance carrier that fits this criterion in connection with Dr. Kiritsis.10 And the trial court did not exclude such evidence.

2007Applying the first part of the test set forth in Hudson , we held that “the legislature clearly intended for the administrative license suspension to be a civil sanction.” Id. at 765, 514 S.E.2d at 795 .

2007In reaching that decision, we observed that the purpose of the administrative suspension was “‘not to punish the offender but to remove from the highways an operator who is a potential danger to other users.’ ” Id. at 763 , 514 S.E.2d at 794 (quoting Tench v. Commonwealth, 21 Va.App. 200, 205 , 462 S.E.2d 922, 924 (1995)).

2004The first part of that inquiry calls for a determination of whether “ ‘the accused actually invoked his right to counsel.’ ” Id. (quoting Tipton v. Commonwealth, 18 Va.App. 832, 834 , 447 S.E.2d 539, 540 (1994)) (emphasis added).

2004The first part of that inquiry calls for a determination of whether "`the accused actually invoked his right to counsel.'" Id. (quoting Tipton v. Commonwealth, 18 Va.App. 832, 834 , 447 S.E.2d 539, 540 (1994)) (emphasis added).

2004A significant factor in the first part of the analysis— “whether the government knew of or acquiesced in the search,” Mills, 14 Va.App. at 463 , 418 S.E.2d at 720 ,—is the determination whether “the Government did more than adopt a passive position toward the underlying private conduct.” Skinner, 489 U.S. at 615 , 109 S.Ct. at 1412 .

2004A significant factor in the first part of the analysis— “whether the government knew of or acquiesced in the search,” Mills, 14 Va.App. at 463 , 418 S.E.2d at 720 ,—is the determination whether “the Government did more than adopt a passive position toward the underlying private conduct.” Skinner, 489 U.S. at 615 , 109 S.Ct. at 1412 .

2004A significant factor in the first part of the analysis— “whether the government knew of or acquiesced in the search,” Mills, 14 Va.App. at 463 , 418 S.E.2d at 720 ,—is the determination whether “the Government did more than adopt a passive position toward the underlying private conduct.” Skinner, 489 U.S. at 615 , 109 S.Ct. at 1412 .

2004A significant factor in the first part of the analysis— “whether the government knew of or acquiesced in the search,” Mills, 14 Va.App. at 463 , 418 S.E.2d at 720 ,—is the determination whether “the Government did more than adopt a passive position toward the underlying private conduct.” Skinner, 489 U.S. at 615 , 109 S.Ct. at 1412 .

1992The first part of the test was announced in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932); the second part was announced in Grady .

1992Under Blockburger , the second of two prosecutions is not barred if each offense “requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304 .

1991In Westmoreland, this Court held that, if an expert medical witness could not testify that “it is at least more probable than not that the disease arose out of and in the course of employment, compensation must and should be denied.” 7 Va. App. at 224 , 372 S.E.2d at 416 .

1991In Westmoreland, this Court held that, if an expert medical witness could not testify that “it is at least more probable than not that the disease arose out of and in the course of employment, compensation must and should be denied.” 7 Va. App. at 224 , 372 S.E.2d at 416 .

1956The definition there stated was cited with approval in numerous other cases, among them Newell v. Riggins, 197 Va. 490 , 90 S. E. 2d 150 .

1956The definition there stated was cited with approval in numerous other cases, among them Newell v. Riggins, 197 Va. 490 , 90 S. E. 2d 150 .

1956The language of the first part of the instruction was first used in this court in Wright v. Osborne, 175 Va. 442, 445 , 9 S. E. 2d 452 .

1956The language of the first part of the instruction was first used in this court in Wright v. Osborne, 175 Va. 442, 445 , 9 S. E. 2d 452 .

1919Va. Ry. & Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 120 Va. 655 , 91 S. E. 632 .

1919Va. Ry. & Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 120 Va. 655 , 91 S. E. 632 .

1837Now, according to the decision of the supreme court (Stevenson’s heirs v. Sullivant, 5 Wheat. 207. 261.) the first part of this clause, which gives the capacity to inherit, is confined to the lineal kindred, to the exclusion of brothers and all collaterals j thus leaving the bastard as incapable as at common law of taking from uncles, cousins or brothers, whose estates shall pass to the commonwealth by escheat, rather than descend upon one whose capacity the lawmakers designed to restore, and are confessed to have restored in so far as respects the lineal ancestors.