first part test in California

2025Discussion Under Penal Code section 1424 (section 1424), a motion to recuse a prosecutor “may not be granted unless the evidence shows that a conflict of interest exists that would render it 9 PEOPLE v. CARDENAS Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial.” (§ 1424, subd. (a)(1) (section 1424(a)(1)).) The statute sets out a two-part test: (1) the court first determines whether there is a conflict of interest; and (2) it then considers whether the conflict is “ ‘ “ ‘so severe as to disqualify the district attorney from acting.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Trin

2023But even assuming for the sake of argument only that this satisfies the first part of the test, i.e., “a ‘reasonable possibility’ of less than impartial treatment” due to hostility between counsel (Haraguchi, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 713 ), the court made no finding with respect to the second part of the test, i.e., a likelihood that defendant would be treated unfairly during the criminal proceedings.

1996Even assuming this is a case in which “there simply could be no satisfactory explanation” for counsel’s apparent concession of defendant’s guilt in closing argument (People v. Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 426), that would satisfy only the first part of the test.

1996Even assuming this is a case in which “there simply could be no satisfactory explanation” for counsel’s apparent concession of defendant’s guilt in closing argument (People v. Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 426), that would satisfy only the first part of the test.

1996We must still determine whether counsel’s performance resulted in prejudice, that is, whether there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (In re Sixto (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1247, 1257 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 491 , 774 P.2d 164 ].) We conclude no prejudice is apparent on the facts of this case.

1996We must still determine whether counsel’s performance resulted in prejudice, that is, whether there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” (In re Sixto (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1247, 1257 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 491 , 774 P.2d 164 ].) We conclude no prejudice is apparent on the facts of this case.

2025Discussion Under Penal Code section 1424 (section 1424), a motion to recuse a prosecutor “may not be granted unless the evidence shows that a conflict of interest exists that would render it 9 PEOPLE v. CARDENAS Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial.” (§ 1424, subd. (a)(1) (section 1424(a)(1)).) The statute sets out a two-part test: (1) the court first determines whether there is a conflict of interest; and (2) it then considers whether the conflict is “ ‘ “ ‘so severe as to disqualify the district attorney from acting.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Trin

2016Conflict of Interest The first part of the test asks whether there is a reasonable possibility less than impartial treatment exists. “[A] court must determine whether a conflict exists, that is, whether ‘the circumstances of a case evidence a reasonable possibility that the DA’s office may not exercise its discretionary function in an evenhanded manner.’ [Citations.]” (Haraguchi, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 713.) A defendant’s burden of establishing a genuine conflict “is especially heavy where, as here, the defendant seeks to recuse not a single prosecutor but the entire office. [Citations.]” (Tr

2016(See People v. Superior Court (Humberto S.) (2008) 43 Cal.4th 737, 754 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 276 , 182 P.3d 600 ].) Here, the trial court explained that after hearing evidence the Sheriff secretly maintained the TRED database for over a decade and deputy sheriffs lied about it at the first evidentiary hearing, it concluded the misconduct in other cases was relevant to the misconduct in this case and “the discovery situation in this case is far worse than the court previously realized.” The court stated that although there was “no direct evidence” the OCDA knew of TRED or “actively participated” in

2016(See People v. Superior Court (Humberto S.) (2008) 43 Cal.4th 737, 754 [ 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 276 , 182 P.3d 600 ].) Here, the trial court explained that after hearing evidence the Sheriff secretly maintained the TRED database for over a decade and deputy sheriffs lied about it at the first evidentiary hearing, it concluded the misconduct in other cases was relevant to the misconduct in this case and “the discovery situation in this case is far worse than the court previously realized.” The court stated that although there was “no direct evidence” the OCDA knew of TRED or “actively participated” in

2004We explained, “In assessing whether a statute imposes punishment, we inquire (1) whether the Legislature intended the sanction to be punitive and, if not, (2) whether the sanction is so punitive in effect as to prevent the court from legitimately viewing it as regulatory or civil in nature, despite the Legislature’s intent.” (Rivera, at p. 709.) “ ‘The first part of the test (“intent”) looks solely to the declared purpose of the legislature as well as the structure and design of the statute. [Citations.] The second part of the test (“effects”) requires the party challenging the statute to prov

1998(Russell v. Gregoire (9th Cir. 1997) 124 F.3d 1079 , 1086-1087, citing United States v. Ursery (1996) 518 U.S. 267, 288-289 [ 116 S.Ct. 2135, 2147-2148 , 135 L.Ed.2d 549, 568 ] and Kansas v. Hendricks (1997) 521 U.S. 346, 360-361 [ 117 S.Ct. 2072, 2081-2082 , 138 L.Ed.2d 501, 514-515 ].) 1 “The first part of the test (‘intent’) looks solely to the declared purpose of the legislature as well as the structure and design of the statute. [Citations.] The second part of the test (‘effects’) requires the party challenging the statute to provide ‘the clearest proof’ that the statutory scheme is so pu

1954(Astone v. Oldfield, 67 Cal.App.2d 702 [ 155 P.2d 398 ]; Bischell v. State, 68 Cal.App.2d 557 [ 157 P.2d 41 ].) If appellant could not rely completely upon the flagman the first part of this instruction was clearly applicable in connection with the instructions concerning the giving of signals when turning.

1954(Astone v. Oldfield, 67 Cal.App.2d 702 [ 155 P.2d 398 ]; Bischell v. State, 68 Cal.App.2d 557 [ 157 P.2d 41 ].) If appellant could not rely completely upon the flagman the first part of this instruction was clearly applicable in connection with the instructions concerning the giving of signals when turning.

2025Discussion Under Penal Code section 1424 (section 1424), a motion to recuse a prosecutor “may not be granted unless the evidence shows that a conflict of interest exists that would render it 9 PEOPLE v. CARDENAS Opinion of the Court by Kruger, J. unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial.” (§ 1424, subd. (a)(1) (section 1424(a)(1)).) The statute sets out a two-part test: (1) the court first determines whether there is a conflict of interest; and (2) it then considers whether the conflict is “ ‘ “ ‘so severe as to disqualify the district attorney from acting.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Trin

2025This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.’ [Citations.] To satisfy the first part of the test, appellant must demonstrate that ‘counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.’” (People v. Simmons (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 323 , 336.) Our Supreme Court has “repeatedly stressed ‘that “[where, as here,] the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged[,] . . . unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide o

2024“The defendant must first show that he did not meaningfully understand the immigration consequences of his plea.” (Id. at p. 319.) A party who establishes his lack of understanding of the consequences of his plea must then show that his misunderstanding constituted prejudicial error, which “ ‘means demonstrating a reasonable probability that the defendant would have rejected the plea if the defendant had correctly understood its actual or potential immigration consequences.’ ” (Ibid., quoting People v. Vivar (2021) 11 Cal.5th 510, 529 (Vivar).) The trial court addressed only the first part of

2024Quoting Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co. (1962) 210 Cal.App.2d 825, 837 (Associated Vendors), the court described the two-part test for applying the alter ego doctrine: “ ‘(1) that there be such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist, and Given this conclusion, we need not address the parties’ arguments on 9 the merits of any bona fide error defense. 20 (2) that, if the acts are treated as those of the corporation alone, an inequitable result will follow.’ ” On the first part of the test, the trial court

2023(People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1126 ; People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 333 (Bolin) [trial counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness]; People v. Yates (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 474 , 487–488.) It is sufficient if the defendant can show that defense counsel’s omissions involved a crucial issue with no reasonable explanation for counsel’s inaction.

2023This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” (Id. at 16 p. 687; see also People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215 .) To satisfy the first part of the test, appellant must demonstrate that “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” (Strickland, at p. 688.) To satisfy the second, appellant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.

2023Contrary to appellant’s arguments, there is no indication that the trial court misinterpreted the DMV decision. 7 As the Coffey court noted, the “‘“walk-and-turn test”’ is significant because it tests ‘“many of the same skills needed for driving,” such as small muscle control, information processing, reaction, balance, coordination, and short-term memory.’” (Coffey, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 1203, fn. 3 .) Research shows that if a suspect performs poorly on this test, “‘the suspect’s BAC is likely to be above 0.10 [percent].’” (Ibid.) 8 As the Coffey court noted, “‘research shows that,’” when th

2022(People v. Roy (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 537, 551 [“The instruction could have been more helpful to the prosecution than to the defendant.”], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Ray (1975) 14 Cal.3d 20, 29-30, 32 ; People v. Sheldon (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 174, 181 [omission of instruction “‘was more favorable than harmful to’” defendant]; People v. Williams (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 487, 491 [same].) This is particularly true of the first part of the instruction, “If the defendant fled immediately after the crime was committed, that conduct may show that he was aware of his guilt.” However, it is

2022(People v. Roy (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 537, 551 [“The instruction could have been more helpful to the prosecution than to the defendant.”], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Ray (1975) 14 Cal.3d 20, 29-30, 32 ; People v. Sheldon (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 174, 181 [omission of instruction “‘was more favorable than harmful to’” defendant]; People v. Williams (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 487, 491 [same].) This is particularly true of the first part of the instruction, “If the defendant fled immediately after the crime was committed, that conduct may show that he was aware of his guilt.” However, it is

2022(People v. Roy (1971) 18 Cal.App.3d 537, 551 [“The instruction could have been more helpful to the prosecution than to the defendant.”], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Ray (1975) 14 Cal.3d 20, 29-30, 32 ; People v. Sheldon (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 174, 181 [omission of instruction “‘was more favorable than harmful to’” defendant]; People v. Williams (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 487, 491 [same].) This is particularly true of the first part of the instruction, “If the defendant fled immediately after the crime was committed, that conduct may show that he was aware of his guilt.” However, it is