first part test in Nebraska

2025It was then instructed that it could not set its own standards in determining “ordinary and reasonable care” of a health care provider, which “must necessarily be established by expert witnesses”; however, the jury “shall not determine the standard of care . . . from the testimony of the expert witnesses.” While the first part of instruction No. 10 was correct, the jury was not necessarily alerted to any internal inconsistency, since it would not have necessarily equated “ordinary and reasonable care” with the “standard of care,” “also referred to as the required skill and knowledge to be exer

2025It was then instructed that it could not set its own standards in determining “ordinary and reasonable care” of a health care provider, which “must necessarily be established by expert witnesses”; however, the jury “shall not determine the standard of care . . . from the testimony of the expert witnesses.” While the first part of instruction No. 10 was correct, the jury was not necessarily alerted to any internal inconsistency, since it would not have necessarily equated “ordinary and reasonable care” with the “standard of care,” “also referred to as the required skill and knowledge to be exer

2025It was then instructed that it could not set its own standards in determining “ordinary and reasonable care” of a health care provider, which “must necessarily be established by expert witnesses”; however, the jury “shall not determine the standard of care . . . from the testimony of the expert witnesses.” While the first part of instruction No. 10 was correct, the jury was not necessarily alerted to any internal inconsistency, since it would not have necessarily equated “ordinary and reasonable care” with the “standard of care,” “also referred to as the required skill and knowledge to be exer

2024State v. Castellanos, 26 Neb.

2018State v. Nolt, 298 Neb. 910 , 906 N.W.2d 309 (2018). [2] In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained by a warrantless search under the emergency doctrine, an appellate court employs a two-part standard in which the first part of the analysis involves a review of the historical facts for clear error and a review de novo of the trial court’s ultimate conclusion that exigent circumstances were present.

2018State v. Nolt, 298 Neb. 910 , 906 N.W.2d 309 (2018). [2] In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained by a warrantless search under the emergency doctrine, an appellate court employs a two-part standard in which the first part of the analysis involves a review of the historical facts for clear error and a review de novo of the trial court’s ultimate conclusion that exigent circumstances were present.

2017Regarding historical facts, an appellate court reviews the trial court’s findings for clear error, but whether those facts trig- ger or violate Fourth Amendment protections is a question of law that an appellate court reviews independently of the trial court’s determination.1 1 State v. McCumber, 295 Neb. 941 , 893 N.W.2d 411 (2017). - 962 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 296 Nebraska R eports STATE v. SALVADOR RODRIGUEZ Cite as 296 Neb. 950 [2] In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained by a warrantless search under the emergency doctrine, an appella

2017Regarding historical facts, an appellate court reviews the trial court’s findings for clear error, but whether those facts trig- ger or violate Fourth Amendment protections is a question of law that an appellate court reviews independently of the trial court’s determination.1 1 State v. McCumber, 295 Neb. 941 , 893 N.W.2d 411 (2017). - 962 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 296 Nebraska R eports STATE v. SALVADOR RODRIGUEZ Cite as 296 Neb. 950 [2] In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained by a warrantless search under the emergency doctrine, an appella

2017Regarding historical facts, an appellate court reviews the trial court’s findings for clear error, but whether those facts trig- ger or violate Fourth Amendment protections is a question of law that an appellate court reviews independently of the trial court’s determination.1 1 State v. McCumber, 295 Neb. 941 , 893 N.W.2d 411 (2017). - 962 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 296 Nebraska R eports STATE v. SALVADOR RODRIGUEZ Cite as 296 Neb. 950 [2] In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained by a warrantless search under the emergency doctrine, an appella

2002Since Billups has not shown any basis upon which this court could conclude that his counsel’s performance was deficient, he has not sustained the first part of the test required under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 80 L.

2002Since Billups has not shown any basis upon which this court could conclude that his counsel’s performance was deficient, he has not sustained the first part of the test required under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 80 L.

2001Hudson v. United States, supra; State v. Howell, supra. Regarding the second part of the test, once a determination is made that a sanction was intended to be civil in nature, “[a] court will reject the legislature’s manifest intent only where a party challenging the [statute] provides the clearest proof that the statutory scheme is so punitive in either purpose or effect as to negate the State’s intention.” Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 261 , 121 S. Ct. 727 , 148 L.

2001Hudson v. United States, supra; State v. Howell, supra. Regarding the second part of the test, once a determination is made that a sanction was intended to be civil in nature, “[a] court will reject the legislature’s manifest intent only where a party challenging the [statute] provides the clearest proof that the statutory scheme is so punitive in either purpose or effect as to negate the State’s intention.” Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 261 , 121 S. Ct. 727 , 148 L.

1991With respect to the first part of that test, we agree with the view expressed by the Anderson court: The tort of bad faith can be alleged only if the facts pleaded would, on the basis of an objective standard, show the absence of a reasonable basis for denying the claim, i.e., would a reasonable insurer under the circumstances have denied or delayed payment of the claim under the facts and circumstances. [Citations omitted.] Anderson, supra at 692 , 271 N.W.2d at 377 .

1991With respect to the first part of that test, we agree with the view expressed by the Anderson court: The tort of bad faith can be alleged only if the facts pleaded would, on the basis of an objective standard, show the absence of a reasonable basis for denying the claim, i.e., would a reasonable insurer under the circumstances have denied or delayed payment of the claim under the facts and circumstances. [Citations omitted.] Anderson, supra at 692 , 271 N.W.2d at 377 .

1987We observe first that the entrapment defense “is not of a constitutional dimension.” United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433 , 93 S. Ct. 1637 , 36 L.

1987We observe first that the entrapment defense “is not of a constitutional dimension.” United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433 , 93 S. Ct. 1637 , 36 L.