Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
25 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1994–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Olds v. Stategreen2 sentences2020See Olds v. State, 299 Ga. 65, 69-70 ( 786 SE2d 633 ) (2016). 2020See Olds v. State, 299 Ga. 65, 69-70 ( 786 SE2d 633 ) (2016). | 5 | 5 |
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences2017Williams v. State, 299 Ga. 209, 212 (2) ( 787 SE2d 187 ) (2016). 2017Williams v. State, 299 Ga. 209, 212 (2) ( 787 SE2d 187 ) (2016). | 2 | 2 |
Henderson v. Stategreen1 sentence2026With regard to the first part of the test, the trial court 9 admitted the Rule 404(b) evidence as relevant to show intent. 6 It is well settled that “[t]he relevance of other acts evidence offered to show intent is established when the prior act was committed with the same state of mind as the charged crime.” Henderson, 318 Ga. at 755 (quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Nelson v. Stategreen1 sentence2025See Nelson, 321 Ga. at 464 (explaining that a one-year delay is typically presumed to be prejudicial). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Noriegagreen2 sentences2024See Noriega, 676 F3d at 1260 (III) (C) (same). 2024See Noriega, 676 F3d at 1260 (III) (C) (same). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Alejandro Barron-Sotogreen2 sentences2024The first part of the test requires courts to “excise from the search warrant affidavit any information gained during the alleged illegal entry and determine whether the remaining information supports a finding of probable cause.” Barron-Soto, 820 F3d at 415 (III) (A). 2024The first part of the test requires courts to “excise from the search warrant affidavit any information gained during the alleged illegal entry and determine whether the remaining information supports a finding of probable cause.” Barron-Soto, 820 F3d at 415 (III) (A). | 1 | 1 |
Heard v. Stategreen2 sentences2022To address the first part of this test, we look to OCGA § 24-4-401, which defines “relevant evidence” as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” See Heard v. State, 309 Ga. 76, 84-85 (3) (b) ( 844 SE2d 791 ) (2020). 2022To address the first part of this test, we look to OCGA § 24-4-401, which defines “relevant evidence” as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” See Heard v. State, 309 Ga. 76, 84-85 (3) (b) ( 844 SE2d 791 ) (2020). | 1 | 1 |
Wilkes & Mchugh, P.A. v. LTC Consulting, L.P.green2 sentences2021See Wilkes, 306 Ga. at 262 (explaining that a challenged claim arises from protected activity when it could reasonably be construed as fitting within one of the categories set forth in OCGA § 9-11-11.1 (c)). 2021See Wilkes, 306 Ga. at 262 (explaining that a challenged claim arises from protected activity when it could reasonably be construed as fitting within one of the categories set forth in OCGA § 9-11-11.1 (c)). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Herbert G. Evans, Jr.green1 sentence2015See Dillon, 738 F3d at 291 (“To the extent that the District Court’s determination under the first prong of Sell depends on findings of fact, we review those findings under a clear-error standard.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Evans, 404 F3d 227, 236 (4th Cir. 2005) ("The district court’s determination that the government’s interest is ‘important’ is a legal conclusion that we review de novo, although we review any factual findings relevant to this legal determination for clear error.” (citation omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Simon Dillongreen2 sentences2015See, e.g., United States v. Dillon, 738 F3d 284, 291 (D.C. 2015See Dillon, 738 F3d at 291 (“To the extent that the District Court’s determination under the first prong of Sell depends on findings of fact, we review those findings under a clear-error standard.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Evans, 404 F3d 227, 236 (4th Cir. 2005) ("The district court’s determination that the government’s interest is ‘important’ is a legal conclusion that we review de novo, although we review any factual findings relevant to this legal determination for clear error.” (citation omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
Franklin County v. Fieldale Farms Corp.green2 sentences2012See also Franklin County v. Fieldale Farms Corp., 270 Ga. 272, 275 (2) ( 507 SE2d 460 ) (1998). 2012See also Franklin County v. Fieldale Farms Corp., 270 Ga. 272, 275 (2) ( 507 SE2d 460 ) (1998). | 1 | 1 |
Home Depot Supply, Inc. v. Hunter Management, LLC.green2 sentences2011Home Depot Supply v. Hunter Mgmt., 289 Ga. App. 286, 288 ( 656 SE2d 898 ) (2008). (a) Noorani argues that the first part of the test cannot be met because he, personally, did not consummate any business transactions or conduct any business transactions in this state. 2011Home Depot Supply v. Hunter Mgmt., 289 Ga. App. 286, 288 ( 656 SE2d 898 ) (2008). (a) Noorani argues that the first part of the test cannot be met because he, personally, did not consummate any business transactions or conduct any business transactions in this state. | 1 | 1 |
City of Indianapolis v. Edmondgreen1 sentence2006The somewhat enigmatic phrase “programmatic level” originated in Justice O’Connor’s opinion in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. S. 32, 48 (III) (121 SC 447, 148 LE2d 333) (2000). 7 Harwood v. State, 262 Ga. App. 818, 820 (1) (a) ( 586 SE2d 722 ) (2003). | 1 | 1 |
Hobbs v. Stategreen2 sentences2006In this appeal, only the first part of the test is in issue. 5 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) McCray v. State, 268 Ga. App. 84 ( 601 SE2d 452 ) (2004). 6 Hobbs v. State, 260 Ga. App. 115, 116 (1) ( 579 SE2d 50 ) (2003). 2006In this appeal, only the first part of the test is in issue. 5 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) McCray v. State, 268 Ga. App. 84 ( 601 SE2d 452 ) (2004). 6 Hobbs v. State, 260 Ga. App. 115, 116 (1) ( 579 SE2d 50 ) (2003). | 1 | 1 |
Harwood v. Stategreen2 sentences2006The somewhat enigmatic phrase “programmatic level” originated in Justice O’Connor’s opinion in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. S. 32, 48 (III) (121 SC 447, 148 LE2d 333) (2000). 7 Harwood v. State, 262 Ga. App. 818, 820 (1) (a) ( 586 SE2d 722 ) (2003). 2006The somewhat enigmatic phrase “programmatic level” originated in Justice O’Connor’s opinion in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. S. 32, 48 (III) (121 SC 447, 148 LE2d 333) (2000). 7 Harwood v. State, 262 Ga. App. 818, 820 (1) (a) ( 586 SE2d 722 ) (2003). | 1 | 1 |
Nhek v. Stategreen1 sentence1999The first part of the test requires that the defendant “overcome the ‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s performance fell within a ‘wide range of reasonable professional conduct’ and that counsel’s decisions were ‘made in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.’ ” Nhek at 247 (3). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. City Wide Cab, Inc.green2 sentences1994Although not required to do so because he did not have the burden of proof on the matters admitted, Johnson v. City Wide Cab, 205 Ga. App. 502, 503 (1) ( 422 SE2d 912 ) (1992), Tsay produced evidence negating the admissions, including affidavits and depositions. 1994Although not required to do so because he did not have the burden of proof on the matters admitted, Johnson v. City Wide Cab, 205 Ga. App. 502, 503 (1) ( 422 SE2d 912 ) (1992), Tsay produced evidence negating the admissions, including affidavits and depositions. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kirby v. State
green
2 sentences2023Accordingly, we analyze below whether the evidence of the October 32 28 incident satisfied the other two parts of the test. (ii) In evaluating the first part of the test, we look to OCGA § 24-4-401, which defines “relevant evidence” as evidence that “ha[s] any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Relevance “is a binary question—evidence is either relevant or it is not.” Kirby, 304 Ga. at 480 . 2023Accordingly, we analyze below whether the evidence of the October 28 incident satisfied the other two parts of the test. (ii) In evaluating the first part of the test, we look to OCGA § 24-4-401, which defines “relevant evidence” as evidence that “ha[s] any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Relevance “is a binary question—evidence is either relevant or it is not.” Kirby, 304 Ga. at 480 . 32 Here, Clark pled not guilty to the charged crimes and did not otherw | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2009Strickland, 466 U. S. at 689-690 . 1996To meet the first part of this test, a defendant must overcome the “strong presumption” that his counsel’s performance fell within a “wide range of reasonable professional conduct” and that his counsel’s decisions were “made in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Id. | 2 | 1996–2009 |
Pawnmart, Inc. v. Gwinnett County
green
2 sentences2012“The first part provides the rule that general laws preempt local or special laws on the same subject; the second part excepts from this rule local laws permitted by, and not conflicting with, the general law.” Pawnmart v. Gwinnett County, 279 Ga. 19 (1) ( 608 SE2d 639 ) (2005). 2012“The first part provides the rule that general laws preempt local or special laws on the same subject; the second part excepts from this rule local laws permitted by, and not conflicting with, the general law.” Pawnmart v. Gwinnett County, 279 Ga. 19 (1) ( 608 SE2d 639 ) (2005). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Flanigan v. State
green
2 sentences2009Flanigan v. State, 269 Ga. 160 (2) ( 496 SE2d 255 ) (1998). 2009Flanigan v. State, 269 Ga. 160 (2) ( 496 SE2d 255 ) (1998). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
EHCA CARTERSVILLE, LLC v. Turner
green
2 sentences2006EHCA Cartersville, LLC v. Turner, 280 Ga. 333 ( 626 SE2d 482 ) (2006). 2006EHCA Cartersville, LLC v. Turner, 280 Ga. 333 ( 626 SE2d 482 ) (2006). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
McCray v. State
green
2 sentences2006In this appeal, only the first part of the test is in issue. 5 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) McCray v. State, 268 Ga. App. 84 ( 601 SE2d 452 ) (2004). 6 Hobbs v. State, 260 Ga. App. 115, 116 (1) ( 579 SE2d 50 ) (2003). 2006In this appeal, only the first part of the test is in issue. 5 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) McCray v. State, 268 Ga. App. 84 ( 601 SE2d 452 ) (2004). 6 Hobbs v. State, 260 Ga. App. 115, 116 (1) ( 579 SE2d 50 ) (2003). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Weeks v. State
green
1 sentence1996As to the first part of this test, a defense counsel’s cross-examination of a former client who is now a State’s witness does not amount to “ ‘actively representing conflicting interests.’ ” Id. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.