59 Pennsylvania opinions name it 9 courts 1904–2026 11 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Scarpitti v. Weborggreen2 sentences2006We concluded that the first part of the test sets forth a standing requirement that leaves “discretion with the court to determine whether recognition of [intended] beneficiary status would be appropriate,” while the second part of the test defines “the two types of claimants who may be intended as third party beneficiaries.” Scarpitti, 609 A.2d at 150 . 2006We concluded that the first part of the test sets forth a standing requirement that leaves "discretion with the court to determine whether recognition of [intended] beneficiary status would be appropriate," while the second part of the test defines "the two types of claimants who may be intended as third party beneficiaries." Scarpitti, 609 A.2d at 150 . | 2 | 3 |
Kachinski v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Boardgreen2 sentences2008The first part of the test states: "The employer who seeks to modify a claimant’s benefits on the basis that he has recovered some or all of this ability must first produce medical evidence of a change in condition.” Id. at 252, 532 A.2d at 380 (emphasis added). 2008The first part of the test states: "The employer who seeks to modify a claimant's benefits on the basis that he has recovered some or all of this ability must first produce medical evidence of a change in condition." Id. at 252, 532 A.2d at 380 (emphasis added). | 1 | 4 |
Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrickgreen2 sentences2002Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 446 Pa.Super. 87 , 666 A.2d 323, 325 (1995). ¶ 7 In the first part of our analysis, we must focus on whether Officer Magerl had the reasonable suspicion necessary to subject Appellant to an investigatory stop and frisk. 2002Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 446 Pa.Super. 87 , 666 A.2d 323, 325 (1995). ¶ 7 In the first part of our analysis, we must focus on whether Officer Magerl had the reasonable suspicion necessary to subject Appellant to an investigatory stop and frisk. | 1 | 2 |
Wilder & Miller, P.C. v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence2024Bd. of Rev., 525 A.2d 852, 856 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987) (“A claimant is attached to the labor force as long as she is able to do some type of work and there is a reasonable opportunity for securing such work in the vicinity of her residence.”) (emphasis added).5 Turning to the first part of the inquiry, we conclude that the presumption that Claimant was able and available to work was rebutted by evidence of Claimant’s limitation on her availability to accept the work offered by Employer – i.e., hybrid in-person and remote instruction beginning on December 7, 2020. | 1 | 1 |
Adoption of: J.B. Appeal of: L.M.green1 sentence2024See M.E.L., 298 A.3d at 127; see also J.M.B., 308 A.3d at 1268 ; see also 18 Pa.C.S. § 4301; 23 Pa.C.S. § 3304(a)(1). | 1 | 1 |
Bruno, D., Aplts. v. Erie Insurancegreen1 sentence2024See id. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Kalichakgreen1 sentence2015However, Hall has not filed a post-sentence motion. “[W]hen a court revokes probation and imposes a new sentence, a criminal defendant needs to preserve challenges to the discretionary aspects of that new sentence either by objecting during the revocation sentencing or by filing a post-sentence motion.” Commonwealth v. Kalichak, 943 A.2d 285, 289 (Pa. Super. 2008); see also Commonwealth v. Colon, 102 A.3d 1033 (Pa. Super. 2014). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Washingtongreen1 sentence2015See Conunonwealth v. Stewart, 84 A.3d 701°, 712 (Pa.Super. 2013); Commonwealth v. Washington, 361 A.2d 670, 674 (Pa.Super. 1976). | 1 | 1 |
Alex v. Gavingreen1 sentence2015See Conunonwealth v. Stewart, 84 A.3d 701°, 712 (Pa.Super. 2013); Commonwealth v. Washington, 361 A.2d 670, 674 (Pa.Super. 1976). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Colongreen1 sentence2015However, Hall has not filed a post-sentence motion. “[W]hen a court revokes probation and imposes a new sentence, a criminal defendant needs to preserve challenges to the discretionary aspects of that new sentence either by objecting during the revocation sentencing or by filing a post-sentence motion.” Commonwealth v. Kalichak, 943 A.2d 285, 289 (Pa. Super. 2008); see also Commonwealth v. Colon, 102 A.3d 1033 (Pa. Super. 2014). | 1 | 1 |
Joe v. Prison Health Services, Inc.green2 sentences2008The first part of the inquiry is whether attorney-client privilege does indeed apply to a particular communication.") (citations omitted); Carbis Walker, supra at 581 ("[T]he party who has asserted the attorney-client privilege must initially set forth facts showing that the privilege has been properly invoked. . . .") (citation omitted); Joe v. Prison Health Servs., 782 A.2d 24, 31 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2001) ("The party asserting the privilege has the initial burden to prove that it is properly invoked, and the party seeking to overcome the privilege has the burden to prove an application exception to 2008The first part of the inquiry is whether attorney-client privilege does indeed apply to a particular communication.”) (citations omitted); Carbis Walker, supra at 581 ("[Tlhe party who has asserted the attorney-client privilege must initially set forth facts showing that the privilege has been properly invoked_”) (citation omitted); Joe v. Prison Health Servs., 782 A.2d 24, 31 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001) ("The party asserting the privilege has the initial burden to prove that it is properly invoked, and the party seeking to overcome the privilege has the burden to prove an application exception to the pr | 1 | 1 |
Milne v. Milnegreen2 sentences2008Caplan v. Caplan, 400 Pa.Super. 352 , 583 A.2d 823 (1990); see also Milne v. Milne, 383 Pa.Super. 177 , 556 A.2d 854 (1989). ¶ 19 With regard to the first part of the test, namely whether the child is physically and mentally able to engage in profitable employment, the trial court found that “the testimony presented on Dustin’s behalf [was] neither convincing [n]or complete enough to meet the standard of proof [in this case].” Trial Court Opinion, 9/12/07, at 10. 2008Caplan v. Caplan, 400 Pa.Super. 352 , 583 A.2d 823 (1990); see also Milne v. Milne, 383 Pa.Super. 177 , 556 A.2d 854 (1989). ¶ 19 With regard to the first part of the test, namely whether the child is physically and mentally able to engage in profitable employment, the trial court found that “the testimony presented on Dustin’s behalf [was] neither convincing [n]or complete enough to meet the standard of proof [in this case].” Trial Court Opinion, 9/12/07, at 10. | 1 | 1 |
| Popovitch v. Kasperlikgreen | 1 | 1 |
Bonds v. Bondsgreen2 sentences2008Judicial decision gives no clear answer to this question.”), accord at § 2325 ("All involuntary disclosures ... are not protected by the privilege, on the principle that ... the law ... leaves to the client and attorney to take measures of caution....”); Carbis Walker, supra at 579 ("[T]he appellate courts of this jurisdiction have found waiver [of the attorney-client privilege] when the communication is made in the presence of or communicated to a third party or to the court ... ”), quoting Bonds v. Bonds, 455 Pa.Super. 610 , 689 A.2d 275, 277 (1997); Popovitch v. Kasperlik, 70 F.Supp. 376, 3 2008Judicial decision gives no clear answer to this question.”), accord at § 2325 ("All involuntary disclosures ... are not protected by the privilege, on the principle that ... the law ... leaves to the client and attorney to take measures of caution....”); Carbis Walker, supra at 579 ("[T]he appellate courts of this jurisdiction have found waiver [of the attorney-client privilege] when the communication is made in the presence of or communicated to a third party or to the court ... ”), quoting Bonds v. Bonds, 455 Pa.Super. 610 , 689 A.2d 275, 277 (1997); Popovitch v. Kasperlik, 70 F.Supp. 376, 3 | 1 | 1 |
Carbis Walker, LLP v. Hill, Barth and King, LLCgreen2 sentences2008The first part of the inquiry is whether attorney-client privilege does indeed apply to a particular communication.") (citations omitted); Carbis Walker, supra at 581 ("[T]he party who has asserted the attorney-client privilege must initially set forth facts showing that the privilege has been properly invoked. . . .") (citation omitted); Joe v. Prison Health Servs., 782 A.2d 24, 31 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2001) ("The party asserting the privilege has the initial burden to prove that it is properly invoked, and the party seeking to overcome the privilege has the burden to prove an application exception to 2008The first part of the inquiry is whether attorney-client privilege does indeed apply to a particular communication.”) (citations omitted); Carbis Walker, supra at 581 ("[Tlhe party who has asserted the attorney-client privilege must initially set forth facts showing that the privilege has been properly invoked_”) (citation omitted); Joe v. Prison Health Servs., 782 A.2d 24, 31 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001) ("The party asserting the privilege has the initial burden to prove that it is properly invoked, and the party seeking to overcome the privilege has the burden to prove an application exception to the pr | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Eddingsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dillon v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Boardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Szuchongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Clifton v. Suburban Cable TV Co., Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Clifton v. Suburban Cable Television Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Clifton v. Suburban Cable Television Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Brewer v. Scottgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Drivergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Oberti v. Board Of Educationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jochynek v. Commonwealthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Larry C. Smith, Etc., United States of America v. Marshall Carter, Etc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Rothman v. Rothmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Thistle's Estategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Rementer
green
2 sentences2019Rementer , 598 A.2d at 1305 . *769 As to the first part of the test, the defendant's conduct need not be the only cause of the victim's death in order to establish a causal connection. 2008Rementer, 598 A.2d at 1305 . ¶ 14 As to the first part of the test, the defendant’s conduct need not be the only cause of the victim’s death in order to establish a causal connection. | 11 | 1993–2025 |
Guy v. Liederbach
green
2 sentences2013“The first part of the test sets forth a standing requirement... [which] leaves discretion with the trial court to determine whether recognition of third party beneficiary status would be ‘appropriate.’” Guy, 459 A.2d at 751 . 1993“Consequently, this court in Guy concluded: “There is thus a two part test for determining whether one is an intended third party beneficiary: (1) the recognition of the beneficiary’s right must be ‘appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties,’ and (2) the performance must ‘satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary’ or ‘the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.’ “Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. at 60 , 459 A.2d at 751 .The first part of the test sets forth a standing requirement which | 3 | 1993–2013 |
Com. v. EM
green
2 sentences2002We find that he did. ¶ 8 Recently, in Commonwealth v. E.M., 558 Pa. 16 , 735 A.2d 654 (1999), our Supreme Court revisited and summarized the jurisprudence surrounding the “investigatory stop and frisk” as follows: It is well established that a police officer may conduct a brief investigatory stop of an individual if the officer observes unusual conduct which leads him to reasonably conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal activity may be afoot. 1999We find that he did. ¶ 10 Recently, in Commonwealth v. E.M., 558 Pa. 16 , 735 A.2d 654 (1999), our supreme court revisited and summarized the jurisprudence surrounding the “investigatory stop and frisk.” In that case the court stated: It is well established that a police officer may conduct a brief investigatory stop of an individual if the officer observes unusual conduct which leads him to reasonably conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal activity may be afoot. | 2 | 1999–2002 |
Commonwealth v. E.M.
green
2 sentences2002We find that he did. ¶ 8 Recently, in Commonwealth v. E.M., 558 Pa. 16 , 735 A.2d 654 (1999), our Supreme Court revisited and summarized the jurisprudence surrounding the “investigatory stop and frisk” as follows: It is well established that a police officer may conduct a brief investigatory stop of an individual if the officer observes unusual conduct which leads him to reasonably conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal activity may be afoot. 1999We find that he did. ¶ 10 Recently, in Commonwealth v. E.M., 558 Pa. 16 , 735 A.2d 654 (1999), our supreme court revisited and summarized the jurisprudence surrounding the “investigatory stop and frisk.” In that case the court stated: It is well established that a police officer may conduct a brief investigatory stop of an individual if the officer observes unusual conduct which leads him to reasonably conclude, in light of his experience, that criminal activity may be afoot. | 2 | 1999–2002 |
Style v. Shaub
green
2 sentences2026We observed that as to the first part of the test, i.e., whether the child was physically and mentally able to engage in profitable employment, Ms. Style failed to prove that the child was “not able to engage in profitable employment.” Id. at 410 . 2026“With regard to the second part of the test for rebutting the presumption, namely whether employment [wa]s available to the child at a supporting wage,” we found “little or no evidence in this regard.” Id. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen
green
1 sentence2025The government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. 597 U.S. at 24 .5 The first part of the test requires the court to determine whether the Second Amendment applies to the legislated conduct, i.e., whether the challenged legislation infringes “the right of the people to keep and bear arms.” This Court has already determined that convicted felons are included in “the people” to whom the Second Amendment’s protections apply. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
United States v. Rahimi
green
1 sentence2025With respect to the second part of the test, Farmer noted Rahimi stated, inter alia, that “[f]rom the earliest days of the common law, firearm[s] regulations have included provisions barring people from misusing weapons to harm or menace others.” Farmer, 329 A.3d at 454 (quoting Rahimi, 602 U.S. at 693 ). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Commonwealth v. Leaner
green
1 sentence2024Id. at 769 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
1 sentence2020In other words, can the trial court omit any specific finding, special verdict slip, special[] interrogatory, or the like as to these essential elements, and/or direct a finding of this fact as to the grading of the underlying offense as a matter of law, notwithstanding Apprendi’s clear directive that “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed maximum penalty must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 . [Appellant] submits that the answer to this question is “no,” and that his [first-degree felony conviction at Coun | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Commonwealth v. Mazeffa, R.
green
1 sentence2020Criminal responsibility may be properly ____________________________________________ 5 While Kakhankham concerns events occurring after the General Assembly amended the drug delivery resulting in death statute to reduce the mens rea element to a recklessness standard, 132 A.3d at 994-95 , this Court’s holding is nevertheless relevant to our consideration of the foreseeability and causation of death resulting from heroin use. - 13 - J-A30036-19 assessed against an individual whose conduct was a direct and substantial factor in producing the death even though other factors combined with that con | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Adoption of: M.A.B., A Minor, Appeal of: Erie OCY
green
1 sentence2018In re M.A.B., 166 A.3d at 445-46 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Tincher, T. v. Omega Flex, Inc., Aplt.
green
1 sentence2018As the Supreme Court noted, "in critical part, the trial court instructed the jury in accordance with the law as articulated in Azzarello and its progeny." Tincher , 104 A.3d at 407 ; see also Trial Court Opinion, 3/22/16, at 3 ("we charged as required by Azzarello "). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Nationwide Mutual Insurance v. Fleming
green
2 sentences2015If the court determines that the attorney-client privilege does apply, the court must then “engage in the second part of the inquiry: whether an exception or waiver applies, thereby overcoming the privilege and permitting disclosure.” Id., at 1265-1266 . 2015“The first part of the inquiry is whether the attorney-client privilege does indeed apply to a particular communication.” Id. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Bily v. Arthur Young & Co.
green
1 sentence2013In responding to LandAmerica’s arguments and moving for summary judgment, Hospitality relies on Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992), Robert H. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Commonwealth v. Collins
green
1 sentence2010Collins , at 55, 703 A.2d at 422 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Joyner v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Lewis v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Caplan v. Caplan
green
2 sentences2008Caplan v. Caplan, 400 Pa.Super. 352 , 583 A.2d 823 (1990); see also Milne v. Milne, 383 Pa.Super. 177 , 556 A.2d 854 (1989). ¶ 19 With regard to the first part of the test, namely whether the child is physically and mentally able to engage in profitable employment, the trial court found that “the testimony presented on Dustin’s behalf [was] neither convincing [n]or complete enough to meet the standard of proof [in this case].” Trial Court Opinion, 9/12/07, at 10. 2008Caplan v. Caplan, 400 Pa.Super. 352 , 583 A.2d 823 (1990); see also Milne v. Milne, 383 Pa.Super. 177 , 556 A.2d 854 (1989). ¶ 19 With regard to the first part of the test, namely whether the child is physically and mentally able to engage in profitable employment, the trial court found that “the testimony presented on Dustin’s behalf [was] neither convincing [n]or complete enough to meet the standard of proof [in this case].” Trial Court Opinion, 9/12/07, at 10. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Hertzberg v. Zoning Board of Adjustment green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Milne v. Crossett green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| United States v. Roland Richard Driver, A/K/A Roland Richard Mousseaux green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Woods v. Commonwealth Department of Transportation red | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Medina v. United States green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Simpson v. Missouri green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Keller green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Commonwealth v. Ogontz Area Neighbors Ass'n green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| County of Venango v. Borough of Sugarcreek neutral | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Borough of Tunkhannock v. County of Wyoming green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Commonwealth v. Skufca green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Rando v. Estelle green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Skufca v. Pennsylvania green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Commonwealth v. Kaschik green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Commonwealth v. Schuck green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Kistler v. Faller green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Commonwealth v. Mount green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Maris's Estate green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Barium Steel Corp. v. Wiley green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| Betterman v. American Stores Co. green | 1 | 1959–1959 |
| Miller's Estate neutral | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.