11 South Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1951–2011 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
City of Aberdeen v. Meidingergreen2 sentences1992The test that we espoused in City of Aberdeen v. Meidinger, 89 S.D. 412 , 233 N.W.2d 331, 333 (1975) is as follows: The first part of the test is whether the statute does set up arbitrary classifications among various persons subject to it. 1992The test that we espoused in City of Aberdeen v. Meidinger, 89 S.D. 412 , 233 N.W.2d 331, 333 (1975) is as follows: The first part of the test is whether the statute does set up arbitrary classifications among various persons subject to it. | 3 | 6 |
State v. Karlengreen2 sentences2009The circuit court examined the two-part test adopted by this Court, which provides that “[t]he 180-day period commences when the defendant has first appeared on the re-indictment if ‘(1) the earlier indictment was properly dismissed by a competent judicial officer and (2) the record does not reveal evidence of a prosecutorial attempt to circumvent the 180-day rule.’ ” State v. Karlen, 1999 SD 12, ¶ 12 , 589 N.W.2d 594, 598 (citations omitted). [¶ 6.] In concluding that the State violated the 180-day rule, the circuit court held that the first part of the test had not been met because the dismi 2009The circuit court examined the two-part test adopted by this Court, which provides that “[t]he 180-day period commences when the defendant has first appeared on the re-indictment if ‘(1) the earlier indictment was properly dismissed by a competent judicial officer and (2) the record does not reveal evidence of a prosecutorial attempt to circumvent the 180-day rule.’ ” State v. Karlen, 1999 SD 12, ¶ 12 , 589 N.W.2d 594, 598 (citations omitted). [¶ 6.] In concluding that the State violated the 180-day rule, the circuit court held that the first part of the test had not been met because the dismi | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Aesoph
green
1 sentence2011Id. (citing State v. Aesoph, 2002 S.D. 71 , ¶ 12, 647 N.W.2d 743, 750 ). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Johnson
green
1 sentence2011Once the scene is set and the players’ lines and actions are reconstructed, the court must apply an objective test to resolve the ultimate inquiry: was there a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Wright, 2009 S.D. 51 , ¶ 19, 768 N.W.2d at 520 (quoting Johnson, 2007 S.D. 86 , ¶ 22, 739 N.W.2d at 9 ). [¶ 13.] The first part of the test involves factual determinations as to “ ‘the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.’” Bow ker, 2008 S.D. 61 , ¶27, 754 N.W.2d at 65 (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 , 116 S.Ct. 457, | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Thompson v. Keohane
green
2 sentences2011Once the scene is set and the players’ lines and actions are reconstructed, the court must apply an objective test to resolve the ultimate inquiry: was there a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Wright, 2009 S.D. 51 , ¶ 19, 768 N.W.2d at 520 (quoting Johnson, 2007 S.D. 86 , ¶ 22, 739 N.W.2d at 9 ). [¶ 13.] The first part of the test involves factual determinations as to “ ‘the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.’” Bow ker, 2008 S.D. 61 , ¶27, 754 N.W.2d at 65 (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 , 116 S.Ct. 457, 2011Once the scene is set and the players’ lines and actions are reconstructed, the court must apply an objective test to resolve the ultimate inquiry: was there a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Wright, 2009 S.D. 51 , ¶ 19, 768 N.W.2d at 520 (quoting Johnson, 2007 S.D. 86 , ¶ 22, 739 N.W.2d at 9 ). [¶ 13.] The first part of the test involves factual determinations as to “ ‘the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.’” Bow ker, 2008 S.D. 61 , ¶27, 754 N.W.2d at 65 (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 , 116 S.Ct. 457, | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Wright
green
1 sentence2011Once the scene is set and the players’ lines and actions are reconstructed, the court must apply an objective test to resolve the ultimate inquiry: was there a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Wright, 2009 S.D. 51 , ¶ 19, 768 N.W.2d at 520 (quoting Johnson, 2007 S.D. 86 , ¶ 22, 739 N.W.2d at 9 ). [¶ 13.] The first part of the test involves factual determinations as to “ ‘the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.’” Bow ker, 2008 S.D. 61 , ¶27, 754 N.W.2d at 65 (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 , 116 S.Ct. 457, | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Bowker
green
1 sentence2011Once the scene is set and the players’ lines and actions are reconstructed, the court must apply an objective test to resolve the ultimate inquiry: was there a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Wright, 2009 S.D. 51 , ¶ 19, 768 N.W.2d at 520 (quoting Johnson, 2007 S.D. 86 , ¶ 22, 739 N.W.2d at 9 ). [¶ 13.] The first part of the test involves factual determinations as to “ ‘the circumstances surrounding the interrogation.’” Bow ker, 2008 S.D. 61 , ¶27, 754 N.W.2d at 65 (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 , 116 S.Ct. 457, | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Ornelas v. United States
green
2 sentences2006The first part of the analysis involves only a determination of historical facts, but the second is a mixed question of law and fact: “[T]he historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the [relevant] statutory [or constitutional] standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.” Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696-97 , 116 S.Ct. at 1661-62 , 134 L.Ed.2d at 919 (quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 , 289 n. 19, 102 S.Ct. 1781 , 1791 n. 19, 72 L.Ed.2d 2006The first part of the analysis involves only a determination of historical facts, but the second is a mixed question of law and fact: “[T]he historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the [relevant] statutory [or constitutional] standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.” Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696-97 , 116 S.Ct. at 1661-62 , 134 L.Ed.2d at 919 (quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 , 289 n. 19, 102 S.Ct. 1781 , 1791 n. 19, 72 L.Ed.2d | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Pullman-Standard v. Swint
green
2 sentences2006The first part of the analysis involves only a determination of historical facts, but the second is a mixed question of law and fact: “[T]he historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the [relevant] statutory [or constitutional] standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.” Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696-97 , 116 S.Ct. at 1661-62 , 134 L.Ed.2d at 919 (quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 , 289 n. 19, 102 S.Ct. 1781 , 1791 n. 19, 72 L.Ed.2d 2006The first part of the analysis involves only a determination of historical facts, but the second is a mixed question of law and fact: “[T]he historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the [relevant] statutory [or constitutional] standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.” Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696-97 , 116 S.Ct. at 1661-62 , 134 L.Ed.2d at 919 (quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 , 289 n. 19, 102 S.Ct. 1781 , 1791 n. 19, 72 L.Ed.2d | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Accounts Management, Inc. v. Williams
green
1 sentence2004Accounts Management, 484 N.W.2d at 300 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Jackson v. . Telegraph Co.
green
2 sentences1951Co. [ 139 N.C. 347 , 51 S.E. 1015 , 70 L.R.A. 738 ] is a conspicuously clear exponent of the first part of the rule above set out. 1951Co. [ 139 N.C. 347 , 51 S.E. 1015 , 70 L.R.A. 738 ] is a conspicuously clear exponent of the first part of the rule above set out. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.