63 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1911–2026 22 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Scottgreen2 sentences2026The first part of this analysis involves an assessment of the objective reasonableness of counsel’s actions, see State v. Scott, 2020 UT 13, ¶ 35 , 462 P.3d 350 , and “requires [a] showing . . . that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 . 2026The first part of this analysis involves an assessment of the objective reasonableness of counsel’s actions, see State v. Scott, 2020 UT 13, ¶ 35 , 462 P.3d 350 , and “requires [a] showing . . . that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 . | 15 | 19 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2026The first part of this analysis involves an assessment of the objective reasonableness of counsel’s actions, see State v. Scott, 2020 UT 13, ¶ 35 , 462 P.3d 350 , and “requires [a] showing . . . that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 . 2026The first part of this inquiry involves an assessment of the objective reasonableness of counsel’s actions, see State v. Scott, 2020 UT 13, ¶ 35 , 462 P.3d 350 , and “requires [a] showing . . . that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 . | 3 | 11 |
Archuleta v. Galetkagreen2 sentences2023Because “failure to satisfy either part of the ineffective assistance test is fatal to a defendant’s claim,” State v. Popp, 2019 UT App 173, ¶ 48 , 453 P.3d 657 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 485 P.3d 943 (Utah 2021), we need not “address both components of the inquiry if we determine that [Stephanie] has made an insufficient showing on one,” see Archuleta v. Galetka, 2011 UT 73, ¶ 41 , 267 P.3d 232 (quotation simplified). ¶91 The first part of the test requires Stephanie to show that Trial Counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Scott, 2020 UT 13, ¶ 2023Because “failure to satisfy either part of the ineffective assistance test is fatal to a defendant’s claim,” State v. Popp, 2019 UT App 173, ¶ 48 , 453 P.3d 657 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 485 P.3d 943 (Utah 2021), we need not “address both components of the inquiry if we determine that [Stephanie] has made an insufficient showing on one,” see Archuleta v. Galetka, 2011 UT 73, ¶ 41 , 267 P.3d 232 (quotation simplified). ¶91 The first part of the test requires Stephanie to show that Trial Counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Scott, 2020 UT 13, ¶ | 3 | 6 |
In Re JPgreen2 sentences2018See In re J.P. , 648 P.2d at 1374 -75 . 2018See In re J.P., 648 P.2d at 1374–75. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Clarkgreen2 sentences2020See, e.g., State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶ 6 , 89 P.3d 162 (“To satisfy the first part of the test, defendant must overcome the strong presumption that [his] trial counsel rendered adequate assistance, by persuading the court that there was no conceivable __________________________________________________________ 7 We note the concern of amicus curiae that “virtually any act or omission of trial counsel could be construed as part of a hypothetical ‘strategy’ (rather than an error that is objectively unreasonable).” But when inquiring whether counsel may have had a sound trial strategy, it must f 2020See, e.g., State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶ 6 , 89 P.3d 162 (“To satisfy the first part of the test, defendant must overcome the strong presumption that [his] trial counsel rendered adequate assistance, by persuading the court that there was no conceivable __________________________________________________________ 7 We note the concern of amicus curiae that “virtually any act or omission of trial counsel could be construed as part of a hypothetical ‘strategy’ (rather than an error that is objectively unreasonable).” But when inquiring whether counsel may have had a sound trial strategy, it must f | 1 | 6 |
State v. Raygreen2 sentences2024ANALYSIS ¶55 To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Gourdin must make a two-part showing: (1) that Trial Counsel’s performance was deficient in that it “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) that this deficient performance “prejudiced the defense” such that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 687–88, 694 (1984); accord State v. Scott, 2020 UT 13, ¶ 28 , 462 P.3d 350 ; State v. Ray, 2020 UT 12, ¶ 24 , 469 P.3d 2024ANALYSIS ¶55 To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Gourdin must make a two-part showing: (1) that Trial Counsel’s performance was deficient in that it “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) that this deficient performance “prejudiced the defense” such that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 687–88, 694 (1984); accord State v. Scott, 2020 UT 13, ¶ 28 , 462 P.3d 350 ; State v. Ray, 2020 UT 12, ¶ 24 , 469 P.3d | 1 | 3 |
Howes v. Fieldsgreen2 sentences2019If “an individual’s freedom of movement was curtailed,” the court must then determine “whether the relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.” Id. ¶30 The first part of this inquiry—whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave—is an objective one. 2018If "an individual's freedom of movement was curtailed," the focus turns to "whether the relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda ." Id. ¶22 The first part of this inquiry-whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave-requires "examin[ing] all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation" to determine "how a suspect would have gauge[d] his freedom of movement." Id. (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 3 |
J. D. B. v. North Carolinagreen2 sentences2019See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 271 (2011) (stating that the inquiry “involves no consideration of the actual mindset of the particular suspect” because “the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned are irrelevant” (quotation simplified)). 2018Declining to "demarcate a limited set of relevant circumstances," the United States Supreme Court requires courts to look at "all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, including any circumstance that would have affected how a reasonable person in the suspect's position would perceive his or her freedom to leave." J.D.B. v. North Carolina , 564 U.S. 261 , 270-71, 131 S.Ct. 2394 , 180 L.Ed.2d 310 (2011) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 2 |
Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co.green2 sentences2015The first part of the test, often called the "formalities requirement," requires the movant to show "such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist." Norman, 596 P.2d at 1030 ; see also Messick v. PHD Trucking Serv., Inc., 678 P.2d 791, 794 (Utah 1984). 2015"The first part of the test, often called the "formalities requirement, requires the movant to show 'such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer exist"" Id. (quoting Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979)). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Chacongreen2 sentences2012The prejudice component can be shown by demonstrating that there is "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Millard, 2010 UT App 355 , 114, 246 P.3d 151 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 51 (Utah 1998) (stating that prejudice must be "a demonstrable reality and not a speculative matter" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 16 According to Welborn, trial counsel was deficient because he did not argue to the sentencing court that the probation provision, "by virtue o 2005The supreme court determined that "because defendant's trial counsel did not make a reasonable investigation into the possibility of procuring prospective defense witnesses," this met the first part of the test, id., that trial counsel "rendered deficient performance which fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment." Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50 . 120 Likewise, after the rule 28B hearing in the instant case, the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law reflected the following: 5 (1) prior to trial, Defendant informed trial counsel of relatives who could serve a | 1 | 2 |
State v. Crosbygreen2 sentences2010"To satisfy the first part of the test, defendant must overcome the 'strong presumption that [his] trial counsel rendered adequate assistance."" Id. (quoting State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996)) (alterations in original). 123 In State v. Carter, we questioned whether victim impact evidence concerning a defendant's blameworthiness was probative and held that victim impact evidence was inadmissible in capital sentencing. 888 P.2d 629, 652-58 (Utah 1995), superseded by statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-2070 )(a)@i) (1995) ("This censure of victim impact evidence in capital cases applies t 2010"To satisfy the first part of the test, defendant must overcome the `strong presumption that [his] trial counsel rendered adequate assistance.'" Id. (quoting State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996)) (alterations in original). ¶ 23 In State v. Carter , we questioned whether victim impact evidence concerning a defendant's blameworthiness was probative and held that victim impact evidence was inadmissible in capital sentencing. 888 P.2d 629, 652-53 (Utah 1995), superseded by statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (2)(a)(iii) (1995) ("This censure of victim impact evidence in capital cases appl | 1 | 2 |
| Jenkins v. Swangreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Jamiesongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Newtongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Lewisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Vallejogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Messick v. PHD Trucking Service, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Cartergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Parsons v. Barnesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Commissiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Bryantgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Louis B. Scottgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Taylor v. Wardengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Division of State Lands & Forestrygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Thamergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Carlisle v. Coxgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wilcox v. Clowardgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Poulsen v. Poulsengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Whytock
green
2 sentences2022“A defendant must satisfy both parts of this test in order to successfully establish ineffective assistance.” State v. Whytock, 2020 UT App 107, ¶ 26 , 469 P.3d 1150 . ¶26 The first part of the test requires Garcia-Lorenzo to show that his attorney’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Scott, 2020 UT 13, ¶ 31 (quotation simplified). 2022“A defendant must satisfy both parts of this test in order to successfully establish ineffective assistance.” State v. Whytock, 2020 UT App 107, ¶ 26 , 469 P.3d 1150 . ¶26 The first part of the test requires Garcia-Lorenzo to show that his attorney’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Scott, 2020 UT 13, ¶ 31 (quotation simplified). | 4 | 2021–2022 |
State v. Millard
green
2 sentences2012"Failure to establish either prong is fatal to [Veale's] ineffective assistance claim." Pedersen, 2010 UT App 38, ¶ 13 , 227 P.3d 1264 . 15 To satisfy the first part of the test, Veale "must overcome the strong presumption that [his] trial counsel rendered adequate assistance by persuading the court that there was no conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions." State v. Millard, 2010 UT App 355, ¶ 14 , 246 P.3d 151 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2012"Failure to establish either prong is fatal to [Veale's] ineffective assistance claim." Pedersen, 2010 UT App 38, ¶ 13 , 227 P.3d 1264 . 15 To satisfy the first part of the test, Veale "must overcome the strong presumption that [his] trial counsel rendered adequate assistance by persuading the court that there was no conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions." State v. Millard, 2010 UT App 355, ¶ 14 , 246 P.3d 151 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). | 3 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Kufrin
green
2 sentences2026Thus, “if either is lacking, the claim fails and this court need not address the other.” State v. Kufrin, 2024 UT App 86, ¶ 55 , 551 P.3d 416 (cleaned up). ¶25 The first part of this test requires Durfee to show that Counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Scott, 2020 UT 13, ¶ 31 (cleaned up). 2026Thus, “if either is lacking, the claim fails and this court need not address the other.” State v. Kufrin, 2024 UT App 86, ¶ 55 , 551 P.3d 416 (cleaned up). ¶34 The first part of the test requires James to show that Counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Scott, 2020 UT 13, ¶ 31 (cleaned up). | 2 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Jessop
green
2 sentences2025But “if the court does find that an individual’s freedom of movement was curtailed, the focus turns to whether the relevant environment presented the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.” Id. (quotation simplified). ¶17 “The first part of this inquiry—whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave—is an objective one.” Id. ¶ 41 (quotation simplified). 2025But “if the court does find that an individual’s freedom of movement was curtailed, the focus turns to whether the relevant environment presented the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.” Id. (quotation simplified). ¶31 “The first part of this inquiry—whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave—is an objective one.” Id. ¶ 41 (quotation simplified). | 2 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Popp
green
2 sentences2023Because “failure to satisfy either part of the ineffective assistance test is fatal to a defendant’s claim,” State v. Popp, 2019 UT App 173, ¶ 48 , 453 P.3d 657 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 485 P.3d 943 (Utah 2021), we need not “address both components of the inquiry if we determine that [Stephanie] has made an insufficient showing on one,” see Archuleta v. Galetka, 2011 UT 73, ¶ 41 , 267 P.3d 232 (quotation simplified). ¶91 The first part of the test requires Stephanie to show that Trial Counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Scott, 2020 UT 13, ¶ 2023Because “failure to satisfy either part of the ineffective assistance test is fatal to a defendant’s claim,” State v. Popp, 2019 UT App 173, ¶ 48 , 453 P.3d 657 (quotation simplified), cert. denied, 485 P.3d 943 (Utah 2021), we need not “address both components of the inquiry if we determine that [Stephanie] has made an insufficient showing on one,” see Archuleta v. Galetka, 2011 UT 73, ¶ 41 , 267 P.3d 232 (quotation simplified). ¶91 The first part of the test requires Stephanie to show that Trial Counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Scott, 2020 UT 13, ¶ | 2 | 2020–2023 |
State v. Pedersen
green
2 sentences2012"Failure to establish either prong is fatal to [Veale's] ineffective assistance claim." Pedersen, 2010 UT App 38, ¶ 13 , 227 P.3d 1264 . 15 To satisfy the first part of the test, Veale "must overcome the strong presumption that [his] trial counsel rendered adequate assistance by persuading the court that there was no conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions." State v. Millard, 2010 UT App 355, ¶ 14 , 246 P.3d 151 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2012"Failure to establish either prong is fatal to [Veale's] ineffective assistance claim." Pedersen, 2010 UT App 38, ¶ 13 , 227 P.3d 1264 . 15 To satisfy the first part of the test, Veale "must overcome the strong presumption that [his] trial counsel rendered adequate assistance by persuading the court that there was no conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions." State v. Millard, 2010 UT App 355, ¶ 14 , 246 P.3d 151 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). | 2 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Decorso
green
2 sentences2005In determining whether evidence is admissible under rule 404(b), a "trial court must determine (1) whether such evidence is being offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose under 404(b), (2) whether such evidence meets the requirements of rule 402, and (3) whether this evidence meets the requirements of rule 403." State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ¶ 20 , 993 P.2d 837 . ¶ 71 Under the first part of this test, "the proponent must demonstrate that the evidence is actually being offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose, such as those specifically listed in" rule 404(b). 2005In determining whether evidence is admissible under rule 404(b), a "trial court must determine (1) whether such evidence is being offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose under 404(b), (2) whether such evidence meets the requirements of rule 402, and (3) whether this evidence meets the requirements of rule 403." State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ¶ 20 , 993 P.2d 837 . ¶ 71 Under the first part of this test, "the proponent must demonstrate that the evidence is actually being offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose, such as those specifically listed in" rule 404(b). | 2 | 2001–2005 |
State v. Durfee
green
1 sentence2026In evaluating an attorney’s performance, courts often examine whether the attorney had a strategic reason for taking the 20230410-CA 10 2026 UT App 42 State v. Durfee challenged action. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Turner v. University of Utah Hospitals & Clinics
green
1 sentence2026“Rather, as long as (a) all of the party’s peremptory challenges were used and (b) a juror who was previously challenged for cause ends up being seated on the jury, the issue of jury bias has been preserved.” Id. 6 Here, Whitefeather meets the first part of this test—he used all of his peremptory challenges—but he cannot meet the second, because no juror that was challenged for cause ended up being seated on the jury. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Goddard
green
2 sentences2025“Relevant factors include, but are not limited to, the location of the questioning, its duration, statements made during the interview, the presence or absence of physical restraints during the questioning, and the release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning.” Id. (quotation simplified). ¶32 Here, Bush’s conversation with Officer took place just outside his own home—not in a police car or at the police station, settings that are “inherently coercive.” State v. Goddard, 2021 UT App 124, ¶ 51 , 501 P.3d 1188 , cert. denied, 505 P.3d 55 (Utah 2022). 2025“Relevant factors include, but are not limited to, the location of the questioning, its duration, statements made during the interview, the presence or absence of physical restraints during the questioning, and the release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning.” Id. (quotation simplified). ¶32 Here, Bush’s conversation with Officer took place just outside his own home—not in a police car or at the police station, settings that are “inherently coercive.” State v. Goddard, 2021 UT App 124, ¶ 51 , 501 P.3d 1188 , cert. denied, 505 P.3d 55 (Utah 2022). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Samora
green
2 sentences2025And with respect to the first part of the test, an attorney’s performance is considered to be deficient “if the alleged conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” State v. Samora, 2023 UT 5, ¶ 20 , 529 P.3d 330 (cleaned up). ¶25 In this case, Mendoza asserts that Counsel rendered ineffective assistance in three particulars: (1) by failing to object to what he calls “prosecutorial misconduct” when the prosecutor argued, during both opening statement and closing argument, that the jury could use evidence of guilt on Count 2 as propensity evid 2025And with respect to the first part of the test, an attorney’s performance is considered to be deficient “if the alleged conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” State v. Samora, 2023 UT 5, ¶ 20 , 529 P.3d 330 (cleaned up). ¶25 In this case, Mendoza asserts that Counsel rendered ineffective assistance in three particulars: (1) by failing to object to what he calls “prosecutorial misconduct” when the prosecutor argued, during both opening statement and closing argument, that the jury could use evidence of guilt on Count 2 as propensity evid | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Mendoza
green
1 sentence2025And with respect to the first part of the test, an attorney’s performance is considered to be deficient “if the alleged conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” State v. Samora, 2023 UT 5, ¶ 20 , 529 P.3d 330 (cleaned up). ¶25 In this case, Mendoza asserts that Counsel rendered ineffective assistance in three particulars: (1) by failing to object to what he calls “prosecutorial misconduct” when the prosecutor argued, during both opening statement and closing argument, that the jury could use evidence of guilt on Count 2 as propensity evid | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Ragsdale v. Fishler
green
1 sentence2024That is, Hunt does not challenge the court’s determination that—if he engaged Fishler, 2021 UT 29 , 491 P.3d 835 , did not expressly overrule our pronouncement in Ellison, we must of course follow our supreme court’s admonitions to the extent they are inconsistent with our own, and we do so here. 20230753-CA 6 2024 UT App 117 Harris v. Hunt in a course of conduct directed at Harris—his actions would have caused a reasonable person in Harris’s situation to either (i) fear for their or someone else’s safety or (ii) suffer emotional distress. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Harris v. Hunt
green
1 sentence2024That is, Hunt does not challenge the court’s determination that—if he engaged Fishler, 2021 UT 29 , 491 P.3d 835 , did not expressly overrule our pronouncement in Ellison, we must of course follow our supreme court’s admonitions to the extent they are inconsistent with our own, and we do so here. 20230753-CA 6 2024 UT App 117 Harris v. Hunt in a course of conduct directed at Harris—his actions would have caused a reasonable person in Harris’s situation to either (i) fear for their or someone else’s safety or (ii) suffer emotional distress. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
In re B.D.
green
1 sentence2024To avoid perpetuating this misuse of terminology and to better capture the unique nature of the latter part of the rule, we refer to Mother’s rule 34(e) response as a “no-contest response,” per our recent decision, In re B.D., 2024 UT App 104, ¶ 12 . 20230310-CA 4 2024 UT App 147 In re J.M. abused and neglected. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
In re J.M...
neutral
1 sentence2024To avoid perpetuating this misuse of terminology and to better capture the unique nature of the latter part of the rule, we refer to Mother’s rule 34(e) response as a “no-contest response,” per our recent decision, In re B.D., 2024 UT App 104, ¶ 12 . 20230310-CA 4 2024 UT App 147 In re J.M. abused and neglected. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Fredrick
green
2 sentences2023Conversely, if the court does find that “an individual’s freedom of movement was curtailed, the focus turns to whether the relevant environment present[ed] the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.” Id. ¶ 21 (quotation simplified). ¶41 “The first part of this inquiry—whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave—is an objective one.” State v. Fredrick, 2019 UT App 152, ¶ 30 , 450 P.3d 1154 , cert. denied, 458 P.3d 748 (Utah 2020). 2023Conversely, if the court does find that “an individual’s freedom of movement was curtailed, the focus turns to whether the relevant environment present[ed] the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.” Id. ¶ 21 (quotation simplified). ¶41 “The first part of this inquiry—whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave—is an objective one.” State v. Fredrick, 2019 UT App 152, ¶ 30 , 450 P.3d 1154 , cert. denied, 458 P.3d 748 (Utah 2020). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Tuinman
green
1 sentence2023In evaluating the reasonableness of counsel’s actions, courts will often look to whether the actions counsel took were motivated by 20210242-CA 38 2023 UT App 83 State v. Tuinman trial strategy. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Mottaghian
green
1 sentence2022Thus, “it is unnecessary for a court to address both components of the inquiry if we determine that a defendant has made an insufficient showing on one.” Id. (quotation simplified). 20200199-CA 24 2022 UT App 8 State v. Mottaghian ¶51 The first part of the test requires Mottaghian to show that his attorneys’ performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Scott, 2020 UT 13, ¶ 31 (quotation simplified). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Samora green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Kelley green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Doutre green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Martinez green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Archuleta green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Cramer v. State green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Peterson v. Browning green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Broadbent v. BD. OF EDUC. OF CACHE CTY. green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Hansen v. America Online, Inc. green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Van De Grift v. State green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Litherland green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Powell green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Eldridge v. Johndrow green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Jones & Trevor Marketing, Inc. v. Lowry green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Colman v. Colman green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Ott green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. Vos green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Templin green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Billings v. Union Bankers Insurance Co. green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Masich v. United States Smelting, Refining & Mining Co. green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Berry by and Through Berry v. Beech Aircraft green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.