27 Iowa opinions name it 2 courts 1866–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Iowa courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruengreen2 sentences2025But it’s not easy to get to the plurality’s result through analysis of the plain text, as Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17, instructs. 2025Id. | 2 | 2 |
State of Iowa v. Brent Michael Romergreen2 sentences2022See Romer, 832 N.W.2d at 182 (stating “the State had the right to charge multiple counts in the same offense to achieve judicial economy” in connection with whether there was a common scheme or plan). 2022See Romer, 832 N.W.2d at 182 (stating “the State had the right to charge multiple counts in the same offense to achieve judicial economy” in connection with whether there was a common scheme or plan). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Tusinggreen2 sentences2026See id.; State v. Tusing, 344 N.W.2d 253, 254 (Iowa 1984) (“It is obvious that brass knuckles fulfill the first part of this test; unlike a revolver or a knife, which could be used for target shooting or to peel an apple, there is only one purpose for brass knuckles, and that is to inflict injury, presumably upon a human being.”). 2015Our supreme court had no trouble concluding “brass knuckles fulfill the first part of this test; unlike a revolver or a knife, which could be used for target shooting or to peel an apple, there is only one purpose for brass knuckles, and that is to inflict injury, presumably upon a human being.” Id. at 254 . | 1 | 2 |
District of Columbia v. Hellergreen2 sentences2025Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17; see also Heller, 554 U.S. at 592. 2025Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17 ; see also Heller, 554 U.S. at 592 . | 1 | 1 |
Wende v. Orv Rocker Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc.green2 sentences2025As noted, the heading for the lead argument in the defendants’ motion to enforce the settlement stated: “This Court has authority to summarily enforce settlement agreements where no genuine issue as to any material fact exists.” 21 (Emphases added.) The argument went on to recite the first part of the rule from Wende: “If the important facts are not in dispute, courts may summarily enforce the agreement on motion by one of the parties.” 530 N.W.2d at 94 (emphasis added). 2025As noted, the heading for the lead argument in the defendants’ motion to enforce the settlement stated: “This Court has authority to summarily enforce settlement agreements where no genuine issue as to any material fact exists.” 21 (Emphases added.) The argument went on to recite the first part of the rule from Wende: “If the important facts are not in dispute, courts may summarily enforce the agreement on motion by one of the parties.” 530 N.W.2d at 94 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedmangreen1 sentence2024We turn to the second prong of the test: “whether the state can show suf- ficient justification for the discrimination.”1 Democko, 840 N.W.2d at 293 ; see also Friedman, 487 U.S. at 65 . | 1 | 1 |
Frideres v. Schiltzgreen1 sentence2021See Frideres v. Schiltz, 540 N.W.2d 261, 264 (Iowa 1995) (en banc) (“A law is retroactive if it affects acts or facts which occurred, or rights which accrued, before the law came into 6 force.”). | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Lankford v. Allbeegreen1 sentence2019Lankford v. Allbee, 544 N.W.2d 639, 641 (Iowa 1996) (“Moreover, the use of the word ‘may’ indicates that the director has discretion to make any of the deductions permitted by section 904.702.”); Feller v. Scott Cty. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Magheegreen1 sentence2019We remand for further proceedings concerning Fishel’s request for support under Iowa Code section 236.5(1)(b)(6). 2002) (“By using the word ‘may,’ the legislature signaled its intention to place the decision about whether to file an affidavit to reveal or not reveal the biological parent’s identity squarely in the discretion of that parent.”); State v. Maghee, 573 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 1997) (“The first part of the rule is discretionary: the district court may order amendment so as to correct errors or omissions that either are or are not substantive.”); State ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.green2 sentences1997The first part of rule 702 permits admission of “scientific knowledge.” Id. at 590 , 113 S.Ct. at 2795 , 125 L.Ed.2d at 480 . 1997The first part of rule 702 permits admission of “scientific knowledge.” Id. at 590 , 113 S.Ct. at 2795 , 125 L.Ed.2d at 480 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hildebrantgreen1 sentence1997With regard to the first part of this test, defendant must “overcome the strong presumption counsel’s actions were reasonable under the circumstances and fell within the normal range of professional competency.” State v. Hildebrant, 405 N.W.2d 839, 841 (Iowa 1987). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Zaehringergreen1 sentence1985With respect to the first part of the test, we conclude that armed robbery, the felony of which defendant was previously convicted, encompasses “stealing in an elemental sense,” see State v. Zaehringer, 325 N.W.2d at 756, and so involves dishonesty within the meaning of Martin . | 1 | 1 |
Clark v. Iowa Department of Job Servicegreen1 sentence1982See Clark v. Iowa Department of Job Service, 317 N.W.2d 517, 518 (Iowa Ct.App.1982). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Iowa. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Solem v. Helm
red
2 sentences2009Solem, 463 U.S. at 290 -91 & n. 17, 103 S.Ct. at 3010 & n. 17, 77 L.Ed.2d at 649 & n. 17. 2009Solem, 463 U.S. at 290 -91 & n. 17, 103 S.Ct. at 3010 & n. 17, 77 L.Ed.2d at 649 & n. 17. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Fagg v. Parker
green
2 sentences1913Fagg v. Parker, 11 Iowa, 18 ; State of Iowa v. Wilson, 12 Iowa, 424 . 1866Fagg v. Parker, 11 Iowa, 18 ; The State of Iowa v. Wilson, 12 Iowa, 424 . | 2 | 1866–1913 |
State v. Wilson
neutral
2 sentences1913Fagg v. Parker, 11 Iowa, 18 ; State of Iowa v. Wilson, 12 Iowa, 424 . 1866Fagg v. Parker, 11 Iowa, 18 ; The State of Iowa v. Wilson, 12 Iowa, 424 . | 2 | 1866–1913 |
Joseph W. Democko, Donald Jones and James Samis v. Iowa Department of Natural Resources
green
1 sentence2024We turn to the second prong of the test: “whether the state can show suf- ficient justification for the discrimination.”1 Democko, 840 N.W.2d at 293 ; see also Friedman, 487 U.S. at 65 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Bearshield v. John Morrell & Co.
green
1 sentence2019In the first part of its analysis, the court found the employee failed to show she was substantially limited in her ability to care for herself or walk, citing her testimony “that she could do her normal activities at home.”3 Id. at 920 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Bruegger
green
1 sentence2017Id. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Snethen v. State
green
2 sentences1983Id. 1983Id. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Ehlers v. Iowa Warehouse Company
green
1 sentence1972Some two months after the trial court filed its decree we filed our opinion in Eh-lers v. Iowa Warehouse Co., supra. In Ehlers we overruled our prior holdings as to the second facet in the rule but left the first part of the rule, the limitations restrictions, unchanged. | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Peterson v. Union Motor Sales Company
green
2 sentences1960It is true each was bound to use the care of an ordinarily prudent person under the circumstances; but, as we said in Peterson v. Union Motor Sales Company, 245 Iowa 1337, 1341 , 66 N.W.2d 496, 499 , while the standard required is the same, the conduct necessary to meet that standard is not always so. 1960It is true each was bound to use the care of an ordinarily prudent person under the circumstances; but, as we said in Peterson v. Union Motor Sales Company, 245 Iowa 1337, 1341 , 66 N.W.2d 496, 499 , while the standard required is the same, the conduct necessary to meet that standard is not always so. | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Kisling v. Thierman
green
2 sentences1944Kisling v. Thierman, 214 Iowa 911 , 243 N. W. 552 ; Lukin v. Marvel, 219 Iowa 773 , 259 N. W. 782 . 1944Kisling v. Thierman, 214 Iowa 911 , 243 N. W. 552 ; Lukin v. Marvel, 219 Iowa 773 , 259 N. W. 782 . | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Lukin v. Marvel
neutral
2 sentences1944Kisling v. Thierman, 214 Iowa 911 , 243 N. W. 552 ; Lukin v. Marvel, 219 Iowa 773 , 259 N. W. 782 . 1944Kisling v. Thierman, 214 Iowa 911 , 243 N. W. 552 ; Lukin v. Marvel, 219 Iowa 773 , 259 N. W. 782 . | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Young v. Hendricks
green
2 sentences1939The first part of the instruction defines what an emergency is — “where one is required to act upon the impulse of the moment.” Young v. Hendricks, 226 Iowa 211 , 283 N. W. 895 . 1939The first part of the instruction defines what an emergency is — “where one is required to act upon the impulse of the moment.” Young v. Hendricks, 226 Iowa 211 , 283 N. W. 895 . | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Looney v. Parker
green
2 sentences1933Furthermore, under the instruction, it became the duty of Mrs. Lurie, if there was danger of a collision, to bring her car to a stop and avoid injury, whether, as a reasonably prudent person, she could do SO' or not. ' The district court, in Looney v. Parker, 210 Iowa 85 , reading on pages 89 and 90 ( 230 N. W. 570, 572 ), gave the following instruction: “The driver of a car following another car has a duty to perform in being prepared for a sudden stop by the car ahead of him and keep at such a distance and' to maintain such control of his car as to enable him to stop without hitting the car 1933Furthermore, under the instruction, it became the duty of Mrs. Lurie, if there was danger of a collision, to bring her car to a stop and avoid injury, whether, as a reasonably prudent person, she could do SO' or not. ' The district court, in Looney v. Parker, 210 Iowa 85 , reading on pages 89 and 90 ( 230 N. W. 570, 572 ), gave the following instruction: “The driver of a car following another car has a duty to perform in being prepared for a sudden stop by the car ahead of him and keep at such a distance and' to maintain such control of his car as to enable him to stop without hitting the car | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Jarvis v. Stone
green
2 sentences1933The driver’s duty was to exercise reasonable or ordinary care.” Again we said in Jarvis v. Stone, 216 Iowa 27 ( 247 N. W. 393, 396 ), reading on page 34: “The instruction [the one involved in the Jarvis case] cannot be approved on account of the statements in relation to the duty devolving on the driver of the car upon discovering, or at the time he should have discovered, the presence of the plaintiff on the road. 1933The driver’s duty was to exercise reasonable or ordinary care.” Again we said in Jarvis v. Stone, 216 Iowa 27 ( 247 N. W. 393, 396 ), reading on page 34: “The instruction [the one involved in the Jarvis case] cannot be approved on account of the statements in relation to the duty devolving on the driver of the car upon discovering, or at the time he should have discovered, the presence of the plaintiff on the road. | 1 | 1933–1933 |
McPherrin v. Jones
green
1 sentence1904McPherrin v. Jones, 5 N. D. 26 ( 65 N. W. | 1 | 1904–1904 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.