13 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1947–2024 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Leon-Delfisgreen2 sentences2022It seems ultimately to conclude that the trial court should assess not only whether the government has introduced a new matter on rebuttal (as authorized by Gregory), but also somehow assess the materiality of the government’s rebuttal evidence, notwithstanding that any “new matter” introduced on rebuttal is by definition material. 6 See United States v. Purkey, 428 F.3d 738, 759 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that surrebuttal is appropriate “when new matters are raised in the rebuttal testimony”); United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 821 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Surrebuttal evidence is admissible to r 2022It seems ultimately to conclude that the trial court should assess not only whether the government has introduced a new matter on rebuttal (as authorized by Gregory), but also somehow assess the materiality of the government’s rebuttal evidence, notwithstanding that any “new matter” introduced on rebuttal is by definition material. 6 See United States v. Purkey, 428 F.3d 738, 759 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that surrebuttal is appropriate “when new matters are raised in the rebuttal testimony”); United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 821 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Surrebuttal evidence is admissible to r | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Lloyd Eugene Butchergreen2 sentences2022It seems ultimately to conclude that the trial court should assess not only whether the government has introduced a new matter on rebuttal (as authorized by Gregory), but also somehow assess the materiality of the government’s rebuttal evidence, notwithstanding that any “new matter” introduced on rebuttal is by definition material. 6 See United States v. Purkey, 428 F.3d 738, 759 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that surrebuttal is appropriate “when new matters are raised in the rebuttal testimony”); United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 821 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Surrebuttal evidence is admissible to r 2022It seems ultimately to conclude that the trial court should assess not only whether the government has introduced a new matter on rebuttal (as authorized by Gregory), but also somehow assess the materiality of the government’s rebuttal evidence, notwithstanding that any “new matter” introduced on rebuttal is by definition material. 6 See United States v. Purkey, 428 F.3d 738, 759 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that surrebuttal is appropriate “when new matters are raised in the rebuttal testimony”); United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 821 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Surrebuttal evidence is admissible to r | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Aquilia Marcivicci Barnette, United States of America v. Aquilia Marcivicci Barnettegreen2 sentences2022It seems ultimately to conclude that the trial court should assess not only whether the government has introduced a new matter on rebuttal (as authorized by Gregory), but also somehow assess the materiality of the government’s rebuttal evidence, notwithstanding that any “new matter” introduced on rebuttal is by definition material. 6 See United States v. Purkey, 428 F.3d 738, 759 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that surrebuttal is appropriate “when new matters are raised in the rebuttal testimony”); United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 821 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Surrebuttal evidence is admissible to r 2022It seems ultimately to conclude that the trial court should assess not only whether the government has introduced a new matter on rebuttal (as authorized by Gregory), but also somehow assess the materiality of the government’s rebuttal evidence, notwithstanding that any “new matter” introduced on rebuttal is by definition material. 6 See United States v. Purkey, 428 F.3d 738, 759 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that surrebuttal is appropriate “when new matters are raised in the rebuttal testimony”); United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 821 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Surrebuttal evidence is admissible to r | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Wesley Ira Purkeygreen2 sentences2022It seems ultimately to conclude that the trial court should assess not only whether the government has introduced a new matter on rebuttal (as authorized by Gregory), but also somehow assess the materiality of the government’s rebuttal evidence, notwithstanding that any “new matter” introduced on rebuttal is by definition material. 6 See United States v. Purkey, 428 F.3d 738, 759 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that surrebuttal is appropriate “when new matters are raised in the rebuttal testimony”); United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 821 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Surrebuttal evidence is admissible to r 2022It seems ultimately to conclude that the trial court should assess not only whether the government has introduced a new matter on rebuttal (as authorized by Gregory), but also somehow assess the materiality of the government’s rebuttal evidence, notwithstanding that any “new matter” introduced on rebuttal is by definition material. 6 See United States v. Purkey, 428 F.3d 738, 759 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that surrebuttal is appropriate “when new matters are raised in the rebuttal testimony”); United States v. Barnette, 211 F.3d 803, 821 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Surrebuttal evidence is admissible to r | 2 | 2 |
Reyes v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Servicesgreen1 sentence2024See Reyes, 48 A.3d at 168 (“The less skilled and less independent the work is, the more likely the worker is an employee and not expected to carry his own accident burden. | 1 | 1 |
Whalen v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2022See 445 U.S. at 693-94 . | 1 | 1 |
In Re TJgreen1 sentence2017The first part of this standard comes from language in which we equated the parent’s exercise of their right to designate a caregiver with the parent’s “determination of what is in their child’s best interest.” Id. at 16; see 32 also In re J.D.W., 711 A.2d 826 , 833 (D.C. 1998) (holding that a mother’s consent was not entitled to weighty consideration when the mother was “addicted to drugs, refusing treatment, depressed, and without a stable home” and “gave little or no thought to the best interests of her son”). | 1 | 1 |
In Re JDWgreen1 sentence2017The first part of this standard comes from language in which we equated the parent’s exercise of their right to designate a caregiver with the parent’s “determination of what is in their child’s best interest.” Id. at 16; see 32 also In re J.D.W., 711 A.2d 826 , 833 (D.C. 1998) (holding that a mother’s consent was not entitled to weighty consideration when the mother was “addicted to drugs, refusing treatment, depressed, and without a stable home” and “gave little or no thought to the best interests of her son”). | 1 | 1 |
Morgan v. District of Columbiagreen1 sentence2013A special relationship can also be created by a statute that requires the District to undertake "mandatory acts clearly for the protection of a particular class of persons rather than the public as a whole.” Morgan, 468 A.2d at 1314 (internal quotation marks omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authoritygreen2 sentences1996See Smith, supra, 631 A.2d at 390 ; Sherman, supra, 653 A.2d at 869 . 1996See Smith, supra, 631 A.2d at 390 ; Sherman, supra, 653 A.2d at 869 . | 1 | 1 |
In Re Lenoirgreen2 sentences1993See In re Kennedy, 605 A.2d 600, 604 (D.C.1992) (per curiam); In re Lenoir, 585 A.2d 771, 774 (D.C.1991) (per curiam) (citing In re Hutchinson, supra, 534 A.2d at 924 ; In re Haupt, 422 A.2d 768, 771 (D.C.1980) (Haupt I); In re Smith, 403 A.2d 296, 303 (D.C.1979)). 1993See In re Kennedy, 605 A.2d 600, 604 (D.C.1992) (per curiam); In re Lenoir, 585 A.2d 771, 774 (D.C.1991) (per curiam) (citing In re Hutchinson, supra, 534 A.2d at 924 ; In re Haupt, 422 A.2d 768, 771 (D.C.1980) ( Haupt I ); In re Smith, 403 A.2d 296, 303 (D.C.1979)). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Kennedygreen2 sentences1993See In re Kennedy, 605 A.2d 600, 604 (D.C.1992) (per curiam); In re Lenoir, 585 A.2d 771, 774 (D.C.1991) (per curiam) (citing In re Hutchinson, supra, 534 A.2d at 924 ; In re Haupt, 422 A.2d 768, 771 (D.C.1980) (Haupt I); In re Smith, 403 A.2d 296, 303 (D.C.1979)). 1993See In re Kennedy, 605 A.2d 600, 604 (D.C.1992) (per curiam); In re Lenoir, 585 A.2d 771, 774 (D.C.1991) (per curiam) (citing In re Hutchinson, supra, 534 A.2d at 924 ; In re Haupt, 422 A.2d 768, 771 (D.C.1980) ( Haupt I ); In re Smith, 403 A.2d 296, 303 (D.C.1979)). | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Hauptgreen2 sentences1993See In re Kennedy, 605 A.2d 600, 604 (D.C.1992) (per curiam); In re Lenoir, 585 A.2d 771, 774 (D.C.1991) (per curiam) (citing In re Hutchinson, supra, 534 A.2d at 924 ; In re Haupt, 422 A.2d 768, 771 (D.C.1980) (Haupt I); In re Smith, 403 A.2d 296, 303 (D.C.1979)). 1993See In re Kennedy, 605 A.2d 600, 604 (D.C.1992) (per curiam); In re Lenoir, 585 A.2d 771, 774 (D.C.1991) (per curiam) (citing In re Hutchinson, supra, 534 A.2d at 924 ; In re Haupt, 422 A.2d 768, 771 (D.C.1980) ( Haupt I ); In re Smith, 403 A.2d 296, 303 (D.C.1979)). | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Smithgreen2 sentences1993See In re Kennedy, 605 A.2d 600, 604 (D.C.1992) (per curiam); In re Lenoir, 585 A.2d 771, 774 (D.C.1991) (per curiam) (citing In re Hutchinson, supra, 534 A.2d at 924 ; In re Haupt, 422 A.2d 768, 771 (D.C.1980) (Haupt I); In re Smith, 403 A.2d 296, 303 (D.C.1979)). 1993See In re Kennedy, 605 A.2d 600, 604 (D.C.1992) (per curiam); In re Lenoir, 585 A.2d 771, 774 (D.C.1991) (per curiam) (citing In re Hutchinson, supra, 534 A.2d at 924 ; In re Haupt, 422 A.2d 768, 771 (D.C.1980) ( Haupt I ); In re Smith, 403 A.2d 296, 303 (D.C.1979)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Bynum v. United States
green
2 sentences2022The majority opinion says “[t]his two-part test is consistent with our case law on rebuttal” but then immediately acknowledges, ante at 19 n.6, that the first part of this test “may appear inconsistent 4 The court also stated that it “[did]n’t think [the proffered surrebuttal] testimony would rebut testimony . . . provided in the Government’s rebuttal case,” but as the government acknowledged in its brief, the court made this remark in denying the defense’s request for a missing witness instruction, not with regard to the request for surrebuttal. 40 with Bynum, 799 A.2d at 1194 .” 5 For the re 2022The majority opinion says “[t]his two-part test is consistent with our case law on rebuttal” but then immediately acknowledges, ante at 19 n.6, that the first part of this test “may appear inconsistent 4 The court also stated that it “[did]n’t think [the proffered surrebuttal] testimony would rebut testimony . . . provided in the Government’s rebuttal case,” but as the government acknowledged in its brief, the court made this remark in denying the defense’s request for a missing witness instruction, not with regard to the request for surrebuttal. 40 with Bynum, 799 A.2d at 1194 .” 5 For the re | 2 | 2022–2022 |
In Re Cohen
green
1 sentence2014Respondent attempts to analogize her case to In re Cohen, 847 A.2d 1162 (D.C.2004), and In re Cater, 887 A.2d 1 (D.C.2005), where attorneys were suspended no more than 180 days as a result of their failure to supervise employees, which resulted in various types of misconduct, including embezzlement of client funds. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
In Re Cater
green
1 sentence2014Respondent attempts to analogize her case to In re Cohen, 847 A.2d 1162 (D.C.2004), and In re Cater, 887 A.2d 1 (D.C.2005), where attorneys were suspended no more than 180 days as a result of their failure to supervise employees, which resulted in various types of misconduct, including embezzlement of client funds. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Biddle v. Chatel
green
1 sentence2009But the second element is equally critical: the prior litigation “must have been with a third party and not with the defendant in the present action.” Id. (emphasis added). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Sherman v. District of Columbia
green
2 sentences1996See Smith, supra, 631 A.2d at 390 ; Sherman, supra, 653 A.2d at 869 . 1996See Smith, supra, 631 A.2d at 390 ; Sherman, supra, 653 A.2d at 869 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
In Re Hutchinson
green
2 sentences1993See In re Kennedy, 605 A.2d 600, 604 (D.C.1992) (per curiam); In re Lenoir, 585 A.2d 771, 774 (D.C.1991) (per curiam) (citing In re Hutchinson, supra, 534 A.2d at 924 ; In re Haupt, 422 A.2d 768, 771 (D.C.1980) (Haupt I); In re Smith, 403 A.2d 296, 303 (D.C.1979)). 1993See In re Kennedy, 605 A.2d 600, 604 (D.C.1992) (per curiam); In re Lenoir, 585 A.2d 771, 774 (D.C.1991) (per curiam) (citing In re Hutchinson, supra, 534 A.2d at 924 ; In re Haupt, 422 A.2d 768, 771 (D.C.1980) (Haupt I); In re Smith, 403 A.2d 296, 303 (D.C.1979)). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Brown v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment
green
1 sentence1988It was apparent that an attorney-client relationship existed since the attorneys facing disqualification "had served as counsel for the District of Columbia in two earlier transactions allegedly related to [the one at issue].” 486 A.2d at 40 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Robert L. Dunn, of the Estate of Ruth E. Hoover, Deceased v. William J. Marsh, of the Estate of Margaret v. Marsh, Deceased
green
2 sentences1980Standardized Jury Instructions, supra, No. 64, incorporates verbatim the first part of this test as expressed in Dunn v. Marsh, supra at 248 , 393 F.2d at 357 , which defined proximate cause as “that cause, which in natural and continual sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred.” See note 1 supra. The fuller Spar definition was then given following the substantial factor test, in summary of what the jury must find to determine proximate cause. 1980Standardized Jury Instructions, supra, No. 64, incorporates verbatim the first part of this test as expressed in Dunn v. Marsh, supra at 248 , 393 F.2d at 357 , which defined proximate cause as "that cause, which in natural and continual sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred." See note 1 supra. The fuller Spar definition was then given following the substantial factor test, in summary of what the jury must find to determine proximate cause. | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Barstow v. Capital Traction Co.
green
1 sentence1947Barstow v. Capital Traction Co., 29 App.D.C. 362 . | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.