first part instruction in Kansas

2026Logan, 236 Kan. at 86 .

2024"In other words, if the first part of Kansas's two-part inquiry asks whether the defendant had knowledge of a broadly described dangerous condition, the second part of that inquiry must ask whether the defendant recklessly disregarded or was indifferent to the same broadly described risk; conversely, if the first part of the test targets the narrow, specific risk that caused the particular accident at issue and asks if the defendant was aware or should have been aware of that particular specific risk, then the second part of the analysis to be consistent must ask if the defendant was indiffere

2022Under the first part of this analysis, we determine whether the asserted right or declared interest falls within the purview of rights protected by section 1. 309 Kan. at 620. "'[T]he doctrine of judicial self-restraint'" requires us to begin with "'a careful description of the asserted right.'" Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 , 113 S. Ct. 1439 , 123 L.

2022Under the first part of this analysis, we determine whether the asserted right or declared interest falls within the purview of rights protected by section 1. 309 Kan. at 620. "'[T]he doctrine of judicial self-restraint'" requires us to begin with "'a careful description of the asserted right.'" Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 , 113 S. Ct. 1439 , 123 L.

2022State v. Scheuerman, 314 Kan. 583 , 593, 502 P.3d 502 (2022).

2018Then, in *129 exercising our independent judgment under the second part of the test, we opined as follows: "As to the second-prong of the test, we explained in Williams that 'community consensus is entitled to great weight but it is not determinative.' 298 Kan. at 1087, 319 P.3d 528 .

2018In the first part of the test we determine "whether the legislative means selected ... has a real and substantial relation to the objective sought." Injured Workers , 262 Kan. at 854 , 942 P.2d 591 .

2018In the first part of the test we determine "whether the legislative means selected ... has a real and substantial relation to the objective sought." Injured Workers , 262 Kan. at 854 , 942 P.2d 591 .

2007App. 2d 539, 541 , 6 P.3d 441 (2000), the court stated that the first part of the analysis in determining whether jail credit would be available in cases such as this was deciding whether the halfway house qualified as a residential facility.

2006Kluin v. American Suzuki Motor Corp., 274 Kan. 888 , Syl, 56 P.3d 829 (2002).

2006Kluin v. American Suzuki Motor Corp., 274 Kan. 888 , Syl, 56 P.3d 829 (2002).

2005The first part of the rule is governed by an objective standard: “If the desire for counsel is presented ‘sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney,’ no ambiguity or equivocation exists, and all questions must cease.” Walker, 276 Kan. at 945 .

2005This court has stated that “it is good practice for the interrogator to ask clarifying questions” if an accused makes an ambiguous request for counsel; “however, it is not required and the questioning may continue.” Walker, 276 Kan. at 945 .

2005The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals approved the first part of the instruction that prohibited drawing adverse inferences from Liddy’s retaining counsel. 509 F.2d at 443-44 .

2005The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals approved the first part of the instruction that prohibited drawing adverse inferences from Liddy's retaining counsel. 509 F.2d at 443-44 .

2003Recalling the two-step test set forth in Cummings and our adoption of the first part of that test in Halsey , two important cases followed Cummings involving the question of UIM coverage under the second part of Cummings : “[T]he claimant must have damages in excess of the opposing party’s liability cov *438 erage.” 13 Kan.

1997A person may be considered a state actor "because he is a state official, he acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the state." Gilmore, supra, at 635, quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co ., 457 U.S. 922 , 936 ; 102 S.Ct. 2744 , 2754 (1982).

1997A person may be considered a state actor "because he is a state official, he acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the state." Gilmore, supra, at 635, quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co ., 457 U.S. 922 , 936 ; 102 S.Ct. 2744 , 2754 (1982).

1975State v. Schriner, 215 Kan. 86 , 523 P. 2d 703 ; State v. Ingram, 211 Kan. 587 , 506 P. 2d 1148 .

1975State v. Schriner, 215 Kan. 86 , 523 P. 2d 703 ; State v. Ingram, 211 Kan. 587 , 506 P. 2d 1148 .

1975State v. Schriner, 215 Kan. 86 , 523 P. 2d 703 ; State v. Ingram, 211 Kan. 587 , 506 P. 2d 1148 .

1975State v. Schriner, 215 Kan. 86 , 523 P. 2d 703 ; State v. Ingram, 211 Kan. 587 , 506 P. 2d 1148 .

1924(Ehrsam v. Brown, 76 Kan. 206 , 91 Pac. 179 ; Lumber Co. v. Mercantile Co., 114 Kan. 10 , 216 Pac. 815 .) The remainder of the instruction was correct, and covered the case made by the answer and the testimony supporting it.

1924(Ehrsam v. Brown, 76 Kan. 206 , 91 Pac. 179 ; Lumber Co. v. Mercantile Co., 114 Kan. 10 , 216 Pac. 815 .) The remainder of the instruction was correct, and covered the case made by the answer and the testimony supporting it.

1924(Ehrsam v. Brown, 76 Kan. 206 , 91 Pac. 179 ; Lumber Co. v. Mercantile Co., 114 Kan. 10 , 216 Pac. 815 .) The remainder of the instruction was correct, and covered the case made by the answer and the testimony supporting it.

1924(Ehrsam v. Brown, 76 Kan. 206 , 91 Pac. 179 ; Lumber Co. v. Mercantile Co., 114 Kan. 10 , 216 Pac. 815 .) The remainder of the instruction was correct, and covered the case made by the answer and the testimony supporting it.

1897The case of Hubbell v. The City of Yonkers ( 104 N. Y. 434 ) is quite like this case in respect of the facts, and the rule of law there applied meets our approval.

1893In the case of Railway Co. v. Pointer, 14 Kas. 37 , it was held, that “Where the facts are disputed, negligence is a question of fact for the jury; where the facts are undisputed and but one deduction is to be drawn from them, it presents a question of law for the courts; but where the facts are undisputed, but are of such a nature that different minds will draw different conclusions from them as to the reasonableness and care of a party’s conduct, it is a proper question for the determination of a jury.” The rule as declared in this case has been adhered to in all subsequent cases.