first part analysis in North Carolina

2020App. at 103 , 616 S.E.2d at 5 (citing Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 289 , 523 S.E.2d at 671 ). 9 “‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” N.C.

2020App. at 103 , 616 S.E.2d at 5 (citing Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 289 , 523 S.E.2d at 671 ). 9 “‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” N.C.

2020“The first part of the inquiry seeks to determine the child’s purpose in making the statement, not the interviewer’s purpose in conducting the interview.” Lewis, 172 N.C.

2020“The first part of the inquiry seeks to determine the child’s purpose in making the statement, not the interviewer’s purpose in conducting the interview.” Lewis, 172 N.C.

2014As Iodice noted, identically-worded policies may be read together “harmoniously,” but that reading is predicated on whether the claimant falls within different “classes” between the respective policies. 133 N.C.

2014As Iodice noted, identically-worded policies may be read together “harmoniously,” but that reading is predicated on whether the claimant falls within different “classes” between the respective policies. 133 N.C.

2006The first part of this standard requires that a defendant show “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688 , 80 L.

2006The first part of this standard requires that a defendant show “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 688 , 80 L.

2026“We require extraordinary circumstances because a writ of certiorari ‘is not intended as a substitute for a notice of appeal.’ If courts issued writs of certiorari solely on the showing of some error below, it would ‘render meaningless the rules governing the time and manner of noticing appeals.’” Id. (quoting Ricks, 378 N.C. at 741, 862 S.E.2d 839 ).

2023The trial court appears to have concluded that the evidence met the first part of the standard, specifically that it went beyond “conjecture,” but failed to meet the second part of the 1 While our precedent in Larrimore, 340 N.C. at 144–45, does not explicitly state that reviewing the proffered evidence in the light most favorable to defendants requires that reasonable inferences be drawn in their favor, it stands to reason that drawing reasonable inferences in the defendants’ favor is part of this analysis.

2016See McKyer, 179 N.C.App. at 146 , 632 S.E.2d at 836 ("Before earning capacity may be used as the basis of [a child support] award, there must be a showing that the actions reducing the party's income were taken in bad faith to avoid family responsibilities."); Pataky, 160 N.C.App. at 306 -07 , 585 S.E.2d at 415-16 ; Bowers, 141 N.C.App. at 732 , 541 S.E.2d at 510 .

2016See McKyer, 179 N.C.App. at 146 , 632 S.E.2d at 836 ("Before earning capacity may be used as the basis of [a child support] award, there must be a showing that the actions reducing the party's income were taken in bad faith to avoid family responsibilities."); Pataky, 160 N.C.App. at 306 -07 , 585 S.E.2d at 415-16 ; Bowers, 141 N.C.App. at 732 , 541 S.E.2d at 510 .

2016See McKyer, 179 N.C.App. at 146 , 632 S.E.2d at 836 ("Before earning capacity may be used as the basis of [a child support] award, there must be a showing that the actions reducing the party's income were taken in bad faith to avoid family responsibilities."); Pataky, 160 N.C.App. at 306 -07 , 585 S.E.2d at 415-16 ; Bowers, 141 N.C.App. at 732 , 541 S.E.2d at 510 .

2016See McKyer, 179 N.C.App. at 146 , 632 S.E.2d at 836 ("Before earning capacity may be used as the basis of [a child support] award, there must be a showing that the actions reducing the party's income were taken in bad faith to avoid family responsibilities."); Pataky, 160 N.C.App. at 306 -07 , 585 S.E.2d at 415-16 ; Bowers, 141 N.C.App. at 732 , 541 S.E.2d at 510 .

2009Id.

2009It is clear that "[i]n the context of retirement benefits, a contractual obligation exists once the employee's rights have vested." Schimmeck v. City of Winston-Salem, 130 N.C.

2009State v. Bruton, 344 N.C. 381, 393 , 474 S.E.2d 336, 345 (1996) (citing Carver, 319 N.C. at 667-68 , 356 S.E.2d at 351 ).

2009State v. Bruton, 344 N.C. 381, 393 , 474 S.E.2d 336, 345 (1996) (citing Carver, 319 N.C. at 667-68 , 356 S.E.2d at 351 ).

2006App. at 815 , 616 S.E.2d at 647 . {42} The first part of this analysis requires that “there . . . be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; the unilateral activity within the forum state of others who claim some relationship with a non-resident defendant will not suffice.” Tom Togs, Inc. v. Ben Elias Indus.

2001After satisfying the first part of the test, defendant must next show he was prejudiced by the error such that “a reasonable probability exists that the trial result would have been different absent the error.” Lee, 348 N.C. at 491 , 501 S.E.2d at 345 .

2001After satisfying the first part of the test, defendant must next show he was prejudiced by the error such that “a reasonable probability exists that the trial result would have been different absent the error.” Lee, 348 N.C. at 491 , 501 S.E.2d at 345 .

2000Id. at 705 , 404 S.E.2d at 20 .

2000Id. at 705 , 404 S.E.2d at 20 .

1994Id. at 624 , 389 S.E.2d at 424 .

1994Id. at 624 , 389 S.E.2d at 424 .

1990Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513 , 186 S.E.2d 897 , reh’g denied, 281 N.C. 516 (1972); Godwin Sprayers v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co., 59 N.C.

1990Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513 , 186 S.E.2d 897 , reh’g denied, 281 N.C. 516 (1972); Godwin Sprayers v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co., 59 N.C.

1990Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513 , 186 S.E.2d 897 , reh’g denied, 281 N.C. 516 (1972); Godwin Sprayers v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co., 59 N.C.

1990Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513 , 186 S.E.2d 897 , reh’g denied, 281 N.C. 516 (1972); Godwin Sprayers v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co., 59 N.C.

1986Therefore only the good faith and prejudice steps remain to be addressed by the trial court. *720 The first of these, the “requirement that any period of delay beyond the limits of timeliness . . . [be] in good faith” was carefully defined by this Court in Great American: Anyone who knows that he may be at fault or that others have claimed he is at fault and who purposefully and knowingly fails to notify ought not to recover even if no prejudice results. 303 N.C. at 399 , 279 S.E. 2d at 776 .

1986Therefore only the good faith and prejudice steps remain to be addressed by the trial court. *720 The first of these, the “requirement that any period of delay beyond the limits of timeliness . . . [be] in good faith” was carefully defined by this Court in Great American: Anyone who knows that he may be at fault or that others have claimed he is at fault and who purposefully and knowingly fails to notify ought not to recover even if no prejudice results. 303 N.C. at 399 , 279 S.E. 2d at 776 .