26 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1967–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Armstronggreen2 sentences2026The Tennessee Supreme Court recognized that “a substantial compliance standard would be very difficult to apply in a consistent and uniform manner, and therefore would conflict with the very purpose of Preston.” Armstrong, 126 S.W.3d at 912 . 2024Our supreme court has concluded that “a substantial compliance standard would be very difficult to apply in a consistent and uniform manner, and therefore would conflict with the very purpose of Preston.” Armstrong, 126 S.W.3d at 912 ; Herbison, 2023 WL 5846696 at *6. | 6 | 9 |
State v. Irwingreen2 sentences2017In State v. Armstrong, 126 S.W.3d 908, 912 (Tenn. 2003), the Tennessee Supreme Court held that it had “never applied a substantial compliance standard to the Preston requirements[.]” Instead, it reiterated that the Preston requirements regarding Rule 37 were “‘explicit and unambiguous.’” Id. (quoting State v. Irwin, 962 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tenn. 1998); Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d at 837 ). 2015In State v. Armstrong, 126 S.W.3d 908, 912 (Tenn. 2003), the Tennessee Supreme Court held that it had “never applied a substantial compliance standard to the Preston requirements[.]” Instead, it reiterated that the Preston requirements regarding Rule 37 were “„explicit and unambiguous.‟” Id. (quoting State v. Irwin, 962 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tenn. 1998); Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d at 837 ). | 6 | 7 |
State v. Pendergrassgreen2 sentences2017In State v. Armstrong, 126 S.W.3d 908, 912 (Tenn. 2003), the Tennessee Supreme Court held that it had “never applied a substantial compliance standard to the Preston requirements[.]” Instead, it reiterated that the Preston requirements regarding Rule 37 were “‘explicit and unambiguous.’” Id. (quoting State v. Irwin, 962 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tenn. 1998); Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d at 837 ). 2015In State v. Armstrong, 126 S.W.3d 908, 912 (Tenn. 2003), the Tennessee Supreme Court held that it had “never applied a substantial compliance standard to the Preston requirements[.]” Instead, it reiterated that the Preston requirements regarding Rule 37 were “„explicit and unambiguous.‟” Id. (quoting State v. Irwin, 962 S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tenn. 1998); Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d at 837 ). | 3 | 7 |
State of Tennessee v. Michael Shane Springergreen2 sentences2026“The defendant bears the burden of ensuring that the final order complies with the requirements of Rule 37 and that the appellate record is sufficient for review.” State v. Springer, 406 S.W.3d 526, 531 (Tenn. 2013); see State v. Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Tenn. 1996). 2024“The defendant bears the burden of ensuring that the final order complies with the requirements of Rule 37 and that the appellate record is sufficient for review.” State v. Springer, 406 S.W.3d 526, 531 (Tenn. 2013); see Pendergrass, 937 S.W.2d at 837 (Tenn. 1996). | 2 | 2 |
Tracy Eiswert v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2020See Eiswert v. United States, 619 F. App’x 483 , 486–87 (6th Cir. 2015) (Noting that “the Supreme Court of Tennessee has not expressly addressed whether substantial compliance may suffice under section [29-26-]122” or “whether Tennessee law requires strict compliance under section [29-26-]122 . . . .”). - 12 - unless the expert or experts who signed the written statement in support thereof were competent under section 29-26-115(b) to testify as to every necessary element contained in section 29-26-115(a). 2020See Eiswert v. United States, 619 F. App’x 483 , 486–87 (6th Cir. 2015) (Noting that “the Supreme Court of Tennessee has not expressly addressed whether substantial compliance may suffice under section [29-26-]122” or “whether Tennessee law requires strict compliance under section [29-26-]122 . . . .”). - 12 - unless the expert or experts who signed the written statement in support thereof were competent under section 29-26-115(b) to testify as to every necessary element contained in section 29-26-115(a). | 2 | 2 |
Arden v. Kozawagreen1 sentence2018See Arden, 466 S.W.3d at 764 . | 1 | 1 |
Estate of McFerren v. Infinity Transport, LLCgreen1 sentence2015In Estate of McFerren v. Infinity Transport, LLC, 197 S.W.3d 743, 748 (Tenn. 2006), our Supreme Court explained that the requirements of Rule 4.03 are mandatory, stating: Rule 4.03 clearly and specifically requires that a return identify the person upon whom process was served and a description of the manner of service. | 1 | 1 |
Owens v. New Britain General Hospitalgreen1 sentence2008Owens v. New Britain General Hospital, 627 A.2d at 1379, (affirmed by Connecticut Supreme Court in Owens v. New Britain General Hospital, 643 A.2d 233, 240 (Conn. 1994)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Frazier
green
2 sentences1997In Neal , the Tennessee Supreme Court articulated - the difference between “substantial compliance” and “harmless error” analysis as follows: While we have alluded to review of Boy-kin violations as being “subject to substantial compliance and harmless error scrutiny” in State v. Frazier, [ 784 S.W.2d 927 (Tenn.1990) ], we did not mean to adopt a substantial compliance doctrine that would be anything less than full compliance with the heretofore set out requirements. *625 While absolutely literal compliance with the advice to be given is not required, expressing the sense of the substance of t 1995In Neal , the Tennessee Supreme Court articulated the difference between “substantial compliance” and “harmless error” analysis as follows: While we have alluded to review of Boy-kin violations as being “subject to substantial compliance and harmless error scrutiny” in State v. Frazier, [ 784 S.W.2d 927 (Tenn.1990) ], we did not mean to adopt a substantial compliance doctrine that would be anything less than full compliance with the heretofore set out requirements. | 3 | 1991–1997 |
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend
green
1 sentence2024Although it may be necessary for a court to probe behind the pleadings before adjudicating a certification question, Comcast Corp., 569 U.S. at 33 , we have noted that the extent of the rigorous analysis necessary for a decision on class certification “depend[s] upon the claims and defenses presented, the type of class certification requested, the issues raised regarding the compliance with the rule’s requirements, the members of the purported class, and other questions presented by the particular case and the requirements of Rule 23.” Rogers v. Adventure House LLC, 617 S.W.3d 542 , 552 (Tenn. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Akilah Louise Wofford v. M.J. Edwards & Sons Funeral Home, Inc.
green
2 sentences2024Although it may be necessary for a court to probe behind the pleadings before adjudicating a certification question, Comcast Corp., 569 U.S. at 33 , we have noted that the extent of the rigorous analysis necessary for a decision on class certification “depend[s] upon the claims and defenses presented, the type of class certification requested, the issues raised regarding the compliance with the rule’s requirements, the members of the purported class, and other questions presented by the particular case and the requirements of Rule 23.” Rogers v. Adventure House LLC, 617 S.W.3d 542 , 552 (Tenn. 2024The trial court must “conduct its own inquiry into whether the requirements of Rule 23 have been met.” Id. (quoting Wofford, 528 S.W.3d at 540 ). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Vanzant
green
1 sentence2003State v. Vanzant, 659 S.W.2d 816 (Tenn. Crim. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State v. Neal
green
1 sentence1997That would be substantial compliance. 810 S.W.2d at 137 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Coonradt v. Sailors
green
2 sentences1989We in effect approved this principle when this Court in Coonradt v. Sailors, 186 Tenn. 294 , 209 S.W.2d 859, 861 , 2 A.L.R.2d 880 , said: “By the great weight of authority, the adoption of a child is governed by statute and to effect a legal adoption it must be strictly complied with.” Another case emphasizing the strict compliance doctrine regarding adoptions is In re Van Huss’ Petition, 207 Tenn. 168 , 338 S.W.2d 588 (1960). 1989We in effect approved this principle when this Court in Coonradt v. Sailors, 186 Tenn. 294 , 209 S.W.2d 859, 861 , 2 A.L.R.2d 880 , said: “By the great weight of authority, the adoption of a child is governed by statute and to effect a legal adoption it must be strictly complied with.” Another case emphasizing the strict compliance doctrine regarding adoptions is In re Van Huss’ Petition, 207 Tenn. 168 , 338 S.W.2d 588 (1960). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
In re Petition of Van Huss
green
2 sentences1989We in effect approved this principle when this Court in Coonradt v. Sailors, 186 Tenn. 294 , 209 S.W.2d 859, 861 , 2 A.L.R.2d 880 , said: “By the great weight of authority, the adoption of a child is governed by statute and to effect a legal adoption it must be strictly complied with.” Another case emphasizing the strict compliance doctrine regarding adoptions is In re Van Huss’ Petition, 207 Tenn. 168 , 338 S.W.2d 588 (1960). 1989We in effect approved this principle when this Court in Coonradt v. Sailors, 186 Tenn. 294 , 209 S.W.2d 859, 861 , 2 A.L.R.2d 880 , said: “By the great weight of authority, the adoption of a child is governed by statute and to effect a legal adoption it must be strictly complied with.” Another case emphasizing the strict compliance doctrine regarding adoptions is In re Van Huss’ Petition, 207 Tenn. 168 , 338 S.W.2d 588 (1960). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
State v. Teague
green
1 sentence1989The State made application for appeal to this Court submitting that the bench and bar need further guidance regarding the import of the language in Rounsaville , on the premise that it has been construed to constitutionalize the supervisory requisites for guilty plea allocutions found in Mackey ; to eliminate the substantial compliance rule established in Mackey and approved in State v. Teague, 680 S.W.2d 785 (Tenn. 1984); and also to place the supervisory requisites beyond the harmless error rule established by T.R.A.P. 36(b). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Barnes v. Prudential Ins. Co.
neutral
2 sentences1981Barnes v. Prudential Insurance Co., 28 Tenn.App. 109 , 186 S.W.2d 918 (Tenn.App.E.S.1944), cert. denied, id. 1981Barnes v. Prudential Insurance Co., 28 Tenn.App. 109 , 186 S.W.2d 918 (Tenn.App.E.S.1944), cert. denied, id. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Jackson v. Stoner
neutral
1 sentence1968Baised, however, for the first time in the printed argument, the objection, being one not fatal to the appeal, working at most a continuance to obtain a corrected transcript, conceiving, in their absence, that counsel preferred an early decision upon the merits, we have waived a compliance with the rule, satisfied, as we are, that in this case there was no intention to evade it.” The same C.J.S. footnote cites 4 C.J., page 430, note 28 wherein are cited Fernow v. Dubuque, supra, and Jackson v. Stoner, 17 Kan. 605 (1877) wherein the Court rejected an original bill of exceptions which had not be | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Fernow v. Dubuque & Southwestern Railroad
neutral
1 sentence1968Baised, however, for the first time in the printed argument, the objection, being one not fatal to the appeal, working at most a continuance to obtain a corrected transcript, conceiving, in their absence, that counsel preferred an early decision upon the merits, we have waived a compliance with the rule, satisfied, as we are, that in this case there was no intention to evade it.” The same C.J.S. footnote cites 4 C.J., page 430, note 28 wherein are cited Fernow v. Dubuque, supra, and Jackson v. Stoner, 17 Kan. 605 (1877) wherein the Court rejected an original bill of exceptions which had not be | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n v. King
green
2 sentences1967Brandt v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass’n, 30 Tenn.App. 14 , 202 S.W.2d 827 ; Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass’n v. King, 55 Tenn.App. 72 , 396 S.W.2d 94 , 95 and eases cited in these opinions. 1967Brandt v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass’n, 30 Tenn.App. 14 , 202 S.W.2d 827 ; Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass’n v. King, 55 Tenn.App. 72 , 396 S.W.2d 94 , 95 and eases cited in these opinions. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Brandt v. Mutual Ben. Health Acc. Ass'n
green
2 sentences1967Brandt v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass’n, 30 Tenn.App. 14 , 202 S.W.2d 827 ; Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass’n v. King, 55 Tenn.App. 72 , 396 S.W.2d 94 , 95 and eases cited in these opinions. 1967Brandt v. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass’n, 30 Tenn.App. 14 , 202 S.W.2d 827 ; Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass’n v. King, 55 Tenn.App. 72 , 396 S.W.2d 94 , 95 and eases cited in these opinions. | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.