compliance standard in Illinois

2023The court stated: “We reject defendant’s implicit premise that the strict compliance standard of [People v. Janes, 158 Ill. 2d 27 (1994),] must be applied so mechanically as to require Illinois courts to grant multiple remands and new hearings following the initial remand hearing.

2023The court stated: “We reject defendant’s implicit premise that the strict compliance standard of [People v. Janes, 158 Ill. 2d 27 (1994),] must be applied so mechanically as to require Illinois courts to grant multiple remands and new hearings following the initial remand hearing.

2023Although earlier cases did not require absolute perfection in a petition for a tax deed (see People v. Orth, 21 Ill. 2d 205, 211 (1961)), in 1970 the General Assembly amended the Tax Code to specifically include a strict compliance requirement (In re Application of Cook County Collector, 100 Ill.

1991This court, in interpreting the strict compliance requirement in In re Application of Cook County Collector (1981), 100 Ill.

2013Samuelson v. Cook County Officers Electoral Board, 2012 IL App (1st) 120581, ¶¶ 27, 29 (Justice Joseph Gordon rejected this same argument and held that the phrase “ ‘in substantially the following form’ ” “applies to all, not some, of that section’s requirements”). ¶ 21 Appellants cite Bowe v. Chicago Electoral Board, 79 Ill. 2d 469 (1980) (per curiam), for the proposition that the doctrine of substantial compliance does not apply when the legislature sets forth a “different, significant” notarization form.

2004Petitioner also cites Bowe v. Chicago Electoral Board, 79 Ill. 2d 469 , 404 N.E.2d 180 (1980), for the proposition that mandatory provisions in the Election Code cannot be satisfied by “substantial compliance.” Again, we do not interpret Bowe as rejecting the doctrine of substantial compliance.

2005Under the strict compliance standard, a section 41 notice is "`insufficient if one or more of the essential elements is omitted.'" Davis, 326 Ill.App.3d at 1028 , 260 Ill.Dec. 774 , 762 N.E.2d at 44 , quoting Yokley, 307 Ill.

2001Under the applicable strict compliance standard, a proper section 41 notice "must contain each of the required elements set forth in the statute and is insufficient if one or more of the essential elements is omitted." Yokley , 307 Ill.

2000If they intended to insist upon a compliance with this requirement, they should have made known their intention before the duties were entered upon.” Pardridge v. Ryan, 134 Ill. 247, 255 , 25 N.E. 627 (1890). “[I]f the parties proceeded to a hearing before unsworn arbitrators without objection, they will be deemed to have waived that requirement.” City of Carlyle v. Village of Beckemeyer, 243 Ill.

2000If they intended to insist upon a compliance with this requirement, they should have made known their intention before the duties were entered upon.” Pardridge v. Ryan, 134 Ill. 247, 255 , 25 N.E. 627 (1890). “[I]f the parties proceeded to a hearing before unsworn arbitrators without objection, they will be deemed to have waived that requirement.” City of Carlyle v. Village of Beckemeyer, 243 Ill.

1998App. 3d at 998 , citing Arrington v. Industrial Comm’n, 96 Ill. 2d 505 (1983).

1998App.3d at 998 , 150 Ill.Dec. 824 , 563 N.E.2d 951 , citing Arrington v. Industrial Comm'n, 96 Ill.2d 505 , 71 Ill.Dec. 712 , 451 N.E.2d 866 (1983).

2026The certificate serves as evidence that the requisite consultation has taken place.” ’ [Citation.] This court has rejected arguments that the strict compliance standard of Rule 604(d) ‘must be applied so mechanically as to require Illinois courts to grant - 16 - multiple remands and new hearings following the initial remand hearing.’ [Citation.] Where a defendant has been ‘afforded a full and fair second opportunity to present a motion for reduced sentencing,’ there is ‘limited value in requiring a repeat of the exercise, absent a good reason to do so.’ [Citation.]” Brown, 2024 IL 129585, ¶ 53

2026Our supreme court “has rejected arguments that the strict compliance standard of Rule 604(d) ‘must be applied so mechanically as to require Illinois courts to grant multiple remands and new hearings following the initial remand hearing.’ ” Id. (quoting People v. Shirley, 181 Ill. 2d 359, 369 (1998)).

2020Id. ¶ 18 Thus, under the strict compliance standard applicable to leasing options, failure to timely exercise the option is fatal.

2019Id. ¶ 18 Thus, under the strict compliance standard applicable to leasing options, failure to timely exercise the option is fatal.

2017Thus, what occurred on remand was a “mere charade performed for the purpose of reinstating an appeal.” People v. Tejada-Soto, 2012 IL App (2d) 110188 , ¶ 14. ¶8 The State relies on People v. Shirley, 181 Ill. 2d 359, 369 (1998), which found “limited value” in an additional remand where, on the first remand, the defendant “was afforded a full and fair second opportunity to present a motion for reduced sentencing.” The context for that statement is the Shirley court’s rejection of “defendant’s implicit premise that the strict compliance standard of [Janes] must be applied so mechanically as to r

2017Thus, what occurred on remand was a “mere charade performed for the purpose of reinstating an appeal.” People v. Tejada-Soto, 2012 IL App (2d) 110188 , ¶ 14. ¶8 The State relies on People v. Shirley, 181 Ill. 2d 359, 369 (1998), which found “limited value” in an additional remand where, on the first remand, the defendant “was afforded a full and fair second opportunity to present a motion for reduced sentencing.” The context for that statement is the Shirley court’s rejection of “defendant’s implicit premise that the strict compliance standard of [Janes] must be applied so mechanically as to r

2015Instead, our inquiry is more fundamental: whether defendant’s waiver was a “knowing, intelligent act[ ] done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d at 137 . ¶ 16 We find that the admonishments given by the trial court were sufficient and that defendant’s waiver of his right to file a postconviction petition was knowing, voluntary, and valid.

2014Instead, our inquiry is more fundamental: whether defendant's waiver was a "knowing, intelligent act[] done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) McClanahan, 191 Ill. 2d at 137 . ¶ 16 We find that the admonishments given by the trial court were sufficient and that defendant's waiver of his right to file a postconviction petition was knowing, voluntary, and valid.

2012Cinkus, 228 Ill.2d at 211 , 319 Ill.Dec. 887 , 886 N.E.2d 1011 . ¶ 36 When a deviation from the Code is minor or technical in nature, and does not defeat the thrust, purpose, and effect of the statute, or "affect the legislative intent to guarantee a fair and honest election," it will not render that petition *478 invalid.

2012Cinkus, 228 Ill.2d at 211 , 319 Ill.Dec. 887 , 886 N.E.2d 1011 . ¶ 36 When a deviation from the Code is minor or technical in nature, and does not defeat the thrust, purpose, and effect of the statute, or "affect the legislative intent to guarantee a fair and honest election," it will not render that petition *478 invalid.

2012Id. at 555 .

2012Id. at 555 .

2012Plaintiff asserts that it is not likely that the Illinois supreme court would adopt Farm Fresh Catfish 's strict compliance test, favoring instead the Kansas Supreme Court's adoption of a substantial compliance test. ¶ 23 The Farm Fresh Catfish court stated that it "reject[ed] the Kansas Supreme Court's application of a substantial compliance factor to the Act's direct notice exception. [Citation.] We consider the decision unpersuasive and contrary to established rules of statutory interpretation." Farm Fresh Catfish, 371 F.3d at 454 n. 3.

2012Plaintiff asserts that it is not likely that the Illinois supreme court would adopt Farm Fresh Catfish’s strict compliance test, favoring instead the Kansas Supreme Court’s adoption of a substantial compliance test. ¶ 23 The Farm Fresh Catfish court stated that it “reject[ed] the Kansas Supreme Court’s application of a substantial compliance factor to the Act’s direct notice exception. [Citation.] We consider the decision unpersuasive and contrary to established rules of statutory interpretation.” Farm Fresh Catfish, 371 F.3d at 454 n.3.

2010Evidence of Financial Incentive In his brief, the plaintiff seeks to support the introduction of "financial interest" evidence because "the introduction of this evidence was limited and specific to the issue of the defendants' compliance with the standard of care." The plaintiff claims, "the evidence of financial incentive goes to the heart of the breach of the standard of care by the physician." I note no authority is cited for the introduction of such evidence even where its purpose is "limited and specific." The plaintiff seeks to distinguish the decision in Bearden v. Hamby, 240 Ill.

2009Evidence of Financial Incentive In his brief, the plaintiff seeks to support the introduction of “financial interest” evidence because “the introduction of this evidence was limited and specific to the issue of the defendants’ compliance with the standard of care.” The plaintiff claims, “the evidence of financial incentive goes to the heart of the breach of the standard of care by the physician.” I note no authority is cited for the introduction of such evidence even where its purpose is “limited and specific.” The plaintiff seeks to distinguish the decision in Bearden v. Hamby, 240 Ill.

2010Specifically, "Whitfield requires that defendants be advised that a term of MSR will be added to the actual sentence agreed upon in exchange for a guilty plea to the offense." (Emphasis added.) Morris, 236 Ill. 2d at 367 .

2010Specifically, “Whitfield requires that defendants be advised that a term of MSR will be added to the actual sentence agreed upon in exchange for a guilty plea to the offense.” (Emphasis added.) Morris, 236 Ill. 2d at 367 .

2007In separate appeals, the appellate court in Mashni reversed the trial court judgment ( 362 Ill.

2007In separate appeals, the appellate court in Mashni reversed the trial court judgment ( 362 Ill.

2005Scott, 285 Ill.

2005Scott , 285 Ill.

2005Under the strict compliance standard, a section 41 notice is "`insufficient if one or more of the essential elements is omitted.'" Davis, 326 Ill.App.3d at 1028 , 260 Ill.Dec. 774 , 762 N.E.2d at 44 , quoting Yokley, 307 Ill.

2005Under the strict compliance standard, a section 41 notice is "`insufficient if one or more of the essential elements is omitted.'" Davis, 326 Ill.App.3d at 1028 , 260 Ill.Dec. 774 , 762 N.E.2d at 44 , quoting Yokley, 307 Ill.

1998"The failure to demonstrate this authority until after the statutory period expired does not meet the strict compliance standard required for circuit court review of Industrial Commission cases." Illinois Armored Car , 205 Ill.

1998"The failure to demonstrate this authority until after the statutory period expired does not meet the strict compliance standard required for circuit court review of Industrial Commission cases." Illinois Armored Car, 205 Ill.

1998The resulting loss of the property might constitute a financial disaster.'" In re Application of the County Treasurer and ex-Officio County Collector of Cook County, Illinois, for Order of Judgment and Sale of Lands and Lots upon Which all or Part of the General Taxes for 5 or More Years are Delinquent Pursuant to Section 235A of the Revenue Act of 1939, as Amended , 213 Ill.

1998The resulting loss of the property might constitute a financial disaster.’ ” In re Application of the County Treasurer & ex officio County Collector of Cook County, Illinois, for Order of Judgment & Sale of Lands & Lots upon Which All or Part of the General Taxes for Five or More Years Are Delinquent Pursuant to Section 235A of the Revenue Act of 1939, as Amended, 213 Ill.

1994App. 3d at 650 ; People v. Denson (1993), 243 Ill.

1994App. 3d at 648 ; People v. Denson (1993), 243 Ill.