87 New Jersey opinions name it 4 courts 1924–2026 25 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Alan J. Cornblatt, PA v. Barowgreen2 sentences2026The doctrine of substantial compliance can be applied "to avoid technical defeat[] of [a] valid claim[]." Fink v. Thompson, 167 N.J. 551, 561 (2001) (quoting Cornblatt v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 239 (1998)). 2024"Courts invoke the doctrine of substantial compliance to 'avoid technical defeats of valid claims.'" Id. at 305 (quoting Cornblatt v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 239 (1998)). | 6 | 20 |
Bernstein v. BD. OF TRUST. TEACHERS'PEN. & ANN. FUNDgreen2 sentences2017Ctr., 167 N.J. 341 , 353 (2001) (noting that the substantial compliance doctrine requires, among other things, a series of steps taken to comply with the applicable statute (citing Bernstein v. Bd. of 12 A-2191-15T4 Trs. of the Teachers' Pension and Annuity Fund, 151 N.J. 2008Any technical non-conformity is excusable under the equitable doctrine of substantial compliance. [2] Bernstein v. Bd. of Trs. of Teachers' Pension & Annuity Fund, 151 N.J.Super. 71, 76-77 , 376 A. 2d 563 (App.Div.1977). | 6 | 18 |
Galik v. CLARA MAASS MED. CENTERgreen2 sentences2026The substantial compliance doctrine requires the moving party to show: (1) the lack of prejudice to the defending party; (2) a series of steps taken to comply with the statute involved; (3) a general compliance with the purpose of the statute; (4) a reasonable notice of petitioner's claim; and (5) a reasonable explanation why there was not strict compliance with the statute. [Ferreira, 178 N.J. at151.] "Establishing those elements is a heavy burden." Galik, 167 N.J. at 357. 2018Ctr., 167 N.J. 341 , 353 (2001) (setting forth five elements necessary to invoke the doctrine of substantial compliance). | 6 | 14 |
Negron v. Llarenagreen2 sentences2024"Courts invoke the doctrine of substantial compliance to 'avoid technical defeats of valid claims.'" Id. at 305 (quoting Cornblatt v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 239 (1998)). 2024Super. 587, 598 (App. Div. 2003) (quoting Negron, 156 N.J. at 305 ).] We have applied the doctrine of substantial compliance "to excuse an untimely filing in New Jersey where the plaintiff has filed a timely claim in a federal court A-0737-22 4 or the court of another state that was dismissed by that court for lack of jurisdiction and followed by a prompt filing in New Jersey." Schmidt v. Celgene Corp., 425 N.J. | 5 | 12 |
County of Hudson v. Stategreen2 sentences2021The substantial compliance doctrine “operates ‘to prevent barring legitimate claims due to technical defects.’” County of Hudson v. Dep’t of Corr., 208 N.J. 1, 21 (2011) (quoting Lebron v. Sanchez, 407 N.J. 2019Even so, the doctrine can only apply if there is no prejudice to the other party and if there is "a reasonable explanation why there was not strict compliance with the statute." [County. of Hudson v. State, Dep't of Corr., 208 N.J. 1, 21-22 (2011) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).] To warrant application of the doctrine of substantial compliance, the moving party must show: (1) the lack of prejudice to the defendant party; (2) steps taken to comply with the statute; (3) a general compliance with the purpose of the statute; (4) reasonable notice of a plaintiff's claim; and (5) a rea | 4 | 4 |
Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic Associatesgreen2 sentences2019Relying upon an affidavit of merit decision, Ferreira v. Rancocas Orthopedic Associates, 178 N.J. 144, 151 (2003), plaintiff argues that the substantial compliance doctrine requires the moving party to show: "(1) the lack of prejudice to the defending party; (2) a series of steps taken to comply with the statute involved; (3) a general compliance with the purpose of the statute; (4) a reasonable notice of [plaintiff's] claim; and (5) a reasonable explanation why there was not strict compliance with the statute." See Galik v. Clara Maass Med. 2019The doctrine of substantial compliance "is invoked so that technical defects will not defeat a valid claim" and provides that "[a] complaint will not be dismissed if the plaintiff can show that he has substantially complied with the statute." Ferreira, 178 N.J. at 151 . | 3 | 8 |
D.D. v. University of Medicine & Dentistrygreen2 sentences2021Super. 71, 76-77 (App. Div. 1977)).] In Tort Claims Act cases, the doctrine of substantial compliance “has been limited carefully to those situations in which the notice, although both timely and in writing, had technical deficiencies that did not deprive the public entity of the effective notice contemplated by the statute.” D.D., 213 N.J. at 159 . 2021In the context of the TCA, the substantial compliance doctrine "has been limited carefully to those situations in which the notice, although both timely and in writing, had technical deficiencies that did not deprive the public entity of the effective notice contemplated by the statute." D.D., 213 N.J. at 159 . | 2 | 6 |
Fink v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2026The doctrine of substantial compliance can be applied "to avoid technical defeat[] of [a] valid claim[]." Fink v. Thompson, 167 N.J. 551, 561 (2001) (quoting Cornblatt v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 239 (1998)). 2021Fink v. Thompson, 167 N.J. 551, 561 (2001). | 2 | 3 |
Joseph Vanderslice v. Harold Stewart and Camden County (073362)green2 sentences2024See Vanderslice, 220 N.J. at 391 (recognizing that "a delay in satisfaction of the service requirement does not have the same deleterious effect upon efficient administration of the arbitration program as a failure to file the demand within time" (quoting Flett Assocs., 361 N.J. 2024See Vanderslice, 220 N.J. at 391 (recognizing that "a delay in satisfaction of the service requirement does not have the same deleterious effect upon efficient administration of the arbitration program as a failure to file the demand within time" (quoting Flett Assocs., 361 N.J. | 2 | 3 |
Flett Associates v. SD CATALANOgreen2 sentences2024See Vanderslice, 220 N.J. at 391 (recognizing that "a delay in satisfaction of the service requirement does not have the same deleterious effect upon efficient administration of the arbitration program as a failure to file the demand within time" (quoting Flett Assocs., 361 N.J. 2024See Vanderslice, 220 N.J. at 391 (recognizing that "a delay in satisfaction of the service requirement does not have the same deleterious effect upon efficient administration of the arbitration program as a failure to file the demand within time" (quoting Flett Assocs., 361 N.J. | 2 | 2 |
Lebron v. Sanchezgreen2 sentences2021The substantial compliance doctrine “operates ‘to prevent barring legitimate claims due to technical defects.’” County of Hudson v. Dep’t of Corr., 208 N.J. 1, 21 (2011) (quoting Lebron v. Sanchez, 407 N.J. 2021The substantial compliance doctrine “operates ‘to prevent barring legitimate claims due to technical defects.’” County of Hudson v. Dep’t of Corr., 208 N.J. 1, 21 (2011) (quoting Lebron v. Sanchez, 407 N.J. | 2 | 2 |
ZAMEL, ET UX. v. Port of NY Authoritygreen2 sentences2023"Courts invoke the doctrine of substantial compliance to 'avoid technical defeats of valid claims.'" Cornblatt v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 239 (1998) (quoting Zamel v. Port of New York Auth., 56 N.J. 1, 6 (1970)). 2006“Courts invoke the doctrine of substantial compliance ‘to avoid technical defects of valid claims.’ ” Cornblatt v. Barow, 153 N.J. 218, 239 , 708 A.2d 401 (1998) (quoting Zamel v. Port of New York Auth., 56 N.J. 1, 6 , 264 A.2d 201 (1970)). | 1 | 10 |
Villalobos v. Favagreen2 sentences2021As required by the doctrine of substantial compliance, equitable tolling requires plaintiffs to "diligently pursue their claims" because although it "'affords relief from inflexible, harsh or unfair application of a statute of limitations,' [it] does not excuse claimants from exercising the reasonable insight and diligence required to pursue their claims." Id. at 31-32 (quoting Villalobos v. Fava, 342 N.J. 2007As required by the doctrine of substantial compliance, equitable tolling requires plaintiffs to "diligently pursue their claims" because although it "`affords relief from inflexible, harsh or unfair application of a statute of limitations,' [it] does not excuse claimants from exercising the reasonable insight and diligence required to pursue their claims." Id. at 31-32, 788 A. 2d 867 (quoting Villalobos v. Fava, 342 N.J.Super. 38, 52 , 775 A. 2d 700 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 210 , 785 A. 2d 438 (2001)). | 1 | 2 |
A-3601-13t2 Ariel Schochet v. Sharona Schochetgreen1 sentence2026We have held the objective of a compliance hearing "is simply to determine whether that failure was excusable or willful"; in other words, whether "the obligor was able to pay and did not." Schochet v. Schochet, 435 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
CES Associates v. Cranbury Townshipgreen1 sentence2025See CES Associates v. Cranbury Twp., 15 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Leake v. Bullockgreen1 sentence2025See Leake v. Bullock, 104 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Schmidt v. CELGENE CORP.green1 sentence2024Super. 587, 598 (App. Div. 2003) (quoting Negron, 156 N.J. at 305 ).] We have applied the doctrine of substantial compliance "to excuse an untimely filing in New Jersey where the plaintiff has filed a timely claim in a federal court A-0737-22 4 or the court of another state that was dismissed by that court for lack of jurisdiction and followed by a prompt filing in New Jersey." Schmidt v. Celgene Corp., 425 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
In re the Adoption of Rules Concerning Conduct of Judges of Compensationgreen1 sentence2022See, e.g., In re Adoption of Rules Concerning Conduct of Judges of Comp., N.J.A.C. 12:235-3.11 Through 3.23, 244 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Binder v. Price Waterhouse & Co., LLPgreen1 sentence2021Super. 38, 52 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 210 (2001)). [Binder v. Price Waterhouse & Co., 393 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
McDade v. Siazongreen1 sentence2020Specifically, those purposes are: (1) to allow the public entity at least six months for administrative review with the opportunity to settle meritorious claims prior to the bringing of suit; (2) to provide the public entity with prompt notification of a claim in order to adequately investigate the facts and prepare a defense; (3) to afford the public entity a chance to correct the conditions or practices which gave rise to the claim; and (4) to inform the State in advance as to the indebtedness or liability that it may be expected to meet. [McDade v. Siazon, 208 N.J. 463, 475-76 (2011) (inter | 1 | 1 |
| Psak, Graziano, Piasecki & Whitelaw v. Fleet National Bankgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Henderson v. Hermangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Palanque v. Lambert-Woolleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Guzman v. City of Perth Amboygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sroczynski v. Milekgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Moore v. Magor Car Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Moegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Moreaugreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ethridge v. Allied Equipment & Supply Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Eller v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Borough of Little Ferry v. Bergen County Sewer Authoritygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bergen County Sewer Authority v. Borough of Little Ferrygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board
green
2 sentences2026Id. at 141 . 2026Id. at 141 . | 2 | 2026–2026 |
Jefferson Street Condominium Ass'n v. Paige
green
2 sentences2025Ibid. (citing Weise v. Dover Gen. 2025Jefferson, 346 N.J. | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Corcoran v. St. Peter's Med. Ctr.
green
2 sentences2003In concluding that the requirement of service of a trial de novo demand can be satisfied by substantial compliance, we noted that the courts of this State have applied the substantial compliance doctrine in various other contexts "where a party files a pleading or other court document in a timely manner, but fails to make service in strict accordance with the governing court rule or statute." Id. at 342 , 771 A. 2d 707 . 2003In concluding that the requirement of service of a trial de novo demand can be satisfied by substantial compliance, we noted that the courts of this State have applied the substantial compliance doctrine in various other contexts "where a party files a pleading or other court document in a timely manner, but fails to make service in strict accordance with the governing court rule or statute." Id. at 342 , 771 A. 2d 707 . | 2 | 2002–2003 |
Burns v. Belafsky
green
2 sentences2000Moreover, in Burns v. Belafsky, 326 N.J.Super. 462, 468 , 741 A. 2d 649 (App.Div.1999), certif. granted, 164 N.J. 189 , 752 A. 2d 1291 (2000), we held that the substantial compliance doctrine is implicated only in the narrow context "where a certification was *170 used in lieu of an affidavit." We observed that "[t]he Supreme Court set forth the requisite circumstances justifying invocation of the substantial compliance doctrine." Id. at 468-69, 741 A. 2d 649 . 2000Moreover, in Burns v. Belafsky, 326 N.J.Super. 462, 468 , 741 A. 2d 649 (App.Div.1999), certif. granted, 164 N.J. 189 , 752 A. 2d 1291 (2000), we held that the substantial compliance doctrine is implicated only in the narrow context "where a certification was *170 used in lieu of an affidavit." We observed that "[t]he Supreme Court set forth the requisite circumstances justifying invocation of the substantial compliance doctrine." Id. at 468-69, 741 A. 2d 649 . | 2 | 2000–2001 |
Ricra v. Barbera
green
2 sentences2001Id. at 431-32 , 746 A.2d 68 . 2001Id. at 431-32 , 746 A.2d 68 . | 2 | 2001–2001 |
New Jersey Division of Youth & Family Services v. F.M.
green
1 sentence2024This minimal delay does not offend notions of due process nor does it warrant the drastic relief sought by defendant, which would "upend a properly conducted guardianship hearing at which the A-1066-23 12 family court has fairly found that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the children." See F.M., 211 N.J. at 446 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
A.T. v. Cohen
green
1 sentence2024Next, relying on our Supreme Court's decision in A.T. v. Cohen, 231 N.J. 337 (2017), plaintiff argues the court erred in failing to find extraordinary circumstances. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Borough of Berlin v. Remington & Vernick Engineers
green
1 sentence2022Applying the doctrine of substantial compliance, the Appellate Division held that the plaintiff’s expert hydrogeologist was “the ‘appropriate licensed person,’ despite the fact that only the engineering firm was sued,” because “[t]he liability pressed against the engineering firm [was] solely vicarious.” Id. at 598 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
United Jersey Bank v. Kensey
green
1 sentence2021As required by the doctrine of substantial compliance, equitable tolling requires plaintiffs to "diligently pursue their claims" because although it "'affords relief from inflexible, harsh or unfair application of a statute of limitations,' [it] does not excuse claimants from exercising the reasonable insight and diligence required to pursue their claims." Id. at 31-32 (quoting Villalobos v. Fava, 342 N.J. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Beauchamp v. Amedio
green
1 sentence2020Specifically, those purposes are: (1) to allow the public entity at least six months for administrative review with the opportunity to settle meritorious claims prior to the bringing of suit; (2) to provide the public entity with prompt notification of a claim in order to adequately investigate the facts and prepare a defense; (3) to afford the public entity a chance to correct the conditions or practices which gave rise to the claim; and (4) to inform the State in advance as to the indebtedness or liability that it may be expected to meet. [McDade v. Siazon, 208 N.J. 463, 475-76 (2011) (inter | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Nascimento v. King green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Madej v. Doe green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Tuckey v. Harleysville Ins. Co. green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| DR Horton, Inc. v. NJ DEP. OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION neutral | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Sroczynski v. Milek green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Freeman v. State green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Schaible Oil Co. v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| White v. Violent Crimes Compensation Board green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Verbiest v. NJ FULL INS. ASS'N green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| In re the Estate of Gerhardt green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| In Re the Probate of the Alleged Will of Ranney green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Matter of Estate of Peters green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Abbott Ex Rel. Abbott v. Burke green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Matter of Commitment of BH green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Gerzsenyi v. Richardson green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Burns v. Belafsky green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Hartsfield v. Fantini green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Giardina v. Bennett green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Baumann v. Marinaro green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Morris County Fair Housing Council v. Boonton Tp. green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Turi v. Turi green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Bronstein v. Payne green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Haston v. Castner green | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| Lasker v. Lasker green | 1 | 1924–1924 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.