60 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1887–2025 15 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Adkinsgreen2 sentences2020“The nonformalistic nature of a substantial compliance rule affords the protection of a strict compliance rule with far less of the problems associated with requiring courts to engage in a word-for-word litany approach.” People v Adkins (After Remand), 452 Mich 702, 727 ; 551 NW2d 108 (1996), overruled in part on other grounds in People v Williams, 470 Mich 634 , 641 n 7; 683 NW2d 597 (2004). 2020“The nonformalistic nature of a substantial compliance rule affords the protection of a strict compliance rule with far less of the problems associated with requiring courts to engage in a word-for-word litany approach.” People v Adkins (After Remand), 452 Mich 702, 727 ; 551 NW2d 108 (1996), overruled in part on other grounds in People v Williams, 470 Mich 634 , 641 n 7; 683 NW2d 597 (2004). | 4 | 10 |
In Re Guilty Plea Casesgreen2 sentences2023MCR 6.302(A)’s requirement that a plea be “understanding, voluntary, and accurate” is “premised on the requirements of constitutional due process . . . .” 7 Strict compliance with MCR 6.302 is not required. 8 Rather, this Court has “adopted a doctrine of substantial compliance,” and “ ‘whether a particular departure [from the requirements of MCR 6.302] justifies or requires reversal or remand for additional proceedings will depend on the nature of the noncompliance.’ ” 9 “Automatic invalidation of a plea due to a 7 People v Cole, 491 Mich 325, 332 ; 817 NW2d 497 (2012). 8 People v Brinkey, 327 2023MCR 6.302(A)’s requirement that a plea be “understanding, voluntary, and accurate” is “premised on the requirements of constitutional due process . . . .” 7 Strict compliance with MCR 6.302 is not required. 8 Rather, this Court has “adopted a doctrine of substantial compliance,” and “ ‘whether a particular departure [from the requirements of MCR 6.302] justifies or requires reversal or remand for additional proceedings will depend on the nature of the noncompliance.’ ” 9 “Automatic invalidation of a plea due to a 7 People v Cole, 491 Mich 325, 332 ; 817 NW2d 497 (2012). 8 People v Brinkey, 327 | 2 | 7 |
Stelzer v. Huddlestongreen2 sentences2021The rationale of the substantial compliance rule is that while the notice provisions in statutes are mandatory, they are essentially procedural; that rigid adherence to such a procedural mandate will not be required if it is clear that a substantial compliance provides realistic fulfillment of the purpose for which the mandate was incorporated in the statute. [Id. at 275, quoting Stelzer v Huddleston, 526 SW2d 710, 713 (Tex Civ App, 1975).] The Court held that the city had substantially complied with the OMA’s public-notice provisions and, because of this, the trial court did not err by refusi 1980"Even though provisions of the statute are mandatory, we hold that the 'notice’ provisions of the statute are subject to the substantial compliance rule * * * The rationale of the substantial compliance rule is that while the notice provisions in statutes are mandatory, they are essentially procedural; that rigid adherence to such a procedural mandate will not be required if it is clear that a substantial compliance provides realistic fulfillment of the purpose for which the mandate was incorporated in the statute.” Stelzer v Huddleston, 526 SW2d 710, 713 (Tex App, 1975). | 2 | 2 |
Aetna Life Insurance v. Brooksgreen2 sentences2017The majority concludes that the handwritten “note does not contradict plaintiff’s letter that the COB form was not received until October 9, the day after decedent passed away.” However, this conclusion ignores the doctrine of substantial compliance, whereby when a COB request is received is not determinative so long as the insured does “all in his [or her] power to effect the change in the manner prescribed in the policy.” Harris v Metropolitan Life Ins Co, 330 Mich 24, 27-28 ; 46 NW2d 448 (1950); see also Aetna Life Ins Co v Brooks, 96 Mich App 310, 315 ; 292 NW2d 532 (1980). 2017The majority concludes that the handwritten “note does not contradict plaintiff’s letter that the COB form was not received until October 9, the day after decedent passed away.” However, this conclusion ignores the doctrine of substantial compliance, whereby when a COB request is received is not determinative so long as the insured does “all in his [or her] power to effect the change in the manner prescribed in the policy.” Harris v Metropolitan Life Ins Co, 330 Mich 24, 27-28 ; 46 NW2d 448 (1950); see also Aetna Life Ins Co v Brooks, 96 Mich App 310, 315 ; 292 NW2d 532 (1980). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Russellgreen2 sentences2022The substantial compliance rule requires a trial court to “make an express finding that the defendant fully understands, recognizes, and agrees to abide by the waiver of counsel procedures.” Russell, 471 Mich at 191 . 2022The substantial compliance rule requires a trial court to “make an express finding that the defendant fully understands, recognizes, and agrees to abide by the waiver of counsel procedures.” Russell, 471 Mich at 191 . | 1 | 7 |
People v. Saffoldgreen2 sentences2023MCR 6.302(A)’s requirement that a plea be “understanding, voluntary, and accurate” is “premised on the requirements of constitutional due process . . . .” 7 Strict compliance with MCR 6.302 is not required. 8 Rather, this Court has “adopted a doctrine of substantial compliance,” and “ ‘whether a particular departure [from the requirements of MCR 6.302] justifies or requires reversal or remand for additional proceedings will depend on the nature of the noncompliance.’ ” 9 “Automatic invalidation of a plea due to a 7 People v Cole, 491 Mich 325, 332 ; 817 NW2d 497 (2012). 8 People v Brinkey, 327 2023MCR 6.302(A)’s requirement that a plea be “understanding, voluntary, and accurate” is “premised on the requirements of constitutional due process . . . .” 7 Strict compliance with MCR 6.302 is not required. 8 Rather, this Court has “adopted a doctrine of substantial compliance,” and “ ‘whether a particular departure [from the requirements of MCR 6.302] justifies or requires reversal or remand for additional proceedings will depend on the nature of the noncompliance.’ ” 9 “Automatic invalidation of a plea due to a 7 People v Cole, 491 Mich 325, 332 ; 817 NW2d 497 (2012). 8 People v Brinkey, 327 | 1 | 5 |
People v. Plumajgreen2 sentences2021ACTUAL PREJUDICE The requirement of “actual prejudice” for obtaining postjudgment relief “is similar to the prejudice standard in an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.” Swain, 288 Mich App at 638 . -6- “Actual prejudice” is established under MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b)(ii) when “the defect in the proceedings was such that it renders the plea an involuntary one to a degree that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the conviction to stand.” This Court has held that “[s]trict compliance with MCR 6.302 is not essential; rather, our Supreme Court has adopted a doctrine of substantial compliance, hol 2021ACTUAL PREJUDICE The requirement of “actual prejudice” for obtaining postjudgment relief “is similar to the prejudice standard in an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.” Swain, 288 Mich App at 638 . -6- “Actual prejudice” is established under MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b)(ii) when “the defect in the proceedings was such that it renders the plea an involuntary one to a degree that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the conviction to stand.” This Court has held that “[s]trict compliance with MCR 6.302 is not essential; rather, our Supreme Court has adopted a doctrine of substantial compliance, hol | 1 | 3 |
Stand Up for Democracy v. Secretary of Stategreen2 sentences2024The Court specifically stated that “neither the statutory scheme nor the caselaw [the] plaintiff relies on supports the application of the substantial compliance doctrine in the period before an election.” Stand Up 492 Mich at 608 (emphasis added); see also id. at 606-607 (“[W]hile this Court has recognized application of the substantial compliance doctrine to mandatory petition requirements post-election, it has not recently sanctioned application of substantial compliance to nonconforming petitions before an election.”). 2024The Court specifically stated that “neither the statutory scheme nor the caselaw [the] plaintiff relies on supports the application of the substantial compliance doctrine in the period before an election.” Stand Up 492 Mich at 608 (emphasis added); see also id. at 606-607 (“[W]hile this Court has recognized application of the substantial compliance doctrine to mandatory petition requirements post-election, it has not recently sanctioned application of substantial compliance to nonconforming petitions before an election.”). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Andersongreen2 sentences2020See Anderson, 398 Mich at 368 (requiring the trial court to make a record evidencing a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the defendant’s right to counsel and assertion of the right to self-representation); Russell, 471 Mich at 191 (recognizing that the substantial compliance standard requires the trial court to conduct “a short colloquy with the defendant, and make an express finding that the defendant fully understands, recognizes, and agrees to abide by the waiver of counsel procedures.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 2016The nonformalistic nature of a substantial compliance rule affords the protection of a strict compliance rule with far less of -5- the problems associated with requiring courts to engage in a word-for-word litany approach. [Id. at 726-727.] It is not disputed that the requirement set forth in Anderson, 398 Mich at 367 -368 were not strictly complied with in this instance. | 1 | 2 |
CHARTER TWP. OF MERIDIAN v. City of East Lansinggreen2 sentences2013Under the substantial compliance doctrine, “ ‘[a]s a general principle, all doubts as to technical deficiencies or failure to comply with the exact letter of procedural requirements are resolved in favor of permitting the people to vote and express their will on any proposal subject to election.’ ” Bloomfield Charter Twp v Oakland Co Clerk, 253 Mich App 1, 21 ; 654 NW2d 610 (2002), quoting Meridian Twp, 101 Mich App at 810 . 2002In light of these facts, we find that the petitions were “in sufficiently clear terms so that those signing the petition can be assumed to have understood to what it was they were appending their signatures.” Meridian, supra at 810. *25 With respect to the other elements of substantial compliance discussed in Meridian as will be discussed further in part v of this opinion, the petitions properly contained the signatures of at least twenty percent of the registered electors residing within the annexation area, were circulated within the annexation area of the township, and contained the names a | 1 | 2 |
Kadans v. Wayne County Clerkgreen2 sentences2012See Carmen v Secretary of State, 384 Mich 443, 454-455 ; 185 NW2d 1 (1971) (reasoning that the error in noncompliant initiatory petitions was cured by voters’ adoption of the constitutional amendment because they were “directly notified” of the omitted information on election day); City of Jackson v Commissioner of Revenue, 316 Mich 694, 716-718 ; 26 NW2d 569 (1947) (noting that courts should view technical errors differently once the electors have voted affirmatively). 34 Kadans v Wayne Co Clerk, 363 Mich 306 ; 109 NW2d 788 (1961). 35 Id. at 308 . 15 Kadans’s broad application of the substant 2012See Carmen v Secretary of State, 384 Mich 443, 454-455 ; 185 NW2d 1 (1971) (reasoning that the error in noncompliant initiatory petitions was cured by voters’ adoption of the constitutional amendment because they were “directly notified” of the omitted information on election day); City of Jackson v Commissioner of Revenue, 316 Mich 694, 716-718 ; 26 NW2d 569 (1947) (noting that courts should view technical errors differently once the electors have voted affirmatively). 34 Kadans v Wayne Co Clerk, 363 Mich 306 ; 109 NW2d 788 (1961). 35 Id. at 308 . 15 Kadans’s broad application of the substant | 1 | 2 |
Gibson v. Group Insurancegreen2 sentences2025See Gibson v Group Ins Co, 142 Mich App 271, 275-276 ; 369 NW2d 484 (1985) (applying the doctrine to the EUO requirement); Reed v Loyal Protective Ass’n, 154 Mich 161, 175 ; 117 NW 600 (1908) (applying the doctrine to a notice requirement). 2025See Gibson v Group Ins Co, 142 Mich App 271, 275-276 ; 369 NW2d 484 (1985) (applying the doctrine to the EUO requirement); Reed v Loyal Protective Ass’n, 154 Mich 161, 175 ; 117 NW 600 (1908) (applying the doctrine to a notice requirement). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Jaworskigreen1 sentence2015See Saffold, 465 Mich at 273 , citing Jaworski, 387 Mich 21 . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Napiergreen2 sentences2015See, e.g., People v Napier, 69 Mich App 46, 46-48 ; 244 NW2d 359 (1976) and cases therein. 2015See, e.g., People v Napier, 69 Mich App 46, 46-48 ; 244 NW2d 359 (1976) and cases therein. | 1 | 1 |
| Carman v. Secretary of Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Trentadue v. Buckler Automatic Lawn Sprinkler Companygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Roberts v. Mecosta County General Hospitalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cox v. Flint Board of Hospital Managersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| McDougall v. Schanzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| EQUIVEST LTD. PARTNERSHIP v. Broomsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brown Plumbing & Heating, Inc v. Homeowner Construction Lien Recovery Fundgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. William Stewart McDowellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Harold G. Millergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Curleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Trinegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People of Michigan v. Peter Thomas Brinkey
green
2 sentences2025Our Supreme Court has adopted a doctrine of substantial compliance, and whether a particular departure from the requirements of MCR 6.302 justifies or requires reversal depends on the nature of the noncompliance.” Brinkey, 327 Mich App at 98 . 2024Our Supreme Court has adopted a doctrine of substantial compliance, and whether a particular departure from the requirements of MCR 6.302 justifies or requires reversal depends on the nature of noncompliance.” People v Brinkey, 327 Mich App 94, 98 ; 932 NW2d 232 (2019) (citation omitted). | 7 | 2021–2025 |
People v. Al-Shara
green
2 sentences2022The proper inquiry to be made, based on the record, is whether “the judge informed the defendant of the constitutional and other rights delineated in the rule in such manner as reasonably to warrant the conclusion that the defendant understood what a trial is and that by pleading guilty he was knowingly giving up his right to a trial and the rights and incidents of a trial.” People v Al-Shara, 311 Mich App 560, 572 ; 876 NW2d 826 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 2022The proper inquiry to be made, based on the record, is whether “the judge informed the defendant of the constitutional and other rights delineated in the rule in such manner as reasonably to warrant the conclusion that the defendant understood what a trial is and that by pleading guilty he was knowingly giving up his right to a trial and the rights and incidents of a trial.” People v Al-Shara, 311 Mich App 560, 572 ; 876 NW2d 826 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted). | 3 | 2021–2022 |
People v. Williams
green
2 sentences2020“The nonformalistic nature of a substantial compliance rule affords the protection of a strict compliance rule with far less of the problems associated with requiring courts to engage in a word-for-word litany approach.” People v Adkins (After Remand), 452 Mich 702, 727 ; 551 NW2d 108 (1996), overruled in part on other grounds in People v Williams, 470 Mich 634 , 641 n 7; 683 NW2d 597 (2004). 2020“The nonformalistic nature of a substantial compliance rule affords the protection of a strict compliance rule with far less of the problems associated with requiring courts to engage in a word-for-word litany approach.” People v Adkins (After Remand), 452 Mich 702, 727 ; 551 NW2d 108 (1996), overruled in part on other grounds in People v Williams, 470 Mich 634 , 641 n 7; 683 NW2d 597 (2004). | 3 | 2015–2020 |
Michigan Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc v. Dufty Road Properties
green
2 sentences2004The substantial compliance doctrine adopted in Michigan Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc v Dufty Road Properties, 90 Mich App 732, 735-736 ; 282 NW2d 809 (1979) [,] requires, in part, that the builder possess a valid residential builder’s license at the time the construction contract is executed. 2004The substantial compliance doctrine adopted in Michigan Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc v Dufty Road Properties, 90 Mich App 732, 735-736 ; 282 NW2d 809 (1979) [,] requires, in part, that the builder possess a valid residential builder’s license at the time the construction contract is executed. | 3 | 1991–2004 |
People v. Cole
green
2 sentences2023MCR 6.302(A)’s requirement that a plea be “understanding, voluntary, and accurate” is “premised on the requirements of constitutional due process . . . .” 7 Strict compliance with MCR 6.302 is not required. 8 Rather, this Court has “adopted a doctrine of substantial compliance,” and “ ‘whether a particular departure [from the requirements of MCR 6.302] justifies or requires reversal or remand for additional proceedings will depend on the nature of the noncompliance.’ ” 9 “Automatic invalidation of a plea due to a 7 People v Cole, 491 Mich 325, 332 ; 817 NW2d 497 (2012). 8 People v Brinkey, 327 2023MCR 6.302(A)’s requirement that a plea be “understanding, voluntary, and accurate” is “premised on the requirements of constitutional due process . . . .” 7 Strict compliance with MCR 6.302 is not required. 8 Rather, this Court has “adopted a doctrine of substantial compliance,” and “ ‘whether a particular departure [from the requirements of MCR 6.302] justifies or requires reversal or remand for additional proceedings will depend on the nature of the noncompliance.’ ” 9 “Automatic invalidation of a plea due to a 7 People v Cole, 491 Mich 325, 332 ; 817 NW2d 497 (2012). 8 People v Brinkey, 327 | 2 | 2023–2023 |
In re Stillwell Trust
green
2 sentences2021Rather, “[o]ur Supreme Court has adopted a doctrine of substantial compliance, and whether a particular departure from the requirements of MCR 6.302 justifies or requires reversal depends on the nature of the noncompliance.” Id. 2021Rather, “[o]ur Supreme Court has adopted a doctrine of substantial compliance, and whether a particular departure from the requirements of MCR 6.302 justifies or requires reversal depends on the nature of the noncompliance.” Id. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Plunkett v. Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences2018The appellant shall file a supplemental brief within 42 days of the date of this order addressing: (1) whether strict or substantial compliance is required with the notice provision contained within MCL 691.1404(2), compare Rowland v. Washtenaw County Road Commission , 477 Mich. 197 , 731 N.W.2d 41 (2007), with Plunkett v. Dep't of Transportation , 286 Mich. App. 168 , 779 N.W.2d 263 (2009) ; (2) whether the plaintiff's notice failed to comply with MCL 691.1404(2) under either a strict or substantial compliance standard; (3) whether the Legislature's use of the word "shall" in MCL 691.1404(1) 2018The appellant shall file a supplemental brief within 42 days of the date of this order addressing: (1) whether strict or substantial compliance is required with the notice provision contained within MCL 691.1404(2), compare Rowland v. Washtenaw County Road Commission , 477 Mich. 197 , 731 N.W.2d 41 (2007), with Plunkett v. Dep't of Transportation , 286 Mich. App. 168 , 779 N.W.2d 263 (2009) ; (2) whether the plaintiff's notice failed to comply with MCL 691.1404(2) under either a strict or substantial compliance standard; (3) whether the Legislature's use of the word "shall" in MCL 691.1404(1) | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Rowland v. Washtenaw County Road Commission
green
2 sentences2018The appellant shall file a supplemental brief within 42 days of the date of this order addressing: (1) whether strict or substantial compliance is required with the notice provision contained within MCL 691.1404(2), compare Rowland v. Washtenaw County Road Commission , 477 Mich. 197 , 731 N.W.2d 41 (2007), with Plunkett v. Dep't of Transportation , 286 Mich. App. 168 , 779 N.W.2d 263 (2009) ; (2) whether the plaintiff's notice failed to comply with MCL 691.1404(2) under either a strict or substantial compliance standard; (3) whether the Legislature's use of the word "shall" in MCL 691.1404(1) 2018The appellant shall file a supplemental brief within 42 days of the date of this order addressing: (1) whether strict or substantial compliance is required with the notice provision contained within MCL 691.1404(2), compare Rowland v. Washtenaw County Road Commission , 477 Mich. 197 , 731 N.W.2d 41 (2007), with Plunkett v. Dep't of Transportation , 286 Mich. App. 168 , 779 N.W.2d 263 (2009) ; (2) whether the plaintiff's notice failed to comply with MCL 691.1404(2) under either a strict or substantial compliance standard; (3) whether the Legislature's use of the word "shall" in MCL 691.1404(1) | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Harris v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences2017The majority concludes that the handwritten “note does not contradict plaintiff’s letter that the COB form was not received until October 9, the day after decedent passed away.” However, this conclusion ignores the doctrine of substantial compliance, whereby when a COB request is received is not determinative so long as the insured does “all in his [or her] power to effect the change in the manner prescribed in the policy.” Harris v Metropolitan Life Ins Co, 330 Mich 24, 27-28 ; 46 NW2d 448 (1950); see also Aetna Life Ins Co v Brooks, 96 Mich App 310, 315 ; 292 NW2d 532 (1980). 2017The majority concludes that the handwritten “note does not contradict plaintiff’s letter that the COB form was not received until October 9, the day after decedent passed away.” However, this conclusion ignores the doctrine of substantial compliance, whereby when a COB request is received is not determinative so long as the insured does “all in his [or her] power to effect the change in the manner prescribed in the policy.” Harris v Metropolitan Life Ins Co, 330 Mich 24, 27-28 ; 46 NW2d 448 (1950); see also Aetna Life Ins Co v Brooks, 96 Mich App 310, 315 ; 292 NW2d 532 (1980). | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Annex Construction, Inc v. Fenech
green
2 sentences2004Therefore, plaintiff's failure to acquire a valid license during the making and performance of the contract precludes it from maintaining its suit against defendants. [ Annex, supra at 220-221 , 477 N.W.2d 103 .] There is nothing in the language quoted above that construes the statutory phrase "was licensed ... during the performance of the act or contract." To the extent that above-quoted language can be construed as ruling that the builder has to be licensed at the time the contract is entered into, the ruling was made in the context of the requirements of the substantial compliance doctrine 2004Therefore, plaintiffs failure to acquire a valid license during the making and performance of the contract precludes it from maintaining its suit against defendants. [Annex, supra at 220-221 .] There is nothing in the language quoted above that construes the statutory phrase “was licensed... during the performance of the act or contract.” To the extent that above-quoted language can be construed as ruling that the builder has to be licensed at the time the contract is entered into, the ruling was made in the context of the requirements of the substantial compliance doctrine, a doctrine not at | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Reed v. Loyal Protective Ass'n
green
2 sentences2025See Gibson v Group Ins Co, 142 Mich App 271, 275-276 ; 369 NW2d 484 (1985) (applying the doctrine to the EUO requirement); Reed v Loyal Protective Ass’n, 154 Mich 161, 175 ; 117 NW 600 (1908) (applying the doctrine to a notice requirement). 2025See Gibson v Group Ins Co, 142 Mich App 271, 275-276 ; 369 NW2d 484 (1985) (applying the doctrine to the EUO requirement); Reed v Loyal Protective Ass’n, 154 Mich 161, 175 ; 117 NW 600 (1908) (applying the doctrine to a notice requirement). | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Swain
green
1 sentence2021ACTUAL PREJUDICE The requirement of “actual prejudice” for obtaining postjudgment relief “is similar to the prejudice standard in an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim.” Swain, 288 Mich App at 638 . -6- “Actual prejudice” is established under MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b)(ii) when “the defect in the proceedings was such that it renders the plea an involuntary one to a degree that it would be manifestly unjust to allow the conviction to stand.” This Court has held that “[s]trict compliance with MCR 6.302 is not essential; rather, our Supreme Court has adopted a doctrine of substantial compliance, hol | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Horace v. City of Pontiac
green
2 sentences2019The public-building exception is to be narrowly construed. -4- Horace v City of Pontiac, 456 Mich 744, 749 ; 575 NW2d 762 (1998). 2019The public-building exception is to be narrowly construed. -4- Horace v City of Pontiac, 456 Mich 744, 749 ; 575 NW2d 762 (1998). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Rusha v. Department of Corrections
green
1 sentence2018Id . at 311, 859 N.W.2d 735 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Carnicom
green
2 sentences2017A trial court abuses it discretion when its decision “results in an outcome falling outside the principled range of outcomes.” People v Carnicom, 272 Mich App 614, 617 ; 727 NW2d 399 (2006). 1 People v Winters, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered July 1, 2016 (Docket No. 333009). -1- While strict compliance with MCR 6.302 is not essential, our Supreme Court has applied the doctrine of substantial compliance—whether a particular departure from MCR 6.302 requires reversal or remand for additional proceedings will depend on the nature of the noncompliance. 2017A trial court abuses it discretion when its decision “results in an outcome falling outside the principled range of outcomes.” People v Carnicom, 272 Mich App 614, 617 ; 727 NW2d 399 (2006). 1 People v Winters, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered July 1, 2016 (Docket No. 333009). -1- While strict compliance with MCR 6.302 is not essential, our Supreme Court has applied the doctrine of substantial compliance—whether a particular departure from MCR 6.302 requires reversal or remand for additional proceedings will depend on the nature of the noncompliance. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Bloomfield Charter Township v. Oakland County Clerk
green
2 sentences2013Under the substantial compliance doctrine, “ ‘[a]s a general principle, all doubts as to technical deficiencies or failure to comply with the exact letter of procedural requirements are resolved in favor of permitting the people to vote and express their will on any proposal subject to election.’ ” Bloomfield Charter Twp v Oakland Co Clerk, 253 Mich App 1, 21 ; 654 NW2d 610 (2002), quoting Meridian Twp, 101 Mich App at 810 . 2013Under the substantial compliance doctrine, “ ‘[a]s a general principle, all doubts as to technical deficiencies or failure to comply with the exact letter of procedural requirements are resolved in favor of permitting the people to vote and express their will on any proposal subject to election.’ ” Bloomfield Charter Twp v Oakland Co Clerk, 253 Mich App 1, 21 ; 654 NW2d 610 (2002), quoting Meridian Twp, 101 Mich App at 810 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Bulger green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| City of Jackson v. Com'r of Revenue green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Boykin v. Alabama green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| People v. Hawthorne green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Wojciechowski v. General Motors Corp. green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Michigan Roofing & Sheet Metal, Inc. v. Dufty Road Properties neutral | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| People v. Butcher green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Edmond v. Department of Corrections neutral | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Rainey v. Department of Corrections green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| People v. Rufus Williams green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| People v. Stearns green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Livingston v. Saginaw Circuit Judge neutral | 1 | 1930–1930 |
| City of Detroit v. Daly green | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| City of Manistee v. Harley green | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| Cote v. Village of Highland Park neutral | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| Moore v. Royal Oak Lumber & Supply Co. green | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Baxter v. . Ellis neutral | 1 | 1894–1894 |
| Proctor v. Prout green | 1 | 1887–1887 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.