12 Montana opinions name it 1 courts 1907–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Montana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Petty v. Flathead County Board of County Commissionersgreen2 sentences2009Yurczyk v. Yellowstone Co., 2004 MT 3, ¶ 22 , 319 Mont. 169 , 83 P.3d 266 , citing Petty v. Flathead City Bd. of City Commrs., 231 Mont. 428, 431 , 754 P.2d 496, 498-99 (1988). 2009Yurczyk v. Yellowstone Co., 2004 MT 3, ¶ 22 , 319 Mont. 169 , 83 P.3d 266 , citing Petty v. Flathead City Bd. of City Commrs., 231 Mont. 428, 431 , 754 P.2d 496, 498-99 (1988). | 2 | 2 |
Rush v. Lewis & Clark Countygreen2 sentences2025Often, very valuable property is lost for a mere pittance.” Moran, 261 Mont. at 4 482-83, 863 P.2d at 398 ; see also Rush v. Lewis & Clark Cnty., 36 Mont. 566, 569 , 93 P. 943, 944 (1908) (“[T]he tax almost always bears a very small proportion to the value of the property sold. . . . [I]t has generally been held that proceedings on tax sales should strictly comply with the statute.”). ¶8 This case is unique in that there was an attempt to redeem, thus presenting an entirely separate question from those cases addressing whether strict compliance was achieved by the party seeking to obtain the t 2025Often, very valuable property is lost for a mere pittance.” Moran, 261 Mont. at 4 482-83, 863 P.2d at 398 ; see also Rush v. Lewis & Clark Cnty., 36 Mont. 566, 569 , 93 P. 943, 944 (1908) (“[T]he tax almost always bears a very small proportion to the value of the property sold. . . . [I]t has generally been held that proceedings on tax sales should strictly comply with the statute.”). ¶8 This case is unique in that there was an attempt to redeem, thus presenting an entirely separate question from those cases addressing whether strict compliance was achieved by the party seeking to obtain the t | 1 | 1 |
Formicove, Inc. v. Burlington Northern, Inc.green2 sentences2021Our decision in Pope is not manifestly wrong ¶13 Stare decisis is a fundamental doctrine that “reflects our concerns for stability, predictability, and equal treatment[.]” Formicove, Inc. v. Burlington N., 207 Mont. 189, 194 , 673 P.2d 469, 472 (citations omitted). 2021Our decision in Pope is not manifestly wrong ¶13 Stare decisis is a fundamental doctrine that “reflects our concerns for stability, predictability, and equal treatment[.]” Formicove, Inc. v. Burlington N., 207 Mont. 189, 194 , 673 P.2d 469, 472 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Bridger Canyon Property Owners' Ass'n v. Planning & Zoning Commission for the Bridger Canyon Zoning Districtgreen2 sentences2012See Bridger Canyon Property Owners’ Ass’n v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n, 270 Mont. 160, 170 , 890 P.2d 1268, 1274 (1995) (stating that “the propositions established in Little are applicable” to Part 1 zoning). ¶18 HSG argues that the zoning regulations do not substantially comply with the Growth Policy because the zoning board “disregard[ed] the actual use of the land.” HSG points out that the County’s staff report, made at the PZ Commission’s request, noted the existence of five gravel pits in and around the transitional area encompassing District 43. 2012See Bridger Canyon Property Owners’ Ass’n v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n, 270 Mont. 160, 170 , 890 P.2d 1268, 1274 (1995) (stating that “the propositions established in Little are applicable” to Part 1 zoning). ¶18 HSG argues that the zoning regulations do not substantially comply with the Growth Policy because the zoning board “disregard[ed] the actual use of the land.” HSG points out that the County’s staff report, made at the PZ Commission’s request, noted the existence of five gravel pits in and around the transitional area encompassing District 43. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Z. T. Kennedygreen2 sentences2010"That the clerk's office did not even attempt to follow the law is more than a mere technical irregularity and evades the substantial compliance standard." Norquay directs our attention to State v. LaMere, 2000 MT 45, ¶ 57 , 298 Mont. 358 , 2 P.3d 204 ("A substantial failure to comply encompasses a statutory violation that affects the `random nature or objectivity of the selection process.'" (quoting United States v. Kennedy, 548 F.2d 608, 612 (5th Cir.1977))), and argues that the Clerk's error in selecting Norquay's jury panel constitutes structural error. 2010“That the clerk’s office did not even attempt to follow the law is more than a mere technical irregularity and evades the substantial compliance standard.” Norquay directs our attention to State v. LaMere, 2000 MT 45, ¶ 57 , 298 Mont. 358 , 2 P.3d 204 (“A substantial failure to comply encompasses a statutory violation that affects the ‘random nature or objectivity of the selection process.’ ” (quoting United States v. Kennedy, 548 F.2d 608, 612 (5th Cir. 1977))), and argues that the Clerk’s error in selecting Norquay’s jury panel constitutes structural error. | 1 | 1 |
Solberg v. County of Yellowstonegreen2 sentences2000See generally Solberg v. County of Yellowstone (1983), 203 Mont. 79 , 659 P.2d 290 ; Dvorak v. Huntley Project Irrigation Dist. (1981), 196 Mont. 167 , 639 P.2d 62 ; State v. Deeds (1957), 130 Mont. 503 , 305 P.2d 321 ; State v. Porter (1952), 125 Mont. 503 , 242 P.2d 984 ; State v. Hay (1948), 120 Mont. 573 , 194 P.2d 232 ; State v. Diedtman (1920), 58 Mont. 13 , 190 P. 117 ; State v. Miller (1914), 49 Mont. 360 , 141 P. 860 ; State v. Groom (1914), 49 Mont. 354 , 141 P. 858 ; State v. Landry (1903), 29 Mont. 218 , 74 P. 418 ; State v. Tighe (1903), 27 Mont. 327 , 71 P. 3; Kennon v. Gilmer (1 2000See generally Solberg v. County of Yellowstone (1983), 203 Mont. 79 , 659 P.2d 290 ; Dvorak v. Huntley Project Irrigation Dist. (1981), 196 Mont. 167 , 639 P.2d 62 ; State v. Deeds (1957), 130 Mont. 503 , 305 P.2d 321 ; State v. Porter (1952), 125 Mont. 503 , 242 P.2d 984 ; State v. Hay (1948), 120 Mont. 573 , 194 P.2d 232 ; State v. Diedtman (1920), 58 Mont. 13 , 190 P. 117 ; State v. Miller (1914), 49 Mont. 360 , 141 P. 860 ; State v. Groom (1914), 49 Mont. 354 , 141 P. 858 ; State v. Landry (1903), 29 Mont. 218 , 74 P. 418 ; State v. Tighe (1903), 27 Mont. 327 , 71 P. 3; Kennon v. Gilmer (1 | 1 | 1 |
| Rambur v. DIEHL LUMBER COMPANYgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gregory v. City of Forsythgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dawson v. Saadagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Montana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Yurczyk v. Yellowstone County
green
2 sentences2009Yurczyk v. Yellowstone Co., 2004 MT 3, ¶ 22 , 319 Mont. 169 , 83 P.3d 266 , citing Petty v. Flathead City Bd. of City Commrs., 231 Mont. 428, 431 , 754 P.2d 496, 498-99 (1988). 2009Yurczyk v. Yellowstone Co., 2004 MT 3, ¶ 22 , 319 Mont. 169 , 83 P.3d 266 , citing Petty v. Flathead City Bd. of City Commrs., 231 Mont. 428, 431 , 754 P.2d 496, 498-99 (1988). | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Moran v. Robbin
green
2 sentences2025Often, very valuable property is lost for a mere pittance.” Moran, 261 Mont. at 4 482-83, 863 P.2d at 398 ; see also Rush v. Lewis & Clark Cnty., 36 Mont. 566, 569 , 93 P. 943, 944 (1908) (“[T]he tax almost always bears a very small proportion to the value of the property sold. . . . [I]t has generally been held that proceedings on tax sales should strictly comply with the statute.”). ¶8 This case is unique in that there was an attempt to redeem, thus presenting an entirely separate question from those cases addressing whether strict compliance was achieved by the party seeking to obtain the t 2025Often, very valuable property is lost for a mere pittance.” Moran, 261 Mont. at 4 482-83, 863 P.2d at 398 ; see also Rush v. Lewis & Clark Cnty., 36 Mont. 566, 569 , 93 P. 943, 944 (1908) (“[T]he tax almost always bears a very small proportion to the value of the property sold. . . . [I]t has generally been held that proceedings on tax sales should strictly comply with the statute.”). ¶8 This case is unique in that there was an attempt to redeem, thus presenting an entirely separate question from those cases addressing whether strict compliance was achieved by the party seeking to obtain the t | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. LaMere
green
2 sentences2010“That the clerk’s office did not even attempt to follow the law is more than a mere technical irregularity and evades the substantial compliance standard.” Norquay directs our attention to State v. LaMere, 2000 MT 45, ¶ 57 , 298 Mont. 358 , 2 P.3d 204 (“A substantial failure to comply encompasses a statutory violation that affects the ‘random nature or objectivity of the selection process.’ ” (quoting United States v. Kennedy, 548 F.2d 608, 612 (5th Cir. 1977))), and argues that the Clerk’s error in selecting Norquay’s jury panel constitutes structural error. 2010“That the clerk’s office did not even attempt to follow the law is more than a mere technical irregularity and evades the substantial compliance standard.” Norquay directs our attention to State v. LaMere, 2000 MT 45, ¶ 57 , 298 Mont. 358 , 2 P.3d 204 (“A substantial failure to comply encompasses a statutory violation that affects the ‘random nature or objectivity of the selection process.’ ” (quoting United States v. Kennedy, 548 F.2d 608, 612 (5th Cir. 1977))), and argues that the Clerk’s error in selecting Norquay’s jury panel constitutes structural error. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Little v. Board of County Commissioners
green
2 sentences2006Little, 193 Mont. at 353 , 631 P.2d at 1293 . 2006Little, 193 Mont. at 353 , 631 P.2d at 1293 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Egelhoff
green
2 sentences2002LaMere , ¶¶ 32, 35. ¶18 Finally, the State contends that LaMere cannot be retroactively applied to Robbins in a collateral proceeding such as postconviction relief based on the test for retroactive application set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane (1989), 489 U.S. 288 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 , and followed by this Court in State v. Egelhoff (1995), 272 Mont. 114 , 900 P.2d 260 (rev’d on other grounds by Montana v. Egelhoff (1996), 518 U.S. 37 , 116 S.Ct. 2013 , 135 L.Ed.2d 361 ). 2002LaMere , ¶¶ 32, 35. ¶18 Finally, the State contends that LaMere cannot be retroactively applied to Robbins in a collateral proceeding such as postconviction relief based on the test for retroactive application set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane (1989), 489 U.S. 288 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 , and followed by this Court in State v. Egelhoff (1995), 272 Mont. 114 , 900 P.2d 260 (rev’d on other grounds by Montana v. Egelhoff (1996), 518 U.S. 37 , 116 S.Ct. 2013 , 135 L.Ed.2d 361 ). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Teague v. Lane
green
2 sentences2002LaMere , ¶¶ 32, 35. ¶18 Finally, the State contends that LaMere cannot be retroactively applied to Robbins in a collateral proceeding such as postconviction relief based on the test for retroactive application set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane (1989), 489 U.S. 288 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 , and followed by this Court in State v. Egelhoff (1995), 272 Mont. 114 , 900 P.2d 260 (rev’d on other grounds by Montana v. Egelhoff (1996), 518 U.S. 37 , 116 S.Ct. 2013 , 135 L.Ed.2d 361 ). 2002LaMere , ¶¶ 32, 35. ¶18 Finally, the State contends that LaMere cannot be retroactively applied to Robbins in a collateral proceeding such as postconviction relief based on the test for retroactive application set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane (1989), 489 U.S. 288 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 , and followed by this Court in State v. Egelhoff (1995), 272 Mont. 114 , 900 P.2d 260 (rev’d on other grounds by Montana v. Egelhoff (1996), 518 U.S. 37 , 116 S.Ct. 2013 , 135 L.Ed.2d 361 ). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Montana v. Egelhoff
green
2 sentences2002LaMere , ¶¶ 32, 35. ¶18 Finally, the State contends that LaMere cannot be retroactively applied to Robbins in a collateral proceeding such as postconviction relief based on the test for retroactive application set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane (1989), 489 U.S. 288 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 , and followed by this Court in State v. Egelhoff (1995), 272 Mont. 114 , 900 P.2d 260 (rev’d on other grounds by Montana v. Egelhoff (1996), 518 U.S. 37 , 116 S.Ct. 2013 , 135 L.Ed.2d 361 ). 2002LaMere , ¶¶ 32, 35. ¶18 Finally, the State contends that LaMere cannot be retroactively applied to Robbins in a collateral proceeding such as postconviction relief based on the test for retroactive application set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane (1989), 489 U.S. 288 , 109 S.Ct. 1060 , 103 L.Ed.2d 334 , and followed by this Court in State v. Egelhoff (1995), 272 Mont. 114 , 900 P.2d 260 (rev’d on other grounds by Montana v. Egelhoff (1996), 518 U.S. 37 , 116 S.Ct. 2013 , 135 L.Ed.2d 361 ). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State Ex Rel. Henningsen v. District Court of the Second Judicial District
green
2 sentences2000Henningson v. District Court (1959), 136 Mont. 354, 360 , 348 P.2d 143, 146 . ¶67 The substantial compliance standard is appropriate, in our view, as a matter of public policy. 2000Henningson v. District Court (1959), 136 Mont. 354, 360 , 348 P.2d 143, 146 . ¶67 The substantial compliance standard is appropriate, in our view, as a matter of public policy. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Groom
green
2 sentences2000See generally Solberg v. County of Yellowstone (1983), 203 Mont. 79 , 659 P.2d 290 ; Dvorak v. Huntley Project Irrigation Dist. (1981), 196 Mont. 167 , 639 P.2d 62 ; State v. Deeds (1957), 130 Mont. 503 , 305 P.2d 321 ; State v. Porter (1952), 125 Mont. 503 , 242 P.2d 984 ; State v. Hay (1948), 120 Mont. 573 , 194 P.2d 232 ; State v. Diedtman (1920), 58 Mont. 13 , 190 P. 117 ; State v. Miller (1914), 49 Mont. 360 , 141 P. 860 ; State v. Groom (1914), 49 Mont. 354 , 141 P. 858 ; State v. Landry (1903), 29 Mont. 218 , 74 P. 418 ; State v. Tighe (1903), 27 Mont. 327 , 71 P. 3; Kennon v. Gilmer (1 2000See generally Solberg v. County of Yellowstone (1983), 203 Mont. 79 , 659 P.2d 290 ; Dvorak v. Huntley Project Irrigation Dist. (1981), 196 Mont. 167 , 639 P.2d 62 ; State v. Deeds (1957), 130 Mont. 503 , 305 P.2d 321 ; State v. Porter (1952), 125 Mont. 503 , 242 P.2d 984 ; State v. Hay (1948), 120 Mont. 573 , 194 P.2d 232 ; State v. Diedtman (1920), 58 Mont. 13 , 190 P. 117 ; State v. Miller (1914), 49 Mont. 360 , 141 P. 860 ; State v. Groom (1914), 49 Mont. 354 , 141 P. 858 ; State v. Landry (1903), 29 Mont. 218 , 74 P. 418 ; State v. Tighe (1903), 27 Mont. 327 , 71 P. 3; Kennon v. Gilmer (1 | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Miller
neutral
2 sentences2000See generally Solberg v. County of Yellowstone (1983), 203 Mont. 79 , 659 P.2d 290 ; Dvorak v. Huntley Project Irrigation Dist. (1981), 196 Mont. 167 , 639 P.2d 62 ; State v. Deeds (1957), 130 Mont. 503 , 305 P.2d 321 ; State v. Porter (1952), 125 Mont. 503 , 242 P.2d 984 ; State v. Hay (1948), 120 Mont. 573 , 194 P.2d 232 ; State v. Diedtman (1920), 58 Mont. 13 , 190 P. 117 ; State v. Miller (1914), 49 Mont. 360 , 141 P. 860 ; State v. Groom (1914), 49 Mont. 354 , 141 P. 858 ; State v. Landry (1903), 29 Mont. 218 , 74 P. 418 ; State v. Tighe (1903), 27 Mont. 327 , 71 P. 3; Kennon v. Gilmer (1 2000See generally Solberg v. County of Yellowstone (1983), 203 Mont. 79 , 659 P.2d 290 ; Dvorak v. Huntley Project Irrigation Dist. (1981), 196 Mont. 167 , 639 P.2d 62 ; State v. Deeds (1957), 130 Mont. 503 , 305 P.2d 321 ; State v. Porter (1952), 125 Mont. 503 , 242 P.2d 984 ; State v. Hay (1948), 120 Mont. 573 , 194 P.2d 232 ; State v. Diedtman (1920), 58 Mont. 13 , 190 P. 117 ; State v. Miller (1914), 49 Mont. 360 , 141 P. 860 ; State v. Groom (1914), 49 Mont. 354 , 141 P. 858 ; State v. Landry (1903), 29 Mont. 218 , 74 P. 418 ; State v. Tighe (1903), 27 Mont. 327 , 71 P. 3; Kennon v. Gilmer (1 | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Diedtman
green
2 sentences2000See generally Solberg v. County of Yellowstone (1983), 203 Mont. 79 , 659 P.2d 290 ; Dvorak v. Huntley Project Irrigation Dist. (1981), 196 Mont. 167 , 639 P.2d 62 ; State v. Deeds (1957), 130 Mont. 503 , 305 P.2d 321 ; State v. Porter (1952), 125 Mont. 503 , 242 P.2d 984 ; State v. Hay (1948), 120 Mont. 573 , 194 P.2d 232 ; State v. Diedtman (1920), 58 Mont. 13 , 190 P. 117 ; State v. Miller (1914), 49 Mont. 360 , 141 P. 860 ; State v. Groom (1914), 49 Mont. 354 , 141 P. 858 ; State v. Landry (1903), 29 Mont. 218 , 74 P. 418 ; State v. Tighe (1903), 27 Mont. 327 , 71 P. 3; Kennon v. Gilmer (1 2000See generally Solberg v. County of Yellowstone (1983), 203 Mont. 79 , 659 P.2d 290 ; Dvorak v. Huntley Project Irrigation Dist. (1981), 196 Mont. 167 , 639 P.2d 62 ; State v. Deeds (1957), 130 Mont. 503 , 305 P.2d 321 ; State v. Porter (1952), 125 Mont. 503 , 242 P.2d 984 ; State v. Hay (1948), 120 Mont. 573 , 194 P.2d 232 ; State v. Diedtman (1920), 58 Mont. 13 , 190 P. 117 ; State v. Miller (1914), 49 Mont. 360 , 141 P. 860 ; State v. Groom (1914), 49 Mont. 354 , 141 P. 858 ; State v. Landry (1903), 29 Mont. 218 , 74 P. 418 ; State v. Tighe (1903), 27 Mont. 327 , 71 P. 3; Kennon v. Gilmer (1 | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Taylor
green
2 sentences2000Taylor, 168 Mont. at 146 , 542 P.2d at 102 . 2000Taylor, 168 Mont. at 146 , 542 P.2d at 102 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Dvorak v. Huntley Project Irrigation District
green
2 sentences2000See generally Solberg v. County of Yellowstone (1983), 203 Mont. 79 , 659 P.2d 290 ; Dvorak v. Huntley Project Irrigation Dist. (1981), 196 Mont. 167 , 639 P.2d 62 ; State v. Deeds (1957), 130 Mont. 503 , 305 P.2d 321 ; State v. Porter (1952), 125 Mont. 503 , 242 P.2d 984 ; State v. Hay (1948), 120 Mont. 573 , 194 P.2d 232 ; State v. Diedtman (1920), 58 Mont. 13 , 190 P. 117 ; State v. Miller (1914), 49 Mont. 360 , 141 P. 860 ; State v. Groom (1914), 49 Mont. 354 , 141 P. 858 ; State v. Landry (1903), 29 Mont. 218 , 74 P. 418 ; State v. Tighe (1903), 27 Mont. 327 , 71 P. 3; Kennon v. Gilmer (1 2000See generally Solberg v. County of Yellowstone (1983), 203 Mont. 79 , 659 P.2d 290 ; Dvorak v. Huntley Project Irrigation Dist. (1981), 196 Mont. 167 , 639 P.2d 62 ; State v. Deeds (1957), 130 Mont. 503 , 305 P.2d 321 ; State v. Porter (1952), 125 Mont. 503 , 242 P.2d 984 ; State v. Hay (1948), 120 Mont. 573 , 194 P.2d 232 ; State v. Diedtman (1920), 58 Mont. 13 , 190 P. 117 ; State v. Miller (1914), 49 Mont. 360 , 141 P. 860 ; State v. Groom (1914), 49 Mont. 354 , 141 P. 858 ; State v. Landry (1903), 29 Mont. 218 , 74 P. 418 ; State v. Tighe (1903), 27 Mont. 327 , 71 P. 3; Kennon v. Gilmer (1 | 1 | 2000–2000 |
United States v. Royal
green
2 sentences2000Royal, 174 F.3d at 11 . 2000Royal, 174 F.3d at 11 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Hay
neutral
2 sentences2000See generally Solberg v. County of Yellowstone (1983), 203 Mont. 79 , 659 P.2d 290 ; Dvorak v. Huntley Project Irrigation Dist. (1981), 196 Mont. 167 , 639 P.2d 62 ; State v. Deeds (1957), 130 Mont. 503 , 305 P.2d 321 ; State v. Porter (1952), 125 Mont. 503 , 242 P.2d 984 ; State v. Hay (1948), 120 Mont. 573 , 194 P.2d 232 ; State v. Diedtman (1920), 58 Mont. 13 , 190 P. 117 ; State v. Miller (1914), 49 Mont. 360 , 141 P. 860 ; State v. Groom (1914), 49 Mont. 354 , 141 P. 858 ; State v. Landry (1903), 29 Mont. 218 , 74 P. 418 ; State v. Tighe (1903), 27 Mont. 327 , 71 P. 3; Kennon v. Gilmer (1 2000See generally Solberg v. County of Yellowstone (1983), 203 Mont. 79 , 659 P.2d 290 ; Dvorak v. Huntley Project Irrigation Dist. (1981), 196 Mont. 167 , 639 P.2d 62 ; State v. Deeds (1957), 130 Mont. 503 , 305 P.2d 321 ; State v. Porter (1952), 125 Mont. 503 , 242 P.2d 984 ; State v. Hay (1948), 120 Mont. 573 , 194 P.2d 232 ; State v. Diedtman (1920), 58 Mont. 13 , 190 P. 117 ; State v. Miller (1914), 49 Mont. 360 , 141 P. 860 ; State v. Groom (1914), 49 Mont. 354 , 141 P. 858 ; State v. Landry (1903), 29 Mont. 218 , 74 P. 418 ; State v. Tighe (1903), 27 Mont. 327 , 71 P. 3; Kennon v. Gilmer (1 | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Glasser v. United States
green
2 sentences2000For this Court has long recognized “the insistence with which the people of this country maintain the right of trial by jury.” Clark, 86 Mont. at 512 , 284 R at 267. ¶68 The rationale underlying the substantial compliance standard, then, is that any material deviation from statutory procedures designed to ensure that jury selection results in “trial by a representative group are undermining processes weakening the institution of jury trial, and should be sturdily resisted.” Glasser, 315 U.S. at 86 , 62 S.Ct. at 472 , 86 L.Ed. at 707 . 2000For this Court has long recognized “the insistence with which the people of this country maintain the right of trial by jury.” Clark, 86 Mont. at 512 , 284 R at 267. ¶68 The rationale underlying the substantial compliance standard, then, is that any material deviation from statutory procedures designed to ensure that jury selection results in “trial by a representative group are undermining processes weakening the institution of jury trial, and should be sturdily resisted.” Glasser, 315 U.S. at 86 , 62 S.Ct. at 472 , 86 L.Ed. at 707 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Deeds
neutral
2 sentences2000See generally Solberg v. County of Yellowstone (1983), 203 Mont. 79 , 659 P.2d 290 ; Dvorak v. Huntley Project Irrigation Dist. (1981), 196 Mont. 167 , 639 P.2d 62 ; State v. Deeds (1957), 130 Mont. 503 , 305 P.2d 321 ; State v. Porter (1952), 125 Mont. 503 , 242 P.2d 984 ; State v. Hay (1948), 120 Mont. 573 , 194 P.2d 232 ; State v. Diedtman (1920), 58 Mont. 13 , 190 P. 117 ; State v. Miller (1914), 49 Mont. 360 , 141 P. 860 ; State v. Groom (1914), 49 Mont. 354 , 141 P. 858 ; State v. Landry (1903), 29 Mont. 218 , 74 P. 418 ; State v. Tighe (1903), 27 Mont. 327 , 71 P. 3; Kennon v. Gilmer (1 2000See generally Solberg v. County of Yellowstone (1983), 203 Mont. 79 , 659 P.2d 290 ; Dvorak v. Huntley Project Irrigation Dist. (1981), 196 Mont. 167 , 639 P.2d 62 ; State v. Deeds (1957), 130 Mont. 503 , 305 P.2d 321 ; State v. Porter (1952), 125 Mont. 503 , 242 P.2d 984 ; State v. Hay (1948), 120 Mont. 573 , 194 P.2d 232 ; State v. Diedtman (1920), 58 Mont. 13 , 190 P. 117 ; State v. Miller (1914), 49 Mont. 360 , 141 P. 860 ; State v. Groom (1914), 49 Mont. 354 , 141 P. 858 ; State v. Landry (1903), 29 Mont. 218 , 74 P. 418 ; State v. Tighe (1903), 27 Mont. 327 , 71 P. 3; Kennon v. Gilmer (1 | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State Ex Rel. Clark v. District Court
green
2 sentences2000For this Court has long recognized "the insistence with which the people of this country maintain the right of trial by jury." Clark, 86 Mont. at 512 , 284 P. at 267 . ¶ 68 The rationale underlying the substantial compliance standard, then, is that any material deviation from statutory procedures designed to ensure that jury selection results in "trial by a representative group are undermining processes weakening the institution of jury trial, and should be sturdily resisted." Glasser, 315 U.S. at 86 , 62 S.Ct. at 472 , 86 L.Ed. at 707 . 2000For this Court has long recognized “the insistence with which the people of this country maintain the right of trial by jury.” Clark, 86 Mont. at 512 , 284 R at 267. ¶68 The rationale underlying the substantial compliance standard, then, is that any material deviation from statutory procedures designed to ensure that jury selection results in “trial by a representative group are undermining processes weakening the institution of jury trial, and should be sturdily resisted.” Glasser, 315 U.S. at 86 , 62 S.Ct. at 472 , 86 L.Ed. at 707 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Kennon v. Gilmer neutral | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Tighe
green
2 sentences2000See generally Solberg v. County of Yellowstone (1983), 203 Mont. 79 , 659 P.2d 290 ; Dvorak v. Huntley Project Irrigation Dist. (1981), 196 Mont. 167 , 639 P.2d 62 ; State v. Deeds (1957), 130 Mont. 503 , 305 P.2d 321 ; State v. Porter (1952), 125 Mont. 503 , 242 P.2d 984 ; State v. Hay (1948), 120 Mont. 573 , 194 P.2d 232 ; State v. Diedtman (1920), 58 Mont. 13 , 190 P. 117 ; State v. Miller (1914), 49 Mont. 360 , 141 P. 860 ; State v. Groom (1914), 49 Mont. 354 , 141 P. 858 ; State v. Landry (1903), 29 Mont. 218 , 74 P. 418 ; State v. Tighe (1903), 27 Mont. 327 , 71 P. 3; Kennon v. Gilmer (1 2000See generally Solberg v. County of Yellowstone (1983), 203 Mont. 79 , 659 P.2d 290 ; Dvorak v. Huntley Project Irrigation Dist. (1981), 196 Mont. 167 , 639 P.2d 62 ; State v. Deeds (1957), 130 Mont. 503 , 305 P.2d 321 ; State v. Porter (1952), 125 Mont. 503 , 242 P.2d 984 ; State v. Hay (1948), 120 Mont. 573 , 194 P.2d 232 ; State v. Diedtman (1920), 58 Mont. 13 , 190 P. 117 ; State v. Miller (1914), 49 Mont. 360 , 141 P. 860 ; State v. Groom (1914), 49 Mont. 354 , 141 P. 858 ; State v. Landry (1903), 29 Mont. 218 , 74 P. 418 ; State v. Tighe (1903), 27 Mont. 327 , 71 P. 3; Kennon v. Gilmer (1 | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Duncan v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences2000Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156 , 88 S.Ct. at 1451 , 20 L.Ed.2d at 500 . 2000Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156 , 88 S.Ct. at 1451 , 20 L.Ed.2d at 500 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Porter
green
2 sentences2000See generally Solberg v. County of Yellowstone (1983), 203 Mont. 79 , 659 P.2d 290 ; Dvorak v. Huntley Project Irrigation Dist. (1981), 196 Mont. 167 , 639 P.2d 62 ; State v. Deeds (1957), 130 Mont. 503 , 305 P.2d 321 ; State v. Porter (1952), 125 Mont. 503 , 242 P.2d 984 ; State v. Hay (1948), 120 Mont. 573 , 194 P.2d 232 ; State v. Diedtman (1920), 58 Mont. 13 , 190 P. 117 ; State v. Miller (1914), 49 Mont. 360 , 141 P. 860 ; State v. Groom (1914), 49 Mont. 354 , 141 P. 858 ; State v. Landry (1903), 29 Mont. 218 , 74 P. 418 ; State v. Tighe (1903), 27 Mont. 327 , 71 P. 3; Kennon v. Gilmer (1 2000See generally Solberg v. County of Yellowstone (1983), 203 Mont. 79 , 659 P.2d 290 ; Dvorak v. Huntley Project Irrigation Dist. (1981), 196 Mont. 167 , 639 P.2d 62 ; State v. Deeds (1957), 130 Mont. 503 , 305 P.2d 321 ; State v. Porter (1952), 125 Mont. 503 , 242 P.2d 984 ; State v. Hay (1948), 120 Mont. 573 , 194 P.2d 232 ; State v. Diedtman (1920), 58 Mont. 13 , 190 P. 117 ; State v. Miller (1914), 49 Mont. 360 , 141 P. 860 ; State v. Groom (1914), 49 Mont. 354 , 141 P. 858 ; State v. Landry (1903), 29 Mont. 218 , 74 P. 418 ; State v. Tighe (1903), 27 Mont. 327 , 71 P. 3; Kennon v. Gilmer (1 | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Landry
green
2 sentences2000See generally Solberg v. County of Yellowstone (1983), 203 Mont. 79 , 659 P.2d 290 ; Dvorak v. Huntley Project Irrigation Dist. (1981), 196 Mont. 167 , 639 P.2d 62 ; State v. Deeds (1957), 130 Mont. 503 , 305 P.2d 321 ; State v. Porter (1952), 125 Mont. 503 , 242 P.2d 984 ; State v. Hay (1948), 120 Mont. 573 , 194 P.2d 232 ; State v. Diedtman (1920), 58 Mont. 13 , 190 P. 117 ; State v. Miller (1914), 49 Mont. 360 , 141 P. 860 ; State v. Groom (1914), 49 Mont. 354 , 141 P. 858 ; State v. Landry (1903), 29 Mont. 218 , 74 P. 418 ; State v. Tighe (1903), 27 Mont. 327 , 71 P. 3; Kennon v. Gilmer (1 2000See generally Solberg v. County of Yellowstone (1983), 203 Mont. 79 , 659 P.2d 290 ; Dvorak v. Huntley Project Irrigation Dist. (1981), 196 Mont. 167 , 639 P.2d 62 ; State v. Deeds (1957), 130 Mont. 503 , 305 P.2d 321 ; State v. Porter (1952), 125 Mont. 503 , 242 P.2d 984 ; State v. Hay (1948), 120 Mont. 573 , 194 P.2d 232 ; State v. Diedtman (1920), 58 Mont. 13 , 190 P. 117 ; State v. Miller (1914), 49 Mont. 360 , 141 P. 860 ; State v. Groom (1914), 49 Mont. 354 , 141 P. 858 ; State v. Landry (1903), 29 Mont. 218 , 74 P. 418 ; State v. Tighe (1903), 27 Mont. 327 , 71 P. 3; Kennon v. Gilmer (1 | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Taylor v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences2000Although the statutory procedures for jury selection are designed to protect the constitutional, fair cross-section guarantee, the substantial compliance standard and the constitutional test have as their object of inquiry entirely different subject matters. ¶63 To illustrate, under Taylor and Duren , the fair cross-section test is designed to ensure that “ ‘jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which juries are drawn [do] not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof.’ ’’Duren, 439 U.S. at 363-64 , 99 S.C 2000Although the statutory procedures for jury selection are designed to protect the constitutional, fair cross-section guarantee, the substantial compliance standard and the constitutional test have as their object of inquiry entirely different subject matters. ¶63 To illustrate, under Taylor and Duren , the fair cross-section test is designed to ensure that “ ‘jury wheels, pools of names, panels, or venires from which juries are drawn [do] not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof.’ ’’Duren, 439 U.S. at 363-64 , 99 S.C | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Duren v. Missouri green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Bourjaily v. United States
green
2 sentences2000I Introduction: Diversity Begets Impartiality ¶28 “Our notions of what a proper jury is have developed in harmony with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government.” Glasser v. United States (1942), 315 U.S. 60, 85 , 62 S.Ct. 457, 472 , 86 L.Ed. 680, 707 , superseded on other grounds by statute as recognized by Bourjaily v. United States (1987), 483 U.S. 171 , 107 S.Ct. 2775 , 97 L.Ed.2d 144 . 2000I Introduction: Diversity Begets Impartiality ¶28 “Our notions of what a proper jury is have developed in harmony with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government.” Glasser v. United States (1942), 315 U.S. 60, 85 , 62 S.Ct. 457, 472 , 86 L.Ed. 680, 707 , superseded on other grounds by statute as recognized by Bourjaily v. United States (1987), 483 U.S. 171 , 107 S.Ct. 2775 , 97 L.Ed.2d 144 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Reeve v. City of Oshkosh neutral | 1 | 1907–1907 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.